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Abstract 
This thesis examines employee interaction with information security in large organisations.  It starts by 
revisiting past research in user-centred security and security management, identifying three research 
questions that examine (1) employee understanding of the need for security, (2) the challenges security 
introduces to their work, together with their responses to those challenges, and (3) how to use the 
emerging knowledge to improve existing organisational security implementations.  Preliminary 
examination of an available interview data set, led to the emergence of three additional research 
questions, aiming to identify (4) employee actions after bypassing organisational security policy, (5) their 
response to perceived lack of security support from the organisation, and (6) the impact of trust 
relationships in the organisation on their security behaviours.  
The research questions were investigated in two case studies inside two large organisations.  Different 
data collection (200 interviews and 2129 surveys) and analysis techniques (thematic analysis and 
grounded theory) were combined to improve outcome validity and allow for generalisability of the 
findings.   
The primary contribution of this thesis is the identification of a new paradigm for understanding 
employee responses to high-friction security, the shadow security: employees adapt existing mechanisms 
or processes, or deploy other self-devised solutions, when they consider the productivity impact of 
centrally-procured security as unacceptable.  An additional contribution is the identification of two trust 
relationships in organisational environments that influence employee security behaviours: organisation-
employee trust (willingness of the organisation to remain exposed to the actions of its employees, 
expecting them to behave securely), and inter-employee trust (willingness of employees to act in a way 
that renders themselves or the organisation vulnerable to the actions of another member of the 
organisation).   
The above contributions led to the creation of a structured process to better align security with 
organisational productive activity, together with a set of relevant metrics to assess the effectiveness of 
attempted improvements.  The thesis concludes by presenting a case study attempting to apply the above 
process in an organisation, also presenting the emerging lessons for both academia and industry. 
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Glossary 
Affordable security: security mechanisms that create minimal (or acceptable) overheads on employee 
primary tasks 
Assurance mechanisms: technical controls/mechanisms required for detection of security policy violations 
and enforcement of formal rules 
BYOD: Bring your own device – employees allowed to use personal equipment for corporate tasks 
Cyberattack: attempt to inflict damage on an organisations systems or access sensitive information 
DLP:  Data loss prevention; software that aids system administrators in monitoring and controlling what 
data users can transfer through data transfer channels 
Externalities: term from economics referring to costs or benefits affecting parties who did not choose or 
act to incur those.  Can be positive (benefits) and negative (costs) 
Insecure behaviours: employee behaviours that increase organisational exposure to security risks - 
includes both actions prohibited by security policy or other organisational documents and others not 
officially prohibited. 
Mental models: mental models are descriptions of a user’s understanding of a problem and perception of 
how things work 
Non-compliance:  employees acting in ways explicitly prohibited by an organisation’s security 
policy/mechanisms 
Primary task: the actions humans perform when interacting with technology in order to achieve the goal 
of the interaction 
Productive activities: set of different primary tasks leading to delivering desired organisational targets 
Security-productivity friction: conditions where elements of a security implementation create problems or 
overheads in user attempts to complete primary task related activities 
 Friction-inducing: elements of the security implementation that create friction 
Security culture: set of collective norms and values, developed based on the employees’ interaction with 
information security elements or the behaviour of their colleagues 
 Team security culture: security culture developed within organisational sub-divisions 
Security hygiene: property of security mechanisms or processes indicating that they have been designed 
around employee tasks and priorities  
14 
 
Security implementation: mechanisms, rules, policies, training and communication aiming to reduce 
organisational security risk exposure 
Shadow security: employees deploying own solutions when security is perceived as not serving their 
primary task focus 
Trust: the willingness to be vulnerable based on positive expectation about the behaviour of others 
Inter-employee: the willingness of employees to act in a way that renders themselves or the 
organisation vulnerable to the actions of another member of the organisation.  
Organisation-employee: the willingness of the organisation to remain exposed to the actions of 
its employees, expecting them to behave securely 
Trustworthy behaviour: employees behaving as the organisation expects  
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 Introduction 
Information security is becoming increasingly relevant to modern organisations.  Throughout the past 
four decades, technology has transformed organisational production processes, which led to the success, 
but also survival, of many organisations depending on their ability to protect their technology systems and 
the information stored on those.  Uninterrupted system operation and continuous information availability 
are key enablers for organisational operations and ability to provide services to customers.  In addition, 
sensitive customer information, financial results, upcoming product releases, R&D outcomes and any 
other information not available in the public domain, requires some level of protection to maintain 
competitive advantage, but also avoid potential legal consequences and reputation damages from sensitive 
information leakages.  This led to information security emerging outside its original role in the military 
and secret service domain, and becoming a central part of modern organisational management (von 
Solms, 2006).  Today, information security requires well-designed risk assessment and management, 
implementation of processes and technical mechanisms for information and system protection, but also 
policy formulation, communication and enforcement; all the above aim to deliver the best possible risk 
mitigation, using the available resources.  The importance of information-related risks made information 
security1 a significant priority not just for information security management, but also for corporate 
governance (Gabel et al., 2015). 
Despite the increased attention and investment information security receives, industry reports on 
information security breaches (IBM, 2014, Table 1), suggest that current approaches are failing to provide 
effective protection.  Organisations are still significantly exposed to information security risks and 
potential consequences.   
Percentage of large businesses attacked by an unauthorised outsider in the last year 55% 
Percentage of large organisations that suffered from infection by viruses or malicious 
software in the past year 
73% 
Percentage of large organisations that were hit by denial of service attacks in the last year 38% 
Percentage of large organisations that detected successful outside penetration of their 
network in the last year 
24% 
Percentage of large organisations knowing that outsiders have stolen their intellectual 
property or confidential data in the last year 
16% 
Table 1: Latest security breach statistics (IBM, 2014) 
According to IBM’s Computer Security Incident Response team, a significant percentage of the above 
compromises (95%) relates to human error (IBM, 2014).  Exploiting the human element to bypass 
technical protection has been a fruitful approach for attackers throughout the years.  Kevin Mitnick for 
example testified to the US Senate committee how 9 out of 10 passwords he managed to compromise in a 
                                                          
 
1 Lately increasingly referred to as cyber security but, as protection of information is not restricted to the cyber space, 
this thesis will stick to the traditional (and more common in academia) term, information security. 
16 
 
series of attacks were obtained by tricking target organisations’ employees to share sensitive information 
with him, rather than breaking through their technical defences (Mitnick and Simon, 2002).  Additional 
examples of how employee behavioural traits and willingness to be helpful can be exploited to damage 
organisational security protection have been described, amongst many others, by Winkler, (1997) and 
Hadnagy (2010).  The vulnerabilities human behaviour can introduce in current security implementations 
led to Schneier (2000) stating that “… security is only as good as its weakest link, and people are the 
weakest link in the chain”.   
The success of attacks against employees, suggests that more research is required, in order to improve 
employee participation in organisational security implementations.  In an attempt to improve existing 
understanding of employee security behaviour, and also improve security researchers’ and practitioners’ 
ability to better accommodate for employee behaviours in security management, this thesis presents an in-
depth investigation and characterisation of employee interaction with organisational security 
implementations.  Recognising the drawbacks and failures of past organisational security research and 
practice approaches, the research used a case study approach, engaging directly with employees, 
exploring their interaction with various elements of security implementations, the emerging problems in 
their productivity-related activities and their subsequent responses.  This aimed to generate knowledge 
that can be used to design security mechanisms and processes better suited to employee productivity 
tasks, also allowing security managers to make more effective resource allocation decisions and deliver 
the best possible security protection. 
1.1 Background  
Effective information security cannot be delivered by perfecting the effectiveness of technical controls; it 
is also crucial for the systems and processes in place to be well-suited to the tasks, priorities and 
understanding of their users.  This need to fit secure systems to their users was first discussed by 
Kerckhoffs (1883) in his military cipher design principles: “Given the circumstances in which it is to be 
used, the system must be easy to use and should not be stressful to use or require its users to know and 
comply with a long list of rules”.  Many years later, Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) first included usability 
in the requirements for modern security systems.  The growing realisation that systems are as strong as 
the people who use them, led to the emergence of user-centred security as an academic discipline in the 
mid-to-late 90s.  Researchers like Zurko and Simon (1996), Adams and Sasse (1999) and Whitten and 
Tygar (1999) presented research results demonstrating that security systems not designed around human 
behavioural principles lead to insecure behaviours.  A significant amount of research on user-centred 
security has been published since then, aiming to provide knowledge and generate methodologies for 
behaviour-driven systems design to improve employee interaction with  security.  This research identified 
a number of drawbacks in current attempts to manage employee security behaviours in organisations: 
1. Currently security is designed and deployed without considering employee productivity 
priorities, leading to ineffective policies (Saunders, 2012), inflexible control-based security 
management (Vroom and von Solms, 2004) and ineffective security communication (Stewart 
and Lacey, 2013). 
2. Employees have to invest significant resources (time and effort) interacting with security 
processes, mechanisms and policies that were not designed around their productivity needs.  
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When security demands more resources  than what they consider acceptable (their Compliance 
Budget – Beautement et al., 2008), insecure behaviours become the only way to limit their 
exposure to such resource-demanding security implementation elements (Herley, 2009; Inglesant 
and Sasse, 2010) 
3. Current security management approaches to reduce insecure behaviours are primarily focused on 
increasing control to ensure employees behave as required (through increased formulation of 
security policies and mechanisms).  But attempts to enforce increased control also increase 
security deployment costs (Pallas, 2009) and lead to alienation between security management 
and employees (Gurbaxani, 2010; Mintzberg, 1985).  In addition, when control elements further 
increase the security-related overhead on employee tasks, employees have even stronger 
incentives to bypass security (Bartsch and Sasse, 2012; Beautement et al. 2008; Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Inglesant and Sasse, 2010); the emerging high non-compliance rates eventually make 
enforcement expensive and ineffective (Adams and Sasse, 1999; Hine, 2014; Tuyls et al., 2007). 
4. Security education and training are also deployed by security managers to provide motivation for 
secure employee behaviours (Thomson and Solms, 1997).   Current attempts fail to provide 
effective motivation though, due to information overload (Stewart and Lacey, 2013) and failure 
to adapt the communicated principles to role-specific risks employees face.  The content 
communicated is generic (Morgan, 2002), often focusing on extreme cases rather than everyday 
employee challenges (Herley, 2014). 
Given the above inability of security managers to implement security designed around employee 
productivity priorities, industry reports that insecure behaviours are rife in organisations (e.g. IBM, 2014) 
come as no surprise.  Non-compliance with security mechanisms and processes may be increasing 
organisational exposure to security risks, but it is the only option for employees seeking to preserve their 
productive capabilities (Beautement et al., 2008; Blythe et al., 2014; Herath and Rao, 2009).  As a result, 
attempts to eliminate it through technical solutions and user training are inevitably failing.  When security 
managers possess little understanding of the behavioural principles that dictate employee security 
behaviours and their focus on productivity, the emerging security implementations will often lead to non-
compliant behaviours, increasing organisational security risk exposure.  
A number of researchers examined user security behaviours in the past few years.  The main paradigm 
that emerged is the characterisation of employee security decision making as an economic problem (e.g. 
Beautement et al., 2008; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herley, 2009):  security is a secondary task (Pfleeger and 
Sasse, 2015), but it often gets in the way of primary task completion, consuming significant user time and 
effort, with users gaining no additional perceived benefit from following it.  As a result they eventually 
ignore it (Herley, 2009), also getting habituated to such behaviours over time (Schechter et al., 2007).   
Despite improving understanding of security decision making, close examination of past security 
behaviour research identified a number of drawbacks: 
1. Attempts for in-depth examination of security behaviour depth focused on individual home users 
(Dourish et al., 2004; Herley, 2009; Wash, 2010), without, to the author’s best knowledge, any 
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attempts to holistically investigate employee interaction with organisational security 
implementations and identify their responses to those.  
2. Attempts to characterise non-compliant employee behaviours and identify the factors that lead to 
those by directly interacting with them, were limited to password behaviours (Adams and Sasse, 
1999; Inglesant and Sasse, 2010; Sasse et al., 2001; Weirich, 2005) and access control 
mechanisms (Bartsch and Sasse, 2013).   
3. Employee behaviour is mostly approached as a binary decision, with their actions being 
characterised as either secure or insecure, with no attempt to identify the effect of security 
overheads on the attitude and actions of risk-aware employees who understand the need for it. 
4. Attempts to deliver user-centred security by improving security design processes and 
requirements gathering focused primarily on providing guidance to design new systems (Faily 
and Fléchais, 2010; Fléchais et al., 2007).  Despite their usefulness, these approaches are of 
limited use to organisations that need to improve their existing security implementations and 
incentivise secure employee behaviour within their current security implementations (Ashenden 
and Sasse, 2013). 
5. The use of metrics in security behaviour is limited.  Metrics are now a key part of modern 
information security management (e.g. Brotby et al., 2013; Payne, 2009; ISO27004), but no 
effective metrics for employee security behaviour have emerged to date.  This prevents 
organisations from identifying potential areas to focus security improvement attempts to better 
accommodate for employee priorities. 
The identified drawbacks of past research, suggest the need for further research in organisational security 
in order to: (1) improve current understanding of the drivers behind employee insecure behaviours, (2) 
understand and characterise employee experience when interacting with organisational security 
implementations, and (3) identify potential sources of information that can be used to devise metrics that 
can aid more effective information security behaviour management in organisations.  
1.2 Research questions 
Aiming to improve existing knowledge of employee security behaviour and provide guidance for 
effective security management, this thesis attempts to answer the following research questions (devised 
based on close examination of past research, but also emerging from the early stages of the iterative 
analysis approach used in this research – for more information on research question formulation please 
refer to sections 3.3.1 and 4.7.2): 
1. Do employees understand the need for security mechanisms in the organisation? If yes or no, 
why? 
2. What security-related challenges do employees find when attempting to proceed with their 
primary tasks? How do they respond to friction between their primary task and security 
mechanisms and processes? 
3. When organisational security provisions appear to provide inadequate risk mitigation, what do 
employees do?  
4. How do employees respond to perceived lack of organisational security support? What are the 
risks from their behaviours and what can organisations learn from those? 
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5. How can the improved understanding from the previous questions be used to transform the 
systems in place to eliminate the problems discovered, avoiding the need to redesign the systems 
completely? 
6. What trust relationships develop in an organisation and how do they influence security 
behaviours?  
Examination of the above research questions led to the emergence of three security behaviour paradigms: 
(1) categorisation of employee insecure behaviours based on the conditions that lead to their development 
(chapter 4), (2) identification of the existence of shadow security in the organisation, with employees 
deploying their own solutions when security was perceived as not serving their primary task focus 
(chapter 5), and (3) the existence of two security-related trust relationships that influence employee 
security decision making (organisation-employee trust and inter-employee trust - chapter 6).  In-depth 
examination of the development of the above phenomena also allowed identifying a number of sources of 
measurable security behaviour-related information. This was then used to devise a process to identify 
shadow security in an organisation and then leverage it to deliver more effective information security 
management (chapter 7).  
1.3 Research approach  
In order to answer the research questions discussed in the previous section, the research presented in this 
thesis used two case studies conducted in two large commercial organisations (which will be referred to 
as Company A and Company B from here onwards).  Case studies were chosen due to their compatibility 
with the exploratory nature of the research questions: they can reveal insights difficult to capture through 
statistical testing of predefined hypotheses (Eisenhardt, 1989).  As a result, they were used to provide in-
depth understanding of the drivers behind both secure and insecure behaviours in organisations.  The 
researcher used existing and newly collected data, both collected through direct engagement with 
employees.  The data collection process did not focus on studying security mechanisms in isolation, like 
the majority of past research has done.  Instead, it attempted to holistically capture employee experience 
with, and attitudes towards security, together with their corresponding behaviours.   
The exploratory nature of the research questions also required a data analysis approach that would allow 
for theories answering the research questions to emerge directly from the data.  As a result, grounded 
theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) was chosen as the primary data analysis method.  200 semi-structured 
interviews from both organisations were analysed, with two large-scale surveys also used to confirm the 
prevalence of the identified behavioural patterns across the two organisations.  Data analysis was done as 
an iterative process, with grounded theory categories and relationships between them continuously 
revisited and updated as new knowledge emerged, aiming to more accurately capture employee attitudes, 
beliefs, knowledge, priorities and better characterise any emerging behavioural phenomena.  Before 
commencing the grounded theory analysis, a thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) on a subset of 
the available data was also conducted, aiming to provide some preliminary understanding of employee 
behaviours represented in the data and drive the subsequent grounded theory analysis. 
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1.4 Research scope 
The paradigms emerging from this research (employee behaviour categorisation, shadow security 
development and security-related trust relationships) improved existing understanding of employee 
interaction with organisational security implementations and their responses to the problems those cause.  
They also provided valuable knowledge that modern security management can use to better manage 
employee security behaviours.  Despite that, two potential research scope limitations were identified: 
1. Organisational nature: The organisations examined share a number of properties: they are large, 
have more than 10000 employees each, located in various locations around the UK, also 
operating at in international level.  They also operate in highly regulated areas, with a significant 
part of the regulation and standards they need to comply with containing clauses that affect their 
security strategy and implementations.   
2. Employee characteristics: Employees mostly work on computer-related tasks, in office jobs, and 
the majority also came from similar environments in their past work history.  As a result, they 
should be assumed to possess slightly higher computer expertise than employees in organisations 
where tasks are less computerised; on the other hand this also means they are probably more 
exposed to information security risks, thus widening the scope of the emerging knowledge.  In 
addition, employee security expertise was not possible to investigate before the research 
commenced to achieve maximal representation of various levels of expertise, but care was taken 
to engage with employees from various divisions to alleviate the potential impact of this. 
Despite the above scope limitations, between-organisation differences in both the technology and 
processes used, combined with the use of pattern matching to confirm the presence of behavioural 
patterns identified in Company A with those later identified in Company B, improved the external 
validity and generalisability of the research findings (discussed in detail in sections 3.4 and 5.4).  In 
addition, the security behaviour management guidelines and processes presented in Chapter 7 can 
potentially be customised to fit different environments, acting as a useful learning source for those 
responsible to deliver effective security protection in organisations of various sizes and other operational 
domains. 
1.5 Thesis contributions 
The results presented in this thesis significantly improve the available knowledge on employee interaction 
with security processes and mechanisms that create productivity overheads.  They also provide security 
managers and researchers with valuable insights on how to create better security behaviour management 
tools and processes in the future.  In particular the results provided: 
1. Identification of employee desire to help in security and invest some of their time and effort to 
protect the organisation they work for, unless security is creating significant productivity 
overheads or they lack sufficient awareness. 
2. Categorisation of the conditions that lead to insecure employee behaviours: (1) lack of 
awareness, (2) compliance with security mechanisms and policies being expensive, or (3) 
compliance being impossible due to mechanism problems. 
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3. Identification and characterisation of shadow security behaviours.  When security experts insist 
on “standard” or “best practice policies” that create problems in employee productive abilities, 
employees do not wilfully disregard security; instead they procure, deploy and refine their own 
solutions, outside the control of the organisation’s designated security management division.  
4. Identification of two trust relationships that influence security behaviours.  Organisation-
employee trust, suggesting the presence of some implicit trust from the organisation towards its 
employees to behave securely that is not formalised in the security strategy, but can be inferred 
from the flexibility employees are allowed in their security behaviours.  Inter-employee trust on 
the other hand, is developed between employees and acts as a readily-available resource when 
security creates productivity overheads, encouraging employees to procure their own shadow 
security solutions. 
5. Development of a user behaviour model, demonstrating how various elements of the 
organisational environment influence employee security decisions, culture and habit 
development. 
6. Demonstration of the importance of security hygiene: security designed around employee tasks 
and priorities is a prerequisite to any attempts to implement effective organisational security. 
7. Guidance on how organisations can use the above knowledge (1-6) to develop a metrics-driven 
organisational learning approach to aid future security decision making and better align it with 
organisational risk management strategy. 
8. Demonstration of the usefulness of case studies as an effective information security research 
approach, in combination with grounded theory analysis to generate new knowledge on topics 
where current understanding is limited. 
9. Presentation of a number of lessons learned while attempting to apply the findings of this thesis 
in an organisation.  These lessons are used to provide advice for future collaborative work 
between academia and industry, but also to aid application of the research findings to deliver 
more effective and efficient information security management. 
Essentially this thesis argues that in any security implementation, no one should have to choose between 
security and productivity.  If the right learning and improvement processes are implemented, security 
management can deliver effective and efficient protection, while also continuously assessing its 
effectiveness and productivity impact to intervene when usability improvements are required. 
1.6 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 (Background) reviews past literature on user-centred security and security in organisations.  It 
discusses past and current attempts to manage the human element of information security and identifies a 
number of reasons for the failure of current approaches to deliver effective protection.  It then explains 
how the research gaps identified led to the emergence of the research questions and drove the work 
presented in the remainder of this thesis.  
Chapter 3 (Methodology) presents the research approaches, data collection and analysis processes used, 
discusses steps taken to improve outcome validity, also presenting a set of ethical research principles 
followed while conducting this research. 
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Chapter 4 (Security behaviour drivers) presents the process of the thematic analysis conducted, discusses 
emerging codes and themes and explains how their identification led to the characterisation and 
categorisation of non-compliant behaviour drivers, based on the conditions that led to their emergence.  It 
also discusses the identification of a third category of security behaviours, in addition to the existing 
compliant or non-compliant categorisation: employees devising their own security solutions outside the 
control of security managers.  Identification of this third category drove the subsequent grounded theory 
analysis presented in Chapter 5.   The findings of this chapter also led to the creation of a preliminary 
model of employee security behaviour and identified the potential existence of security-related trust 
relationships that drove the analysis presented in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 5 (The shadow security) presents a grounded theory analysis of the available interviews, 
investigating employee experience with the organisation’s security implementation and emerging 
behaviours.  This analysis led to identification and characterisation of a new security behaviour paradigm, 
the shadow security: employees deploying own solutions when security is perceived as not serving their 
primary task focus.  The chapter also analyses the drivers of shadow security development, the emerging 
risks and consequences for organisational security management, and how security managers can use 
shadow security as a tool to reduce conflicts between security and productivity.  It also presents the steps 
taken to improve the validity and understanding of the emerging behavioural phenomena. 
Chapter 6 (Trust and security behaviours) presents a new grounded theory analysis examining the 
development and influence of trust on employee security behaviours.  It identifies two different security-
related trust relationships in the organisational environment (organisation-employee trust and inter-
employee trust), explains how they come to conflict, and presents their impact on shadow security 
development. 
Chapter 7 (Using shadow security to improve security management) uses the lessons learned from 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 to provide guidelines for effective and productive management of shadow security by 
security managers, focusing on five areas: (1) the need to move away from current binary understanding 
of user behaviour, (2) understanding that “unusable” elements of security implementations need to be 
removed before attempting to influence employee behaviours, (3) leveraging shadow security as a 
learning tool to engage employees in security management, (4) leveraging the presence of trust as an 
additional defence layer, and (5) measuring readily available or easy to collect data to assess the 
effectiveness of existing approaches and identify areas where improvements are required.   
Chapter 8 (Case study in industry and lessons learned) discusses how the improved understanding of 
employee security behaviours that emerged from the other chapters was used to drive security 
improvement attempts in Company B, focusing on the lessons learned from applying the findings of this 
thesis in a corporate environment.   
Chapter 9 (Conclusion and contributions) uses the findings presented in this thesis to answer the research 
questions, discusses research contributions for industry and academia, presents a critical review of the 
thesis and outlines potential future research directions based on the emerging paradigms. 
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 Background 
A growing number of information security researchers and practitioners are now focused on creating 
security mechanisms that accommodate for the needs and understanding of their target users: in the past 
15 years, a significant amount of research has been published on user-centred security, covering a wide 
range of topics from improving interface design to better understanding security decision making.  
Modern organisational security management also considers user behaviour as a key element of effective 
security, but current approaches fail to leverage employees as an effective defence layer.  This chapter 
presents an examination and discussion of past and current attempts to manage the human element of 
information security, by both researchers and practitioners.  The chapter identifies a number of reasons 
for the failure of current approaches to deliver effective protection.  It also explains how the identified 
research gaps inspired the work presented in the remainder of this thesis, in order to create an approach 
that improves employee participation in delivering effective information security.  
2.1 Defining information security 
Before discussing the current state of information security in organisations and its impact on employee 
behaviours, it is important to define information security as a term and its use in this thesis.  The term has 
been defined in various ways, either as (1) a risk management discipline (e.g. Blakley, McDermott, and 
Geer, 2001), (2) a process that aims to protect intellectual property (Pipkin, 2000), or as (3) an action/state 
of protecting information and information systems (CNSS, 2010). Aiming to disambiguate and 
consolidate the various definitions, Cherdantseva and Hilton (2012) examined a number of those by 
various sources, from both industry and academia.  Based on the above, they defined information security 
as “a multidisciplinary area of study and professional activity which is concerned with the development 
and implementation of security mechanisms of all available types (technical, organizational, human-
oriented and legal) in order to keep information in all its locations (within and outside the organisation’s 
perimeter) and, consequently, information systems, where information is created, processed, stored, 
transmitted and destructed, free from threats”.  The above definition positions information security as a 
discipline that identifies the threats to information and information systems, and then implements 
appropriate controls to protect from those.  This approach is in line with information security risk 
management practices, as defined by a number of widely-adopted international standards (NIST 800-39; 
ISO 27005; IRAM2):  
1. Identify threats.  A threat is “anything that is capable, by its action or inaction, of causing harm 
to an information asset” (IRAM2).  Some common ones are: software attacks (e.g. Viruses, 
worms, phishing attacks, and Trojan horses), theft of intellectual property, identity theft (acting 
as someone else to obtain access to systems or vital information), theft of information-carrying 
equipment, sabotage (to cause operational disruption), and information extortion (e.g. theft and 
ransom demands to return information or ransomware). Threats are identified and categorised 
through risk analysis. 
2. Assess vulnerability and exposure. Vulnerabilities are elements of the organisational 
environment (systems, assets, procedure) that can lead to the threats materialising as a security 
incident or breach (ISO27005).  They can emerge from weaknesses in design, implementation, 
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operation or internal control (ISACA, 2009), and exposure to those is also assessed through risk 
analysis.   
3. Define security goals. Based on the identified threats and exposure to those, a set of security 
goals is devised, aiming to protect the target environment or reduce exposure to identified threats 
to acceptable impact levels.   
4. Implement appropriate controls.  Controls are security mechanisms and processes, implemented 
to achieve the security goals.   
The primary goals of an information security implementation are encapsulated in what is known as the 
CIA Principle (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability - Whitman and Mattord, 2011): 
 Confidentiality: Limit access and disclosure of information stored and communicated through a 
system to authorised entities (individuals or systems), also preventing access by or disclosure to 
unauthorised entities. 
 Integrity: Ensure unauthorised creation, modification or deletion of information is either 
impossible, or detectable through implementation of appropriate mechanisms. 
 Availability: Ensure uninterrupted access to information and services for those authorised to 
access those.  
The desired elements of the CIA triplet, are delivered by the implementation of appropriate controls, 
depending on the environment to be protected and the identified risks.  Successful control delivery above 
reduces organisational risk exposure to levels acceptable by an organisation’s security management 
(Pelaez, 2010).   
2.2 Information security goes mainstream 
The need to protect information has evolved significantly since its early deployments by military generals 
in ancient times to protect their message exchanges (Graves, 2007; Kelly, 1998).  From a primarily 
military and political concern, it has now become a major consideration for anyone who uses information 
handling systems: individuals, law enforcement, government and corporations, all require some level of 
protection for their information.  This need for commercial information security significantly increased in 
the 1970’s, when computers and data communication technologies started expanding outside the military 
and political domain and were widely adopted by the commercial world: organisations and businesses 
started integrating information and communication technologies in their day-to-day operations, which 
radically changed the way corporate information is stored and shared, consequently increasing the need 
for information protection mechanisms.   
The evolution of the Personal Computer (PC) in the 1980’s also created new security challenges.  In its 
early stages, corporate technology adoption was mostly limited to centrally managed-servers in large 
organisations.  The introduction of stand-alone devices (PCs), with independent processing, storage and 
communication capabilities, led to their wide deployment both at work and home environments for 
production, entertainment, education and communication.  This led to large volumes of digital 
information being stored on different devices and transferred through a wide range of corporate, home 
and public networks, which complicates attempts to centrally manage that information.  The emerging 
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challenges were further accentuated by the wide adoption of mobile technologies in the late 20th/early 21st 
century: modern portable devices store and exchange vast amounts of personal and corporate information 
through a variety of communication media, with latest ones also increasingly relying on cloud 
information storage facilities.  Consequently, protection of information is now a serious concern for every 
technology user: from home gamers and online shoppers, to IT managers of multinational organisations 
and agents of government intelligence agencies, everyone requires effective personal or corporate 
information protection.  This led to the emergence of information security as a professional discipline, 
combining the principles of the CIA triplet to create solutions that effectively prevent unauthorised access 
to or disclosure of information, but also guarantee the authenticity and availability of information stored 
or communicated through technology systems.   
2.3 Cryptography and access control  
The traditional approach to delivering the CIA triplet is the implementation of access control systems and 
cryptographic mechanisms2.  The first aims to provide formal rules and processes to regulate and control 
access to information, only allowing authorised entities to access, modify, transmit or share it.  It is 
usually implemented by asking access requesters to provide information on identification (who they are), 
authentication (what they know or what they have) and, using pre-defined authorisation rules, grant them 
access to information or use of a system (Garfinkel et al., 2003).  Setup and maintenance of access control 
is done either by the information owner or, in large information systems, by centrally managed 
administration authorities.  In both cases it involves setting permissions on who is to access specific 
information or systems and what they are allowed to do with those (e.g. read only, write, execute etc.), 
with decisions taken on a “need to know” basis (Anderson, 2008).  The format of the emerging rules 
varies across implementations and depends on the access control system in place (e.g. access control lists 
or role-based access control).   
Cryptography is often complementing access control in order to deliver security, changing the form of 
stored and transmitted information to one unrecognisable by unauthorised entities (Schneier, 1996).  This 
can be done using either (1) private key encryption, where a pre-shared key is used to encrypt information 
at one end and then reused at the other end to reverse the process, revealing the original plaintext, or (2) 
public key encryption, where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys: a public one that 
can be openly shared with anyone that wants to communicate with its owner, and a private one, known 
only to the recipient.  There are a number of differences between the two, but discussing their application 
                                                          
 
2 Cryptography is defined as “The art and science of keeping messages secure” (Schneier, 1996):  Turning 
meaningful information to non-sense, unless someone possesses a specific decryption key.  Related fields are 
cryptanalysis (“the art and science of breaking ciphertexts”) and cryptology (“branch of Mathematics encompassing 
both cryptography and cryptanalysis”). 
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is beyond the scope of this thesis3.  Correct implementations of cryptography and access control can 
deliver a significant part of the protection required to meet the CIA triplet:  
1. Confidentiality is achieved using cryptographic keys to store and transmit information in a form 
unrecognisable by someone without access to the keys.  Access control is also deployed to 
ensure users can only see and modify information they are authorised to. 
2. Integrity is achieved through the use of digital signatures, ensuring that the document was 
created by a particular entity and was not modified during transit.   
3. Availability is achieved by ensuring access to decryption keys is provided only for those 
authorised to access encrypted information, with correct access control ensuring no authorised 
individual is left without access to desired information.   
In summary, a correct implementation of cryptographic and access control mechanisms should provide 
effective information protection (confidentiality and integrity), but also pose no problems to anyone that 
needs to access it for legitimate reasons (availability). 
2.4 Humans and information security 
Technical controls can significantly reduce exposure to information security risks, but they can become 
irrelevant if the users of a system are unable to act appropriately to keep it in a secure state.  This section 
examines how user behaviour leads to security compromises, focusing on two main behavioural traits: (1) 
users considering security a secondary priority, thus acting in ways that expose the systems they use, and 
(2) how various elements of human behaviour create vulnerabilities that attackers can expose to 
compromise information holding systems.   
2.4.1 Security is a secondary task 
Before examining human behavioural principles that make computer users vulnerable to attackers, it is 
important to understand what the primary goal of human-technology interaction is.  The use of 
technology usually aims to achieve a goal, for example shop online, with the need for security always 
being a secondary requirement.  Pfleeger and Sasse (2015) formalise this by distinguishing user tasks 
between primary (steps required to achieve goal)4 and secondary (steps required, but not directly 
perceived as serving goal achievement).  For a computer user, security is usually a secondary task and 
often appears to get in the way of primary task completion (e.g. warnings about expired SSL certificates 
that are almost always false positives – Herley, 2009).  As a result, given limited resources to complete 
their primary tasks (time or effort), users often ignore secondary tasks: when security becomes an 
obstacle to primary task completion, users choose to ignore it.  This happens either consciously, to reduce 
impact of emerging externalities on their primary task completion ability (Herley, 2009), or due to 
                                                          
 
3 For the remainder of this thesis, references to cryptographic mechanisms should be assumed to include any of the 
two methods of encryption 
4 In this thesis the primary task is defined as: the actions humans perform when interacting with technology in order 
to achieve the goal of the interaction. 
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habituation from long-term exposure to security warnings (Schechter et al., 2007).  This exposes users 
and the systems they use to a number of possible attacks, discussed in the following section.  
2.4.2 Exploiting human vulnerabilities – understanding scam victims 
In an attempt to better understand what makes humans vulnerable to cyberattacks, (Stajano and Wilson, 
2011) examined a number of real life scams, identifying seven human behaviour principles that attackers 
exploit to carry out successful attacks.  They argue that “systems can only be made secure if designers 
understand and acknowledge inherent vulnerabilities of the human factor”.  The seven principles they 
revealed are discussed below, together with four additional ones that the Stajano and Wilson analysis 
failed to capture, but emerged from examining further information security research. 
2.4.2.1 Distraction 
People are always focused on their primary task, whether that is getting a job completed, access their 
online banking information or buy products online.  When security mechanisms or processes are 
perceived as creating barriers to those activities, they may just ignore those.  For example, problems in 
connecting remotely to a corporate network, caused by a recent change in a company system to improve 
security, may create tension between end-users and system administrators, with the latter ending up 
having to relax the rules to restore the access flexibility users were accustomed to.  Another distraction 
example comes from phishing attacks: attackers send emails asking their targets to quickly change their 
online banking or online shopping password and redirect them to scam websites that steal their money, 
personal or financial information.  The success of those attacks often relies on people paying limited 
attention to security indicators created to prevent those, or even entirely failing to notice the absence of 
those indicators from scam websites, due to either long-term habituation or being focused on getting their 
primary task completed as quickly as possible (Dhamija et al., 2006).  A characteristic example comes 
from a study of phishing indicators by Schechter et al. (2007), where a significant number of computer 
users in an experiment still attempted to log-in on a website, even after their task was interrupted by a 
strong security warning.  The above strongly suggest that when security appears to get in the way of 
primary task completion, users often choose to ignore it, making themselves and the systems they use 
vulnerable to attackers. 
2.4.2.2 Social compliance  
In many military and corporate environments people are often trained not to question authority, with the 
same applying to societal authorities (e.g. police).  This increases potential susceptibility to social 
engineering: skilled individuals psychologically manipulating people into performing actions 
compromising security or divulging sensitive information (Anderson, 2008).  In his book called “The Art 
of Deception”, Kevin Mitnick, a well-known hacker, explains how he took advantage of human 
willingness to be helpful to successfully carry out a number of large-scale attacks (Mitnick and Simon, 
2002).  For example, he gained access to proprietary corporate information about a start-up company by 
waiting until the CEO went out of town, then showing up at the company headquarters pretending to be a 
close friend and business associate of the CEO.  As Mitnick says, the more people are trained to follow 
superior’s demands without questioning those, the more likely they are to fall victims to this type of 
attacks. 
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2.4.2.3 Herd principle 
People let their guards down when others around them appear to take similar risks.  Computer users rarely 
check the authenticity of reviews on websites for example, which makes them vulnerable to fake reviews 
by malicious agents using those to appear trustworthy (Mukherjee et al., 2012).  Kirlappos et al. (2012) 
also identified similar behaviour in the use of online reputation seals, with users reporting their presence 
affected their trust placement decisions for websites, but never checked their authenticity.  This leads to 
users often failing to notice attacks on online reputation and customer review systems, like the creation of 
fake review systems or the addition of fake reviews on a genuine one.  Thinking they are dealing with a 
reputable retailer, they often fall victims to cyberattacks.   
2.4.2.4 Dishonesty 
Anything illegal an individual does can be used against them by law enforcement.  This makes it harder 
for victims to report potential crimes against them, as they may have demonstrated intention to engage in 
illegal activities.  Falling prey to Nigerian 419 scams for example (Smith, 2009), often involves agreeing 
with the other party (the attackers) to carry out money laundering-related activities.  As Stajano and 
Wilson explain, once initiating such a transaction an individual may be reluctant to discuss their actions 
with the police, leaving them to absorb potential losses they suffer from an attack. 
2.4.2.5 Deception 
In a digital environment things are often not what they appear to be; many trustworthiness signals of the 
physical world break down once activities are transferred online (Riegelsberger et al., 2005).  Attackers 
take advantage of this, creating online scam websites and faking elements of their visual appearance to 
make those appear legitimate: fake URLs and fake security symbols (e.g. browser padlocks and trust 
seals) are often added to scam websites to deceive their targets (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012).  Unsuspected 
users often assume they are dealing with a reputable retailer.  This comes to no surprise, as security 
experts and public awareness campaigns often tell the public that the presence of those indicators signals 
trustworthiness (Sheng et al., 2007).  As a result users often engage in transactions with those websites, 
suffering financial losses or identity theft. 
2.4.2.6 Need and Greed 
Greed makes people vulnerable and attackers take advantage of this.  Websites advertising luxury 
products at significantly reduced prices lead to people letting their defences go and dismissing initial 
suspicions, in order to seize “unmissable” deals.  Attackers then steal victims’ card details or money, 
often shipping nothing at all (Winch, 2014) or providing them with counterfeit goods (Melik, 2011).  
2.4.2.7 Time 
People’s decision strategies change significantly when they are (or believe they are) under time pressure.  
Reasoning about secondary issues like security becomes less important, as their focus is on completing 
the required task as quickly as possible.  This leads to people often ignoring security advice, and behaving 
insecurely (Herley, 2014).  Time constraints also play a crucial role in security behaviour in 
organisations, where employees may choose to ignore security policies, when tight timeframes force them 
to decide between completing their productivity-related tasks or adhering to security rules (further 
extensive discussion on organisational security behaviours follows later in this chapter). 
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2.4.2.8 Propensity to do good 
The first behavioural vulnerability missed by Stajano and Wilson is human propensity to do good.  People 
are by nature willing to help a fellow human who appears to be in trouble.  This can also act as a driver 
for successful social engineering, in addition to unwillingness to question authority.  Winkler (1997) for 
example, explains how he used public information obtained from the internet and the telephone register to 
impersonate company employees and obtain access to sensitive corporate information.  Mitnick and 
Simon (2002) also provide examples of two similar attacks: 
1. Attackers gained access to a company's internal computer system that had a password that 
changed every day.  During a snowstorm they called the helpdesk, pretending to be an employee 
who was snowed-in and wanted to work from home.  The operator was happy to share that day’s 
password with them. 
2. A person who got a speeding ticket conned the police to reveal a time when the officer who 
arrested them will be out of town.  They then requested a court date coinciding with that time 
and avoided paying a fine.    
What the practices of both Mitnick and Winkler demonstrate is that, instead of breaking into a well-
secured system, it is often much easier for an attacker to con users willing to help a fellow human that 
appears to be in need; they then provide them with information that may have been otherwise potentially 
unobtainable or expensive to get access to.   
2.4.2.9 Human error 
In addition to the vulnerabilities defined above, computer users often make mistakes that increase their 
exposure (or of the systems they are using) to potential attacks.  This often compromises the effectiveness 
of hard to break technical security mechanisms.  A classic example of this comes from World War II, 
when a group of British codebreakers at Bletchley Park took advantage of an Italian operator’s error 
(sending a test message full of the letter L) to decipher the German Enigma machine5; an encryption 
system that was considered unbreakable given the resources of the time (Smith, 2004; Churchhouse, 
2002).  Seven decades later the problem is still rife: more recently, the UK’s serious fraud office 
accidentally circulated information on a serious closed investigation to unauthorised third parties (Evans, 
2013).  In both cases, the actions that led to the security failure were unintentional, highlighting the 
potentially catastrophic impact of human errors in security and the importance of understanding and 
allowing for potential erroneous behaviours when designing security systems.   
                                                          
 
5 “The one snag with Enigma of course is the fact that if you press A, you can get every other letter but A. I picked up 
this message and — one was so used to looking at things and making instant decisions — I thought: 'Something's 
gone. What has this chap done. There is not a single L in this message.' My chap had been told to send out a dummy 
message and he had just had a fag [cigarette] and pressed the last key on the keyboard, the L. So that was the only 
letter that didn't come out. We had got the biggest crib we ever had, the encipherment was LLLL, right through the 
message and that gave us the new wiring for the wheel [rotor]. That's the sort of thing we were trained to do. 
Instinctively look for something that had gone wrong or someone who had done something silly and torn up the rule 
book.” (Smith, 2004)   
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2.4.2.10 Lack of knowledge and skills 
Humans often completely ignore how attackers operate and how they can be potentially targeted.  
Jannson and von Solms (2013) for example found that many users are unaware about a wide range of 
phishing attacks, while Stone-Gross et al. (2013) demonstrated how effective fake antivirus software is in 
extracting large amounts of personal information and large sums of money from unsuspected victims. 
2.4.2.11 Reduced cognitive ability 
Security that demands excessive cognitive resources from users can lead to them resorting to insecure 
practices.  Adams and Sasse (1999) for example, explain how asking employees to remember an 
excessive number of different passwords led to writing those down.  Böhme and Grossklags (2011) also 
discuss how over-consuming human attention by security applications reduces overall user ability to 
behave securely.  In the long run, security mechanisms not designed around target user capabilities lead to 
users becoming habituated to taking meaningless and unnecessary decisions (e.g. dismissing false 
positive warnings - Dhamija et al., 2006) increasing the likelihood of becoming victims to various types 
of attacks (Krol et al.,  2012). 
2.4.2.12 Folk models  
Users develop their own understanding of security mechanisms and threats.  Wash (2010) examined home 
user understanding of security, identifying eight security folk models:  user-devised perceptions and 
understanding of security (mental models6), representing home user understanding of viruses and hackers, 
together with how they may be targeted by attackers.  He then explains how users use those models to 
justify decisions to ignore expert advice on security, leading to insecure behaviours that increase their 
risks of being victimised. 
2.4.3 The emergence of user-centred security 
To design effective security solutions, designers need to combine technical controls with good 
understanding of human behavioural principles that drive security behaviours.  Any secure system is as 
strong as its weakest component, which is the point of maximal return for an attacker’s invested effort 
(security is an economic problem of return on time and resources invested problem after all – Anderson 
and Moore, 2006).  Whitten and Tygar (1999) have named this the “weakest link property”7. The human 
behavioural traits identified in the previous section that lead to successful attacks, leave users as the 
weakest link of security implementations (Schneier, 2012).  When technical mechanisms are sufficient to 
make attacks expensive and uneconomic, it is more attractive for attackers to focus on the identified 
                                                          
 
6 Mental models are descriptions of a user’s understanding of a problem and perception of how things work (Johnson-
Laird,1980) 
7 Kevin Mitnick also uses the “weakest link term” when referring to humans in an information security context: “The 
human side of computer security is easily exploited and constantly overlooked. Companies spend millions of dollars 
on firewalls, encryption and secure access devices, and its money wasted, because none of these measures address the 
weakest link in the security chain” (Poulsen 2000) 
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human vulnerabilities, in order to achieve cost-effective returns for their invested time, effort and 
resources.   
Improved understanding of the importance of well-designed security mechanisms, combined with the 
realisation that effective management of the human element is important to provide effective security, led 
to the emergence of user-centred security as an academic research discipline.  Researchers started 
introducing principles from the fields of human-computer interaction, the social sciences and, a few years 
later, economics, in the design of security measures.  This aimed to enable the implementation of systems 
designed around human cognitive capabilities and behavioural traits to reduce the potential for erroneous 
behaviours, but also design and implement appropriate safeguards to limit the impact when those happen 
(Sasse et al., 2001).  Today user-centred security is a well-established research discipline, with a number 
of dedicated workshops, symposia and journals, and its findings are widely acknowledged by security 
practitioners (e.g. the growing understanding amongst practitioners about the need to replace passwords 
with less taxing authentication mechanisms – Muncaster, 2015). 
2.4.3.1 Principles of user-centred security 
Identification of the need for usable security systems predates modern computers, again finding its roots 
in the design of military encryption mechanisms.  In 1883 Dutch linguist and cryptographer Auguste 
Kerckhoffs presented six principles for effective military cipher design (Kerckhoffs, 1883): 
1. The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable 
2. It should not require secrecy, and it should not be a problem if it falls into enemy hands 
3. It must be possible to communicate and remember the key without using written notes, and 
correspondents must be able to change or modify it at will 
4. It must be applicable to telegraph communications 
5. It must be portable, and should not require several persons to handle or operate 
6. Given the circumstances in which it is to be used, the system must be easy to use and should not 
be stressful to use or require its users to know and comply with a long list of rules 
Principles 3, 5 and 6 suggest Kerckhoffs’ understanding of the need for military ciphers to be designed 
around the needs of their users.  In commercial information security, the need for easy to use interface 
design was first stated many years later by Saltzer and Schroeder (1975): “It is essential that the human 
interface be designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the protection 
mechanisms correctly. Also, to the extent that the user’s mental image of his protection goals matches the 
mechanisms he must use, mistakes will be minimized.”  Twenty years on, Zurko and Simon (1996) 
introduced the term user-centred security, referring to security models, mechanisms, systems, and 
software that have usability as primary motivation or goal8.  Subsequent research improved understanding 
of user security behaviours, leading to the realisation that security design cannot afford to ignore human 
                                                          
 
8 Usability is “the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with 
effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified context of use.” (ISO 9241). 
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behavioural principles.  Adams and Sasse (1999) showed that making impossible demands in 
organisational security policies and implementations leads to users circumventing those e.g. writing down 
passwords when they had too many and could not recall those from memory.  In the same year, Whitten 
and Tygar (1999) demonstrated that bad mechanism design makes secure behaviour impossible, by 
showing the impact of bad usability of PGP email encryption tools on the ability of users to successfully 
encrypt a message.  All the above demonstrate the need for security design to better accommodate for 
capabilities and priorities of target users in order to deliver effective protection. 
The first attempt to formalise a set of principles of user-centred security design is presented by Pfleeger 
and Sasse (2015), who explain that in the context of enabling confidentiality, integrity and availability, 
usable security should aim to: 
1. Keep a user aware of the security status of data, machines and networks. 
2. Make visible the security implications of a user’s action or choices. 
3. Enable the user to understand related risks and externalities. 
4. Prevent the user from doing harm. 
5. Prevent (as much as possible) security from interfering with a user’s primary activities, as 
availability is a key requirement for any secure system. 
Of course, none of the above principles should damage the security implementation’s ability to deliver 
effective risk mitigation.  User-centred security aims to work within human capabilities to design security 
systems that are fit for protecting sensitive information, also imposing minimal impact on users’ primary 
tasks.   
2.4.3.2 Problems with application of user-centred security  
Two decades after identifying the need for user-centred security, progress in delivering effective security 
design principles is still limited.  As Cranor and Garfinkel (2005) put it ten years ago: “While there is 
much agreement among security practitioners that we need to find ways of designing secure systems that 
people can use, there is less agreement about how to reach this goal.”  Unfortunately, today we are still 
seeing minimal application of user-centred security principles in security design.  A number of reasons 
for this have been identified, discussed below. 
2.4.3.2.1 Lack of appreciation for usability by security designers 
Sasse et al. (2014) explain how current security mechanisms are developed and implemented without 
usability principles being taken into account.  Security experts generally fail to consider user effort 
(Herley, 2014), also failing to design around the principle that security is a supporting task (Sasse and 
Fléchais, 2005).  Current authentication mechanisms for example, fail to accommodate for user primary 
task focus, thus end up imposing excessive workload on users.  Security mechanisms then become an 
obstacle between the user and primary task completion, often demanding disproportionate time or effort.  
Brostoff and Sasse (2000) for example, found that users were not willing to spend one minute 
authenticating if they were planning to only spend a short time on a system.   
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2.4.3.2.2 Failure to consider context of interaction 
Security designers also fail to consider that different primary tasks or physical and social contexts may 
require different security mechanisms (Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012).  Today’s password rules for example, 
often require complex passwords, with varying length and upper/lowercase requirements.  Entering a long 
complex password on a mobile device with a touchscreen while on the move, possibly also having 
strangers around, requires more effort from the user and carries higher risks than working on a desktop 
computer at home or in a well-secured corporate environment (Schaub et al., 2012).   
2.4.3.2.3 Attempt to fix the human instead of the systems  
Herley (2014) explains that there is a reluctance amongst security designers to admit that some existing 
approaches are ineffective and require improvements.  Instead, they insist on asking for more and more 
user time and effort, ignoring potential optimisations in existing mechanisms and processes that could 
either reduce user effort or improve security.  Examining past research on user-centred security, a 
significant proportion of the work presented in academic literature has focused on encouraging secure 
behaviour by “fixing the human” – e.g. improve user ability to detect phishing sites (Kumaraguru et al. 
2009; Sheng et al. 2007), improve security warnings to enable users taking more secure decisions 
(Egelman and Schechter, 2013; Schechter et al., 2007), or deploy public awareness campaigns giving 
users instructions on how to protect themselves and their machines (e.g. US-CERT, 2015).  But, as Herley 
puts it, in many cases security designers and professionals insist on things they know users will not or 
cannot do.  Security warnings for example have been proven to be ineffective, but they are still used 
extensively (Krol et al., 2012); essentially their only achievement is liability transfer for potential 
compromises to the user that has already been habituated to dismissing those.  Passwords are also putting 
excessive cognitive load on users, but users are still told they need to be long, complex, unique and not 
written down (Adams and Sasse, 1999; Inglesant and Sasse, 2010).  Again such advice only transfers 
responsibility for securing a system away from its designers and on the shoulders of its users, for whom 
security is a secondary consideration (Pfleeger and Sasse, 2015), and their understanding of it may be 
erroneous and inadequate (Wash, 2010).  In the end, such attempts only aim to achieve security by 
increasing the workload it creates for the end user (Herley, 2009), ignoring the need to better 
accommodate for user priorities when designing security systems (e.g. Adams and Sasse, 1999).  This 
attempt to intervene on the human rather than the systems in place increases the burden on the shoulders 
of end users, encouraging further dismissal of communicated security principles, thus failing to deliver 
effective security. 
2.4.3.2.4 Usability is still treated as an expensive afterthought 
Other parts of usable security research focused more on explaining the need for user behaviour principles 
to be included in the design of security systems (Camp, 2009; Faily and Fléchais, 2010; Kirlappos and 
Sasse, 2012) and the need to integrate usability and security in requirements design (Flechais et al., 2007).  
Despite this, security products often suffer from limited budgets and time pressure, pushing usability at 
the bottom of the priority list for security requirements design and implementation (Flechais et al., 2007).  
This leads to attempts to retro-fit usability in an almost final product,  an approach which usually fails to 
create usable security solutions. 
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2.5 Organisations and the need for information security  
Organisations worldwide have widely adopted technology in their production tasks.  The use of 
technology in organisational processes provided, amongst others, improved efficiency in production lines, 
improved ability to manage large information databases, faster communication, easier and faster 
information exchange and dissemination, new marketing platforms, access to large international markets, 
and improved customer services (Palmer et al., 2001).  In addition the worldwide spread of the Internet as 
a productivity and marketing medium led to the emergence of new technology-based business models, 
with corporate success often being interlinked with an organisation’s online presence (Chen and Yen, 
2004).  The above advantages, combined with ever-decreasing technology costs (Moore, 1998), led to 
wide technology adoption by the majority of modern organisations aiming for success in today’s highly 
competitive environment.   
The benefits of technology for organisations do not come without problems though: the task of securing 
organisational information systems becomes increasingly complex and challenging as technology 
becomes an integral part of modern production lines, with information handling also getting more and 
more decentralised.  The old dumb terminals and time-sharing systems of the 70s (Auerbach, 1974), 
where information was stored in centralised systems with only accessed by authorised users through 
networks, are now obsolete.  Modern stand-alone PCs, usually come with vast amounts of local storage, 
giving an organisation’s employees significantly more control and responsibility over the data they use.  
Employees can now keep local copies of documents, take those at home to work, share information 
amongst them electronically and use the information they have access to maliciously if they want to.  The 
increasing adoption of modern mobile devices like smartphones, tablets and laptops in corporate 
environments complicates attempts to secure information even further: employees access corporate 
information while on the move, from devices also used for personal purposes, through third-party 
networks over which an organisation has no control.  All these advancements make correct 
implementation of information security mechanisms complex, but significant for the vitality of every 
organisation that has introduced technology in its working processes (military, government and 
commercial).  The remainder of this section discusses (1) major security-related threats modern 
organisations currently face, (2) how information security management evolved from a purely technical 
challenge in its early days to a corporate governance issue in modern organisations, and analyses (3) 
current challenges security managers face when attempting to deliver effective protection for an 
organisation. 
2.5.1 Modern security landscape and threats 
Increased dependency on technology means that security compromises can have potentially catastrophic 
consequences for an organisation, leading to a wide range of damages: 
 Operational ability damage: Attacks like Denial of Service (DoS) can render organisational 
systems inoperable for significant time periods.  This negatively impacts an organisation’s 
ability to carry out its operations, produce and sell its products, communicate with customers or 
deliver services to them (McDowell, 2009).  Customers are often left unable to access desired 
services, which then negatively affects an organisation’s revenues, also damaging customer 
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satisfaction, as customers expect organisational systems to be both secure and continuously 
available (Johnson and Goetz, 2007). 
 Intellectual Property theft: Intellectual property (e.g. research and development manuscripts and 
upcoming product designs) is one of the key targets of modern attacks (Winkler, 1997).  
Consequently, protection of corporate information is a major organisational concern in order to 
secure corporate secrets and product designs that may be of high value to competitors.  
Successful attacks by malicious insiders, corporate espionage and malicious software (designed 
to relay data from corporate machines to remote machines controlled by attackers) can result in 
information theft, reducing potential competitive advantages, and leading to significant financial 
losses for an organisation, from which many may struggle to recover (GRT, 2012).   
 Reputation: Many organisations rely on their reputation as reliable service providers to get 
returning customers, with those customers also expecting the organisation to protect their 
personal information.  Breaches of information that become publicly known can damage an 
organisation’s reputation.  As latest research suggests, people often abandon companies that 
suffer security breaches (Ponemon Institute, 2014). 
 Legal consequences: Legislators require protection of sensitive information held by 
organisations (e.g. UK DPA, 1998), defining potential consequences for organisations that suffer 
data breaches.   
Statistics released by the UK government highlight the seriousness of information security threats modern 
organisations face (UK Cabinet Office, 2014): 
 81% of large UK-based corporations and 60% of small businesses reported a cyber-breach in 
2013. 
 On average more than 33,000 malicious emails are blocked at the Gateway to the Government 
Secure Intranet (GSI) every month. These are likely to contain or link to sophisticated malware. 
A far greater number of malicious, but less sophisticated emails and spam are also blocked each 
month. 
 The cost for the worst cyber-security breach estimated between £600,000 to £1.15 million for 
large businesses and £65,000 to £115,000 for smaller ones. 
The seriousness and variety of the problems suggested by the above statistics, together with their 
potentially catastrophic consequences, demonstrate the importance of achieving the CIA security triplet 
for any modern organisation: 
 Confidentiality is required to protect intellectual property, customer data and classified 
information that may damage the organisation’s viability. 
 Integrity to ensure employees work with accurate, unmodified data. 
 Availability to provide uninterrupted and flawless access to systems and information both for 
employees required to carry out organisational processes and customers who want to use 
company services.     
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2.5.2 Evolution of security management 
The role of information security management in an organisation is to deliver all the information security 
activities described in section 2.1 (Identify threats, Assess vulnerability and exposure, Define security 
goals and Implement appropriate controls).  The ever-changing nature of organisational technology 
mechanisms, leads to changing threats, with information security management having to adapt 
accordingly.  As a result, organisational information security practices have evolved significantly from 
the early days of mainframe-based computing.  Back then, security was a concern limited to small teams 
of technically-minded employees, responsible to keep the organisation safe.  This usually involved 
minimal management involvement and minimal visibility to end users.  In contrast, nowadays information 
security is a significant concern for all employees in an organisation, has a substantial management aspect 
and is a key part of modern corporate governance.  This evolution of security from a technical to a 
governance concern, is well captured by von Solms’s (2006) taxonomy of the four different eras (waves) 
of information security management (Figure 1): 
1. Technical wave: In the early years of mainframe-based computing, implementing strong 
technical solutions was assumed as adequate for effective protection.  Security implementations 
included measures like access control lists, together with creation of different user IDs and 
passwords, while the importance of user awareness and security policies was still unknown.  As 
a result, security was solely a concern for a small community of technical experts who designed, 
implemented and managed the deployed technical protection mechanisms. 
2. Management wave: A few years later, technical experts and top organisational managers realised 
the need for security management processes, in order to coordinate protection efforts and 
resource allocation.  Security managers were now appointed, provided with authorisation and 
resources to deliver the desired protection, and reported to organisational management on their 
deployment progress and effectiveness.  This wave led to the creation and wide adoption of 
security policies, together with security communication and training in order to improve 
employee motivation and ability to act as required to keep the organisation secure. 
3. Institutionalisation wave:  The need for organisations to compare their protection against each 
other and share knowledge and experiences in order to improve their security approaches, led to 
increased standardisation and certification: international standards and best practice guidelines 
for security management were created, based on collective experience, together with metrics and 
benchmarking tools to allow for security implementation effectiveness assessments.  
4. Corporate governance and information security: It is now widely accepted that security in 
organisations should be a top management concern due to its importance for the organisation’s 
operational ability and viability.  This made information security an integral part of corporate 
governance, with security risk management standards being created (e.g. ISO27005), while 
security procedures and existence of adequate security controls became part of compulsory 
requirements for public companies (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002) defining strict 
requirements on the need to protect information held by an organisation. 
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Figure 1: Von Solms waves of information security management 
Modern attempts to deliver organisational information security, require the deployment of various meta-
measures that combine elements of more than one of von Solms’ waves.  Examining the different types of 
controls deployed in organisations, together with corresponding economic costs of deployment and 
enforcement, Pallas (2009) created three controls (or meta-measures) categories, with different costs 
related to each one: 
1. Architectural means: Physical and technical measures implemented to ensure employees are 
behaving in accordance with security rules.  They are strict, governed by well-defined rules, and 
can only protect an organisation from already identified risks.  They provide no ability to adapt 
to exceptional situations unforeseen during their setup, thus are mostly aiming to provide 
prevention rather than detection (e.g. blocking specific types of traffic from corporate firewalls) 
and often come with high fixed-costs to implement. 
2. Formal rules: Security measures not focused on technology, but on accurately defining 
obligatory, allowed and forbidden activities (e.g. by defining those in a security policy).  They 
are well-defined, thus inflexible in taking changing conditions into account (although not as rigid 
as architectural means).  They follow an ex-post enforcement approach, as forbidden activities 
are not prevented, but punished after they have happened.  As a result, they come with high 
marginal costs for monitoring and enforcement.  
3. Informal rules.  Norm-like factors influencing individual behaviours, with “good behaviour” 
principles being defined in a social rather than a formal organisational manner.  They are less 
strict than formal rules, not defined in writing and often emerge in a bottom-up direction (but 
sometimes influenced in a top-down manner).  This makes those difficult to influence, as change 
can only happen slowly and indirectly.  As they do not define acceptable and non-acceptable 
behaviours, they make it easier to respond to unanticipated events.  Enforcement is formalised 
through social control in an ex-post manner, thus it is more complex to control than architectural 
means or formal rules.  In addition, enforcement lies significantly with the community members 
(e.g. an organisation’s employees to whom the informal rule violation is visible), thus reducing 
enforcement costs for centralised security management. 
Effective combination of the three different types of meta-measures is required to deliver effective 
protection.  Unfortunately, as discussed later in this chapter (see section 2.6), current security approaches 
fail to achieve a working balance between the three. 
Technical wave
• Solely technical
• Expert concern
Management 
Wave
• Security policies
• Employee 
participation
Institutionalisation 
wave
• Standardisation
• Metrics
• Certifications
Corporate 
Governance
• Top management 
concern
• Corporate security 
strategy
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2.5.3 Combining the four waves 
All four of von Solms waves play a significant part in modern information security management.  None 
of the four can deliver effective security in isolation, with clear distinction between those in modern 
security approaches being almost impossible.  Each organisation identifies their own risks through 
appropriate risk analysis techniques and mitigates those depending on its risk appetite, combining all four 
waves to deliver the desired risk mitigation (Anderson and Choobineh, 2008; Stoneburner et al., 2002).  
The emerging security solutions are usually based on five different security management elements, each 
of which requires a combination of von Solms’s four waves (Table 2): (1) technical defences, (2) 
adoption of information security standards, (3) information security policies, (4) policy communication 
and employee education, and (5) assurance mechanisms to ensure policy compliance.   
Elements of security 
management 
Purpose Von Solms’ waves used 
Technical defences 
Protect organisational systems from outside attacks, 
enable accountability  
Technical, Management 
Information security 
standards 
Aid knowledge exchange, best practice adoption, 
better policy/mechanisms deployment  
Management, Institutionalisation, 
Corporate governance 
Information security policies Define desired employee behaviours 
Policies, Institutionalisation and 
Corporate governance  
Policy communication and 
employee education 
Provide employees with skills required to enact 
principles presented in policy 
Policies, Corporate governance  
Assurance mechanisms to 
ensure policy compliance 
Detect potential misuse of systems and policy 
violation (either accidental or wilful) 
Technical, Policies, 
Institutionalisation, Corporate 
governance  
Table 2: Elements of modern organisational information security implementations 
2.5.3.1 Technical defences 
Technical protection is the first level of organisational security defence, but also requires effective 
management to deliver the desired protection.  Firewalls and intrusion prevention systems are used to 
filter unauthorised traffic, encryption is deployed to protect hard drives and communication channels, 
access control aims to limit access to information on a “need-to-know basis”, and different types of 
information logging systems are used to allow for accountability of user actions.  In large organisations 
though, often spanning various geographical locations, the complexity that comes with the 
implementation of technical mechanisms needs to be well managed in order to provide functional 
security: different mechanisms are often managed by different teams, with different areas of expertise, 
also positioned in various locations around the world.  Additional challenges also arise from the need to 
deliver the strongest protection possible, constrained by budget allocations.  This makes effective security 
management an essential part of the design and deployment of technical security mechanisms, to deliver 
the best possible risk mitigation. 
2.5.3.2 Information security standardisation 
Information security standards are today highly adopted by organisations in order to improve their 
security deployment and management approaches.  They are frameworks aiming to provide management 
direction and support for information security decisions and deployment, in agreement with business 
requirements and relevant laws and regulations.  They are usually based on industry-wide accepted rules 
and principles, (e.g. COBIT - ISACA, 2014; ISO 27000 series and ITIL) or, in other cases, they are 
required by government or other entities for an organisation to be granted a license to operate in specific 
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domains (e.g. PCI-DSS for card payments or PSN for public service networks in the UK).  The use of 
standards allows organisations to develop and manage their security implementations based on common 
industry knowledge and experience, which is often much broader than the knowledge obtained by 
operating within their own organisational boundaries (BSI Group, 2014).  Today the use of standards is at 
the forefront of any security implementation, with dedicated bodies overseeing and auditing their 
application and management in organisations.   
2.5.3.3 Information security policies 
An information security policy is a set of principles an organisation’s security management considers 
critical for its employees to adhere to.  Their formulation is based on past organisational security 
experience, identified security risks, industry-wide good practice guidelines, international standards and 
potential regulatory requirements.  Policies are the foundation of any security regime, thus their existence 
is crucial for organisations: without those, security practices are developed without clear understanding of 
objectives and responsibilities (Fulford and Doherty, 2003; Hagen et al., 2013; Higgins, 1999), which can 
undermine the effectiveness of technical security solution deployment.  They usually materialise as 
documents or webpages on corporate intranets and define the security objectives of the organisation, the 
responsibilities of employees and desired employee behaviours to reduce organisational security risk 
exposure.   
2.5.3.4 Security communication and education 
Communication of desired employee behaviours defined in security policies is done through security 
awareness, education and training (SAET).  This consists of information periodically sent out to 
employees defining their responsibilities and desired security behaviours, and security modules in internal 
e-learning modules (also widely referred to as CBTs – computer-based training).  Through SAET 
organisations aim to increase employee awareness of information security risks, expecting this to 
motivate them to comply with security processes (Thomson and von Solms, 1997).  The significant risks 
that can emerge from erroneous employee behaviours (section 2.1.2) make effective SAET essential for 
the success of any organisational information security implementation (Höne and Eloff, 2002). 
2.5.3.5 Assurance mechanisms to ensure policy compliance 
Security policies and technical defences are often complemented by additional assurance mechanisms.  
Those aim to reduce organisational exposure to security risks by limiting and monitoring employee 
behaviour, prohibiting malicious or careless actions, or attempting to minimise their impact after they 
happen.  They are usually complemented by additional mechanisms to detect non-compliance with 
security policies, with potential sanctions defined for identified offenders.  Data loss prevention (DLP) 
software for example, is used to monitor data storage and sharing to prevent potential security incidents 
(Symantec, 2014), encrypted USBs aim to prevent data leakages, while firewalls and port-blocking 
software aim to prevent malicious software from infecting corporate machines or unauthorised access to 
information or systems.  Assurance mechanisms are today deployed in the majority of modern 
organisations and many security companies offer those as part of information security management 
solutions.   
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2.5.4 The need for productive balance 
The complexity of managing security stems from the need to effectively and efficiently combine all five 
elements of security management presented in the previous section into a security implementation that 
delivers sufficient protection for the organisation, while minimally impacting organisational productivity.  
Effective security management needs to fortify the organisation’s technical systems (both hardware and 
software) against potential attacks, but should also aim to reflect the priorities and social constraints of the 
corporate environment in which security processes and mechanisms are used (Karyda et al., 2005; Sasse 
et al., 2001).  Security may have risen to the corporate governance level, but if the technical 
implementation is ineffective or inefficient, then no protection can be delivered, or even if it does, the 
resulting overheads will prevent the organisation proceeding with its day-to-day operations. 
2.6 Insecure behaviour drivers 
In order to deliver effective security that is also aligned with employee priorities, security management 
needs to understand the drivers of insecure employee behaviours in modern organisations.  With technical 
protection constantly improving, attackers increasingly target vulnerabilities created by the human 
element in an organisational security implementation: examining a number of attacks, IBM’s Computer 
Security Incident Response team identified human error as a contributing factor to the occurrence of over 
95% of identified security incidents (IBM, 2014).  This highlights the inability of current information 
security approaches to correctly manage the human element of security implementations, also suggesting 
the need to radically rethink current information security management practices to better reflect 
challenges employees face in their work environment.   
Despite wide industry adoption of the security measures outlined in the section 2.5.3, research suggests 
that employee behaviours that significantly deviate from organisational security policies are still widely 
prevalent within modern organisations (Beautement et al., 2008; Blythe et al., 2014; Herath and Rao, 
2009a; Pahnila et al., 2007).  User-centred security research identified the root of that problem to be the 
failure of security managers to accommodate for employee priorities (primary task focus) and 
understanding (security risk perceptions) in the design and deployment of security implementations.  This 
leads to badly-implemented security mechanisms that negatively affect employee ability to focus on their 
primary tasks, creating friction9 between security and employee productive activities.  As a result, in 
order to maintain productivity, employees’ inevitably choose not to follow the policy.  The remainder of 
this chapter discusses past research on information security compliance, explaining why current security 
approaches fail.  It then identifies a number of problems in past research attempts to create effective user-
centred information security, and presents the justification for further research in order to devise new 
approaches to manage employee information security behaviours.    
                                                          
 
9 Friction refers to conditions where the presence of security creates problems for completion or primary task-related 
activities 
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2.6.1 Failure to capture employee priorities  
A major factor that creates security-productivity friction in current security management approaches is the 
failure to accommodate for employee priorities when designing or attempting to improve organisational 
security systems.  This leads to highly inconsistent security behaviours across different organisational 
divisions, better understood by categorising employees in three different groups based on their role in the 
organisation (adapted from Gurbaxani, 2010): 
 Top Management: The part of the organisation setting business goals and deciding on the 
strategies required to meet those.  For them information security is something they often 
authorise funding for, expecting it to keep the organisation risk free, thus able to flawlessly 
continue with its day to day productivity operations.  They may asked to be briefed on the 
current security achievements or challenges by security management, but do not participate in 
security deployments. 
 Business operations/functional areas:  This group includes the majority of employees in the 
organisation who work towards achieving organisational goals.  Employees in this category act 
both for the organisational interest, but also their own: completion of the desired tasks within 
specific timeframes benefits both the organisation and themselves, as this is what their 
performance assessment is based on.  Information security is something they often know they 
should participate in, but they do not always understand related risks or what the correct actions 
they need to take are. 
 Information Security Management: Their goal is to implement the controls required to reduce 
security risks, allowing operations to proceed smoothly towards primary task completion.  Their 
day-to-day tasks involve implementation and correct operation of all company information 
security-related activities presented in section 2.5.3. 
The varying priorities of different organisational functions lead to the development of value differences 
between them.  The tensions emerging from those value differences are captured by the economic 
paradigm of the “Principal-Agent problem”.  This occurs when a principal hires an agent to pursue their 
interests, but the agent aims to maximise their own benefit, which results in conflicting targets between 
them (Gurbaxani and Kemerer, 1999; Holmstrom, 1989).  In an information security implementation, the 
higher the goal asymmetry between different organisational parts, the more severe the Principal-Agent 
division is: organisational management may care about both productivity and security, but employee 
performance is judged based solely on productivity targets met.  Mintzberg (1985) captures the emerging 
value conflicts by describing an organisation as a political arena where different conflict situations exist: 
everyone pursues their own interests, based on their own understanding and priorities.  This leads to the 
development of three distinct “conflict zones” when attempting to implement solutions to mitigate 
information security risks (Figure 2): 
 Top Management – Information Security Management:  Management wants to keep the 
organisation risk-free but does not want this to severely impact the organisation’s ability to 
complete its production-related tasks.  As a result, restrictions in information or system access 
implemented by information security managers, may be blocked by top management if their 
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impact on organisational productivity is considered prohibitive.  In addition, requests for budgets 
to implement new security mechanisms or improve existing ones may be rejected by top 
management, who may prefer to invest in other organisational divisions outside security.  This 
ends up leaving information security managers feeling unable to implement all the measures they 
believe are required to deliver effective security.  
 Information Security Management – Functional Areas:  Information Security Management 
wants employees to comply with controls implemented to reduce the organisation’s exposure to 
information security risks.  But when those controls create significant security workload for 
employees they negatively affect their ability to proceed with primary task completion. User 
refusal to comply with security then leads to security managers considering them a vulnerability 
point (Kraemer et al., 2009).  This leads to further restrictions, deepening the gap and creating 
further tensions between these two sides (Inglesant and Sasse, 2011). 
 Top Management – Functional Areas:  Employees in functional areas are under pressure by the 
organisation to produce required productivity deliverables on time.  As a result, anything that 
hinders their primary task activities (in this case security measures that slow them down), may 
be ignored to stay on track with their productivity and keep the top management satisfied.   
 
Figure 2: The Principal-Agent conflicts in organisations 
The identified value conflicts increase the costs of implementing effective security (Pallas, 2009): both 
the cost of architectural means to deliver effective security and the motivation costs required to 
effectively influence employee behaviour increase with high value misalignment.  In addition, varying 
priorities lead to employees exhibiting very different behaviours, even under the same conditions and 
having received the same level of knowledge or training (Hedström et al., 2011).   Any subsequent 
attempts to change security behaviour through increasing controls increase the identified tensions, 
creating a number of practical problems in security implementations: (1) policy formulation becomes 
difficult, (2) assurance becomes ineffective and (3) effectiveness of risk communication is reduced.   
Top Management: Meeting 
business goals 
Functional areas: Meeting 
productivity targets
Information Security 
Management: Protecting  
organisational information 
and assets
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2.6.1.1 Policy formulation problems 
Currently security policies often fail to allow for employee productivity focus, which often leads to 
failure to reduce information security risks (Saunders, 2012; Wood, 2000).  Wood attributes a large part 
of this failure to the fact that current security policy formulation is still based on a militaristic approach: 
policies define the rules to which security management believes employees should abide to, usually 
adding elements required to comply with legislation and security standards the organisation needs to 
comply with.  This results in a command-and-control based security implementation that fails to capture 
the dynamics of modern organisational environments: modern workers are independent and quite capable 
of making local decisions (Wood, 2000), a trait encouraged by organisations, as it improves productivity 
and adaptability to new primary task-related challenges.  Blind obedience to information security policies 
contradicts this behaviour: expecting employees to follow a set of rules they do not understand and do not 
perceive as beneficial is unrealistic.  This lack of alignment of security policies with employee primary 
tasks, is accentuated by the fact that security rules and policies only rarely get evaluated for fitness for 
purpose (Björck, 2001) and no input from employees is incorporated in their creation process (Bartsch 
and Sasse, 2012).    
The second problem with current policy formulation approaches is their over-reliance on information 
security standards (Pallas, 2009).  Despite allowing easy and quicker policy creation, research has shown 
that information security standards are currently ineffective (Baskerville and Siponen, 2013; Siponen and 
Willison, 2009; Siponen, 2006).  They are developed based on generic and universal principles, without 
paying adequate attention to organisational differences and how other factors (like environment-specific 
contextual elements) affect the practical deployment of information security in an organisational 
environment (Lacey, 2011).  In addition, the ever-increasing number of regulatory frameworks that 
organisations need to comply with, leads to vast amounts of resources being consumed to achieve 
compliance.  This leaves little time for fine-tuning security policy design and formulation to address 
organisation-specific security risks (Anderson and Choobineh, 2008).  As a result, the emerging security 
implementation often misses organisation-specific threats, and the lack of additional resources negatively 
impacts the potential to deploy novel, more context-appropriate security for an organisation.  
Another problem with current policy formulation approaches is that they are mostly reactive, driven by 
past failures and lessons learned from those, either internal to the organisation or based on breaches other 
organisations suffer.  Emerging security mechanisms primarily focus on protecting an organisation from 
threats closely resembling current or past ones, essentially leaving the organisation unable to adapt to 
new, changing threats that are very common in the fast-changing modern information security landscape 
(Dourish and Redmiles, 2002).   
2.6.1.2 Problems with excessive assurance  
Unable to recognise the failure of current policy formulation approaches, information security 
management attributes non-compliance to user ignorance and wilful disobedience.  As a response to this 
“user laziness” (Adams and Sasse, 1999), various architectural assurance mechanisms are put in place, to 
limit employee behaviour within desired domains (e.g. access control restrictions, anti-virus software, 
data loss prevention systems).  When control is impossible (e.g. employees handling confidential 
documents as part of their tasks), monitoring and sanctions are introduced to deter misbehaviour (Fléchais 
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et al., 2005); employees violating policies are threatened with potential reprimands that can be as serious 
as losing their job and legal action taken against them.  
In theory, implementing extensive security controls and sanctions should prevent both intentional insider 
breaches and reduce the impact of erroneous behaviours that increase organisational security exposure.  In 
practice, and despite their wide popularity amongst information security professionals, assurance 
mechanisms have been shown to suffer from a number of drawbacks, negatively affecting security 
effectiveness:   
1. High cost: Strict assurance controls that aim to exhaustively eliminate all information security 
risks come at prohibitive costs (Handy, 1999) and can drain organisational resources, including 
employee time and effort required to comply with those (Beautement, Sasse, and Wonham 2008; 
Herley, 2009).  In addition, human-related security risks cannot always be defined well and are 
constantly changing, depending on factors both internal and external to the organisation.  Any 
attempt to exhaustively eliminate those risks, requires implementation of a wide range of 
architectural means to identify and eliminate all potential vulnerabilities.  For any budget-
sensitive organisation this is prohibitively expensive and can lead to security implementers 
having to compromise with suboptimal solutions (Björck, 2001; Pallas, 2009). 
2. Flexibility reduction: Strict controls take away employee flexibility to respond to changing 
environments, reducing their ability to respond to non-predictable situations (Vroom and von 
Solms, 2004).  When employees engage with tasks where flexibility is required (e.g. remote or 
home working), control becomes time-wasting, inefficient or even impossible to implement.  As 
a result, in order to maintain this flexibility, organisations end up relaxing security policies, 
weakening their security implementation (Flechais et al., 2005).  In addition, excessive controls 
reduce the capability of employees to take any initiative to aid the organisation in managing its 
security challenges. 
3. Ignore the role of trust in achieving security: Strict assurance mechanisms tend to underplay the 
importance of trust in employees as part of effectively and efficiently managing information 
security (Williams, 2008).  Attempts to eliminate the need for trusting any employee also 
contribute to the creation of a negative attitude towards security (“resistance to information 
security policy implementation” – Lapke and Dhillon, 2008), which also hinders the creation of a 
collaborative security culture within the organisation (Inglesant and Sasse, 2011): employees 
feel less trusted, their motivation to behave securely decreases, and are less willing to report any 
problems regarding information security issues. 
4. Dissatisfied employees:  Excessive assurance and sanctions can also lead to employee 
dissatisfaction, deepening the value gap between security enforcers and other employees 
(Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009).  This hinders the development of social capital and shared 
values, leading to minimal incentives for secure behaviour, and increased probability of insider 
attacks (see section 2.6.2, Moore et al., 2011).  It also negatively affects an organisation’s ability 
to retain its valuable employees, as dissatisfaction can lead to them eventually leaving the 
organisation (Ken Blanchard, 2010). 
5. Security perceived as hindrance: Excessive monitoring and sanctions accentuate employee 
perception that security is a hindrance for organisational productivity (Vroom and von Solms, 
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2004).  Despite a small improvement in compliance when probability of detection is high 
(Herath and Rao, 2009a), assurance costs a lot (Pallas, 2009), provides no guarantees for long-
term compliance and does not contribute to the creation of a compliant security culture amongst 
employees.   
In general, excessive assurance negatively affects employee behaviour: it creates conditions where 
employees are less willing to follow information security policies and has no long-term effect on security 
compliance for risk-aware employees. 
2.6.1.3 Risk communication and education problems 
Security risk communication (or user education) is also used to encourage employee compliance with 
security policies.  Current approaches though, fail to effectively influence employee behaviours, for a 
number of reasons: 
 Problems with employee behaviour are attributed to a lack of facts available to them, ignoring 
potential problems in the usability of security mechanisms in place (stupid, lazy, ignorant users 
– Adams and Sasse, 1999).  Security experts seem to overlook primary task focus as the key 
driver of employee decision making, thus creating SAET programs that fail to accommodate for 
it: they just tell people what they think they ought to know (Stewart and Lacey, 2013).  This 
technocratic view of risk communication has been strongly criticised by experts in the field of 
safety risk communication as ineffective and inefficient: it completely overlooks employees’ 
own understanding of the systems in place and role-specific risks arising as part of their primary-
task related activities (Morgan, 2002).    
 Sometimes information security communication presents demands that security management 
knows are impossible to adhere to; they either ask for too much (e.g. no password writing down) 
or they mostly focus on worst-case scenarios instead of risks employees have to deal with in 
their daily activities (Herley, 2014).  When end-users realise the lack of connection between 
communicated principles and employee day-to-day tasks, the credibility of that advice is 
damaged, further accentuating user alienation from security. 
The above problems result in SAET approaches that simply flood employees with generic information, of 
which only a small percentage is related to information security risks they encounter while working 
towards their primary task completion.  As a result much of that information goes unnoticed and the 
limited employee resources available for security are quickly exhausted on attempts to understand 
communicated information unrelated to their role (Beautement et al., 2008). 
2.6.2 Non-compliance as an economic decision – focusing on the primary task 
In their normal day-to-day operations, organisations and their personnel are primarily concerned with 
producing required productivity deliverables – the primary task.  Employees have limited available 
resources and they can either spend those complying with security or proceeding with their primary tasks 
(Ashenden 2008; Sasse et al., 2001).  As a result when security poses unrealistic time and effort demands, 
they may choose to ignore it.  An example comes from Adams and Sasse (1999), who identified that 
having a large number of systems to which the users are required to authenticate to, also requiring long 
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passwords and frequent password changes, results in overloading employees with unmanageable 
password management responsibilities: it becomes impossible to recall their passwords from memory, 
and changing those frequently also imposes high effort overheads to them.  As Beautement et al. (2008) 
explain, the available resources for compliance are both cumulative and limited – what they call the 
“Compliance Budget”: employees need to invest time and effort to comply with security and are only 
willing to bare a limited cost for compliance.  This cost may be further reduced when they are under 
pressure to deliver within tight timeframes (e.g. circumventing a corporate website filtering system using 
a personal machine, when they need urgent access to information).  Weirich (2005) classifies the security 
compliance costs employees have to endure in four different categories:  
1. Primary: the impact of compliance on their primary task (e.g. slowdown) 
2. Secondary: potential loss of access to a source or service, blocked for security reasons (e.g. 
ability to work from home) 
3. Social: Loss of trust amongst colleagues when refusing non-compliance that can benefit each 
other (e.g. password sharing)  
4. Image: Appearing as a paranoid or not a team player when non-compliance can benefit a 
colleague (e.g. when they request for information they do not have official access to).  
When organisations ignore the presence of these costs, the emerging security mechanisms and processes 
increase the friction between security and the organisation’s primary tasks.  This quickly exhausts 
employees’ compliance budget, making non-compliance inevitable: it comes as an employee 
economically rational decision, as a response to friction-inducing security.  When security controls 
become barriers to primary task completion, a conflict between primary task completion and information 
security compliance emerges (Albrechtsen, 2007), and the perceived (or even actual) risk mitigation 
benefit employees receive by complying does not appear to be worth the time and effort investment 
(Karyda et al., 2005, Herley, 2009, Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  When security asks for too much, non-
compliance is the only mechanism employees possess to satisfy primary task demands.   
Employees respond to friction-inducing security by developing coping strategies to overcome its high 
overhead, re-organising their primary tasks to avoid or minimise their exposure to security mechanisms 
that are too onerous (Inglesant and Sasse, 2010).  Inflexible access control systems for example, which 
restrict access to information for those who genuinely need it, lead to informal sharing of sensitive 
information through channels outside official systems (Bartsch and Sasse, 2013).  As those channels were 
not designed for this purpose, and the organisation possesses no control over their security, the exposure 
of the organisation to potential breaches is now dependent on the level of security provided by the 
external channels employees resort to.  In general, any security implementation that fails to capture and 
manage the effect of deployed security mechanisms or processes on employee primary tasks, leads to 
employees ignoring or bypassing those, in order to minimise security-related overheads on their 
productive abilities. 
2.6.3 Discipline is currently impossible and ineffective 
Organisational security policies usually warn employees that breaches will be followed up by warnings 
and sanctions.  But given widespread non-compliance due to friction-inducing security, an unmanageably 
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large number of employees would have to be disciplined under such an approach.  In addition, the high 
volume of false positive alerts from monitoring systems creates noise in attempts to detect non-
compliance, making effective monitoring and enforcement impossible (Tuyls, Skoric, and Kevenaar 
2007).  Subsequent attempts to discipline employees hinder collaboration between different 
organisational parts and increase tension between security enforcers and the rest of the organisation 
(Adams and Sasse, 1999).  When non-compliance eventually becomes widespread and unsanctioned, 
sanctions cease to act as an effective deterrent.   
Excessive enforcement also runs the risk of compliant behaviours not stemming from correct employee 
risk understanding, but from increased pressure by the organisation and the fear of potential 
consequences.  This can be ineffective in a discipline like information security, where changes in the 
threat landscape occur very rapidly; it is impossible to devise and communicate effective desired 
behaviours whenever a new threat emerges, as this can be expensive for security managers and annoying 
for users.  It is also hard to accurately define rules around desired behaviours or implement mechanisms 
to detect non-compliance if threats constantly change, as they would require frequent revisions to ensure 
all potential misbehaviours are effectively captured.  In general, wherever flexibility is required (e.g. 
organisations that need to provide provisions for home and remote working), enforcement of strict 
security becomes complex and impossible to deliver (Hine 2014): it is inefficient and ineffective for any 
modern organisation and can even negatively affect an organisation’s ability to protect itself.   
2.6.4 Risks and vulnerabilities of ineffective behaviour management 
Information security attacks targeting the human element can be distinguished between (1) outsiders 
taking advantage of human behaviours that increase organisational security risk exposure and (2) 
malicious insiders who abuse their access to cause intentional damage to the organisation or steal 
information for their personal benefit. 
2.6.4.1 Outsiders exploiting employee behaviours 
This type of attacks includes situations where attackers take advantage of vulnerabilities created by user 
behaviours to compromise an organisation.  Many of the human behavioural principles exploited by 
attackers targeting organisations are similar to those presented in section 2.4.2, but their impact on 
employee behaviours in an organisational environment creates different types of vulnerabilities (Table 3).  
Exploitation of these vulnerabilities provides attackers with significant opportunities for successful 
attacks.  Laszka et al. (2014) for example, explain how attackers can obtain sensitive information, without 
even targeting the obvious “highly-knowledgeable” individuals that may be more security-sensitised: they 
often collect pieces of information perceived as less sensitive from various individuals in various roles in 
an organisation and then piecing those together to create an accurate representation of the desired content.  
To reduce related risks, it is crucial for organisations to have access to security design principles that 
allow designing organisational systems around employee behaviours and priorities, thus minimising 
potential risks.   
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Behavioural 
property 
Impact on organisational environment Vulnerabilities created 
Distraction 
Employees focused on getting their job done, security 
creates barriers  
Tension between security and productivity divisions – 
rules may need to be relaxed 
Relaxing rules without mitigating 
risks otherwise exposes organisation 
Disregard for security leads to further 
insecure behaviours 
Social compliance 
Employees unwilling to challenge requests from people 
higher up in the organisational hierarchy 
Increases success likelihood of social 
engineering attacks 
Propensity to do good 
Employees willing to help colleagues in need 
May resort to insecure actions in order to do so 
Herd principle 
Widespread non-compliance amongst employees 
reduces propensity to follow policy 
Allows attackers to identify loopholes 
created and take advantage 
Dishonesty 
Employees unlikely to report potential breach if prior 
actions that led to it were against policy 
Breaches remain unreported and 
difficult to detect 
Deception 
Phishing emails manage to pass through organisational 
firewall (with relaxed rules to reduce distraction) 
Loss  of organisational credentials 
Lack of reporting can create long term 
risks 
Need and greed, 
Time 
Time pressure for employees to meet productivity 
targets 
Employees rewarded for productivity not security 
Increased non-compliance when under time pressure  
High non-compliance increases 
potential for attackers to identify it 
and take advantage 
Human error 
Employees forgetting to log out or leaving sensitive 
documents exposed 
Employees losing devices holding sensitive information 
Sensitive organisational information 
leaked to the public 
Attackers can get hold of sensitive 
information through targeted attacks 
Lack of knowledge 
and skills 
Ineffective communication leads to reduced risk 
understanding and mitigating actions  
Employees cannot detect, report or act 
in security-critical conditions 
Reduced cognitive 
ability 
Excessive number of security mechanisms and policy 
clauses creating overload for employees 
Impossible to comply with all (e.g. do not write down 
passwords for 20 different systems with password re-
use not allowed) 
Insecure behaviours widely prevalent 
Increased potential for successful 
attacks 
Disregard for security  
Folk models 
Employees using own understanding and perceptions to 
tackle organisational security challenges 
Widely varying information security behaviours 
Organisational protection depends on what employees 
perceive as required security at individual level 
Inaccurate employee perceptions and 
understanding lead to insecure 
behaviours that expose the 
organisation 
Table 3: Organisational behaviour-driven security vulnerabilities 
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2.6.4.2 Insider attacks 
The second human-related security challenge organisations face is intentional attacks by insiders aiming 
for personal benefit, often referred to as insider attacks10: “current or former employees, contractors, or 
business partners intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, or 
data to steal confidential or proprietary information from the organization” (Moore et al., 2011).  As 
Moore et al. explain, employees may have many reasons to turn against an organisation: IT sabotage, 
fraud, theft of intellectual property (IP), and national security espionage provide significant monetary or 
personal incentives for attacks (e.g. hacktivism).  With a large amount of the value of modern 
corporations stemming from intangibles such as trade secrets, the presence of such insider threats poses a 
serious risk to modern organisations’ viability.  Recent industry reports on insider attacks indicate they 
are still a major threat: despite their potentially catastrophic consequences, current organisational security 
management approaches still do not manage to effectively detect and reduce risks emerging from those 
(PwC, 2015). 
2.6.5 Need to rethink assurance and control 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, information security aims to protect an organisation from 
both malicious outsiders and insiders.  But treating employees as malicious or unknowledgeable all the 
time, damages the collaborative nature of an organisation and makes its defences weaker.  Non-
compliance stems from the fact that almost no modern organisation evaluates whether deployed 
information security policies and mechanisms are fit-for-purpose for the real working environment in 
which they are deployed (Adams and Sasse, 1999).  The resulting friction between security mechanisms 
and productivity slows down the organisation’s day-to-day productive operations, leading to the creation 
of a negative attitude towards security.  This reduces overall compliance rates, risking rendering any 
implemented security mechanism as completely ineffective (Lapke and Dhillon, 2008).  In order to 
eliminate the drawbacks of current security design outlined in this section, organisations need to carefully 
reconsider their information security goals before attempting to design risk mitigation approaches.  They 
need to decide on: (1) what are they trying to protect, (2) how much are they willing to sacrifice to receive 
that protection, and (3) whose values is information security trying to address? (i.e. is the focus on 
productivity or being secure for the sake of security).   
To reduce the excessive friction created by attempts to enforce badly-designed security in an organisation, 
it is important to revisit Pallas’ (2009) classification of information security meta-measures (section 
2.5.2).  Currently all architectural means and formal rules implemented are based on scenarios aiming to 
meet information security managers’ priorities, with potential benefits of informal rules being ignored.  
As a result emerging policies, mechanisms deployed, and policy-driven SAET campaigns have always 
been based on what managers think their target group (employees) should do and know.  There is 
                                                          
 
10 The terms insider threats and insider attacks tend to be used interchangeably, often including to vulnerabilities 
emerging from human actions presented in section 2.6.4.1.  For the remainder of this thesis, reference to insider 
attacks refers to the definition by Moore et al. presented in section 2.6.4.2. 
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minimal consideration for employee priorities, the impact of deployed measures on those, and no attempts 
to understand their risk perceptions and their perceived need for security.  In addition no consideration 
appears to exist on the variation of security requirements for employees in various organisational 
divisions with varying responsibilities that may even require different security implementation and 
training for different roles (Beautement et al., 2009).  There is also limited consideration of the fact that 
employees may possess internal values that can drive their secure behaviour, like personal connection to 
the organisation they work for11 (Bussing, 2002).  This leads to limited use of Pallas’ informal rules in 
delivering security and attempts to enforce inflexible “one size fits all” security implementations, heavily 
reliant on policies and architectural means.  The resulting employee alienation and negative perception of 
security, fails to engage employees in organisational security strategies, thus failing to address the risks 
emerging from employee behavioural vulnerabilities. 
Security approaches need to be redesigned to accommodate for the productivity focus of both the 
employees and the organisation.  Employees should be treated as an asset, not as a liability that could 
break the system (Kraemer et al., 2009).  Security design should acknowledge this and develop an 
approach for a “middle ground” solution that balances user perceptions and priorities with security 
experts’ priorities (Dourish et al., 2004; Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Thomson and von Solms, 2005).  In 
addition, the distributed and decentralised nature of modern IT systems makes the hierarchically-driven 
information security management approaches described earlier in this chapter inefficient.  As Pallas 
(2009) argues, managing information security in increasingly decentralised organisational environments 
should be seen as a problem of coordination and motivation.  
 Coordination: Security management needs to identify optimal state of employee behaviour that 
represents highest overall value for organisation (e.g. who should be granted access to a service 
with an organisationally acceptable increase in the emerging risks) 
 Motivation: Motivation mechanisms need to exist to enforce coordination outcome. Individual 
members often have various incentives for opportunistic behaviour, so they have to be motivated 
to behave in the collective interest of the organisation instead.  Motivation mechanisms aim to 
influence employee decisions, encouraging secure behaviours (e.g. through improved visibility 
of contribution) or discouraging insecure ones (e.g. by ensuring detection and appropriate 
sanctions) 
As Pallas argues, security management can only be effective if it is addressed as a cooperation problem.  
It should attempt to address the priorities of everyone in an organisation, delivering productivity-focused 
security controls. This should be done through implementations that effectively balance expensive 
architectural means, cheaper formal rules and more flexible informal rules to mitigate security risks 
without creating productivity barriers. 
                                                          
 
11 Employee emotional connection to organisations is well documented in organisational research (e.g. Bussing, 
2002), but its impact on security has not been examined.  This is examined later in this thesis (Chapters 6 and 7) 
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2.7 Improving compliance though behavioural change: changing the 
cost-benefit balance 
As discussed in section 2.6.2, to achieve an effective balance between security controls and employee 
productivity, security design needs to understand employee priorities and the economic nature of 
employee information security decisions. Employees are focused on their primary task: what the 
organisation has hired them to do and what their performance assessment is based on.  As a result, they 
allocate their available resources to achieve maximal return on their effort and time input.  If the costs of 
security compliance are higher than the perceived benefit, any economically rational actor would choose 
not to comply, even if that increases organisational risk exposure; security is always a secondary 
requirement.  In addition, as described in section 2.6.1.3, when security advice fails to communicate 
secure behaviour benefits, compliance incentives are minimal.  This section presents past research on how 
to positively influence employee security decision making and incentivise compliance, focusing on three 
key areas: (1) understanding the impact of organisational security culture on security compliance and 
improving it, (2) improving security design elements to make compliance easier, and (3) improving 
employee motivation to behave securely. 
2.7.1 Influencing compliance decisions 
Beautement et al. (2008) presented a number of different factors that influence employee security 
compliance decisions (Figure 3): 
1. Design: Friction-inducing systems that require significant effort investment from employees, 
negatively impact their cost-benefit decisions, leading to reduced compliance.  On the other 
hand, a well-designed system that accommodates for employee productivity needs, reduces 
compliance costs, making compliance an economically attractive option. 
2. Security culture of the organisation:  In organisations where employees value security, 
perceiving it as an enabler to the organisation’s productive operations, the benefit of compliance 
is higher and the cost-benefit balance is more likely to favour compliance. 
3. Awareness:  Accurate understanding of the information security challenges an organisation faces 
and employees’ individual (or collective) contribution in risk mitigation, improves the perceived 
benefit of secure behaviour. 
4. Monitoring:  The probability of non-compliance detection can also affect compliance decisions: 
the more likely employees are to be caught misbehaving the more likely they are to comply 
(Herath and Rao, 2009b).  
5. Sanctions: If non-compliance sanctions are seen to be enforced, their avoidance is a perceived 
benefit for employees that can incentivise compliance.  
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Figure 3: Security Compliance Decision (adapted from Beautement et al., 2008) 
As discussed in section 2.6.3, current information security approaches focus more on assurance-based 
security (monitoring and sanctions), rather than improving the positive elements that could encourage 
employee compliance.  But if employees do not understand why they need to comply (awareness), they 
are individually and collectively habituated to not doing so (culture), and also the systems in place do not 
support compliance (bad design: unusable or friction-inducing security mechanisms), then there is 
minimal benefit for compliance and high benefit from non-compliance (time and effort saved).  As a 
result, attempts to improve security behaviours need to focus on improving the compliance cost/benefit 
balance. 
2.7.2 Improving security implementation design 
The problems leading to insecure behaviours presented in section 2.7, and the need to improve security 
compliance in organisations led to security design rightfully receiving a lot of attention from user-centred 
security researchers.  Well-designed security can reduce security-productivity friction, reduce compliance 
costs and aid in the development of a positive organisational information security culture.  Past research 
on improving security design focused on two main areas: (1) improving the process of security policy 
creation and (2) improving the process of security mechanism and process design. 
2.7.2.1 Improving information security policy formulation 
Current policy formulation needs to be widened to include the priorities of all stakeholder groups 
presented in section 2.6.1 - functional areas, management and information security management 
(Checkland and Poulter, 2006; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001).  By doing so the emerging solutions can 
better accommodate for the needs of primary task-focused employees and improve the alignment of 
different party incentives in the principal-agent problem discussed in 2.6.1.  Drawing parallels from 
King’s definition of Information Systems Alignment as “The degree to which the information systems plan 
reflects the business plan” (King, 1978), alignment should also be a key goal for information security 
implementers: the more a security policy and its implementation accommodate employee priorities and 
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values, the more it improves incentive alignment in the enforcer-employee principal-agent relationship 
(Herath and Rao, 2009).  This can lead to security strategies and deployments that better reflect 
productivity priorities, reducing employee resistance to comply with organisational security policies and 
mechanisms, thus improving security compliance across the organisation (Lapke and Dhillon, 2008; 
Trompeter and Eloff, 2001; Höne and Eloff, 2002; Fulford and Doherty, 2003).   
2.7.2.2 Creation of usable security mechanisms and processes 
Security researchers have long argued that complex systems that do not support user activities incentivise 
insecure behaviours and that secure behaviours can only be achieved by less taxing security solutions.  
Adams and Sasse (1999) for example, identified that users forced to comply with password mechanisms 
incompatible with their work practices, responded with coping mechanisms that often included policy 
violations (e.g. writing passwords down).  Such friction-inducing elements of organisational security need 
to be removed, to avoid exhausting employees’ compliance budget (Beautement et al., 2008), also making 
compliance an economically attractive option.  Florêncio and Herley (2010) present a good example of 
how design plays an important role in security effectiveness and acceptance from users: companies like 
Amazon and some online banking services demand considerably simpler passwords from their customers 
compared to government websites, as an easy-to-use customer login process is important for their 
business models.  To prevent security breaches, customers are only asked for additional security 
information (e.g. use a second form of authentication) when they transfer money to third party accounts 
or ship orders to new addresses.   This creates low security overheads for frequent actions (e.g. buying 
and shipping to the same address), only burdening users with high-overheads when they carry out 
infrequent ones (shipping to a new address).  Designing organisational security systems around similar 
principles is important to create security controls and policies that fit the organisation’s business 
processes, imposing low overheads on low-risk employee tasks.   
2.7.3 Improving motivation 
Research on improving employee motivation to comply with security focused on two key areas: (1) 
improving user education, and (2) encouraging company leadership to lead by example.  Before 
attempting to do any of the above though, it is important for security management to deliver the 
improvements outlined in section 2.7.2 to improve security implementation design; removing friction-
inducing security mechanisms, should be a prerequisite to attempts to deliver behavioural change (Figure 
4, Furnell et al., 2006).   
Behavioural change attempts should aim to elevate the value of security for employees by emphasising its 
importance and its contribution towards the achievement of organisational objectives (James, 1996).  As 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) explain, the effectiveness of any active intervention program that requires 
target group engagement to succeed, depends on incentivising cooperation from corresponding target 
groups.  After removing (or improving) security mechanisms to reduce security-productivity friction, the 
organisation should (1) communicate the importance of security through effective security awareness, 
education and training, and (2) ensure organisational management participates in security protection to 
“lead by example” and incentivise secure behaviours. 
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Figure 4: High-cost security as a barrier to behavioural change attempts 
2.7.3.1 Security awareness, education and training  
To effectively elevate the value of security for employees and management, re-thinking of current 
security awareness, education and training (SAET) approaches is required.  As discussed in section 2.7.1, 
accurate understanding of organisational information security risks, together with corresponding 
mitigating actions can motivate employees to behave securely (Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 2013; 
Adams, 1995; Martins and Eloff, 2002).  On the other hand, inaccurate understanding of threats and low 
motivation make compliance a less attractive option, as the perceived benefit (risk avoidance) is much 
lower than the associated costs of compliance (Adams and Sasse, 1999; Albrechtsen, 2007; Lapke and 
Dhillon, 2008).  The importance of SAET campaigns in changing this is already well understood by 
organisations but, as discussed in section 2.6.1.3, past approaches failed to deliver effective behavioural 
change.   
As a first step towards effectively redesigning SAET approaches, it is important to understand how secure 
and insecure behaviours emerge, driven by employee understanding of security risks and awareness of 
appropriate mitigating actions.  Alfawaz et al. (2010) present four different employee knowledge-action 
states regarding security behaviours: 
1. Not knowing – not doing: An employee is unaware of the information security rules concerning 
their role and consequently does not comply with any of those. 
2. Not knowing – doing: Again an employee is unaware of information security rules but is 
behaving in a secure way; usually due to organisational norms that influence their behaviour 
(e.g. culture, mimicking security habits of colleagues).  This, once again, underlines the 
importance of a security-conscious culture and collaboration in delivering effective security.  It 
is not the most desired state though, as employees cannot make secure decisions when faced 
with rare problems and new challenges that are not part of their (or their colleagues) day-to-day 
routine. 
3. Knowing – not doing: Employees know the rules defined in security policy but are not following 
those, either unconsciously or consciously to reduce the impact of security on their primary task 
completion abilities.   
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4. Knowing – doing: Employees know the rules defined in the security policy and are following 
those.  This is the desired state that a comprehensive organisational SAET program should aim 
to achieve. 
Unfortunately, existing organisational risk communication campaigns fail to deliver the desired 
behavioural transition.  Sasse et al. (2007) explain that a major driver behind this failure is the inability to 
distinguish between the different states of behavioural change: security awareness, security education and 
security training.  As they explain, the above terms are often mistakenly used interchangeably.  Instead, 
they should be addressed as 3 distinct steps of a behavioural change process.  
1. Awareness: Its aim should be to get employees interested in security, attract their attention and 
help them understand its importance for the organisation and themselves.  Once aware they are 
more likely to respond to security education.   
2. Education: It should provide information about security threats and vulnerabilities, also 
presenting employee actions required to protect themselves and the organisation.  It should also 
provide adequate depth of understanding for employees to be able to deal with uncertainty and 
complexity in security decision-making.  
3. Training: Awareness and education only prepare the ground for security behavioural change; 
changing people’s behaviour though, requires training.  In training, desired behaviours presented 
in the education stage are thoroughly tested and corrected.  Effective training needs to be closely 
related to clear and well-understood examples from the organisational context, clearly explaining 
employee security roles within their specific organisational tasks and responsibilities.  
Sasse et al. also state that, once the 3 SAET steps have been applied, regular reminders of the key 
messages are also required.  This can reinforce awareness and keep the employees informed on new risks 
(Weirich, 2005).  In addition training material should always be available for employees that need to refer 
back to it.  The information included in SAET material should aim to communicate: 
 The importance of security for everyone.  Security controls play a vital role in mitigating the 
risks the organisation faces.  Re-framing security as a productivity tool can attract the additional 
attention required by all other parts of the organisation.  Employees need to realise that by 
following recommended security practices they are also contributing to the uninterrupted and 
efficient operation of business processes; if security collapses, productivity will suffer as well.  
Employee perception of security needs to be changed from “something that gets in the way of 
achieving organisational goals” to “something that is important to the organisation achieving its 
goals”.  Von Solms and von Solms (2005) suggest that, in an organisational context, information 
security should be called business security, as it secures the prolonged existence of the company.   
 Employee role in protecting the organisation.  Employees should understand that everyone is 
part of security.  Most employees in an organisation have access to some confidential 
information; thus they all bear some responsibility to keep the organisation safe.  Even a single 
employee’s misbehaviour can have catastrophic consequences (e.g. unauthorised disclosure of 
organisational secrets or dangerous malware entering the organisational network).  As a result, 
56 
 
they all need to know what precautions they should be taking to reduce the organisation’s 
exposure to security risks.   
2.7.3.2 Active management participation 
Security behavioural change cannot be delivered without active management engagement: managers need 
to participate in security deployments, as security is also a corporate governance issue (von Solms, 2006, 
section 2.5.3).  Organisational managers need to lead security implementation by example: adoption of 
security by all levels of management leads to increased visibility to everyone in the organisation, 
positively affecting the organisation’s information security culture and encouraging employee compliance 
with the implemented policies (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010; Höne and Eloff, 2002; Kritzinger and von 
Solms, 2005; Van Niekerk, 2007).  Unwillingness of organisational management to participate in security 
can lead to failures of security behavioural change campaigns (Karyda et al., 2005).   
Management participation may demand allocation of significant management resources in early stages of 
behavioural change (mostly in terms of time and effort), but the long term benefits of improved 
compliance can balance out the initial investment.  Management involvement in security can also bridge 
the value gaps between organisational divisions identified in section 2.6.1: increased adoption by 
organisational management can lead to information security managers feeling they have management 
support in performing what is required to protect the organisation, while productivity-focused divisions 
are more likely to follow their superiors’ example and participate in protecting the organisation.  The 
importance of middle management in the adoption of security should also not be overlooked.  Managers 
of smaller teams interact much more frequently with employees in the functional areas; by raising the 
level of security awareness amongst them and changing their behaviour, it is more likely that employees 
will follow their managers’ behaviour (Johnson and Goetz, 2007).  As a result any attempts for security 
behaviour changes should ensure adequate engagement from all levels of the organisation.   
2.7.4 Information security culture and its effect on compliance 
As discussed in section 2.7.1, organisational information security culture plays a major role in employee 
compliance decisions.  Information security culture is defined as a set of collective norms and values, 
developed through employee interaction with information security elements (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010; 
Schlienger and Teufel, 2003) or by adjusting their behaviour to match that of their colleagues (Thomson 
et al., 2006).  It is developed at individual, group and higher organisational management level, and is not 
formalised, but can severely affect employee behaviour and intention to comply with security policies.  
As a result, many researchers argue that it is equally important to organisational security  as technical 
implementations (Fléchais et al., 2005; Johnson and Goetz, 2007; Karyda et al., 2005; Knapp et al., 2009; 
Pahnila et al., 2007; Williams, 2008).  Faily and Fléchais (2010) explain that the formation of 
organisational security culture is based on a combination of tangible factors (technical and procedural 
controls) and intangible factors (assumptions, norms, and values of employees) within the information 
security implementation.  Any attempts to influence employee culture and incentivise secure behaviour, 
need to target both tangible and intangible factors: friction-inducing technical and procedural controls 
need to be eliminated, and employee assumptions, norms and values that lead to insecure behaviours need 
to be understood and addressed to deliver effective security.   
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2.7.5 Enforcing monitoring and sanctions 
Organisational attempts to increase the cost of non-compliant behaviours through monitoring and 
sanctions should also be implemented and enforced.  But, as discussed in section 2.6.3, identifying 
potential disciplinary offences by employees is currently unmanageable, inefficient and in many cases 
impossible when rule-breaking is part of an organisation’s security culture.  To make detection of non-
compliance possible (1) security implementation design should provide the potential for low-cost secure 
behaviours, (2) employees should be aware of information security risks and required actions to 
participate in risk mitigation, and (3) an organisational security culture that values and favours 
compliance should be nurtured.  Only then it becomes possible for an organisation to create mechanisms 
that can effectively detect non-compliant behaviours and, potentially, impose sanctions on employees 
who practice those.  The consequences for such violations should be clearly stated both in policies and in 
SAET content. 
2.8 Problems with past organisational security research 
The past information security research presented in the previous section provides valuable insights for 
attempts to re-design security and align it with employee primary tasks.  Despite that, as section 2.6 
identified, past research failed to provide organisations with solid guidelines, tools and methodologies 
that can drive the implementation of an end-to-end approach to manage the human element of information 
security.  This can be attributed to a number of reasons:  
1. In-depth security behaviour research focused on individual home users, while organisational 
research focused mostly on higher-level security risk management and policy formulation.  
2. There were limited attempts to engage with organisational security users, to better understand 
and characterise non-compliant behaviours and their drivers.   
3. Security behaviour is usually approached as a binary decision, either secure or insecure, failing 
to identify potential responses to high-friction security by risk-aware employees. 
4. The majority of research attempting to create user-centred security design processes focused on 
designing new systems, with limited attention given to creating methodologies that can improve 
existing organisational implementations and corresponding security behaviours. 
5. Limited attempts were made to define measurements for employee behaviour, and no tools exist 
that allow for long-term and continuous assessment of employee behaviour and organisational 
security culture.  This prevents organisations from implementing ongoing measurement and 
learning approaches to constantly monitor and improve the compatibility of their security 
implementations with their productivity-related activities. 
This section provides an in-depth analysis of the above research drawbacks and explains how new 
research needs to improve on those, in order to provide knowledge that can enable better management of 
security in modern organisations. 
2.8.1 Focus on high-level aspects of organisational security 
The vast majority of past organisational security research did not focus on employee decision making, but 
on high-level aspects of security, like improving information security management (e.g. von Solms, 
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2006), risk assessment integration in security (e.g. Anderson and Choobineh, 2008; Stoneburner et al., 
2002) and writing better policies (e.g. Björck, 2001).  On the other hand, attempts to improve security 
design by better understanding user decision making at the micro level, mostly focused on home security 
users (Wash 2010; Dourish et al. 2004; Herley 2009), providing no insights on the effects of an 
organisational environment on employee compliance decisions.   
Past organisational security research also failed to deploy research methods that accurately capture the 
complexity of employee security behaviours: the majority of the work discussed in this chapter was done 
through surveys and questionnaires (e.g. Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010; Fulford and Doherty, 2003).  The use 
of such data collection methods limits the scope of the investigation to predefined topics decided by 
researchers (and corresponding organisations) before commencing the research, limiting the potential to 
explore and identify currently unknown behavioural patterns and their causes.  The only exception to this 
is Albrechtsen and Hovden’s (2009) open-ended interviews that identified the existence of a value gap 
between information security managers and end users.  This constituted a significant breakthrough in 
understanding the dynamics that drive security behaviours in modern organisations.  The reasons behind 
the identified lack of direct research engagement with organisations can be attributed to three categories:  
1. Lack of perceived direct benefits reduces willingness of organisations to engage with academia.  
Academic research often needs to verify its findings through further studies, especially when 
exploring areas where existing knowledge is currently limited.  For an organisation that seeks 
readily available solutions to manage its security challenges, resources invested in working with 
researchers may often be perceived as better spent elsewhere.  
2. Fear of disclosure of sensitive information on security compromises through academic research 
also acts as a deterrent.   Potential legal and reputational consequences make it hard for 
organisations to allow academic researchers to access such information, and later potentially 
publish it in the public domain. 
3. Reluctance of information security managers to use “untested” innovative approaches proposed 
by academics to replace their existing ones, although this is a bit of an oxymoron given the 
current craft nature of information security management, using principles learned “through 
experience”, with minimal scientific knowledge used.   
The above problems suggest that, unless the benefits of engaging with academia are made obvious to an 
organisation (i.e. the possibility to apply scientifically-validated novel ideas to solve a widely prevalent 
problem), academic access to organisations and industry data will remain hard.  This negatively impacts 
both researcher’s ability to produce knowledge that can improve security implementations in 
organisations, but also security management’s ability to deliver more science-driven security 
implementations. 
2.8.2 Limited attempts to engage with users  
User-involvement in security design can play a key role in the effectiveness of emerging security 
implementations (Camp, 2011).  Unfortunately, past research that engaged with organisational users, is 
minimal and, to the author’s best knowledge, limited to the following:  
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1. Adams and Sasse (1999), Sasse et al. (2001), Weirich (2005) and Inglesant and Sasse (2010) 
used user interviews to investigate user’s understanding of security and its effect on their 
password behaviours. 
2. Bartsch and Sasse (2013) found that employees circumvent access control mechanisms when 
policy change requests appear to ask for too much effort.  
3. Beautement et al.’s (2008) compliance budget showed that employees are only willing to tolerate 
a fixed amount of effort for security.  Once the organisation demands more than that, they will 
just stop complying.  
The findings of the above research provided valuable insights on how to improve the usability of 
passwords and access control, but research focus needs to be widened to other aspects of organisational 
information security.  Information handling for example (i.e. how information is stored and shared in 
organisational or other systems), is a key issue for many organisations.  It is currently heavily monitored, 
with expensive DLP technologies that can block employees from sharing valuable information for work 
purposes that the DLP admin-defined rules may identify as sensitive.  The frustration created by such 
restrictions can lead to user alienation and create a negative attitude towards security, which can then 
impact their willingness to comply even with other well-designed security mechanisms.  As a result, 
security research should look further than examining mechanisms in isolation, and aim to identify the 
complete impact of organisational security implementations on employee workflow, together with 
emerging employee responses. 
The need to further include users in security research also calls for a paradigm shift in how such research 
is defined.  Security aiming to understand and improve user security behaviour is often called usable 
security, but such a definition points to creating easy to use mechanisms.  Research on improving user 
behaviours should always be referred to as user-centred.  This better reflects its attempt to capture and 
design for elements of human behaviour that have little to do with ability to interact with a system like 
employee risk perceptions, their cost-benefit driven security decisions, management pressure to focus on 
other organisational priorities, and the effectiveness of organisational  risk communication. 
2.8.3 Focused on security compliance as a binary decision 
All the past research presented in this chapter considered users engaging with organisational computer 
systems as being either in a secure or an insecure state.  Undesirable behaviours were those where 
employees deviated from the security policy content or what the researchers considered to be a “correct” 
or secure behaviour.  This may be partly accurate but it is important to examine for the existence of a 
middle ground employee behavioural state: how do employees follow up non-compliance? Do they 
discard security in its entirety or do they resort to other actions outside the security policy? If yes, can the 
organisation (and other organisations) learn something from the emerging employee behaviours?  To 
answer these questions, security research needs to better understand employee security decisions when 
they recognise the presence of security-related risks in their work environment, but feel that the 
mechanisms and processes in place are incompatible with their primary task activities.  This can lead to 
better understanding of current security behaviours in organisations, and development of research and 
organisational ability to tailor proposed security solutions that better reflect employee priorities and risk 
perceptions.  Emerging new (or improved) security solutions driven by employee understanding and 
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behaviours are less likely to be resisted, thus improving their real world effectiveness compared to 
existing ones.   
User understanding, perceptions and corresponding behaviours for home computer users have been 
studied by a number of researchers in the past: Dourish et al., (2004) presented home user perception and 
understanding of security systems, Wash (2010) revealed home users perceptions of threats and attackers, 
while Kirlappos and Sasse (2012) and Kirlappos et al. (2012) discussed how users make trust decisions 
online, using their own understanding instead of provided security indicators, suggesting that such user 
perceptions and rationalisations should be taken into account when designing security systems.  
Unfortunately, to the researcher’s knowledge, no research similar to the above has been conducted in a 
corporate environment to date. 
2.8.4 Focused on designing new systems, ignored existing ones 
Past research on user-centred security focused primarily on devising principles to gather requirements in 
order to design new, bespoke software or systems to fit the requirements of specific work environments 
(e.g. Fléchais et al., 2010, Faily and Fléchais, 2010).  This provides limited usefulness for organisations 
seeking to improve their existing security systems and processes; as Ashenden and Sasse (2013) 
identified: “a key responsibility for CISOs is to remove blockages that prevent information security from 
becoming ‘business as usual’”.  In many modern organisations complete replacement and redesign of a 
system is not an option, due to corresponding time and cost overheads.  For information security research 
to add value to organisations, it should aim to provide tangible suggestions on how existing organisational 
security processes and mechanisms can be improved to bring security and productivity closer.  Blythe et 
al. (2014) suggest that this can be achieved in policy rethinking and redesign by identifying existing user 
behaviour and workarounds: “Workarounds that don’t endanger security and that allow more efficient 
workflow processes should be incorporated into the organisation’s policies, essentially moving the policy 
“deviations” to actual policy”.  This is a promising suggestion, but putting it into practice requires much 
better understanding of organisational security behaviours than what existed before the work presented in 
this thesis commenced.  In addition, the need to rethink policy design is just one of the three elements of 
current security implementations that need to be improved to deliver effective protection, as presented in 
section 2.7 of this chapter.  Secure behaviour also requires security mechanisms designed around 
employee primary tasks, to reduce security-productivity friction, and improved communication, to 
effectively communicate organisational risks and better understand employee priorities.  Information 
security research should always aim to help organisations in deploying effective protection without the 
need for expensive and time-consuming adaptations of organisational security (or even complete 
redesign) that may be uneconomic and difficult to justify.   
2.8.5 Lack of measurement and learning-driven security management 
Learning needs to become an integral part of modern organisational security management.  Schein (2010) 
explains that in fast changing environments, like modern organisations, it is not appropriate to base 
decisions in the past or in the present.   It is necessary to think "in terms of the near future to assess 
whether or not our solutions are working".  Organisations should aim to develop an ability to learn, 
which is important for adapting to changing organisational environments, where the business and 
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technologies constantly evolve and become more complex.  In this context of change, security cultures 
can benefit from becoming more learning-oriented.  By observing and learning from employee 
behaviours, organisations can implement continuous improvement programs, in an approach similar to 
the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle of ISO27001.  This can also allow accurate post-deployment assessment of 
the impact that security measures have on employee activities, prioritisation of intervention programs and 
implementation of targeted interventions to address specific security shortcomings. 
An effective way to drive organisational learning on information security is the deployment of 
information security metrics.  Current use of metrics in information security management is mostly 
focused on technical aspects of security (Brotby et al., 2013; Payne, 2009), with some limited attempts to 
measure employee behaviour being basic and providing outcomes of limited usefulness.  Current 
information security metrics provide information on issues like application vulnerabilities, firewall 
configuration effectiveness and incident response statistics (Wong, 2011).  Relevant standardisation also 
exists, with the ISO27004 standard on information security metrics defining a number of measurement 
areas for assessing the effectiveness of Information Security Management Systems (ISMS).  Despite that, 
existing metrics to measure security behaviour in the latest edition of ISO27004, are not suitable to 
capture the complexity of employee security behaviours in an organisation (e.g. Count of logs/registries 
with annual information security awareness training field/row filler as “Received” or ask each user 
about number of passwords which satisfy organisation's password policy).   
Organisational security research needs to generate knowledge that leads to more effective and 
representative behavioural metrics, and then use those to leverage measurement-based learning and 
decision-making; this should allow for increased consideration of employee behaviours in the 
management of organisational security.  Looking deeper into organisations to devise metrics that can be 
used to better understand employee behaviours may sound as difficult at first, but information exists in 
abundance in modern organisational IT systems.  As Hubbard (2010, p48) puts it, “anything detectable at 
different amounts is measurable”.  In addition, combining various sources of measurable information can 
provide organisation-wide snapshots of employee behaviours on various information security areas at any 
given point in time.  It also enables user involvement without the need for continuous, and potentially 
disruptive, direct engagement.  This allows security managers working within organisations to be aware 
of what happens within the wider organisation and can lead to more productivity-focused information 
security management, prioritising risks closer to the concerns of the business, while also minimising the 
impact of security on the organisation’s productive capabilities.   
2.9 Purpose of research 
The identified gaps and drawbacks of past user-centred security research demonstrated the need for 
further research to examine and understand employee security decisions in organisational environments.  
Hands-on, “on the ground” organisational security research is required to obtain better understanding of 
existing information security approaches, their influence on employee behaviour, together with 
corresponding employee responses to those.  The identified research gaps led to the emergence of three 
themes of required research:  
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1. Need to improve current understanding of insecure behaviours in organisational environments by 
better capturing and understanding the challenges security introduces in employee workflow.  
This needs to be done by examining: 
i. employee understanding of organisational information sensitivity and security risks, 
together with actions required to mitigate those (understanding of what organisationally 
prescribed secure actions are and how to comply)   
ii. employee experience with organisational security provisions to mitigate aforementioned 
risks and protect the organisation 
iii. corresponding employee behaviours (how and why security mechanisms and processes are 
followed or bypassed) and responses to high-friction security, also examining employee 
understanding of the risks related to their actions 
iv. the difference between insecure behaviour driven by lack of awareness and insecure 
behaviour driven by high-friction security, together with lessons organisations can draw 
from those 
2. Widen the scope of user-centred security research to capture a more holistic view of the 
organisational security implementation, including as many mechanisms and policies employees 
have to deal with as possible.  Past research approaches demonstrated the difficulty of attempting 
to understand user compliance by only studying specific parts of it.  Attempts to remove 
security-productivity friction require reducing the overall impact of security mechanisms and 
processes on organisational productivity, so studying those in isolation can only partly address 
the problem.  As a result, in order to deliver approaches that lead to more effective protection, 
the goodness-of-fit of the overall security implementation with employee primary tasks needs to 
be evaluated. 
3. There is also a clear need to identify elements of organisational security implementations that 
can be used to devise metrics for employee security behaviours.  These can then be used to 
assess organisational security effectiveness, create learning and communication channels for 
information security management, drive future improvements, and assess the effect of those on 
employee behaviour and the overall organisational security environment. 
Research aiming to address the above topics requires active engagement with organisations in a way that 
can provide rich information on employee interaction with security systems, rules and processes.  In the 
remainder of this thesis, I discuss how I proceeded to conduct two case studies with two large 
organisations to (1) overcome identified problems in security research by engaging directly with 
organisations, (2) produce knowledge that significantly addresses the identified gaps in the approaches 
and findings of past research, (3) improve understanding of the impact of security on employee 
productive activities, (4) better characterise employee response to that impact and their emerging 
behaviours, and (5) use the emerging knowledge to provide organisations with an approach to drive more 
effective and user-centred information security management.   
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 Methodology 
The identified gaps in past organisational security research, discussed at the end of the literature review, 
suggested the need to improve existing understanding of employee security behaviours, as a prerequisite 
to any attempts to improve existing organisational security implementations.  In order to deliver such 
understanding, further research examining security behaviours in organisational environments was 
required.  When this research commenced, the author was presented with a unique opportunity to conduct 
such hands-on research:  an EPSRC-funded project (“Productive security”12) that started at the same time 
as the author’s PhD degree (led by the UCL Information Security Research Group - ISRG), provided 
access to organisations and data that would not be possible otherwise.  The two organisations involved in 
the project (Company A and Company B) were large multinational companies with strong UK presence.  
In both organisations, security management had recognised the need to improve understanding of 
employee security behaviours in relation to their current security implementations.  As part of their 
attempts to improve, they approached ISRG asking for knowledge and guidance that could drive future 
security planning and implementation.  As part of this, they agreed to provide access to their employees, 
together with additional data required for this research, in order to identify and characterise employee 
behaviours, identify potential areas for improvement, and provide knowledge and guidance to drive those 
improvements.  
The two organisations agreed for the author to conduct two case studies, which involved both using 
existing data and collecting new one.  The data collection and analysis process aimed to capture employee 
interaction with existing security mechanisms and processes, but also their attitude towards security.  The 
research work presented in the remainder of this thesis was conducted in six phases: 
Phase 1 Company A thematic analysis. The research commenced with a preliminary thematic analysis 
of 30 interviews from Company A.  Previous work of the ISRG with Company A during a past 
project (“Trust Economics”13) led to a large interview set (118 interviews) and a survey (1488) 
on employee security behaviour being readily available.  This dataset was previously used for 
other publications relating to access control (Bartsch and Sasse, 2012, 2013), but no analysis 
attempted to holistically examine employee interaction with security, investigate friction-
inducing security and identify employee responses to it.  The preliminary analysis of phase 1 
allowed categorising identified insecure employee behaviours, based on factors driving their 
development.  It also allowed identification of cause and effect relationships between existing 
security mechanisms or processes and corresponding employee behaviours, also identifying 
areas where further research was required.  The thematic analysis process followed is outlined 
                                                          
 
12 Productive Security is an EPSRC funded project at UCL Research Institute for the Science of Cyber Security.  It 
aims to scientifically assist decision makers in the field of information security to make more optimal choices with 
respect to both their organisation’s security and productivity. 
13 http://sec.cs.ucl.ac.uk/projects/trust_economics/ 
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later in this chapter (section 3.5.1), while its application and findings are presented in chapter 
4. 
Phase 2 Company A grounded theory analysis.  Based on the improved understanding that emerged 
from the Phase 1 analysis, a second analysis was done of the full set of Company A interviews.  
This analysis improved and enriched the early analysis findings on employee insecure 
behaviours.  The prevalence of insecure behaviours across the organisation was confirmed by 
analysing the available survey results.  This led to the emergence of the main contribution of 
this thesis – the identification of Shadow Security, its impact on employee security behaviours 
and its relevance to organisational security management (chapter 5).      
Phase 3 Company B data collection.  Based on the improved knowledge from Phases 1 and 2, 82 
interviews were conducted in company B.  Those were used to confirm and strengthen the 
validity of the paradigms that emerged from Phases 1 and 2.  In order to capture the prevalence 
of the identified security behaviours across the organisation, a survey of 641 employees was 
conducted, based on a preliminary analysis of the 82 interviews (chapter 5).   
Phase 4 Company B grounded theory analysis. This stage allowed confirmation and better 
characterisation of shadow security, confirmation of its existence in a different organisational 
setting than the one in which it was originally identified, better characterisation of its 
occurrence and impact in a security implementation, and potential approaches to better manage 
its development in organisations (chapter 5). 
Phase 5 Trust-focused grounded theory analysis.  The analyses from Phases 1, 2 and 4 suggested the 
need to examine the development of security-related trust relationships in the two organisations 
and its influence on employee security behaviours.  In order to do so, a secondary grounded 
analysis of both interview datasets was conducted, focusing on instances where the presence of 
trust influenced employee behaviours (chapter 6).  The findings from Phases 4 and 5 were used 
to devise a set of principles, guidelines and metrics that allow organisations to better 
incorporate shadow security and trust in their security management approaches (chapter 7). 
Phase 6 Case study.  On-site work with Company B for 6 months, allowed examining the application of 
the emerging principles, guidelines and metrics in an organisational environment.  This led to 
identification of the challenges of doing research in the field, but also potential challenges for 
researchers attempting to deploy research findings in organisations, together with ways to 
address those (chapter 8).   
The remainder of this chapter presents and justifies the choice of research methods used in the above 
research phases, also describing the data collection and analysis processes.  It also discusses the steps 
taken to improve outcome validity, presents an ethical analysis of the research in question and discusses 
the required ethical research principles followed while conducting this research. 
3.1 Case Study 
The exploratory nature of the research problem made standard statistical methods an unsuitable research 
approach.  It required an exploratory approach that would allow improving the current understanding of 
both practitioners and researchers on how security behaviours in organisations are affected by various 
elements of an existing security implementation.  As a result, a case study appeared to be the most 
65 
 
suitable method to use.  Thomas (2011) defines a case study as "…analyses of persons, events, decisions, 
periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more 
method”.  It is focused on understanding the dynamics presented within single settings, investigating a 
phenomenon within its real-life context, revealing “Not only what, but also why and how” (Yin, 2009).  A 
case study is a form of interpretive research (Lapke 2008, p68): it does not predefine independent and 
dependent variables, focusing on the complexity of human sense as the situation in question emerges, 
attempting to understand phenomena based on the meanings people assign to them.  It can be both 
descriptive and explanatory (Eisenhardt, 1989), and is good for subjects where existing knowledge is 
fundamentally flawed or non-existent: case study outcomes can enrich the available understanding of the 
research issues of interest (Gerring, 2004).  The case that is the subject of the inquiry is an instance of a 
class of phenomena, providing an analytical frame, an object, within which the study is conducted and 
which the case illuminates and explicates.  A case study also has “…an aim to generalise across a larger 
set of units” (Gerring, 2004).   Essentially a case study’s purpose is “not hoping to prove anything but 
learn something”, on a problem where lack of existing understanding prevents the use of other research 
methods (Eysenck, 2013). 
3.1.1 Merits of case study 
The use of case studies in research provides a number of advantages compared to statistical approaches 
(Table 4): 
1. Identification of difficult to capture insights: Case studies offer insights, observations and 
examples not easily revealed using other research approaches.  The depth of investigation allows 
for improved understanding of situations of interest where pre-existing knowledge is limited 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).   
2. Providing causal explanation of phenomena.  In-depth description of phenomena during a case 
study allows identification of causal explanations for phenomena of interest (Yin, 2009). 
3. Biased towards falsifying theories.  Case study research is not more biased towards verification 
than statistical methods.  Instead there is greater bias towards falsification, as single case studies 
can disprove a theory by showing that a current situation is problematic; in such cases one proof 
of evidence is adequate for falsification of a theory (Flyvbjerg, 2006).   
4. Avoids removing extreme cases.  Case studies also avoid the problem of having rare, but 
potentially critical, situations being treated as outliers by other statistical methods.  They also 
prevent the potential for the effect of such rare events on the phenomenon of interest being lost 
in normalisation (Yin, 2009).   
5. Useful for theory generation.  The improved situational understanding of the phenomena of 
interest, emerging from case studies, can be used to provide justification for generation of both 
theories and testable hypotheses that can drive further research (Gersick, 1988). 
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 Case studies Statistical methods 
Strengths 
Depth 
 
High conceptual validity 
 
Process and context understanding 
 
Understanding causes and outcomes 
of phenomena 
 
Fostering new hypotheses and 
research questions 
Breadth 
 
Understanding prevalence of 
phenomena across population 
 
Measuring correlation for case 
population 
 
Establishment of probabilistic 
levels of confidence 
Weaknesses 
Selection bias may overstate or 
understate relationships 
 
Weak understanding of occurrence 
in population  
 
Statistical significance often 
unknown or unclear 
Conceptual stretching to get larger 
samples 
 
Weak understanding of context, 
process and causal mechanisms 
 
Correlation does not imply 
causation 
 
Weak mechanisms for fostering 
new hypotheses 
Table 4: Case study vs Statistical methods (adapted from Yin, 2009 - p8) 
3.1.2 Criticism and defence of case study as a research tool 
The main criticism against the use of case studies in research is that they lack generalisability.  This 
argument is based on the lack of statistical testing or statistical proof of causal relationships in phenomena 
that occur in the context examined, which often leads to researchers immediately dismissing case study 
findings as situation specific (Lee and Baskerville, 2003).  But the truth is that case study research has no 
need or desire to be statistically generalisable (Lapke and Dhillon, 2008).  Instead of looking for numbers 
to perform statistical analyses on, a case study aims to interpret a situation of interest as much as possible 
to: (1) provide holistic and meaningful understanding and description of real events within a problematic 
situation (Yin, 2009), then using that understanding to (2) generate knowledge that can be useful in 
tackling similar problems in the future.   Consequently, generalisability of case study findings is not 
achieved through statistics, but by applying the acquired knowledge to similar contexts when studying 
new cases.  In addition, emerging knowledge can be usefully applied without having to keep all other 
parameters constant, as traditional statistical methods strongly require (Guba et al., 1994).  As a result, 
despite the lack of statistical generalisability, findings and knowledge generated from case studies are 
much easier to transfer across different complex environments than those generated by statistical 
methods.  The case study definition of generalisability ties well with its dictionary definition: “forming 
general notions by abstraction from particular instances” (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010).  As 
Walsham (1993) puts it: there are no correct or incorrect theories, just interesting and less interesting 
ways to view the world and case studies can provide rich representation of such worldviews.   
3.1.3 Why it was chosen 
The exploratory nature of the research topic and the complexity of the research problem (insufficient 
existing understanding of employee security behaviours) required a research method that would focus on 
improving existing knowledge, instead of testing specific theories.  This made a case study the most 
suitable approach.  Case studies currently amount for a large proportion of published books and articles in 
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psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, political science, economics and medicine (Flyvbjerg 2011) 
due to their exploratory and learning-oriented nature.  They have already been reported as a good research 
method to use in software engineering and information systems, when the boundaries between 
phenomena and their context is unclear, offering insights impossible otherwise; examples can be found in 
Runeson and Höst (2008) and Walsham (1993).  Despite that, there are few reports of case studies being 
used in studying the application of information security in organisational environments.  A notable 
exception is Lapke (2008), who used case studies to demonstrate that organisational power relationships 
significantly influence the formulation and implementation of information security policies, and Moore et 
al. (2011), who used those to characterise the drivers and nature of insider attacks in US-based 
organisations.  This section outlines the reasons for which case study was chosen as a suitable 
methodology for the research presented in the remainder of this thesis.  
3.1.3.1 Proving the existence of a problematic situation 
The case studies conducted aimed to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of current information security 
approaches, by providing organisations with tangible examples of failures of their existing processes and 
mechanisms to tackle current security challenges.  This proved to be a useful tool for the author (and 
other ISRG researchers) in attempts to provide relevant and practical suggestions for improvements to 
partner organisations. 
3.1.3.2 Deep understanding of a problem where knowledge is limited 
As previously explained, the aim of this research was to better understand and characterise how existing 
security controls fail to deliver compliance and how employees respond to those.  A case study makes this 
possible by identifying causal explanations for non-compliance by revealing missing or incorrect 
elements of the security implementation that negatively influence employee behaviour.  In addition, to the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, no research has been published to date on employee security 
behaviours that had access to such a large dataset from more than one organisation.  When access to such 
a dataset was secured, a case study approach would provide insights previously inaccessible and 
unattainable.  
Directly interacting with employees during the interview phase allowed for better understanding of 
employee priorities and the effect of current security implementations on the organisations’ primary task-
focused functions.  This allowed identifying causal links between friction-inducing security and 
corresponding employee behaviours.  The emerging knowledge proved to be useful when engaging with 
corporate partners: it attracted attention from industry by providing tangible evidence that current security 
approaches are ineffective and require improvements.  In addition, the combination of two studies from 
different organisations allowed for widening the scope of the emerging paradigms on information security 
compliance, also improving the validity of the outcomes and transferability of those to solve security 
behaviour challenges in other organisational settings (Yin, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2011). 
3.1.3.3 Looking for rare events 
Unless a security implementation suffers from severe drawbacks, information security behaviours in 
many organisations may appear “good enough” on a macro scale, when average-case behaviours are 
examined.  This means that statistical testing can potentially miss infrequent events, by dismissing those 
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as outliers or losing those in normalisation.  The rarity and “extreme case” nature of many high-risk 
behaviours (security breaches are often rare events, with non-compliance affected by many different 
contextual and individual factors), made statistical testing unsuitable for this research and case studies a 
more suitable method to use.   
3.1.3.4 Hypothesis testing unsuitable to use 
Hypothesis testing calls for a controlled environment where control of other influences to the phenomena 
examined exists.  In addition it requires possession of sufficient knowledge on that phenomena for 
statistical hypotheses to be devised before the research commences.  This made hypothesis testing 
unsuitable for this research for three reasons: 
1. As mentioned in section 3.1.3.2, existing knowledge on employee behaviour by security 
researchers, designers or decision makers is not specific enough to devise hypotheses that 
accurately capture the nature of insecure behaviours and their causes.   
2. Attempting to only verify a set of statistically testable hypotheses ends up focusing only on 
specific, predefined factors that a researcher assumes to influence security behaviours.  This 
carries the risk of missing the bigger picture, failing to identify previously unknown drivers 
behind employee behaviours (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Yin, 2009).   
3. It is impossible to control elements of organisational environments to avoid damaging the 
validity of hypothesis testing research.  In organisations changes in the environment happen 
very quickly and are often unpredictable (this became even more obvious when research 
commenced and during the subsequent fieldwork): organisations have projects, audit 
deliverables, annual targets, changes in their target markets they may need to adapt to, even 
mergers, acquisitions and outsourcing of key divisions happening constantly, often at very short 
notice.  Any attempt to engage with them to improve their security should pose a minimal 
impact on their production related tasks, but also be adaptable to the pace with which the above 
changes happen in the corporate world.  This makes controlling organisational elements for 
statistical testing impossible, as all the above changes would invalidate the results.   
3.1.3.5 Creates potential for future research 
The improved knowledge on employee security behaviours that can emerge from case studies provides 
significant ground for future research.  It allows the formulation of future testable hypotheses, grounded 
on real-world problems identified during the case study (and clearly outlined in case study reporting), 
leading to wider applicability of the findings.  This proved to substantially address the “narrow focus” 
problem of past information security research discussed in section 2.8 of the literature review. 
3.2 Data collection 
3.2.1 Interviews 
The interviews conducted covered various aspects of information security in the organisations examined 
and the experience of employees with it, aiming to identify friction points between security and business 
processes that lead to insecure employee behaviours.  Interview questions were semi structured: 
combining features of structured interviews (closed, questionnaire-like questions) and unstructured (open 
questions).  The choice of a semi-structured approach was driven by the need to cover interaction with 
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various mechanisms and areas of interest to the organisation, but also provide adequate flexibility for 
employees to share their behaviours and beliefs on the interview topics, aiming to improve understanding 
of security behaviours in the organisational setting (Rogers et al., 2011).  The interviews were conducted 
one-to-one by a team of three researchers in Company A and four researchers (including the author) in 
Company B, lasting approximately 50 minutes each, allowing for elicitation of a suitably rich 
representation of the employee experience of security.  All interviewers received interview training 
together by the ISRG group leader and the study protocol was pre-shared, discussed extensively and was 
well understood by the interviewers before the interview process commenced.  During the interview 
process, interviewers were instructed to follow up employee responses: when interviewees reported 
problems with a security mechanism, they were asked additional questions, to further explain the 
implications of those problems on their primary tasks and the actions they take to alleviate those.  At no 
point were participants encouraged to admit to security infractions though.  They were simply asked 
about their awareness of, and experience with, a set of corporate security policies and mechanisms.  
Researchers probed interviewees to discuss insecure behaviours only when they reported those first.  Out 
of the 82 interviews conducted in Company B, the researcher directly conducted 20. 
To ensure interviews were adequately context-specific for each organisation, question formulation was 
done in collaboration with the organisations’ security managers. This led to interview questions that 
accommodated for the organisation’s security policy, security mechanisms, the nature of organisational 
primary tasks, the organisation’s goals and security objectives, and concerns of the organisation’s 
management on employee behaviours that could potentially lead to security compromises.  Interview sets 
were also structured to reflect other organisational characteristics (e.g. localised differences between 
office locations).  Piloting of the interview sets was also done with employees from both companies, 
ensuring that the formulated question set accurately reflected the organisational environment in question.  
The structure of interviews touched upon aspects of security awareness and compliance, including: 
1. Employee perception of potential sensitivity of the information they handle and how security 
affects their role. 
2. Employee understanding of organisational support for security.  This included awareness of the 
existence of security policies and corresponding security mechanisms that they should or could 
use to protect information and reduce security risks. 
3. Where employees exercised non-compliance as a response to shortcomings or friction in the 
organisational security experience, identification of the conditions that led to those behaviours 
being divergent from organisation policy.  In those cases, the interviews also assessed their 
understanding about the need for security, despite non-compliance, and potential actions that 
emerged from it. 
The general topics included in all interviews were (detailed topics and extended questions for one of the 
two sets of interviews can be found in Appendix B: Sample interview questions): 
1. Information Security policy awareness 
2. Employee awareness of the sensitivity of information they handle 
3. Management involvement in security compliance 
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4. Information Security Culture 
5. Password use and handling 
6. Information handling and sharing   
7. Document sharing 
8. Laptop and removable media usage   
Sampling (selection of interview participants) did not aim for randomness but for broad organisational 
coverage, aiming to extend the context of emerging theories as much as possible (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Participants held various lower and lower-to-middle management positions within a number of 
organisational divisions, including maintenance, customer service, marketing, administration, finance, 
procurement and IT, and were based in various US or UK locations.  They were recruited via the 
company email newsletter, sent to a random sample of employees from each department.  Participation 
was also encouraged by the organisations’ Chief Information Security Officers, who also assured that 
participants would not be identified or followed up when insecure behaviours were identified.  
In company A the first 118 responders were scheduled for interview in person or by phone.  Participants 
were given a consent form that described how transcripts would be anonymised and only aggregated 
results reported to the organisation, also explaining that they could ask the interviewer further questions 
about the process and terminate the interview at any point.  After the interview, participants were paid the 
equivalent of £25.  The same applied to Company B although, being a slightly smaller organisation, the 
number of employees interviewed was 82.  The interviews were recorded in duplicate recorders and 
copied on encrypted external drives when travelling between interview locations and the university.  Due 
to the high volume of interview data in audio format, transcription to text was done by an external 
company.  It was done on an accurate word-to-word basis to ensure all employee responses were captured 
accurately in text format. 
3.2.2 Using available data in new research 
As mentioned earlier in this section, interview and survey data from Company A was already available 
before commencing this research, so a secondary analysis was conducted on those.  The main advantage 
of secondary analyses is that they save a significant amount of time compared to the collection of bespoke 
data (Bryman, 2012).  This was crucial for successfully carrying out the work presented in this thesis, as 
collecting two large data sets was beyond possibility for a PhD project, both in terms of cost and time 
required for the desired data collection and analysis in two large organisations.  Availability of one large 
interview set and collection of a second one, led to high-quality data being used, which allowed for better 
exploration of the research problem in question and creation of an end-to-end story that can be used to 
drive future improvements of organisational security management.   
3.3 Case study: How it was done 
3.3.1 Case study process 
The case study process followed in the research presented in this thesis was based on Yin’s (2009) six 
steps for a successful case study (Figure 5): (1) Identification of questions, (2) Identification of unit of 
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inquiry, (3) Definition of study propositions, (4) Collection and analysis of data, (5) Logical linking of 
data to propositions, and (6) Interpretation of findings.   
 
Figure 5: Yin’s case study process 
3.3.1.1 Identification of study questions:  
As previously discussed, this research aimed to improve on the existing understanding of security 
behaviours in organisations, based on the identified failures of organisational security management and 
past security research to effectively include employee primary-task priorities to the design of security 
solutions.  To achieve this, the two case studies presented in this thesis aimed to better understand and 
answer the following research questions14:  
1. Do employees understand the need for security mechanisms in the organisation? If yes or no, 
why? 
2. What security-related challenges do employees find when attempting to proceed with their 
primary tasks? How do they respond to friction between their primary task and security 
mechanisms and processes? 
3. How can the improved understanding from the previous question be used to transform the 
systems in place to eliminate the problems discovered, avoiding the need to redesign the systems 
completely? 
3.3.1.2 Identification of unit of inquiry 
The focus of this case study was both the users of organisational security (and their security behaviours) 
and the security mechanisms and processes they interact with (in order to provide insights to 
organisations on how existing security mechanisms and processes can be modified to better accommodate 
for employee focus on the primary task). 
3.3.1.3 Definition of study propositions  
Based on the identified research gaps of section 2.8, the questions that needed to be examined and the 
identified units of inquiry, five study propositions were defined: 
P1. “Directly discussing problems of security implementations and compliance with employees can 
lead to improved understanding of the reasons driving employee insecure behaviours”  
P2. “Engagement with employees can allow falsifying current beliefs that employees can be forced 
to comply with security” 
P3. “Engagement with employees can allow identification of employee responses to friction-
inducing security” 
                                                          
 
14 After completion of Phase 1 (Thematic analysis of 30 Company A interviews presented in Chapter 4), the question 
set was updated with three more questions – see section 4.7.3. 
Identification 
of study 
questions
Identification 
of Unit of 
Inquiry
Definition of 
study 
propositions
Collection and 
Analysis of 
data
Logical linking 
of data to 
propositions
Interpreting 
findings
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P4. “Engagement with employees can allow the identification of problems in security 
implementations (both policies and mechanisms) that organisations have not currently identified 
through other means” 
P5. “Engagement with employees can improve existing organisational ability to manage current 
information security challenges” 
3.3.1.4 Logical linking of data to propositions  
A number of different techniques were used to generate the theories presented in the remaining chapters 
of this thesis: pattern matching (Trochim, 1985) was used to test emerging theories against user 
behaviours across both organisations, explanation building (Amaratunga et al., 2002) was used to identify 
causal links between conditions in the organisational environment and emerging security behaviours, and 
cross case synthesis was used (Yin, 2009) to verify the existence of the observed phenomena across 
organisational divisions in both organisations examined.  As previously discussed, the emerging theories 
were the results of an iterative process: many rounds of data collection and analysis were used to arrive at 
the findings and theories presented in the remainder of this thesis. 
3.4 Improving outcome validity  
In order to provide guidelines to assess the validity of case study findings, Yin (2009) defines four axes 
on which the quality of any empirical social research is judged:  
1. Construct Validity: Identifying correct operational measures for concepts studied 
2. Internal Validity: Establishing causal relationships between conditions 
3. External Validity: Ability to analytically generalise the findings within a larger domain of 
interest  
4. Reliability: Demonstrating repeatability of the findings 
This section discusses the steps taken during the analysis process, in order to meet all four of Yin’s 
research quality requirements. 
3.4.1 Investigator triangulation – Improving Internal validity 
As discussed in section 3.2.1, many researchers took part in data collection and all received training from 
the ISRG group leader, who has significant experience in conducting research in similar settings.  
Researchers also spent a lot of time discussing each other’s interpretation of the data, in order to ensure 
no unjustified conclusions emerged from the work presented in this thesis, or any of the other research 
publications related to this work. 
3.4.2 Methodological triangulation – Improving Internal validity 
Another way to improve the validity of case study results is to combine more than one sources of 
evidence (Bryman, 2003; Klein and Myers, 1999).  For Company A, this was done using an already 
available set of survey data.  The surveys were conducted based on a preliminary analysis of the interview 
data by Dr Adam Beautement.  They presented participants with examples of scenarios where security 
and productivity came to conflict, drawn from the interview results, and asked them to respond to those.  
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To capture both employee behaviour and attitude towards friction-inducing security, two different 
interview scenario types were used: 
 Behaviour scenarios: Survey participants were presented with a scenario where a conflict 
between security and their primary occurs and were offered four non-compliant courses of action 
that would allow them to resolve the conflict.   They were then asked to rank the options in order 
of how likely they would be to follow them and also to rate how severe is the breach of policy 
the chosen course of action presents.  The presented courses of action are based on Schwarz and 
Thompson’s risk models (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990) and each one corresponds to a 
different risk response behaviour (individualists, egalitarians, hierarchists, fatalists – short 
description for each in Appendix C).  
 Attitude scenarios:   Attitude scenarios reflected different levels of maturity on the Security 
Behaviour Maturity Model (SBMM – an adapted version of the Carnegie Mellon Capability 
Maturity Model – Appendix D, Paulk et al., 1993).  A security violation or non-compliant action 
was presented to employees, who were then given four potential actions representing attitudes 
towards that action, each one referring to a different level in SBMM.  Again participants were 
required to rank the available options in terms of how likely they were to follow each of the 
described courses of action. 
A similar survey was conducted inside Company B, with the researcher taking part in formulating the 
scenarios and the corresponding responses, in collaboration with a team of 3 other researchers.  As 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in total 1488 employees from Company A and 641 from 
Company B took part in the survey.  Example scenarios for both attitudes and behaviours and the 
available actions can be found in Appendix E.  For the purpose of this research the survey data from both 
organisations were used to (1) strengthen interview findings by demonstrating the prevalence of identified 
insecure employee behaviours in both organisations on a much larger scale than the 200 interviews.  The 
quantitative nature of survey results also (2) allowed the two organisations to prioritise solution 
deployment to address the more serious of the identified issues first.   
3.4.3 Pattern matching – Internal validity 
Matching and comparing emerging patterns is another way to improve internal validity of case study 
findings.  Behavioural patterns identified in early interview analyses were matched to behaviours 
observed in subsequent interview analyses across both organisations.  This led to improved validity of the 
findings, together with improved applicability and generalisability to a wider domain (Yin, 2009; 
Flyvbjerg, 2011). 
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3.4.4 Data Triangulation – Improving construct validity  
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the primary data collection method used to devise the 
paradigms presented in this thesis is interviews.  Investigating potential validity compromises, two factors 
were identified in the use of interviews as a research tool that could negatively affect the validity of the 
outcomes: 
1. Non face-to-face interviews: Despite the majority of interviews being conducted face to face, 
some employees were located at remote locations or working from home.  In order to include 
them in the sampling and improve the representativeness of the research sample, they had to be 
interviewed over the phone (this was a challenge present in both companies, but more prevalent 
in Company B).   This initially seemed as a limitation, but over time it became obvious that, in 
both the organisations studied, employees spend a significant part of their time working 
remotely, and are accustomed to discussing business issues over the phone.  Ignoring this 
element of the organisational setting by removing them from the sample would narrow the focus 
of the study to the few office locations where physical access was possible.  This would exclude 
employees in smaller offices around the country or working from home, missing a large part of 
the organisational structure.  Combining face to face and phone interviews allowed for improved 
data collection and better company representation. 
2. Selection bias: Interviews can also result in overstating or understating the importance of 
identified problems due to selection bias.  In addition they may provide weak insights on the 
seriousness of phenomena of interest (Flyvbjerg, 2011).  Despite this, as previously reported, 
statistical generalisability was not a goal for this research; the focus was on improving current 
understanding of employee responses to friction-inducing security mechanisms.  
Despite not aiming for statistical generalisability, a number of steps were taken to improve the validity of 
the emerging case study constructs: 
1. Employees across different divisions were interviewed, which ensured the emerging constructs 
were valid across various organisational divisions. In addition the number of interviews was 
Pattern matching example  
Paradigms emerging from early analysis: When security policy or mechanisms impose significant 
overheads on employee primary tasks, employees restructure those tasks or find alternatives that they 
perceive as preserving security, but are less taxing on their productivity. 
Patterns identified in follow-up analyses:  
1. Company A: Company provided encrypted USB drives were described as “slow and 
problematic” for file transfers within the office.  Employees used their own unencrypted 
ones and then deleted the data, assuming their actions preserve security. 
2. Company B: Internal file sharing mechanisms were slow to setup and fine-graining access 
control was slow and hard to get right.  Employees then used third-party file sharing 
facilities, ensuring only those who needed access to that information could see it. 
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high compared to past case studies, which also improves the validity of the constructs and 
demonstrates their prevalence in the examined settings (Yin, 2009). 
2. The use of pattern matching to confirm findings in more than one organisations and improve 
internal validity also improves construct validity (Trochim, 2006). 
3. Inferences were never made unless cause and effect could be identified in employee interviews.  
The chain of evidence that led to the knowledge emerging from this work was purely based on 
what employees reported as their response to non-compliance (no pre-conceived notions 
existed, no hypotheses to be tested), which was then confirmed by the surveys (Yin, 2009). 
4. The findings of the case studies were reviewed by the organisations involved to ensure reported 
outcomes were consistent and valid within the environment in which they were observed, which 
again improves construct validity (Yin, 2009).  
3.4.5 External validity 
Improving the external validity of the findings was also important, as research lacking external validity 
cannot be applied to settings differing from the one in which the theories were developed.  This 
significantly narrows the scope and applicability of emerging knowledge, also reducing their usefulness 
to other researchers or practitioners operating in different contexts.  The combination of method and 
investigator triangulation, pattern matching and data triangulation from different case studies aimed to 
provide external validity for the findings (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Gerring, 2004), which improves their 
generalisability (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
3.4.6 Reliability 
Attempts to improve the reliability of the analysis process focused on two areas: 
1. The coding process and the findings were reviewed by and compared amongst the four 
researchers that analysed the interview data, to ensure emerging themes were consistent with the 
behaviours represented in those.   
2. The iterative approach of the analysis (revisiting interview sets after early identification of the 
concepts reported in this thesis), ensured the process managed to capture a rich understanding of 
the examined environment and corresponding behaviours (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Iterative case study approach (Yin, 2009, p1) 
Prepare 
Collect 
Analyse Share 
Design Plan 
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3.5 Analysis 
As discussed in section 3.1.3, the exploratory nature of the research problem required the use of a 
research approach that would iteratively revisit the available data sets, continuously aiming to enrich and 
strengthen the emerging theories.  To achieve this, the analysis of the interview sets was done in many 
stages, using two different approaches: 
1. Thematic analysis: During the first phase of this work (Phase 1) an exploratory investigation 
was required to examine employee interaction with Company A’s security implementation and 
their corresponding behaviours.  As a result, a thematic analysis was conducted on a subset of 
the Company A interviews, aiming to gain some initial understanding of the research questions 
and allow focusing of further research and analyses.   
2. Grounded theory:  Phases 2, 4 and 5 required an analysis approach that would build on the 
knowledge that emerged from Phase 1.  Using a grounded theory approach, allowed enriching 
understanding of the concepts identified by the thematic analysis, but also led to the emergence 
of new concepts that better characterised employee behaviours (shadow security, security-
related organisational trust relationships discussed in chapters 5 and 6).   
3.5.1 Thematic analysis 
Braun and Clarke (2006) define thematic analysis as: “A method for identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns within data.” A thematic analysis is a data driven analysis that offers an accessible and 
theoretically-flexible approach to qualitative data analysis.  It is an inductive process, with data coded 
without trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame, or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions.  Codes 
are assigned to pieces of text, identifying a feature of the data (semantic content or latent) that appears 
interesting to the analyst, referring to “the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information 
that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon of interest”.  Codes then develop to 
themes, which are broader concepts, aiming to capture important properties of the data in relation to the 
research questions asked.  Emerging themes represent patterned responses or meanings within the data 
set, providing an interpretative analysis of the data in relation to the phenomenon being examined 
(Boyatzis, 1998). 
The process followed for the thematic analysis presented in chapter 4 was based on Braun and Clarke’s 
(2006) set of 6 steps for an effective thematic analysis (Figure 7) 
 
Figure 7: Thematic analysis steps (Braun and Clarke, 2006) 
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3.5.1.1 Phase 1: Familiarising with the data  
Read and re-read data in order to become familiar with what it entails, paying specific attention to any 
patterns that occur.  Present preliminary “start” codes and detailed notes, along with a description of what 
each code means and the source of the code. 
3.5.1.2 Phase 2: Initial code generation 
Generate the initial codes by documenting where and how patterns occur.  This happens through data 
reduction where the researcher collapses data into labels in order to create categories for more efficient 
analysis.  Data complication is also completed here.  This involves the researcher making inferences 
about what the codes mean.  The researcher also needs to provide detailed information as to how and why 
codes were combined, what questions are asked of the data, and how codes can improve the researcher’s 
ability to answer those questions. 
3.5.1.3 Phase 3: Searching for themes 
Combine codes into overarching themes that accurately depict the data. It is important in developing 
themes that the researcher describes exactly how the codes were interpreted and combined to form 
themes, clearly define themes and their assigned meaning, even if some theme does not seem to “fit” the 
initial analysis purpose, or if they contradict each other.  The researcher should also describe what is 
missing from the analysis and present a list of candidate themes for further analysis. 
3.5.1.4 Phase 4: Theme review 
In this stage, the researcher looks at how the devised themes support the data and the overarching 
theoretical perspective.  If the analysis seems incomplete, the researcher needs to go back and investigate 
available data to close any identified knowledge gaps.  This stage should present a coherent recognition of 
how themes are patterned to tell an accurate story about the data, including the process of understanding 
themes and how they fit together with the given codes.  Any answers to the research questions and 
emerging data-driven questions need to be abundantly complex and well-supported by the data. 
3.5.1.5 Phase 5: Theme definition and naming 
The researcher needs to define what each theme is, which aspects of data are being captured, and what is 
interesting about the themes, in relation to the research questions.  They also need to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the themes’ contribution to the emerging understanding of the data. 
3.5.1.6 Phase 6: Reporting 
When the researchers write the report documenting thematic analysis findings, they must decide which 
themes make meaningful contributions to understanding what is going on within the data. Researchers 
should also conduct “member checking” for themes by going back to the data at hand to see if their 
description of phenomena is an accurate representation of what is depicted in the data.  In this stage 
researchers provide a thick description of the results, noting why particular themes are more useful at 
making contributions and understanding what is going on within the data set.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, thematic analysis was chosen as the data analysis approach for the 
first stage of this work, to identify phenomena in the organisational environment related to the research 
questions asked.  The findings from applying the thematic analysis process on 30 of the Company A 
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interviews provided useful insights and improved understanding of employee security behaviours.  They 
identified cause and effect relationships between security mechanisms and insecure behaviours, and 
allowed categorising insecure behaviour occurrences to three major categories: (1) expensive compliance, 
(2) lack of underlying conditions required for compliance, and (3) employees lacking compliance 
motivation (for more on this categorisation and thematic analysis findings, please refer to chapter 4).  
Despite the usefulness of the knowledge emerging from the findings, better understanding was required 
on some emerging phenomena (e.g. employee responses to perceived lack of organisational support for 
security, or the influence of trust relationships in the organisational environment on employee security 
behaviours).  This led to research question refining and, using the preliminary understanding that 
emerged, in depth investigation of security behaviours using a grounded theory analysis on the full 
available interview data set from both companies. 
3.5.2 Grounded Theory analysis 
Grounded theory consists of the process of taking data, breaking it down, conceptualising it and putting it 
back together in new ways.  It is an established social science methodology that provides a focussed and 
structured approach for the collection and analysis of data, with the aim of creating empirically-based 
theories.  It is suited to the systematic creation of a theory of complex high-level phenomena about which 
little knowledge is available.  It was originally conceived by (Glaser et al., 1968) as the product of the 
close inspection and analysis of qualitative data, but was later developed further by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998), who defined it as “…theory that was derived from data, systematically gathered and analysed 
through the research process. In this method, data collection, analysis and eventual theory stand in close 
relationship to one another. A researcher does not begin a project with a preconceived theory in mind 
(…). Rather, the researcher begins with an area of study and allows the theory to emerge from the data.”  
This makes it particularly suitable for investigation of complex subjects or phenomena on which 
knowledge is limited before commencing the analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
3.5.2.1 Why grounded theory 
Grounded theory was used in the work documented in this thesis, as it is considered ideal for 
investigating phenomena about which little knowledge exists, or available knowledge is fundamentally 
problematic (see identified research gaps in section 2.8).  In addition, reporting of emerging theories is 
usually in the form of story-lines, which made it easier to generate prescriptive knowledge to practitioners 
and security decision makers in the form of context-specific scenarios that reflected conditions they may 
encounter in their own organisational setting.  
3.5.2.2 Process 
In order to ensure the grounded theory analysis process takes place in a structured manner, Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) identify 3 major coding stages (open, axial and selective – Figure 8).  
 
Open Coding
Identify instances in 
the data useful to the 
analysis 
Axial Coding
Identify conditions, 
resulting actions and 
consequences
Selective Coding
Refine theory, define 
story line
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Figure 8: The Grounded Theory process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) 
3.5.2.2.1 Open coding 
Notable reported facts or behaviours about the issues of interest to the analysis are identified as concepts 
and similar concepts are grouped together under categories. 
1. Concepts: Labelled phenomena of interest, representing abstract representations of an event, 
object or action/interaction that the researcher identifies as being significant in the data. 
2. Categories: Groups of concepts grouped together under a more abstract higher-order concept.   
During the process some categories can be turned to sub-categories and vice versa.  This is all part of an 
iterative approach, aiming to ensure the emerging theories accurately represent the facts reported in the 
data. 
3.5.2.2.2 Axial coding  
This stage reassembles data that were fractured during open coding. At first, properties of a category 
(characteristics or attributes) and dimensions (possible values of a property along a continuum) are 
determined. The emerging categories are then broken down to subcategories based on those properties 
and dimensions: these specify a category further by denoting information such as when, where, why and 
how an identified phenomenon is likely to occur.  Subcategories can take the form of conditions, 
actions/interactions and consequences.  Categories are then related to their subcategories along the lines 
of their properties and dimensions, in order to form more precise and complete explanations about 
phenomena, integrating process with structure.   
1. In this analysis, conditions describe the elements of the security implementation, employee 
knowledge and beliefs that drive security behaviours.   
a) Causal conditions: represent sets of events that led to the occurrence or development of a 
phenomenon. 
b) Intervening conditions: mitigate or otherwise alter the effect of causal conditions on 
phenomena.  
c) Contextual conditions: are the specific sets of both causal and intervening conditions that 
intersect dimensionally at a specific place and time to create the set of circumstances to 
which employees responded through actions/interactions. 
2. Actions/Interactions are specific behaviours of employees that resulted from the identified 
conditions. 
a) Strategic actions/interactions are purposeful or deliberate acts that are taken by people in 
response to issues, problems, happenings or events that arise under the contextual 
conditions.  
b) Routine actions/interactions are more habituated ways of responding to occurrences in 
everyday life. 
3. Consequences are the conditions resulting from identified actions/interactions (employee 
behaviours) that increase security risks for the organisation (for a full list of these please see the 
axial coding results in Appendix G).  It is important to note here that, in this research, lack of 
action by employee (i.e. choosing to do nothing) is also considered an action by itself.  
80 
 
 
3.5.2.2.3 Selective coding 
This stage integrates and refines the theory.  It is an iterative process and is validated by continual 
comparison of coding results with the raw data to confirm or refute the conclusions that are being made.  
A specific narrative is created based on the identified consequences from axial coding and a core 
category is chosen: the central phenomenon around which all related categories are integrated.  A story 
line is then created: a descriptive narrative about the central phenomenon of the study, created around a 
core category by means of its properties.   
Once the selective coding stage is finished, it is possible to take the analysis one step further by 
integrating process effects.  These describe the sequences of actions/interactions which can be traced back 
to changes in structural conditions and which might themselves change these structural conditions, 
possibly resulting in further actions/interactions.   This stage can also identify gaps that need to be filled 
by further research.   
3.5.2.3 Applying the grounded theory process 
For the work presented in this thesis a combination of open, axial and selective coding was used.  The 
preliminary thematic analysis of Phase 1, in combination with the literature review findings, provided 
some specific starting points for the subsequent research.  These were used as starting themes to drive the 
analysis, but an open coding process was also conducted, aiming to identify potential employee behaviour 
paradigms missed by the analysis in Phase 1, better understand relationships amongst emerging categories 
and generate sub-categories.  All the coding was done using the software tool atlas.ti, which was also 
used for code comparison, code re-use across interview sets, also allowing for the creation of a code 
repository that was later used by other researchers for further analysis. 
3.6 Research ethics 
The nature of data collected for the research presented in this thesis (access to organisational confidential 
information, potential risk for individual employees reporting insecure behaviours if they can be later 
identified by the organisations, and potential unwillingness of employees to report those behaviours), 
created a number of ethical considerations that had to be considered to prevent potentially severe 
consequences for research participants, the researcher, the Information Security Research Group and the 
Axial coding example: Security slowing down production tasks 
Conditions: Problems in organisational security mechanisms (slow VPN, slow encrypted USB drives 
and slow SharePoint access setup), combined with problems in security processes (slow access 
control setup, IT support and password resets) and employees caring more about productivity than 
security. 
Actions/Interactions: Use of unencrypted USB drives, Copying data locally on laptops, USB and 
email-based file sharing, Password sharing, Frustration with security 
Consequences: Increases employee perceived need to come up with ad-hoc solutions that minimise 
the impact of high-cost security, Increases data leakage risks, Reduces perceived security usefulness 
(or corresponding organisational support). 
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university.  This section explains how the ethical principles by professional bodies from both the 
scientific disciplines related to this work (information security and psychology), the ethical guidelines of 
the UCL Ethics Committee, and a set of personal ethical principles were used to reduce the impact of 
potential ethical implications. 
3.6.1 Code of ethics   
3.6.1.1 Professional codes of ethics 
University College London’s ethical guidelines suggest that researchers should follow recognised codes 
of conduct suitable for their research specialism (“UCL Research Ethics Committee”): 
 The British Computer Society (“BCS Code of Conduct”, BCS, 2011) and the Institute of 
Information Security Professionals (“The IISP Code of Ethics”, IISP, 2007) codes of conduct ask 
their members to respect the privacy of others, accurately reporting research findings and 
upholding the reputation of the profession. 
 The British Psychological Society’s ethical code (“BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct”, BPS, 
2009), is mostly concerned with respecting the confidentiality/anonymity of research 
participants, eliminating potential unwanted consequences from their participation and 
acknowledging others for their contributions to any literature/findings reported.   
3.6.1.2 Personal ethical principles  
In addition to the university and professional ethical principles, the researcher has also recognised the 
need for a set personal ethical principles that drove collaboration with other researchers and the 
organisations.  Based on previous experience working in research environments during other postgraduate 
level research projects, combined with knowledge acquired through a taught course on Ethics in Security 
Research, a set of personal ethical principles were created:  
1. Be fair to colleagues, students and supervisor: Give credit where it is due and only claim credit 
for what the researcher has worked on.  
2. Know and follow the rules: Set by the university, research council and discipline-related 
professional bodies.  When disagreeing with a rule, report it instead of breaking it. 
3. Ask for support when in doubt: By colleagues, supervisor and any relevant resources the 
university provides (e.g. academics at other departments).  Assuming good knowledge of issues 
outside the researcher’s expertise and research discipline can result to costly mistakes. 
4. Avoid shortcuts when under pressure: If it is not possible to produce quality outputs due to 
limited time/resources or tight deadlines, consider whether research could be improved and take 
the time to do so.   
5. Prevent potential for dual use and consider impact of research on individuals and society:  Take 
additional care when improper dissemination of research outcomes can present a danger to 
individuals or society; when this potential exists, devise strategies to deal with it. 
3.6.2 Ethical analysis 
Based on the aforementioned principles, a range of ethical issues were identified in relation to this 
research: (1) Need to safeguard collected information, (2) Need to preserve employee anonymity, (3) 
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Adherence to Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) signed between the university (represented by ISRG) 
and the collaborating organisations, (4) Respect employee rights when suggesting solutions to identified 
problems, (5) Accurately report and avoid fabricating results, and (6) Accurately present sources of 
information. This section discusses the potential impact of these issues on the work presented in this 
thesis and presents potential courses of action to minimise potential unwanted consequences, while 
minimally affecting the ability to communicate and apply research findings. 
3.6.2.1 Safeguard collected information 
One of the most important challenges encountered while conducting this research was the need to safely 
store and transport collected datasets.  This was important to ensure no unauthorised disclosure of 
potentially sensitive corporate information could happen while transferring or analysing the data 
collected. 
 Stakeholders: Researcher, other ISRG researchers, employees and management of the 
organisations, university.  
 Pressures: Need to quickly transfer interview data to transcription service.  Limited time to do 
analysis sometimes required to work away from the university. 
 Choice of ethical actions: Audio interview data was transferred to encrypted USB drives (2 per 
interview location for backup reasons).  Transfer to the transcription service was done through a 
secure connection; same for return of the text transcripts.  The transcripts were then continuously 
held on university servers, which are heavily firewalled and protected against unauthorised 
access.  Transcripts were then anonymised: employee names, office locations and company 
names were all removed from the transcripts to avoid any possibility of someone relating back to 
the organisation15.  Original manuscripts were held on encrypted drives and all subsequent 
analysis was performed on the anonymised versions. 
3.6.2.2 Preserve employee anonymity 
Respecting individual employee privacy was also an important consideration during data collection and 
analysis.  Any potential for the partner organisations being able to link identified undesired behaviours to 
individuals had to be eliminated; if this happened, it could undermine potential participation in future 
studies and also damage employee reputation within the organisation, which is against the ethical 
guidelines presented by BPS. 
 Stakeholders: Researcher, employees and management of the organisations, university.  
 Pressures:  The organisation may have asked to talk to individuals that reported to resort to 
behaviours deemed as risky.   
                                                          
 
15 As previously discussed, Company A data was already available when this research commenced.  As a result, it 
was not anonymised when the analysis processes presented in this thesis commenced, but any sensitive information 
that could lead to company or individuals becoming identifiable was removed during the analysis and excluded from 
results reporting. 
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 Choice of ethical actions: Care was taken to safeguard employee information obtained through 
data collection and avoid providing the organisation with information that can make any 
employee potentially identifiable (this is also required by the Data Protection Act, DPA, 1998, 
and also the BCS and the BPS codes of conduct).  Consent was obtained from participating 
employees, who were also assured on their anonymity and confidentiality of information.  
Employee information was only stored on university servers and all employee identifiers were 
removed from subsequent reports and publications.   
In the end, no significant risks arose on this.  The organisations interested and participating in this 
research had already recognised the importance of improving understanding of employee security 
behaviours and the potential benefits of this research towards that.  As a result, they were very willing to 
collaborate without following up reported outcomes with their employees. 
3.6.2.3 Adhere to Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) 
NDAs were signed between collaborating organisations and the university.  Those aimed to legally bind 
the university to take adequate care to prevent leaks of confidential information about internal security 
processes and the organisation’s structure that attackers could use to attack it.  Adhering to NDAs signed 
also protects the reputation of the university as a trustworthy institution that can help industry 
collaborators solve important problems.  The sensitive nature of the findings of this research also run the 
risk to be misreported by media, damaging the reputation of any involved organisation. As a result, care 
had to be taken to not report information that the organisation considered to be sensitive.   
 Stakeholders: Researcher, supervisor, university/other universities, collaborating organisations. 
 Pressures: By the researcher’s host department to advertise their relationship with industry, as 
that increases the impact of emerging research and knowledge, improving potential success of 
future funding attempts.   Also by the organisation not to provide anyone with information that 
can be potentially used to target them.  Also, as a researcher and a research group, emerging 
findings and knowledge needed to be published for academic reasons 
 Choice of ethical actions:  A compromise was required between publishing research outcomes 
and excluding sensitive information from publications.  Discussing this with partner 
organisations, they agreed for the collected data to be used in research and publications.  They 
did not ask to review those publications but, as an act of goodwill, draft versions of research 
reports were sent to them to ensure no parts of the reported findings were considered sensitive.  
They were also encouraged to request exclusion of anything they deemed as sensitive, but chose 
not to do so.  This left the researcher with publishable outcomes and also benefited the 
relationship of ISRG with industry partners, who are still in active collaboration with it.  In 
addition, anything included in the publications was analysed and discussed thoroughly amongst 
ISRG members to ensure it could not be misinterpreted in media publications.   
3.6.2.4 Respect employee privacy in suggested solutions 
The sensitivity of the research topic (employees reporting behaviours that deviate from organisationally-
prescribed ones), also required ensuring that research outcomes would not be used by the organisations to 
drive implementation of more stringent security measures.  The participation of UCL members in such a 
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research should not be linked in any way by employees to the implementation of further security 
restrictions; something that can lead to a negative perception and an overall loss of trust in university 
research. 
 Stakeholders: Researcher, research group, university, organisations. 
 Pressures: Organisations may be looking for ways to identify misbehaving employees and use 
findings to impose excessive monitoring. 
 Choice of ethical actions:  Suggested solutions to problems identified always respected 
employee privacy, avoiding suggesting measures that includes excessive monitoring of 
employees (“Respect Rights of Third parties”, BCS).  Instead, improvements in the design, 
usability and applicability of existing security mechanisms and processes were recommended to 
improve compliance with security (“Promote best practice in InfoSec, recognise potential for 
conflict of interest, take steps to avoid and resolve such conflict”, IISP). 
3.6.2.5 Accurately report and avoid fabricating results 
Two potential sources of pressure to produce “desirable results” existed.  Firstly, organisations sometimes 
want research findings that justify decisions they plan to make in the near future, so they could have 
asked to present the data differently than what this research intended to.  Secondly, the large amounts of 
time and effort required to collect and analyse the data for this research created pressure to “make 
something out of it”, even if the results were not significant i.e. not improving existing knowledge on 
employee compliance.  
 Stakeholders:  Researcher, supervisor/colleagues, collaborating organisations. 
 Pressures:  Need to produce results both for the researcher’s and ISRG’s publication lists, but 
also for research projects that enable (and funded) data collection and analysis. 
 Choice of ethical actions:  No misrepresentation of information was done. (“Do not 
misrepresent or withhold information on performance of systems or services”, BCS).    
Fortunately the emerging findings were useful for the collaborating organisations (and were used 
to implement improvements in their current security implementations), but also generated 
significantly important research insights that led to a number of academic publications (See 
related publications section in Appendix A) 
3.6.2.6 Accurately present sources of information and refer to pre-existing work 
The university is extremely sensitive on plagiarism issues (UCL 2011).  Failure to comply with university 
anti-plagiarism guidelines could affect the researcher’s ability to complete their degree.   
 Stakeholders: Researcher, supervisor 
 Pressures:  Not citing or clearly presenting past research results to present emerging findings as 
original and unique.  Avoid referring to related work published while data collection or analysis 
took place, in order to increase the perceived impact of this work. 
 Choice of ethical actions:  Ensured inclusion of clear reference to the sources of any information 
reported in this thesis.  Also closely followed conferences, journals and other researchers in the 
field of user-centred security and security management to ensure adequate awareness on 
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publication of related work.  When related work was published, its relation and impact to this 
work was well presented, analysed and the new knowledge was incorporated into the work 
presented in this thesis. 
3.6.2.7 Conclusion 
The multidisciplinary nature of this research required considering a number of ethical principles from 
various disciplines during data collection, analysis and reporting.  The ethical actions presented to address 
the identified ethical issues were based on principles from professionals in computing and psychology, 
the university’s ethical guidelines and the researcher’s personal ethical values.  Adhering to those often 
required additional time and effort investment, but it provided significant advantages: (1) it protected the 
researcher, supervisor and the university from potential reputation and legal problems, (2) it protected 
participants and the collaborating organisations, and (3) it improved the validity of the reported results, 
reducing the risk of other researchers challenging the validity of the findings of this research. 
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 Security behaviour drivers 
The literature review chapter identified a significant gap in the existing understanding of security 
behaviours and the drivers of non-compliance and insecure behaviours in organisations.  This revealed the 
need for deeper, exploratory investigation of employee interaction with security mechanisms, their 
corresponding behaviours and their effect on organisational security risk exposure.  In order to improve 
existing knowledge on the above areas, a set of research questions were defined in section 3.3.1.1, to 
which the research presented in this chapter attempts to provide preliminary answers: 
1. Do employees understand the need for security mechanisms in the organisation? If yes or no, 
why? 
2. What security-related challenges do employees find when attempting to proceed with their 
primary tasks? How do they respond to friction between their primary task and security 
mechanisms and processes? 
3. How can the improved understanding from the previous question be used to transform the 
systems in place to eliminate the problems discovered, avoiding the need to redesign the systems 
completely? 
In order to answer the above questions, a preliminary understanding of the phenomena of interest was 
required, to drive the subsequent grounded theory analyses.  In order to identify and describe those 
phenomena, an initial in-depth thematic analysis was conducted on a subset of 30 randomly selected 
interviews from Company A.  Thematic analysis was chosen as an appropriate analysis method, as it 
allows enriching understanding of unknown phenomena (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  This analysis aimed 
to understand (1) the context in which the interaction of employees with elements of organisational 
security takes place (mechanisms, policies and processes) and (2) employee experience of the interaction 
with those elements and related behaviours.  The analysis process was based on the approach defined by 
Braun and Clarke (2006), as presented in section 3.5.1, with the interview transcripts analysed without 
trying to fit them into a pre-existing coding frame.  This allowed extracting bottom-up devised narratives 
describing employee behaviours, also leading to the formulation of additional research questions.  Both 
the emerging narratives and the updated question set allowed carrying out the subsequent grounded 
theory analysis on the full interview sets from both Company A and Company B, allowing for in-depth 
examination of the research gaps presented in section 2.8 and the validity of study propositions, presented 
in section 3.3.1.3. 
This chapter presents the thematic analysis process followed, discusses emerging codes and themes and 
explains how their identification led to the two main contributions of this chapter:  
1. Characterisation and categorisation of non-compliant behaviour drivers, based on the conditions 
that led to their emergence  
2. Identification of a third category of security behaviours, extending the existing binary 
understanding of it (compliant or non-compliant behaviours): employees devising own security 
solutions outside the control of security managers.   
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This chapter also creates a preliminary model of employee security behaviour, discusses the implications 
of the improved behaviour understanding for organisational security management, and explains how the 
findings were used to drive the research presented later in this thesis. 
4.1 Familiarising with the behaviours represented in the data  
The first phase of the thematic analysis process requires identification of start codes to initiate the 
analysis.  An initial set of start codes was devised based on the research questions, areas of interest to the 
partner organisation, organisational security policy and a preliminary reading of the 30 interviews.  The 
start codes that emerged covered a wide range of elements of the organisational security implementation 
(Table 5). 
Start code Meaning Source/Justification 
Understanding of 
the need for 
security 
Employee understanding of their role in 
security protection and how misusing 
information can damage the organisation  
Identify employee understanding of the need for information 
security and their responsibility in helping the organisation to 
remain secure (this was included in organisational security 
communication) 
Policy/mechanisms 
knowledge and 
awareness  
Understanding of organisational measures 
implemented to protect information and 
how to use those for security risk mitigation 
Assess employee ability to relate perceived need for security 
to existing organisational security policies and mechanisms 
Screen lock  
Behaviour in relation to the organisation’s 
screen lock policy 
Investigate employee experience and compliance with policy 
clauses requiring them to lock their computer screens when 
going away from their machines  
Clear desk policy 
Behaviour in relation to the organisation’s 
clear desk policy 
Policy states that desks should be cleared from all documents 
and equipment at the end of working day 
File handling and 
sharing 
Information storage, transferring, backup 
and sharing practices around the 
organisation 
Need to identify and understand employee practices on 
information handling 
Policy: only share on “need to know” basis, take care with 
sensitive information, not export to third party sources 
Laptop usage  
Practices on handling of corporate laptops, 
information stored on them and security 
precautions taken 
Laptops are the main work tool of most employees in the 
office and remotely - employees often work remotely 
Policy: not to install application software or programs unless 
they have explicit authorisation to do so for business reasons 
Password behaviour  
Selection of passwords, strategies to deal 
with multiple passwords for corporate 
systems and the need to change some of 
those over regular intervals 
Policy states employees must not write passwords down or 
share passwords and that they will be held accountable for 
any actions attributed to their accounts  
Identify conditions that led to policy violations 
Email filtering and 
website blocking  
Employee experience and corresponding 
behaviours of corporate systems for website 
and email filtering 
Policy states organisational systems should not be bypassed 
Physical security  
Willingness to challenge potential strangers 
present in the office 
Policy that all visitors should have a badge and are 
accompanied by a member of staff  
Physical document  
handling 
Handling of physical documents (where are 
they stored, shared, destroyed) 
Information sensitivity awareness and its effect on physical 
information handling 
Organisational 
security perception 
Overall assessment of the organisational 
security implementation 
Identify employee perceptions on the state of security around 
the organisation (both organisational provisions to address 
perceived risks and colleague security related behaviours) 
Table 5: Start codes for the thematic analysis 
4.2 Code generation 
Start codes were then assigned to parts of the text, identifying features of the data (semantic content or 
latent) that reflected instances of user behaviour or the organisation’s security implementation related to 
the research questions asked.   New codes were also devised when required, either as modified start 
codes, sub-codes of those, or new codes, to better capture the concepts represented in the data.  In total, 
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143 codes emerged, describing the security mechanisms employees had to interact with, the various 
challenges they faced while doing so and corresponding behaviours.  To improve code validity and ensure 
all instances related to the research questions were captured, an iterative analysis process was followed: 
after the initial code generation, a confirmatory analysis led to code refinement, also ensuring coding 
consistency and identification of behavioural patterns missed by the first analysis.  The codes were also 
reviewed by another member of the Information Security Research Group16 and their remarks and 
questions on the code set where addressed during the validation analysis.  The final list of codes, together 
with themes, relationships between themes, and theme categorisation (described in the next section) can 
be found in Appendix F. 
4.3 Combining codes into themes 
Examining the final code list, 13 behavioural themes emerged, describing the narratives emerging from 
the data: codes referring to the same behavioural instance, mechanisms or conditions, were grouped under 
the same theme to provide a richer understanding of the identified conditions or behavioural patterns.   To 
strengthen theme consistency and accurate representation of the observed behaviours, a confirmatory 
analysis of the 30 interviews was done to verify and fine-grain the emerging themes, based on the 
improved knowledge that emerged from the first analysis. 
4.4 Theme review, definition and naming 
Emerging themes were then assigned meaning and definitions, based on the identified instances in the 
data, and were also grouped in categories.  For example, the Email filtering and website blocking theme 
was defined as Problems in primary tasks created by organisational information filtering systems and 
corresponding employee behaviours and was included in the Security mechanisms category (full code and 
theme list together with definitions in Appendix F). 
 
4.4.1 Theme category creation and grouping 
The emerging themes were then grouped in three distinct categories (Table 6): 
1. Security awareness and understanding:  Themes related to employee awareness, policy 
understanding, training and communication provided by the organisation and overall 
organisational security culture (Example theme: Employees downplaying information security 
                                                          
 
16 Dr Simon Parkin provided valuable feedback on the emerging codes, their naming and grouping, and also how well 
they managed to capture behaviours of interest presented in the data 
Theme Example: Email filtering and website blocking 
Codes included: Email filtering inconsistent, Website blocking causes problems, Website blocking 
annoying, Download information at home, Own assessment of external content security, USB use at 
home 
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risks, describing instances where employees were dismissing the potential for the information 
they use to be misused by someone and damage the organisation). 
2. Security implementation: Themes related to elements of the existing security implementation 
creating problems for employees either in their primary tasks or in their attempts to behave 
securely (e.g. email and website blocking discussed above). 
3. Security behaviours:  Employee behaviours emerging from the presence of insecure habits, 
inaccurate perceptions or restrictive security mechanisms (e.g. Responses to inconsistent or 
restrictive website blocking and email filtering describing employee behaviours like 
downloading information they needed for work purposes at their home computers and bringing it 
in the organisation using personal, unencrypted USB flash drives). 
Theme category Theme Definition 
Security awareness 
and understanding 
Awareness of the importance 
of information security 
Understand of the importance of organisational information 
Recognition of the need for mechanisms and processes to protect it 
Understanding their role in keeping the organisation secure 
Downplay own responsibility Employees downplaying their role in organisational protection 
Security experience and 
perception 
Employee experience with organisational security provisions and perceived 
adequacy in effective risk mitigation 
Security 
implementation  
USB stick use Practices on the use of USB sticks to store and transfer information 
Email filtering/Website 
blocking 
Experience of interaction with organisational systems for information 
filtering (email, internet traffic) 
Enforcement and sanctions 
Experience with sanctions for insecure behaviour and other policy 
enforcement approaches 
Security helpdesk experience Interaction and perceived usefulness of organisational security helpdesk 
Policy communication and 
training 
Experience with communicated information 
Appropriateness of corresponding communication methods 
Perceived usefulness of the communicated information 
Security behaviours 
Physical security 
Behaviours regarding policy requirements to challenge strangers and 
prevent unauthorised access 
Laptop usage 
Awareness of the need to protect corporate laptop 
Actions taken to prevent potential laptop theft 
Screen lock 
Practices regarding policy requirement to apply screen locking when away 
from their computers 
Password use 
Behaviours regarding selection of passwords, steps taken to remember 
those, password sharing conditions and behaviours  
Document handling 
Storage and sharing of information practices, use of personal computers to 
work on corporate information 
Physical document treatment 
Clear desk compliance 
Table 6: Themes that emerged from the analysis 
4.4.2 Theme relationships 
A number of causal relationships were also identified between the emerging themes.  These captured 
cause-and-effect relationships between security implementation elements and corresponding employee 
behaviours; for example where high-friction security (e.g. a mechanism difficult to use) led to behaviours 
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either contradicting the security policy of the organisation or increasing security risks17.  Those 
relationships are represented with many examples later this chapter (section 4.6). 
The remainder of this chapter presents the themes emerging from the analysis and uses those to describe 
how elements of the organisational security environment influence employee behaviours.  It also presents 
a categorisation of identified insecure behaviours together with emerging risks and potential ways to 
alleviate those, discusses lessons learned and provides starting points for the research presented in the 
later chapters of this thesis. 
4.5 Results: employee behaviours 
This section presents employee security-related behaviours that emerged from the analysis, together with 
corresponding security policy clauses and examples from the interviews for each of the identified 
behavioural paradigms. 
4.5.1 Awareness of the importance of information security 
Company A’s security policy asked employees to:  
1. “Be familiar with the provisions of, and process personal data in accordance with, the 
applicable data privacy legislation and relevant company policies and procedures”  
2. “Keep personal data confidential and not disclose it to any person unless authorised to do so by 
the company”, and  
3. “Consider very carefully who needs to receive the message and do not unnecessarily copy 
people in. For example, send only to those who have a need to know.”   
The consequences for employees were also clear “Failure to comply with all security policies may lead to 
disciplinary action and unlawful or illegal conduct may lead to separate criminal or civil proceedings.”  
Examining reported employee understanding, sufficient awareness of the sensitivity of organisational 
information was identified amongst employees: in all the 30 interviews, employees were aware18 about 
the problems that could arise from potential misuse or leak of sensitive organisational information to 
unauthorised sources, both from a security and a commercial perspective.  They described how 
                                                          
 
17 It is important to note here that, despite the main purpose of this thesis being to investigate drivers behind non-
compliance with security policies, it was beneficial to also identify risky behaviours not captured within the examined 
organisations’ security policy.  This was based on: (1) sufficient documentation in literature examined in section 2.3 
that organisational policy formulation processes are not always effective in capturing many potentially dangerous 
employee behaviours.  Our partner organisations were open to suggestions for improvement and policy changes were 
a part of it.  (2) This research aimed to improve understanding on many topics were knowledge is limited.  Assuming 
effective coverage of security behaviours in policies contradicts identified research gaps 
18 When discussing interview findings the use of “were” refers to employee behaviours where sufficient evidence was 
provided in the interviews about their existence 
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information could provide advantages to competitors, damage organisational reputation and negatively 
affect the service providing abilities of the organisation.    
P7: “I think it’s the security of information between us and other suppliers. Because it’s all about our 
competitive environment. […] So I'd say the security of information - it’s kind of commercial information, 
is the biggest kind of way security comes up in my day-to-day job.” 
In addition, all 30 employees mentioned that information sharing within the organisation should only be 
done on a “need to know” basis, also referring to the need to comply with regulations on information 
separation across different organisational divisions.  
P19: “Because we’re regulated, we’re not allowed to share any information with [other business 
division]19.  So we’re not allowed to share any information with other parts of the business to make sure 
everything’s fair” 
Employees also recognised potential consequences they could be subject to if their actions led to leakages 
or losses of sensitive information.   
P26: “I’d probably be more worried about the implications on myself.  I don’t think the company would 
be impacted that greatly, but it wouldn’t be good.” 
They mentioned that potential security problems arising from their actions could negatively impact their 
careers, either from shaming within the organisation getting them into trouble with their colleagues or 
managers, or through potential sanctions imposed on them.  This feeling was accentuated by the warnings 
given to themselves or their colleagues, or when they observed sanctions enforced around the 
organisation, with 9 of them (30%) mentioning the above influenced their security behaviours.   
P2: “I generally not run the risk because I think sometimes the policies can be a bit strong but I’ve never 
had any problem with this but maybe I’m over-cautious.  But some of the stories that I have heard about 
people who have been suspended for doing something that actually sounds quite, relatively minor.” 
In general, employees understood the importance of organisational information, recognised the need for 
mechanisms and processes that aid protection of information within the organisation, and they understood 
their contribution in keeping the organisation secure. 
4.5.2 Policy communication and training 
Employees were aware of some parts the security policy (e.g. screen lock, clear desk), but in other areas, 
(e.g. use of USB sticks, password sharing) they were unaware of policy existence (P16: “Well, I mean, 
common sense would say no but I’ve never seen a policy that says, don’t write your password down, or if 
                                                          
 
19 Division name removed to avoid disclosing nature of organisation’s operations. 
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I have, I can’t remember having seen it, but clearly, you know I wouldn’t do that anyway.”), or appeared 
to ignore or be confused about other aspects of it (e.g. P27 discussing password policy: “No, it says you 
can write them down).  13 (43%) employees mentioned that security policy is too long to read and 
remember, with many clauses being irrelevant to their roles.  5 (17%) of them referred to policy as 
“common sense” and that they “know where to find information if needed”.   
Examining the reasons for the lack of policy awareness, a number of problems were identified in both 
organisational security training and communication: 
1. Inconsistencies were identified in the way the security policy is communicated.  10 employees 
(33%) reported security communication is done in emails “among other things” (P19) and “is 
not read by everyone” (P27).   
2. 15 (50%) employees reported that, from the information communicated to them, information 
security appears to be less important for the organisation than health and safety and physical 
security. “P16: the building security is more of a concern um rather than the IT.  Because 
obviously we want to get them into the building first off.  But then we direct them to the InfoNet 
sites where the security pages are and we tell them to read through the documents.  Um, they 
hand back a checklist at the end of it to say that they've done that.  I mean, who knows whether 
they have.” 
3. Training was also reported as scarce and ineffective. P29: “apart from what their induction does, 
it doesn’t seem like you have any other refreshers stuff, which probably would be a good idea, 
but I think sometimes IT security is seen as something that’s a bit of a pain and most of the time 
rather than something that’s helping you, you don’t really see the end game”.  In addition, they 
mentioned it is mostly based on employee/team initiative: P22: “A typical first day for our 
contractors new in they would probably have a day with our team sort of admin person in the 
wider team.” 
The overall comments on organisational security policy content and corresponding communication were 
that it is full of vague clauses (e.g. “keep information confidential” but also “share when authorised”, or 
“use appropriate encryption”).  This led to inaccurate or insufficient understanding of the purpose of 
information security in the organisation and a confusion on what the desired behaviours were: some said 
sharing passwords is acceptable, others not; same with writing those down (see section 4.5.6 below).  In 
general, employees appeared unaware of many aspects of organisational information security policy, 
despite organisational security communication and some training being in place. 
4.5.3 Downplay own responsibility 
Despite the identified general awareness of the sensitivity of organisational information and knowledge of 
security policy contents, employees failed to make a connection between that awareness and knowledge 
and the information they dealt with as part of their day-to-day jobs:  
 Only 13 (43%) employees mentioned that they consider information security as something they 
need to be aware of while proceeding with their primary tasks and take actions to protect the 
organisation.   
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 But a group of 7 (23%) employees mentioned that no information security implications exist in 
their job; P25: “just some confidentiality issues” that require them to be careful when working 
with confidential data.   
 8 employees (27%) downplayed their role in keeping organisational information secure, either 
by downplaying the impact from leakages of the information they handle (P7: “I guess it’s 
menial, but no one’s gonna bring the whole country down from work I have on my computer […] 
security measures [are] more about regulations and commercial sensitivity of information”), or 
by claiming that more than one compromises are required to get useful data  (P11: “Generally 
there’s not a big issue in the stuff I deal with.  […] You’d have to understand a bigger picture 
than I’ve got.  […] you’d have to know a bit more of the jigsaw puzzle to be able to say what that 
piece of information meant.”).   
 17 (57%) perceived the information they handle as not commercially sensitive or of limited 
interest to anyone outside the organisation; P1: “I think as far as Company’s concerned 
everything is confidential.  I personally can’t see what possible use most of the stuff I deal with 
would be to anybody else whatsoever, outside of the Company, even outside of our department”, 
also referring to their corporate equipment (laptops, phones etc.) as “not interesting” (P18) 
information-wise and that someone “would not significantly benefit from intercepting emails” 
(P2).  One employee even said their colleagues are “surprised when told not to share everything 
with everyone else around them.” (p16)   
In general, despite the identified understanding of the sensitivity of organisational information, employees 
downplayed their role in organisational protection: they perceived the information they handle as 
generically non-sensitive, which acted as a driver for a wide range of insecure behaviours, described later 
in this section. 
4.5.4 Screen lock 
The security policy mandated that employees “ensure that the screen lock facility on your computer is 
engaged when leaving your desk unattended”.  The majority followed this, with 20 of them (67%) 
mentioning they usually do it.  When asked to discuss where motivation for this behaviour came from, 2 
employees (7%) mentioned the open plan office space and 8 others (27%) mentioned peer pressure from 
their colleagues: P8: “…I remember one of my old bosses left his screen unlocked one time, so I think his 
boss then sat down and started typing his resignation letter in the e-mail and then locked his screen, and 
let him come back to it”.  Despite this, 8 employees (27%) reported they often do not lock their screens, 
either because they forget (4 – 13%), because the associated risks are low (2 – 7%) (P29: “I sit at the 
same desk every day, around the same people. So if somebody else was to wander in and sit at my desk, it 
would be pretty obvious”), or because they wait for automatic locking to kick in after a few minutes (1 – 
3%) P15: “in general, that’s not bad. Plus I think the thing has a 5 or 7 minute timer, it 
just…automatically locks”.  In general, motivation to lock screens was driven both by risk understanding 
and peer pressure, with policy violations stemming from either human error (forgetting to do so) or lack 
of appropriate risk understanding. 
94 
 
4.5.5 Laptop usage 
Employees were given corporate laptops and are asked in the policy “not to install application software 
or programs unless you have explicit authorisation to do so for business reasons”, without reference to 
additional need to protect those laptops.  This appeared not to be a problem for employees, as their 
laptops were closed-built, not allowing installation of software, unless approved by technical support (6 – 
20%).  It was also reported as a general practice to take laptops at home 23 (76%), usually for 
productivity reasons (P1: “may need to work from home during the evening”, P4: “may not be able to 
come in the next morning” or P2: “may need to go to a different location”) and security (P3: “feel safer 
taking the laptop than leaving it in the office”) reasons for this.  Despite not being part of the policy, 
employees discussed the need to protect their laptops while on the move, and took appropriate actions to 
reduce the potential of physically losing or having those stolen: 16 employees (53%) mentioned that they 
take risk mitigating actions, with a number of different practices being reported (lock it in car boot, make 
sure it is not obvious they carry a laptop, hide it somewhere when leaving house).  A smaller number (4 
employees, 13%) mentioned that travelling with a laptop is too risky so they avoid doing so unless it is an 
absolute necessity (P8: “as unregularly as possible, or as little as possible”).  Overall, employees took 
various self-devised actions to physically protect their company laptops, even if such actions were not 
mandated by the security policy. 
4.5.6 Password use 
4.5.6.1 Password choice and handling 
The organisation has a number of different systems which employees need to access during their day-to-
day tasks; with many of those requiring different user ID’s and passwords.  The security policy included a 
number of clauses on passwords: “Keep all authentication credentials secure and must not write down or 
share passwords or token on their accounts – Users will be held accountable for any actions attributed to 
any account/uid they are responsible for”, also stating that “not knowingly access or seek to access data 
using authentication credentials that they are not authorized to have, e.g. by using another user's user 
identifier and password”, but also including ambiguous clauses on password sharing: “users must not 
access any information or system using another employee's or system's password unless explicitly 
authorised to do so.”  When probed to discuss authentication to organisational systems, employees 
reported that the number of different passwords for various organisational systems made password 
management (choosing them and remembering them) a challenging task.  To cope with this, they 
developed a number of strategies: 
1. 11 (37%) employees reported that they write down their passwords either (a) on paper (7 
employees, 23% - P8: “I just find there’s too many to remember otherwise and we’ve got a 
different username and password most of the time for each of the logins, so […] it’s written 
down on a bit of paper.  It’s locked in my desk when I’ve not got hold of it, probably along the 
laptop, which is probably not too clever thinking about it”) or (b) in electronic form (in a word 
document – 1 employee, or on their PDAs – 2 employees - P26: “I’ve got a Microsoft Word 
document, which is 5 pages long now that contains passwords for everything. […] But mostly 
work cause I don’t do a lot of stuff on the internet personally.  And the amount of password-
protected things…leads you to the necessity to write them down, which introduces a risk.”) 
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2. 7 (23%) employees reported that they use the same password for more than one system.  Some 
do so only for rarely used ones, where remembering all required passwords is not possible; 
others do it for all they have to use.  This was reported as a way to avoid having to write their 
passwords down (P25: “I come from the school of the same password for as many things as 
possible rather than having them either physically written down or put into some sort of 
document somewhere.”) 
3. One other though, reported that writing passwords down is allowed by policy! (I: “Does it also 
say in the policy you’re not allowed to write them down?” P27: “No, it says you can write them 
down.”) 
4.5.6.2 Password changing 
The organisation requires employees to change their passwords over regular time periods, which 
accentuates the problem of multiple password management: it imposes a large compliance overhead on 
employees, turning password management to a problem that requires significant time and effort 
investment.  In some cases, it also leads to employees being locked out of systems, thus negatively 
impacting their ability to proceed with their primary tasks, but also creating frustration.  As a response to 
this, employees developed different coping mechanisms:   
1. 5 employees (17%) who used the same password for more than one system said they change all 
passwords together when one expires.   I: “And do you change them all at the same time even 
though they probably don’t all have to be changed at the same time?” P1: “Yeah, change them 
all at the same time”. 
2. 15 employees (50%) developed their own, simple password-change strategies.  9 of them for 
example (30%) reported that they change only one digit of the password when required (e.g. 
change “Password.01” to “Password.02”).  Others mentioned they keep the password the same 
and add the existing month at the end (e.g. P15 realised that a system prevented the use of the 
current month as a password, so they started using Summer01 for June, Summer02 for July etc.)   
4.5.6.3 Password sharing 
As discussed earlier in this section, Company A’s security policy explicitly prohibited sharing passwords, 
but also included contradictory clauses like: “…unless explicitly authorised to do so”.  A group of 7 
(23%) employees mentioned they do not share their passwords, as they cannot be sure who to trust and 
they are not willing to take the risk of getting in trouble from potential credential misuse (P15: “…from a 
point of view of if you're asked to give your password then really it doesn't matter who it is, whether it’s 
senior management, the philosophy within the company is you shouldn't be asked and if you are asked 
you should have the right to say no without any recrimination.  Um, there is a policy in place and it’s 
there to protect you and to protect others.” or P29: “Sometimes it comes up as a bit of any solution and 
I've always refused to do that actually.  More for personal reasons I would say.  Not because I think 
there's particularly a big corporate risk, for my own risk it’s a significant risk to take.”) 
Despite policy prohibiting password sharing, 15 employees (50%) reported that in a number of cases they 
needed to access systems for which they did not have an account set up (either because they were new to 
the organisation or because they had no need to use that specific system in the past).  In those cases, the 
necessity for quick access meant they had to share passwords with their colleagues, as access right setups 
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“take ages” (P8) and “colleagues have been unable to work for weeks” (P20).  This group acknowledged 
password sharing as a risky behaviour and, despite feeling uncomfortable, they still did it (e.g. P6: “… 
sometimes people don’t have access to information or systems that they need to do their job and therefore 
they’re shared within teams.  And I flagged that before that it shouldn’t happen but it does, because it can 
take so long to get something through that they might need to do their job.  So it would be, “Use 
somebody else’s account.” […] so that you can learn the process and do the process yourself” or P12: 
“Well, I’ve never had to but, like I said, we had a person off long-term sick and we needed to access some 
information that without it a £6 million contract wouldn’t have been awarded so we knew the risks and 
we, we had to do it”).  Employees in this group also mentioned that only those who should be allowed 
access to a resource should be given a password (P18: Within the small pricing team, it’s giving that two 
or three people who would need access to those to share the password”); none of them mentioned they 
were “…explicitly authorised to do so”, as the company policy demanded though.  In addition, “generic 
accounts exist on rarely used systems” (P14) that reduce potential for accountability of actions.  In 
general password sharing appeared to be the only way to access systems when urgent access was required 
and no organisational provisions existed to provide that access through official channels. 
4.5.6.4 General comments on password behaviour 
Overall, employee password behaviours were varying and divergent from organisational policy.  They set 
all their passwords to the same and easy to remember ones to improve memorability, changed those at the 
same time, wrote those on paper, stored those in documents and shared those with their colleagues when 
they needed quick system access.  The reported practices create a number of problems and risks for the 
organisation:  
 Single password security: Using a single password for all systems reduces the security provided 
by multiple passwords, as a compromised password can be reused to access all systems the 
password owner is authorised to do.  The risks may be even higher if employees reuse the same 
password for personal purposes: potential compromises of personal accounts (combined with the 
fact that some may use personal email for work purposes – see section 4.5.9) can increase 
security risks for the organisation.  
 Simultaneous password change: This is an effective strategy to improve employee ability to 
recall their passwords for various systems, but consumes significantly more employee time than 
a single password change, increasing the employee effort required to manage the organisation’s 
security mechanisms. 
 Writing passwords down: This reduces the additional security different passwords provide to a 
single point of failure.  To gain access to a number of different organisational systems, a 
potential attacker only needs to gain access (either physical or electronic) to the document where 
the passwords are stored, which is only protected by what employees perceive to be the most 
appropriate way to do so. 
 Own password devising mechanisms - simple change: e.g. “Summer01” example presented 
above.  Banning words like “Summer” from passwords allowed could eliminate this practice, but 
any implementation based on banned words should not underestimate employee ability to come 
up with something that can pass the formal security rules, while still being severely insecure. 
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 Password sharing:  Password sharing increases risks for system misuse, also leading to reduced 
accountability in case employee behaviours need to be followed up, especially if such sharing 
was authorised by managers.  The risks of this practice can be amplified when passwords are 
shared across many systems.   
In general, having many passwords that require frequent changes turns password management to a 
problem that requires a significant time and effort investment from employees.  The emerging risks can 
be significant for an organisation and are also increased by slow setup of system access that encourages 
password sharing, for employees to be able to proceed with primary task activities.  
4.5.7 Document handling 
Another theme that emerged from the interview analysis was employee handling of documents containing 
organisational information, both in digital and physical form.  This included behaviours in relation to 
document storage, sharing, handling of physical documents and clear desk requirements, also including 
the use of personal computers to store, transfer or work on corporate information. 
4.5.7.1 Document storage  
The security policy asked employees to: “Keep personal data confidential and not disclose it to any other 
person unless authorised to do so by the Company.”  Each employee was assigned personal storage space, 
locally mapped on their company laptop (usually under the drive letter H://), also continuously backed-up 
by the organisation.  That drive is only accessible when people are logged on the network, either on 
company sites or from other locations using VPN access.  In the interviews only 3 employees (10%) 
reported to store data solely on the network mapped drives, providing security and automatic backup 
reasons for this. P6: “Well the H drive replicates so there’s an automatic mirror of that somewhere.  So I 
guess even if the laptop got destroyed then I could probably still have my Outlook and my mail.”  All 
other employees stored many documents locally on their computers.  Discussing the drivers behind this 
practice, a number of responses were received: 
 5 (17%) believed the Windows password provides adequate protection for the data stored on 
their laptop, P6:“I think the laptops seem pretty well secure.  That's an assumption I've made that 
the laptops seem pretty well password enabled.  So you’d have to log on originally and you’d 
need to know the PIN code as well to log on as well.”  
 5 others (17%) mentioned that sometimes remotely connecting to the corporate network can be 
difficult (either the service is too slow or they may not have internet access), but they may still 
need to access some documents for productivity purposes (e.g. prepare for a next day meeting, 
access from a client’s site etc.).  P17: “Cause occasionally I go to [a] place where I don’t have 
an internet connection, if we go out of site or wherever and having some of the files that I need 
on my laptop means that I can work, otherwise I’ve got to connect it to a server somewhere 
that’s not always possible.  It’s not really that sensitive. I don’t have any passwords on the other 
files, I’ve tried that in the past, and then I end up not being able to access the files on it, if I can’t 
remember the passwords to the files” 
 3 (10%) mentioned that they had run out of the allocated capacity on the network drive and they 
needed to store files locally to be able to keep those.  P6: “I have very little on my H drive yet the 
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drive is full, that’s why I can’t backup my C drive to it.  And it just won’t let me save because 
there’s too much information generally on the H drive.”   
4.5.7.2 Document sharing 
The ability to share documents with colleagues was also reported as important for all employees, as a 
large part of their work involved collaborative working.  Desired behaviours on information sharing were 
extensively covered in the security policy: 
 “NOT access any electronic messages or data for which they are not the intended recipient or 
they are not authorised to access, (unless they are permitted proxy access)” and also “NOT 
circumvent or attempt to circumvent any security controls that have been applied to prevent 
unauthorised access to any part of the information system.” 
 “Bear in mind that unencrypted electronic messaging is not a secure method of communication.” 
and “Where information is confidential, price sensitive, commercially sensitive or  includes 
personal data, first confirm with your intended recipient that the use of electronic messaging is 
an acceptable form of communication and should use appropriate security measures (for 
example,  encryption technology) to ensure confidentiality.” 
The organisation provided a number of different provisions for employees to enable secure file sharing:  
shared drives existed for collaborators to share information and SharePoint sites were present as group 
document repositories.  While discussing their document sharing behaviours, only 7 employees (23%) 
reported that they use the provided provisions for file sharing, while two (7%) of them reported they are 
not well-suited for their sharing needs (P6: “I have concerns with the systems that we have because the 
shared drive I might only be able to get on to it twice or three times a week.”, P8: “…we’ve got a guy 
from university who’s working with us for a few weeks at the moment. And he doesn’t have access to the 
various files that are on our actual S drive, so we’re just having to e-mail backwards and forwards bits of 
files”.  Examining employee file sharing habits, 18 (60%) reported that they mostly use USB drives to do 
so (encrypted and unencrypted – see section 4.5.8) while 7 others (23%) reported that it is a common 
practice to share documents via email.  If a document contains sensitive information, 3 employees (10%) 
mentioned they send the password separately in another email:  P16: “Yeah, well apart from again, just 
password protecting it.  They're probably the specialist method if we were sending it.” 
Some employees also appeared to be aware of potential risks arising from their actions: 5 (17%) explicitly 
acknowledged their behaviours to be potentially risky, but also mentioned that no alternative effective 
way to transfer or store files exists. P4: “But there are exceptions where you need to transfer this 
information and you know that information is a bit sensitive, you know who you’re transferring it to, and 
for whatever reason you can’t use email so you have to use a flash stick. You should use an encrypted one 
but for ease and generally because I haven’t got an encrypted one I just use an unencrypted one, whip it 
across and then just delete the copy off the flash stick which isn’t perfect but it’s quicker, easier than 
having to follow the policy.” 
4.5.7.3 Physical documents – Clear desk 
As previously discussed, employees were aware on the sensitivity of corporate information and some of 
the corresponding policies to protect it.  Many complied with clear desk requirements, with 15 (50%) 
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reporting not leaving sensitive documents on their desks and securely disposing information on paper 
once they are finished working with it.  In contrast, 9 others reported not complying with clear desk, 
despite awareness of the need for it, due to “information not being sensitive” (P24) or “lack of 
enforcement” (P14).  
4.5.7.4 Personal computer use 
The use of personal computers to handle company information was not covered in the security policy.  4 
employees (13%) reported using personal computers at home to do corporate work, for similar 
productivity-related reasons as having to store information locally on laptops (e.g. bad remote connection, 
need to work when outside the office away from internet connection).  P5: “…so if I want to work on 
something I have to send a document, I’ll send a file to a personal email address.  I don’t have access 
[system name] in that way because of the cost of it.” 
4.5.7.5 Document handling discussion 
In general, employee actions did not manage to effectively “Keep personal data confidential and not 
disclose it to any other person unless authorised to do so by [the company]”.  Many of the identified 
behaviours regarding the handling of corporate information lead to increased organisational exposure to 
security risks: 
1. Storing documents locally means that potential loss of a laptop results in loss of the data as well.  
It also enables anyone who gets the laptop to recover the contents of the hard drive (even 
encrypted drives have been found to be insecure if someone gets physical access to a computer – 
Halderman et al., 2009).  In addition local drives are not backed up, so no way to recover the 
data exists if they are deleted accidentally, or the laptop is lost or corrupted (violates availability 
principle in addition to loss of confidentiality). 
2. Email-based sharing also increases the organisation’s exposure to security risks.   Confidential 
documents can end up being included in emails stored locally on employee laptops that move 
around with them, running the risk of being stolen by attackers.  In addition, security policy and 
communication, provided no explanation to employees on how to protect the information stored 
on their computers. 
3. Information left around in physical form can be visible to unauthorised individuals.  In many 
cases, an attacker may not even need to remove a document of interest from an employee’s desk, 
obtaining the required information by, for example, taking a photograph of it.  Leakages of 
sensitive information on issues like upcoming projects can have significant consequences for an 
organisation trying to devise a long term strategy to stay ahead of its competition.  
4. Storing organisational information on personal computers is risky, despite not explicitly 
prohibited by the security policy.  Many modern security threats (viruses, screen capture 
software etc.) can lead to leakages of organisational information copied on personal home 
computers of employees.  In addition the use of that equipment by third parties unrelated to the 
organisation (e.g. employee family members) can further increase the risk of unauthorised 
individuals getting access to information that may accidentally be left on an employee’s personal 
computer. 
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In general, employee handling of organisational information was widely varying, with the security policy 
often failing to capture potential behaviours that could increase organisational information security risk 
exposure.  
4.5.8 USB stick use 
USB drives were commonly used amongst employees to store, transfer and share information (18 - 60%).  
The security policy clauses on USB sticks; ask employees to “Ensure that they take all reasonable 
precautions and checks to ensure that malicious software does not enter Company Networks or systems 
via any means, e.g. removable media, USB drives, Internet etc.” but also “NOT connect any device if you 
are unsure of the source of the information in the device as it may contain malicious software.”   
The organisation has also provisioned for encrypted USB drive availability by providing a number of 
employees with encrypted ones, instructing them to use those when they need to transfer data.  Not all 
employees were given one automatically, but the procurement process was relatively simple: they just had 
to file a request to the IT department.  Despite this, only 10 of the interviewed employees (33%) reported 
using the encrypted drives: P30: “they’ve said if you want to use a memory stick, then use the ones that 
the company is endorsing and so, for instance, in our department, one of the PAs to the senior 
management ordered memory sticks for the teams”.  Examining employee responses on the use of USB 
drives a number of non-compliance practices regarding USB use were identified: 
1. 3 employees (10%), who were not given an encrypted drive, assumed they were not supposed to 
have one. P10: “The other point about this, the flash drive, was that they’re very expensive 
obviously. I think what happened when the policy came out that you had to use that and nothing 
else, then there were lots of people that needed a portable means of carrying things around. And 
they were hit by and order for about 800 or something of them. And I don’t think those orders 
were all approved, because the cost was just too much.” 
2. Those who needed to use a drive but did not have one mentioned that procurement requests take 
some time to be processed, so for urgent data transfers they needed to find another solution.  
P24: “I have seen one or two around the place that don’t meet that description. On the other 
hand, the method of ordering them doesn’t make it easy, and one of the ways improve that 
adherence, would to make the process of ordering a drive simple, just make it as easy as 
possible, and currently, frankly it isn’t. The addresses of the people who have to approve it are 
many years out of date.” 
As a result, if they still wanted to use a recommended data transfer practice, they had to borrow a 
colleague’s drive together with their password.  P4: “A couple of times I’ve had to borrow someone’s 
encrypted one, instead of transferring it between people in the same room I’ve been transferring it to a 
different off site location.  So use one of those, information has been backed up on to an encrypted one. 
Yeah, have to borrow the password.  But, again, going on to the security of it generally, passwords are 
not the most secure either, it’s generally a post-it note with the encrypted memory stick. So they’d have a 
USB encrypted with the backup of everything on and they’d have a post-it note with the packaging or next 
to it or on it to say what the password is.” 
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16 employees (53%) reported that they use unencrypted drives, providing various reasons for this, mostly 
related to information availability concerns and incorrect understanding or related risks: 
1. Encrypted drives were too small for their needs or the need to transfer a file was immediate; the 
encryption/description process required too much effort when they just needed to share a single 
file between them and a colleague.  It was then much easier to use their own unencrypted drives 
and delete the data after the transfer, believing that this practice is adequate to protect the 
confidentiality of the data.  P17: “Sometimes, if you’ve got a big document, is not enough so I’ve 
struggled to get it even if you’ve got one gig, that’s not very big.  Sometimes I’ve got a document 
on to give to somebody in the office…I only need to leave there for a short period of time.  And 
it’s not really that sensitive…the encrypted one, you usually got to put it in, you got put a 
password in, and you got to copy it on, the document’s too big to email, and you don’t want to 
type somebody’s emails in, you put it on an unencrypted disk. Walk go over to somebody else’s 
desk, copy it onto their computer and then just delete it off the disk. Cause otherwise you’ve got 
to go to their workstation and then put your password in or tell them your password. So it’s 
simpler just have it on an unencrypted disk.” 
2. They were afraid that they may not be able to access the drives at critical situations: P10: 
“…part of it is some virtual thing where you have to log into it or something like that. And, at 
crucial moments you’re taking this flash drive to a presentation and you need to get it to work 
and, the damn thing doesn’t work.  So what people do is that they don’t use them because of the 
problem. Because I think people can understand the rationale behind the policy, but if the thing 
doesn’t work in practice every time, it gets abused.”  
3. They failed to understand potential risks.  P9: “We do have password protected USB sticks, but 
they tend not to get used. To be honest, they just sit in the drawer, I don’t know the reason why.  
If I’ve ever had to take something to a formal presentation, if I’m travelling overseas or 
anything, then I’ll use it.  Generally, if I’m in the office, I’ll just use a normal USB stick and then 
it just sits on there until it gets deleted again.” 
3 employees (10%) mentioned they did not use USB drives at all, because they found encrypted ones too 
cumbersome to use and unencrypted ones too risky.  As a result they resorted to other ways to 
share/transfer files, like emailing those to their personal accounts for example (e.g. P5 example in Section 
4.5.7.4). 
The identified practices on employee USB drive behaviours significantly increase organisational security 
risk exposure:  
1. The unencrypted drives used were not issued by the organisation and were often also used on 
their home machines, increasing the potential for malware-infected drives to be connected to 
corporate machines.   
2. The confidentiality of the data stored on unencrypted USB drives can also be compromised if 
they are lost in transit to another corporate site, or if employees forget to wipe off the drive, 
which can then be misplaced, lost, stolen or passed on to a colleague who is not authorised to 
access the data on the drive.  In addition, if no specialist deletion software has been used to 
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securely remove data from the drive, information employees perceived as deleted can be easily 
recovered.  In general, when sensitive information ends up lying around the organisation on 
unencrypted USB drives, the potential of it being of being mishandled is increased. 
4.5.9 Email filtering, Website blocking   
The organisation operated an email filtering system and website blocking mechanism that prevented 
employees from visiting websites identified as potentially high-risk.  In addition, in order to protect 
organisational systems from virus infections, employees were asked: “NOT open electronic message 
attachments from unknown external sources as they may contain viruses or other malicious software. The 
user should alert Information Security via the helpdesk”, “Ensure that they take all reasonable 
precautions and checks to ensure that malicious software does not enter Company Networks or systems 
via any means, e.g. removable media, USB drives, Internet etc.” and “NOT circumvent or attempt to 
circumvent any security controls that have been applied to prevent unauthorised access to any part of the 
communications systems, or to any electronic messages contained within those systems, or to the Internet 
usage facilities.”  In the interviews, employees referred to both technologies as inconsistent, not well 
configured, and also often blocking work-related employee tasks.   
Discussing their experience with email filtering, 4 employees (13%) reported that they had work-related 
emails blocked and that blocking can be random and unreliable, failing to help them distinguish between 
legitimate emails and fraudulent ones.    
P13: “…there was one incident thinking about it whereby a friend had, got access to my email address. 
And they picked up a virus and I kept getting random emails through.  And I found it quite ironic that 
some of the things that were coming through to me from this virus infected email accounts should have 
been blocked by the firewall and yet all of that stuff was coming through.  And yes business documents 
were being blocked and I thought that was quite ironic at the time.” 
Discussing their experience with website blocking mechanisms, 8 employees (26%) mentioned that 
websites they need to access for work purposes are often blocked. 
P11: “you are blocked from a lot of websites.  And in my job I very often Google things, for example I was 
looking for big licences. And I Googled Microsoft and I got loads of access denied, for all sorts of 
reasons.  So, you kind of think to yourself, “I don’t understand what the site I can’t get  is.”  […]  But 
there are lots of sites blocked and you don’t know whether behind it the data is useful to you or not” 
To gain access to the desired content, 4 of them (13%) downloaded the files on their home computers and 
transferred those on the company ones, either using USB drives or by emailing those to their corporate 
email accounts from their personal ones.  As one employee said, if they did not cause problems to their 
home machines, they assumed they are safe to use on their corporate machines as well.   
P3: “So I went home and that night at home on my home PC I downloaded this formula and the 
instruction manual to go with it.  I thought, “I’ll send that to myself at work tomorrow.” “And I, I can 
read it at work.”  And I send it to work and it got bounced back.  […]Um, so I put it on my USB memory 
stick and brought it in and then had a look at it at work the next day. On the unencrypted one. I think 
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because it was an Excel macro it was a bit cautious about the fact that it was a macro and it could do 
things it wasn’t designed to do. But doing the research I did to get to where I go to I was fairly certain it 
was a legitimate software tool, a legitimate bit of Excel macro that wasn’t going to do any harm. It 
wasn’t downloaded from piratesoftware.com or something like that.  I think that was why the website was 
blocked because part of the page had a forum on it where people had commented and, and provided 
feedback on what was, what was available […] I couldn’t access the website from work so I had to go 
home to do it.” 
In general the problems both website and email filtering systems created for employees trying to access 
work-related information, led to employees dismissing the usefulness of those.  This, combined with 
inaccurate risk awareness (e.g. on virus propagation risks), provided adequate justification for their 
circumvention decisions. 
4.5.10 Physical Security 
Policy clauses on physical security stated that “Any visitors are accompanied, ensure they have a visitors 
badge and ensure they comply with all Company policies. In particular visitors must not connect any 
third party laptop or other device to Company's computers or network infrastructure (except the guest 
wireless networks after appropriate authorisation).”  In the interviews, 5 (17%) employees reported they 
would challenge strangers walking around the office.  In contrast, many reported passive physical security 
behaviours: 9 (30%) said that anyone in the building should have been checked at entry for authorised 
access, so there is no need to challenge them, while 3 others (10%) mentioned that “Outsiders would be 
picked by someone else”.  8 others (27%) reported that organisational provisions for physical security 
were insufficient, that it was “not hard to get into office” (P25) and that existing security processes are not 
effective:  P22: “A number of times when I've certainly left this key for my desk pedestal at home or I've 
forgotten to bring my pass in on certain days.  So I've come in before where my laptop’s been locked in 
my pedestal but you can call facilities and they can come and open it straightway.  Now from a facilities 
perspective I've never once had them challenge whether that is my desk and my pedestal.”  In general, as 
with other aspects of organisational security, employees appeared to downplay their own responsibility in 
preventing unauthorised physical access to the organisation’s premises. 
4.5.11 Enforcement and sanctions 
The security policy clearly stated that sanctions could be imposed for employee non-compliance with the 
clauses defined in it: “Failure to comply with all IS Security policies may lead to disciplinary action and 
unlawful or illegal conduct may lead to separate criminal or civil proceedings. If you are a third party 
user of company’s information, for example a consultant or contractor to Company, misuse is likely to 
lead to termination of your contract.”  Despite this, employees reported that sanctions appear not to be 
enforced.  They mentioned they can get away with missent emails (P7 “I know we can’t just get away 
with turning a blind eye to security, but in terms of every day little slips of information, such as on a 
memory stick, or an e-mail which is sent wrongly, then I don’t know how heavily that is monitored, to be 
honest”), using unencrypted USB drives (see section 4.5.8) and sharing passwords (section 4.5.6).  In 
addition, non-compliance appeared to be advocated by managers whenever employees had problems that 
slowed down or prevented completion of their primary tasks (i.e. high security-productivity friction): P6: 
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“And recently I have shared a password with a senior manager because I was keeping an emergency log 
and it made sense to, to keep using the same log on my laptop […] as I say the reason I diverted away 
from policy has been driven by a business requirement.  And it’s one of those things that’s always been 
discussed with seniors and it’s been seen as a work around because the policy doesn’t fit the business 
requirement” and P30 (Manager): “I mean, my advice to anyone wanting to use that would just be aware 
of what it’s doing, deleting that back off that local area, and putting it on the server” 
4.5.12 Security helpdesk experience 
The security policy asked employees to contact the organisational IT helpdesk whenever they were in 
doubt about security-related risks (e.g. “NOT open electronic message attachments from unknown 
external sources as they may contain viruses or other malicious software. The user should alert 
Information Security via the helpdesk”).  Despite this, identified policy reliance on the helpdesk, 15 
employees (50%) referred to it as unreliable, “useless”, slow, also mentioning they prefer not to use it at 
all. 
P20: “I think it’s got much worse. The outsourcing of the support is awful.  I need to speak to the person 
that’s going to mend my computer, and when they can’t even understand my name, can’t understand what 
I’m saying, until you have a real communication I’m sorry, but it’s just rubbish. You know, you need to be 
able to say “Hi, I’m AB, you know, this is my problem, please can you fix it?” 
This lack of support for secure behaviour provided sufficient justification for breaking the rules. 
4.5.13 Security experience and perception 
Employees were also asked to discuss their overall experience of organisational information security. 
They referred to the security implementation as “about right but could be improved” and to their 
colleagues as “mostly compliant” that follow “most security rules most of the time”, but also recognised 
that some rules are generally broken because there are good reasons for doing so (e.g. slowdown: P20: 
“takes about 20 minutes to log on on the good days”).  They also expressed some concerns about the 
access allowed to contractors (e.g. P6: “laptops given without much care taken […] not erasing data”), 
who to them should be treated as potentially riskier, as they are less motivated to follow security rules; 
essentially hinting that the security processes were not working well.  When probed to discuss potential 
risks emerging from their behaviours, 10 (33%) employees (e.g. P26 above) recognised risks created, but 
justified those as necessary (P20: “I think we are rule-breakers when it’s rubbish rules […] and they set 
the rule, without actually thinking about the consequences, and that’s when it all becomes problematic, 
when you can’t actually get the flash drive”).  In general, employees considered some security violations 
as necessary to proceed with their primary tasks, reported lack of visible enforcement for violations, and 
downplayed their own responsibility in keeping the organisation secure. 
4.5.14 Overall security behaviour 
Employee behaviours appeared to be widely varying, and in many cases deviating quite severely from the 
organisation’s security policy, creating significant security risks for the organisation.  Some of the 
identified insecure practices were a result of employees’ lack of awareness of related policy clauses or 
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risks: they just based their security decisions on their own risk perceptions.  In other cases though, rule-
breaking was deliberate, driven by friction created by existing security policy or mechanisms being 
incompatible with employee primary tasks.  This provided employees with justification for their 
behaviours, even when they acknowledged corresponding risks, as to them productivity is more important 
than security.  Employees also appeared to make their own decisions on when policy should be followed, 
with those decisions often being situation-specific; in some cases they also devised their own “workable” 
security.  They (1) chose themselves which of the clauses from policy and communicated principles 
applied to them and their role in the organisation, (2) put pressure on their colleagues to comply with 
policy clauses (e.g. screen lock), (3) devised their own approaches to protect their laptops, (4) wrote their 
passwords in protected documents and (5) shared their passwords only with those who, they thought, 
genuinely needed access.  The remainder of this chapter uses the identified employee behavioural 
paradigms, to characterise the influence of different elements of the organisational security 
implementation on employee behaviours, and categorise the identified insecure behaviours, based on the 
factors that led to their emergence. 
4.6 Security behaviour drivers 
Examining the employee behaviour themes that emerged from the thematic analysis, two main categories 
of behavioural drivers were identified: (1) Secure behaviour drivers (elements of the security 
implementation or employee understanding that encouraged secure behaviour) and (2) Insecure behaviour 
drivers (elements of the security implementation or employee understanding that led to behaviours that 
increased organisational security risk exposure).  This section analyses both the above categories, 
explaining how the employee behaviour examples presented in section 4.5 allowed identification and 
characterisation of the impact of a widely varying set of elements of the organisational environment on 
employee security behaviours.  It also discusses how the perceived lack of enforcement leads to insecure 
security culture development and presents a preliminary model of security behaviour drivers, which is 
refined further in the next chapters of this thesis. 
4.6.1 Secure behaviour drivers 
Employee motivation for secure behaviour stemmed from both organisational security communication 
and employees’ personal risk awareness.  Security communication led to understanding of organisational 
security risks, with employees then complying with communicated behaviours (e.g. the need for 
information sharing to be done on a “need to know” basis).  In other cases though, employees identified 
potential security risks that were not included in the organisation’s security policy or communication (e.g. 
the need to protect their laptops).  In order to mitigate those, they acted in ways they deemed as 
appropriately secure (e.g. take laptop with them).   
Despite leading to secure behaviours, employee actions driven by own understanding of security risks can 
also increase organisational risk exposure.  Long-term employee reliance on those self-devised security 
behaviours can lead to security habit and culture development invisible to central security management.  
When employees devise their own security processes, security management is less able to monitor their 
behaviours, which also reduces their ability to assess current levels of security protection.   
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4.6.2 Insecure behaviour drivers 
The results presented in section 4.5 identified a number of different insecure employee practices.  
Analysing the relationships between the themes that emerged from the analysis, three main categories of 
drivers for those practices emerged: 
1. Inaccurate security understanding and risk perceptions: Employees failing to understand 
security purpose, combined with their inaccurate risk perceptions, make non-compliance more 
attractive on a cost-benefit scale than the effort required to comply with security mechanisms 
(e.g. downloading files locally and bringing those in the organisation believing they pose no risk, 
instead of contacting the unresponsive security helpdesk to unblock access to a website). 
2. Compliance not possible: The mechanisms required for employees to behave securely are 
currently not present (e.g. a network drive being full leading to employees copying files locally). 
3. Compliance too expensive: Employees may correctly perceive the risks involved in their actions, 
but consciously choose not to comply due to high compliance costs (e.g. increased time-
overhead of encrypted USB sticks leading to the use of personal unencrypted ones). 
The remainder of this section discusses each of the above insecure behaviour drivers, analysing the 
conditions that led to their emergence, presenting the risks they create for the organisation, but also 
discussing why security management appears to be complicit to their existence.  
4.6.2.1 Inaccurate security understanding and risk perceptions 
The need for some of the existing information security mechanisms and policy clauses was unclear to 
employees.  Despite possessing some awareness about the need to protect sensitive information, reports 
like “just confidentiality not security” suggest lack of understanding of what information security tries to 
achieve; one of the key goals of information security is to preserve confidentiality of information.  This 
inaccurate knowledge and awareness about potential security threats, led to inaccurate risk perceptions 
and development of incorrect mental models20 on the operations of the systems in place amongst 
employees, making non-compliance an attractive option when they encountered friction-inducing 
security.  A few examples of this: 
1. Employees rarely considered the possibility that using USB drives to copy data they downloaded 
at home on their corporate machines might lead to malware infections.  They seemed to 
misunderstand how a virus may propagate though the organisation’s systems (modern viruses 
are extremely complicated and propagate using various clever mechanisms – botnets, for 
example, are almost invisible to the end-user, while other viruses may be programmed to deliver 
their payload later in time etc.). With their simplistic understanding, employees assumed that a 
downloaded file that causes no harm to their home computer is safe to be used on a corporate 
one, adopting this practice when they could not access a file from inside the organisation.   
                                                          
 
20 “A mental model is the “user’s belief” about a system in hand” (Nielsen, 2010) or “A theory people build to 
explain the causal behaviour of systems” (Dix et al., 2003).   
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2. They also failed to consider that data deleted from unencrypted USB drives can be easily 
recovered; they believed that deleting all the data from a drive after a file transfer provides 
adequate protection in the case the drive falls in unauthorised hands. 
3. Employees also stored sensitive files locally on their laptops, assuming the presence of a 
Windows password prevented someone from accessing those files.  But a Windows password is 
only effective for access control purposes and, even with encryption added on top, the data on it 
is still vulnerable to brute force attempts, if an attacker manages to get unconstrained access to 
the laptop (Halderman et al. 2009).  
The impact of inaccurate employee understanding of employee behaviours was often made worse by the 
organisational security policy not providing clear indications on what the correct risk-mitigating actions 
are (e.g. policy on password sharing: “NOT access any information or system using another employee's or 
system's password unless explicitly authorised to do so” – in this case no clarification existed on who is 
allowed to give that authorisation).  
In general, most employees did not have a good understanding of what information security is, and what 
it tries to protect.  Security aim is not just to “prevent computers from getting infected by viruses”, as one 
interviewee said, but also protecting information and providing uninterrupted access to it.  The presence 
of those misconceptions led to a reduced perceived benefit from complying with security, making non-
compliance an economically attractive option for employees, when secure behaviour required significant 
time or effort investment (see section 4.6.2.3).  They also downplayed their role in organisational 
protection: they perceived the information they handle as generically not-sensitive, which led to the wide 
range of insecure behaviours, described in section 4.5. 
4.6.2.2 Compliance not possible 
In many cases, compliance was not an option regardless of how much time or effort employees were 
willing to invest to achieve it. Employees reported inability to comply with parts of the security policy, 
because the mechanisms required for secure behaviour were either difficult to use or absent.  A number of 
examples of this behaviour were identified:  
1. Employees justified copying files locally to their laptops when there was insufficient space on 
their network drive, or to avoid problems with remote file access when working from home or 
while travelling.   
2. They also found the encrypted USB drives provided by the organisation to be too small, which 
created the need for alternative file-sharing methods such as using unencrypted drives or 
emailing files to each other. 
3. The large number of passwords required for various corporate systems resulted in employees 
being unable to recall those from memory.  Employees then wrote their passwords down, either 
in electronic form on their laptop or in a document/notebook they carry with them all the time. 
4. In order to cope with website blocking preventing access to information needed for work 
purposes, employees downloaded the required content at home and brought it in the 
organisation, using either USB drives or through email. 
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In the four examples above, the majority of employees were aware of the increased risks associated with 
their behaviour, but felt that the organisation failed to provide a properly working technical 
implementation.  This forced them into workarounds, so they could keep working towards primary task 
completion.  In addition, managers appeared happy to encourage non-compliant behaviours, as long as 
mitigating actions were taken (e.g. delete documents from USB drive when done); this accentuated 
employees’ belief that the organisation would prefer security transgressions to “letting everything grind to 
halt”.   
4.6.2.3 Compliance too expensive 
The third driver for employee insecure behaviours was the high individual resource investment (time, 
cognitive or physical effort) that certain security mechanisms demanded:  
1. Employees shared their passwords for quick access to systems because it “would take ages” to 
get the permissions changed.  They also expected their colleagues to do the same for them.  Even 
some managers reported this as common and acceptable practice: “employees newly-involved in 
a project access the system using someone else’s credentials until their access is sorted out”.  
2. They also used personal unencrypted USB drives to share data with their colleagues because it is 
faster and easier than using company-issued encrypted ones.  The effort involved in using the 
latter was perceived to be “not worth it for simple file transfers around the office”.  Some 
interviewees, who understood potential risks from this practice, reported they “immediately 
wiped the drives afterwards” to prevent information from falling in the wrong hands. 
3. Employees also resorted to file sharing through emails and unencrypted USBs, as the 
organisational file sharing solutions were either unreliable or inaccessible.  
In this category of behaviours, compliance with policies was possible, but employees perceived the 
impact of compliant actions on their primary tasks to be higher that what they were willing to accept to 
protect the organisation (confirming past research suggestions that security behaviours are an economic 
cost-benefit decision - see section 2.7.1). 
4.6.3 Lack of enforcement and security culture development 
Despite security violations appearing to be widely prevalent in the organisation, employees reported 
minimal attempt for security policy enforcement.  This perceived lack of enforcement suggested to 
employees that security is not part of organisational priorities.  In the interviews, they mentioned that 
clear desk inspections were “stopped some time ago”, screen lock motivation did not come from 
enforcement but from colleagues playing jokes on each other, while their managers advocated for 
password sharing whenever setting up access was perceived as “not worth it” time-wise.  Long term 
occurrence of such behaviours, combined with perceived organisational failure to prevent those (no 
attempts to create security solutions that fit the primary task or enforce policy), leads to employees 
considering policy violations as justified.  Over time, such behaviours become habitual to employees and 
become part of organisational security culture, leading to increased organisational exposure to security 
risks. 
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4.6.4 Security behaviour drivers model 
The identified relationships between elements of the organisational security environment and related 
employee behaviours (Appendix F) led to the emergence of a security behaviour model, presented in 
Figure 9.   
Figure 9: Security behaviour model 
It is important to note here that some of the relationships presented in the model in Figure 9 were 
extracted from a small number of employee reports, often just one or two (e.g. support problems leading 
to justification to bypass).  As a result, this model should be seen as a preliminary suggestion for now and 
is revisited and adjusted later in the thesis based on the findings emerging from chapters 5 and 6. 
4.7 Lessons learned, research questions and further work 
This chapter presented an analysis of 30 interviews from Company A, investigating employee interaction 
with organisational security implementation and corresponding behaviours.  It identified drivers behind 
secure behaviour, elements of the security implementation that drove insecure behaviours and non-
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compliance with policies21, also devising a preliminary model of security behaviour drivers.  Based on the 
findings that emerged, this section starts by discussing problems with current information security 
management approaches, revisits research questions and propositions presented in section 3.3, and also 
provides justification for the research presented  later in this thesis. 
4.7.1 Problems of current security management  
The findings of this chapter demonstrate the impact of fiction-inducing security on employee behaviours.  
Mechanisms and processes not designed around employee primary tasks, make non-compliance an 
attractive option for quick primary task completion, or even the only available employee action when 
security is completely unusable.  In both cases, employees’ main goal is efficient completion of the 
primary task, such as manufacturing goods or delivering services.  But, as Herley (2009) pointed out, it is 
often the case that “security people value customers’ time at zero”, creating security mechanisms difficult 
and cumbersome to use, draining employee time and effort.  Productivity-focused employees then resort 
to insecure behaviours, as the primary task overhead leads to security being perceived as “not worth the 
effort”.  The greater the perceived urgency and importance of the primary task, the more attractive or 
acceptable non-compliant options appear.   
In addition to friction-inducing security mechanisms, ambiguous and unclear policies (and corresponding 
communication) also drive insecure employee behaviours.  The findings show that unrealistic or 
ambiguous policy clauses (e.g. “appropriate secure channels should be used”) led to lack of accurate risk 
understanding, with employees then downplaying their participation in delivering security.  Insecure 
behaviours then become a norm, encouraged by the presence of friction-inducing security and also 
advocated by line managers, whose focus is on team primary task completion rather than security.  The 
findings also show that security solutions deployed only partially in an organisation (e.g. provisioning for 
encrypted USBs for only a proportion of the employees), can lead to insecure behaviours when 
employees are left to assume things (e.g. employees not given USB sticks assumed they should not have 
one, so they kept using unencrypted ones).  In addition, users may devise their own secure practices when 
they perceive a risk that the security policy appears to have failed to capture (e.g. devising own 
approaches to protect corporate laptops).  Over time, ineffective risk communication and high-friction 
security lead to insecure behaviours becoming part of organisational security culture, with organisational 
security being unable to control it, leaving it exposed to long-term insecure employee behaviours. 
4.7.2 Revisiting research questions and subsequent PhD work 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the purpose of the analysis presented above was to provide 
better understanding of the conditions surrounding employee behaviours, to provide starting points for a 
                                                          
 
21 It is important here to underline the difference between the two terms.  Non-compliance in this thesis refers to 
conditions where employees are behaving in ways prohibited by the organisation’s security policy.  Insecure 
behaviours refer to both non-compliant behaviours and other behaviours that can increase organisational security 
exposure that were not included in the organisation’s security policy. 
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more in-depth analysis on the full available Company A dataset (and also provide guidance for data 
collection and analysis in Company B).  Looking back at the research questions, the findings managed to 
improve existing understanding of employee security behaviours, partially addressing some of the 
research gaps identified in section 2.8 by providing some preliminary answers to the research questions.  
They also revealed areas that required further research.  The above led to the emergence of an updated set 
of research questions, driven by security behaviour insights that emerged from the results.   
4.7.2.1 Do employees understand the need for security mechanisms in the organisation? If yes or no, 
why? 
The interview analysis revealed some general awareness and understanding amongst employees that 
organisational information needs to be protected.  Despite that, many failed to explicitly relate that to 
information security, referring to it as “just confidentiality”.  The findings provided partial evidence that 
lack of effective communication is responsible for this (e.g. employees were unsure of policy content – 
some said they know where it is, but also admitted to not looking it up).  In addition, some preliminary 
understanding emerged on employee responses when they perceive organisational security support as 
lacking, but understand the need for risk mitigation: they appear to modify existing security processes or 
mechanisms, or develop their own, believing those provide adequate protection.  Both the above topics 
(employee understanding of the need for security and their responses to perceived lack of organisational 
support) need to be further investigated, to improve understanding of their effect on employee security 
behaviours, how they evolve over time and passed-on to new starters, and what can an organisation learn 
from those regarding the effectiveness of their current security deployment.  In order to investigate this, a 
new research question was devised:  
“How do employees respond to a perceived lack of organisational security support? What are the risks 
from their behaviours and what can organisations learn from those?” 
4.7.2.2 What security-related challenges do employees find when attempting to proceed with their 
primary tasks? How do they respond to friction between their primary task and security 
mechanisms and processes? 
Security mechanisms not designed to accommodate for employee primary tasks often make secure 
behaviour either expensive (requiring high time or effort investment from employees) or impossible 
(when they do not work as intended).  The subsequent need to prioritise between compliance and primary 
task completion creates friction between the two.  Whenever the option between secure behaviour and 
productivity is binary (e.g. don’t share password, lock screen), employees choose the latter, behaving 
insecurely.  But when employee options are not that clearly defined, combined with employee 
information security risk awareness, subsequent behaviours become more complicated: employees 
appeared to deviate from prescribed practices (e.g. use encrypted USB drives), using resources available 
to them (own drives) and then taking self-devised risk mitigating actions (“wipe the data off the drive”).  
This was also the case when employees identified security risks not covered in the security policy (e.g. 
how to protect their laptop).  The need to further investigate the emerging self-devised security 
behaviours, led to the emergence of another research question:  
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When organisational security provisions appear to provide inadequate risk mitigation, what do 
employees do?  
Another interesting aspect of the findings that required further investigation is the influence of trust on 
security behaviours: employees appeared to acknowledge password sharing as a risky behaviour, but still 
shared those, despite feeling uncomfortable about it.  Violations were also encouraged by managers, who 
reported to trust their employees, with trust towards colleagues also being reported as a reason for not 
following even simple mechanisms like screen lock and clear desk (e.g. P10: “it’s a matter of degree I 
suppose if you are a few feet away, that’s fine, but if you actually leave and go somewhere else, then 
certainly you should lock it. And I don’t think you would have issue with your own team. If, for example, 
everybody goes off for a team meeting, you really should lock your screen”).  These preliminary 
indications of trust affecting employee security behaviours gave rise to another research question:  
What trust relationships develop in an organisation and how do they influence security behaviours? 
4.7.2.3 How can the improved understanding from the previous question be used to transform the 
systems in place to eliminate the problems discovered, avoiding the need to redesign the 
systems completely? 
As mentioned in section 2.8.4 of the literature review, for most modern organisations, complete redesign 
of their security implementations from scratch to eliminate identified problems is never an option.  A 
more flexible approach to security design is required that will allow identification of problems in their 
security implementations and devise improvement approaches.  The findings of this chapter create can be 
of significant value to attempts to create such a process.  The identified non-compliance categorisation 
(section 4.6.2), preliminary identification of employee responses to security-productivity friction (section 
4.6.2 and 4.6.3) and the security behaviour model that emerged (section 4.6.4), provide useful insights to 
organisations, highlighting the importance of security mechanisms designed around employee needs and 
priorities in delivering effective protection.  Despite this, the analysis of the results presented in this 
chapter did not provide sufficient user behaviour insights to allow for the creation of an approach that 
organisations can use to identify and design out friction-inducing security mechanisms.  In an attempt to 
create such an approach, building on the findings presented in this chapter, the remainder of this thesis 
presents research aiming to investigate the updated research question set and: (1) better understand 
employee actions when security mechanisms or communication creates problems to primary task 
completion (chapter 5), (2) identify the effects of trust on organisational security behaviours (chapter 6) 
(3) use the knowledge that emerges from both (1) and (2) to provide approaches for improvement and 
guidelines towards creating more effective (and less costly for employees) information security 
management in organisations (chapter 7), and (4) apply the emerging approach to identify and deliver 
potential improvements in one of the two partner organisations (chapter 8). 
4.7.3 Revisiting research propositions 
P1.  “Directly discussing problems of security implementations and compliance with employees can lead 
to improved understanding of the reasons driving employee insecure behaviours”  
113 
 
As discussed in section 2.8 of the literature review, research discussing problems with security 
implementation in organisations has been limited and mostly focused on employee password behaviours.  
Using semi-structured employee interviews managed to reveal interesting insights on their security 
behaviours:  
1. Identification of relationships between friction-inducing elements of the organisational security 
implementation and the emerging employee security behaviours. 
2. Categorisation of the underlying conditions leading to insecure behaviours, based on specific 
properties of the security implementation/environment that created those. 
The findings in this section provided sufficient evidence that P1 is a valid proposition, but, as discussed 
earlier, they only covered a subset of the available dataset.  By analysing the full set of available 
interviews, and collecting an additional interview set in a second organisation, the research presented in 
the next two chapters managed to enrich and strengthen understanding of the paradigms presented in this 
chapter, also strengthening current findings that suggest P1 validity. 
P2. “Engagement with employees can allow falsifying current beliefs that employees can be forced to 
comply with security” 
In section 2.6.3 it was explained that attempts to enforce security mechanisms or processes upon 
employees without assessing the effect of those on their primary task completion ability can create a 
number of problems: (1) high cost of policy-prescribed behaviours leads to non-compliance, (2) inability 
to discipline when non-compliance is widespread, due to high volume of false positive alerts, (3) creation 
of a negative attitude towards security, (4) decreased organisational adaptability to respond to changes in 
the threat landscape, (5) inability to provide flexibility where required (e.g. home and remote working).  
The findings of this chapter revealed another problem: employees will always find a way around security 
restrictions, often attempting to alleviate related perceived risks through self-devised security practices 
(e.g. employee using Summer01 for password, downloading files at home, sharing files on unencrypted 
USBs and erasing those afterwards).  Currently security management attempts to eliminate these 
behaviours through enforcement, without first taking care to remove friction-inducing elements of the 
security implementation.  This creates further friction between employee primary task completion and 
security, increasing the risks from emerging insecure behaviours.  Similarly to P1, the findings of the 
thematic analysis suggest that P2 is a valid proposition.  Despite this, further in-depth examination of 
employee responses to organisational policy enforcement attempts was required, in order to improve 
understanding of the effect of those on employee attitude towards security.  The follow up data collection 
process and analyses aiming to improve the above understanding are presented in the remainder of this 
thesis, together with emerging results and their implications for organisational security management. 
P3. “Engagement with employees can allow identification of employee responses to friction-inducing 
security” 
Past research suggested that employees respond to high-friction security by developing their own, 
productivity-focused coping strategies (section 2.6.2).  In addition to re-organising their primary tasks to 
reduce exposure to high-cost security (Inglesant and Sasse, 2010) or sharing information through informal 
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channels (Bartsch and Sasse, 2012), the findings of this chapter suggest that, when security is perceived 
as inadequate or expensive, security-aware employees may take other actions that they consider as 
mitigating security risks (e.g. use of unencrypted USB drives, erasing the data afterwards).  As this was 
not the focus of the analysis presented in this chapter, detailed description and understanding of those 
actions based on the results presented in this chapter is not possible.  But the identification of their 
existence drove the focus of the analysis presented in chapter 5, aiming to better understand and 
characterise those.  
P4. “Engagement with employees can allow the identification of problems in security implementations 
(both policies and mechanisms) that organisations have not currently identified through other 
means” 
Past empirical organisational research has provided valuable insights on employee interaction with 
security that created problems in primary task completion (section 2.6.2).  But it did not attempt to 
holistically explore organisational environments to identify and characterise different instances of 
insecure employee behaviour.  The behaviours identified and discussed in this chapter provide a first step 
towards such an analysis, with many of the identified behaviours being impossible for Company A to 
identify without direct interaction with employees: despite some behaviours being easier to observe (e.g. 
clear desk, screen lock, employees using own USBs), other more complex ones would be much harder to 
capture (e.g. ineffectiveness of communication, password sharing or storing documents locally on 
laptops).  The findings presented in this chapter provide evidence for potential validity of P4, but further 
analysis was required to strengthen it.  This was done by the grounded theory analysis on the full 
interview set from the two organisations presented in chapter 5. 
P5. “Engagement with employees can improve existing organisational ability to manage current 
information security challenges” 
Other than identifying the need to eliminate friction-inducing security mechanisms and improve security 
communication and training, the analysis of the results presented in this chapter did not provide sufficient 
employee security behaviour insights to allow creating an approach that organisations can use to identify 
fiction and redesign their security implementation accordingly.  As a result, no evidence for P5 validity 
emerged, but this proposition is revisited after the analyses presented in chapters 5 and 6, and discussion 
in chapter 7. 
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 The shadow security 
The findings of the thematic analysis presented in chapter 4 improved existing understanding of the 
impact of friction-inducing organisational security on employee behaviours.  But, as discussed at the end 
of the previous chapter, the findings only provided partial answers to the research questions this thesis 
aims to answer.  Better understanding was required on (1) employee understanding of the need for 
security as a primary task enabler and the behaviours that emerge from it, (2) employee responses to 
perceived lack of organisational security support, (3) challenges to employee primary tasks created from 
an organisation’s security mechanisms and processes, together with (4) corresponding employee 
behaviours emerging from those, (5) employee behaviours when deployed security is perceived as 
inadequate, (6) the development of trust in the organisation and its influence on employee behaviour, and 
(7) potential lessons information security management emerging from all the above in order to deliver 
less taxing and more effective security.  The need to investigate the above points, led to the emergence of 
an updated question set, driven by the findings of chapter 4 and repeated here for the benefit of the reader:  
1. Do employees understand the need for security mechanisms in the organisation? If yes or no, 
why? 
2. What security-related challenges do employees find when attempting to proceed with their 
primary tasks? How do they respond to friction between their primary task and security 
mechanisms and processes? 
3. When organisational security provisions appear to provide inadequate risk mitigation, what do 
employees do?  
4. How do employees respond to perceived lack of organisational security support? What are the 
risks from their behaviours and what can organisations learn from those? 
5. How can the improved understanding from the previous questions be used to transform the 
systems in place to eliminate the problems discovered, avoiding the need to redesign the systems 
completely? 
6. What trust relationships develop in an organisation and how do they influence security 
behaviours?  
Building on the insecure behaviour driver categorisation of section 4.6, the first half of this chapter 
presents a grounded theory analysis of the 118 Company A interviews, investigating employee experience 
with the organisation’s security implementation and their emerging behaviours.  This analysis led to a 
detailed, empirically-founded understanding of employee responses to friction-inducing security, through 
the emergence of a new security behaviour paradigm, the shadow security: employees deploying own 
solutions when security is perceived as not serving their primary task focus.  This new paradigm 
characterises employee interaction with friction-inducing security elements of their work environment, 
using identified behavioural narratives.  It then provides improved understanding of employee responses 
to friction-inducing security.  Building on this improved understanding, the second half of this chapter 
analyses the drivers of shadow security development, the emerging risks and consequences for 
organisational security management, and the lessons security managers can draw from it in order to 
reduce security-productivity friction.  It also explains how data and methodological triangulation 
approaches were used to improve the validity of the findings: a large-scale survey was used to verify the 
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existence of identified insecure behaviours on a scale wider than the 118 interviews.  In addition, a new 
round of interview data collection and analysis from Company B and another large-scale survey verified 
the existence of identified employee practices, improving the validity and understanding of the emerging 
behavioural phenomena. 
5.1 Grounded theory process 
A grounded theory analysis was conducted on the Company A interview data set, based on the process 
presented in section 3.5.2.  All the coding was done using the software tool atlas.ti, which was also used 
for code comparison and re-use across interview sets.  The code list that emerged was exported and 
shared with other researchers who used it as a basis for future analyses of the interview set, examining 
behaviours different to the ones presented in this thesis.  Before starting the analysis, a set of focus topics 
was identified, based on the results presented in chapter 4 and the updated research questions (Table 7).   
Category Description 
Need for security awareness Employee awareness about the need for security in the workplace 
Potential negative consequences on 
individuals from insecure behaviours  
Shaming, potential sanctions imposed by the organisation 
Confusion on security purpose Unaware of what security is trying to achieve, or what is security in general 
Policy awareness  Awareness of security policy existence and content 
Security communication  Mechanisms, perception and understanding of security communication  
Security training Training process 
Security culture Employee perception on the overall information security culture of the organisation  
USB stick use Use of USB drives (encrypted, unencrypted), purposes of use 
Email filtering, Website blocking   Experience with organisational systems for filtering of emails and website content 
Support Problems Problems with organisational support for security 
Laptop usage Use of organisational laptops, awareness about the need to protect those, actions taken 
Screen lock Awareness about the need to lock screens, related behaviours 
Password use  Choice and mechanisms to remember those, also potential sharing and reasons 
Document handling Handling of organisational documents – awareness about the need to protect those 
Document storage  Expedience with provisions for securely storing information, usage and problems 
Document sharing Methods for sharing information (either organisation provided or ad-hoc) 
Clear desk Behaviours related to the need to prevent physical information lying around the office 
Physical Security Experience with organisational attempts to secure physical access to sites  
Table 7: Staring topics for grounded theory analysis 
The analysis process consisted of a combination of the three grounded theory stages presented in section 
3.5.2.2 (open, axial and selective coding).  The exploratory nature of it allowed both in-depth examination 
and improved understanding of employee behaviours in relation to the start codes defined above.  It also 
led to the emergence of new topics that enriched the emerging understanding, improving the researcher’s 
ability to answer the research questions.  This section presents the analysis process followed, while the 
remainder of this chapter focuses on presenting and interpreting the findings. 
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5.1.1 Open coding 
Open coding aims to exploratory investigate the available data to reveal previously unknown information.  
It was used at the beginning of the analysis to identify a set of themes representing employee experience 
and behaviour in relation to various organisational security elements (mechanisms and processes), but 
also employee security risk perceptions and understanding that drove their security behaviours.  Those 
themes directed subsequent analysis steps (including additional topics of interest to the research questions 
missed by the thematic analysis), that led to their characterisation, refinement and identification of 
relationships amongst those.  After the first stage of the open coding process, 47 themes emerged.  Each 
employee discussed on average 20.35 (stddev 4.93), with the median number of themes discussed being 
20.5.  Example themes included security communication, storage of information and organisational 
provisions for employee support (for the full list of themes that emerged from the analysis and the number 
of employees that discussed each one please refer to Appendix H).   
Based on the emerged theme set, the 118 interviews were revisited.  During this stage, employee reported 
facts or behaviours on the themes of interest were identified as concepts.  Concepts referring to similar 
topics were grouped together under categories.  For example, the security communication problems 
category was characterised by the concepts overloaded, vague, inconsistent, unrelated to role, as 
identified in the interview analysis.  In total 82 categories emerged (once again for space reasons, the full 
list of emerged categories, together with example extracts, is presented in Appendix I). 
5.1.2 Axial coding 
During the axial coding process the categories that emerged from open coding were broken down to 
subcategories denoting when, where, why and how an identified phenomenon was likely to occur.  
Subcategories took the form of conditions, actions/interactions and consequences of the phenomena 
described by the top level categories.  During the process some categories were turned to sub-categories 
and vice versa.  This aimed to achieve the best representation of the facts reported in the data in the 
emerging theories.  For each category a set of properties were defined (characteristics or attributes) and 
dimensions (possible values of a property along a continuum) were determined (secure, insecure 
behaviour, defined in policy, own mechanism).  After the final list of categories and subcategories 
emerged, related categories were grouped under four major category groups:  
1. Employee security awareness and secure behaviour drivers: categories relating to employee 
understanding of security risks, their responsibility in acting to protect the organisation, and also 
the drivers behind their secure behaviours.  
2. Impact of burdensome security: categories characterising the impact of friction-inducing security 
on employee primary tasks and related employee behaviours.  
3. Team level mediation: categories relating to elements of security management happening at local 
level amongst colleagues and their line managers. 
4. Security implementation and culture perception: categories describing employee perception of 
security implementation effectiveness and overall organisational security culture. 
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Full list of category groups with corresponding categories, properties and dimensions of those, conditions 
related to each category, subsequent actions/interactions and emerging consequences can be found in 
Appendix G. 
5.1.3 Selective coding 
To ensure accurate reflection of the behaviours represented in the data in the emerging paradigms, during 
axial coding, continual comparison of the findings with the raw data was done to confirm or refute the 
conclusions that were made.  After ensuring consistency of the emerging categories with the raw data, a 
specific narrative was created based on the identified consequences from axial coding, with a core 
category emerging: the shadow security.  A story line was then created, based on the emerging categories: 
When employees come across unusable – not well-designed security – shadow security emerges.  Shadow 
security consists of all self-made security measures created by productivity-focused employees when the 
organisation’s existing security implementation does not meet their needs.  
After the selective coding stage and the emergence of the research main story line, the analysis was taken 
one step further by integrating process effects.  These describe the sequences of actions/interactions which 
can be traced back to existing conditions and which might themselves change these structural conditions, 
possibly resulting in further actions/interactions.  For example, shadow security leads to disregard for 
central security that drives the subsequent emergence of ad-hoc security culture, with employees 
dismissing the usefulness of centrally communicated security advice.  This dismissal leads to further 
shadow security development. 
5.2 Emerging narratives - grouping categories 
In this section each of the four emerging category groups is presented and discussed together with related 
categories, using interview extracts identified during the analysis.  A quantitative measure is also 
included, indicating the number of code occurrences related to each category; the aim of this is to present 
an estimation of the prevalence of the identified behaviours in the environment investigated22 23.   
5.2.1 Employee security awareness and secure behaviour drivers 
The first main group of emerged categories related to employee awareness about the need for security, 
related policies and the drivers behind secure employee behaviours identified in the interviews. 
                                                          
 
22 It is important to note here that the numerical findings presented in this chapter are likely to underestimate the true 
prevalence of the identified behaviours.  This is due to the open nature of the interviews, which meant that not all 
interviewees got to cover all the topics referred to in this chapter (as mentioned earlier each interviewee discussed on 
average 20.3 out of the 47 topics discussed in total).   
23 This section avoids discussing the effects of organisational trust relationships on security behaviours that emerged 
from the analysis, as they were significant enough to be included in a separate chapter (chapter 6) 
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5.2.1.1 Security awareness 
Two of the emerging categories related to employee security awareness.  The first concerned awareness 
of information security risks and the need for mechanisms or processes to mitigate those, while the 
second concerned awareness of the existence of the organisation’s security policy and specific clauses to 
mitigate those risks. 
5.2.1.1.1 Risk/need for security awareness 
102 (86%) of the interviewed employees were aware of the existence of information security risks, 
recognising the need for security processes and mechanisms in the organisation (e.g. need to protect 
information useful to competitors, need for uninterrupted access to information, or the need to protect the 
organisation from malicious outsiders and potential reputation damages):   
P79: “Security implications well clearly were they to be compromised there’d be massive impact so it’s 
very important in that respect and there are increasing reports of systems around the world being 
attacked”.   
98 employees (83%) understood their responsibility to follow security policy when handling sensitive 
information, contributing to organisational attempts to mitigate information security risks and avoiding 
potential negative consequences for the organisation:  
P36: “So if it's HR Payroll data, make sure that we pull the employees Social Security, date of birth out 
and scrub the data before we publish it to whoever’s asking for it.” 
In addition to awareness about the need for security, 95 employees (81%) also reported awareness about 
existing regulation for data protection and handling of sensitive information.  This was quoted by 27 
(23%) as a driver for adherence to Chinese wall requirements for information separation across 
organisational divisions24, and also for information sharing within the organisation being done only on a 
need to know basis:  
P65: “Because they’re in tune with a couple of other things like the regulatory model, separation and stuff 
like that, so having to do things for a reason even though it might not seem like it’s a good thing”   
In addition 17 (14%) quoted the existence of confidentiality agreements as increasing their perceived 
need for security:  
P55: “We have a lot of confidentiality agreements between us and a customer, obviously we won’t share 
that information and hope to God that they don’t either”. 
Despite the identified awareness of the need for security, a number of problems in security perceptions 
were identified amongst employees.  They appeared to be confused on what information they should 
                                                          
 
24 Chinese wall provisions:  “internal rules designed to prevent conflicts of interest” (Anderson, 2008, p.264) 
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consider as sensitive, with 75 (64%) reporting that the information they personally handle as part of their 
job is not sensitive: 
P104: “Not at my level. There’s obviously other people here, you know operational managers and things 
like that that might have more commercially sensitive information but at my level I wouldn’t have 
anything that’s that sensitive” 
8 (7%) of them seemed to misunderstand the purpose of security, describing security risks as 
confidentiality issues that can arise from mishandling sensitive information, but were not able to relate 
those risks to information security:  
P51:  “So it’s not strict Information Security, it’s more commercial information that we have to be aware 
of” 
In addition 58 employees (49%) also downplayed the need to follow securty advice to challenge strangers 
they see in the office, as they believed they either had the right to be there or that someone else would 
challenge them: 
P72: “That's not something I would do as my general process…I think they have to present ID at the door, 
the security desk that was their name and possibly that they work for a certain company”  
27 others (23%) were confused about the purpose of some organisational security mechanisms:  
P107: “we have got firewalls and other protection, I know incoming emails are scanned for viruses, they 
are scanned for material that might be inappropriate, so I have got a fair degree of confidence that when 
things go out, when they are sent out or they come in that they are very sort of screened, and to a degree 
kept confidential.” 
5.2.1.1.2 Policy awareness 
As discussed in the previous chapter, an information security policy was present in the organisation and 
all employees reported to be aware of its existence.  When probed to discuss their understanding of its 
purpose and its content, 57 (48%) employees reported to be aware of security’s importance:  
P75: “So I think this company’s quite good at explaining why we need to have security in this manner” 
Policy awareness increased on role-related issues, with 38 (32%) reporting to be more likely to follow 
security policy clauses related to their day-to-day activities: 
P66: “You know you've got (what) you can and can’t do, what you can send through your emails.  You 
know the virus software that's going on, your security ID passwords, checklists, everything like that that 
goes on.  So yeah little bits and bobs I suppose” 
Encrypted USB use (45 – 38%), clear desk and screen lock (52 – 44%) and password sharing (32 – 27%) 
were the policy clauses most known among employees.  Despite the identified employee awareness and 
policy importance understanding, only 5 employees (4%) reported they visit the policy website to remain 
up to date with the information there.  This suggested that some elements of organisational security 
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communication were happening outside official organisational channels (this is discussed in detail later in 
this chapter).  In contrast to this, 56 (47%) others ignored organisational policy clauses regarding their 
role, while 51 (43%) others believed some contents of the policy do not apply to them (e.g. challenging 
strangers), thus did not follow recommended practices: 
P89: “I’m relatively new and there’s a lot of people coming from outside reception that would come – but 
because everybody else is okay with them, I think it’s okay.” 
53 (45%) also reported that the security policy appears unimportant both to employees and the 
organisation (e.g. P52: “Looking around the office and I can see lots of stuff lying around on people’s 
desks that’s been there for a long time.  And I don’t believe that the ‘clear desk policy’ is administered or 
audited on a regular basis.  Perhaps the occasional walk but I can’t recollect any signs of one recently.”), 
with 32 (27%) dismissing its usefulness as a means to protect the organisation: P41: “Well I mean, it is 
sort of like a very, I hate to use the word legalese, but it’s a document that I’ve opened up the link before 
and I’ve skimmed through it and I said “I don’t have a chance to read this.”  It seems to be very much in 
audit speak.” 
Perceived non-necessity of the policy led to 104 employees (88%) devising their own ad-hoc security 
practices (e.g. information handling/sharing strategies, password management strategies):  
P95: “So I always make a point, if I’ve ever had to give my ID to somebody, I reset my password as soon 
as I can afterwards… it minimises the risk … I trust people I work with but the point is that you still take 
the contingency measure.”   
P56: “if I’m travelling overseas or anything, then I’ll use it, if I’m in the office, I’ll just use a normal USB 
stick and then it just sits on there until it gets deleted again. And normally that’s not a Company USB 
stick, that’s one that I’ve bought or been given or something.” 
5.2.1.2 Ineffective training and communication 
The policy awareness problems amongst employees identified in the previous section (lack of awareness 
of policy clauses, perceived non-usefulness of the policy and own interpretation of secure behaviours), 
suggested a need to examine employee perceptions and understanding of information communicated 
through organisational security training and communication.  When asked to discuss organisational 
attempts to communicate the need for security, outline organisational risks and potential courses of action 
to mitigate those, employees spoke of problematic organisational security communication (106 – 90%) 
and lack of effective security training (75 – 64%), both of which failed to provide risk awareness and 
motivation to behave securely: 
P98: “You either get lots of communication that’s not necessarily relevant and sometimes I think they 
miss the communication that is very relevant.”   
P55: “I’ve never had any formal training. Everything we’ve been made aware of was on the induction 
day, “This is your password,” and you’re drummed in then, “Don’t share it,” but there’s been no formal 
half day workshops or anything.” 
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Employees also referred to training and communication content as overloaded, with information 
inconsistent and unrelated to their role (44 – 37%).  In addition, 14 (12%) of them referred to 
communicated security practices as “common sense”: 
P46: “Off the top of my head it’s not something I could really talk about with any authority but I know we 
did have a computer training that we did fairly recently.  It was just things to do with confidentiality and 
a lot of it was common sense…a lot it’s common sense.” 
5.2.1.3 Secure behaviour drivers 
Despite the training and communication problems identified, in many situations employees behaved in 
ways that protected the organisation.  Examining the drivers behind those behaviours, in addition to the 
already discussed awareness about the need for security, a number of other factors were identified that 
incentivised those.  These fell under two categories: (1) Official (controlled by the organisation), (2) 
Unofficial (developed outside organisational control) 
5.2.1.3.1 Official 
These were secure behaviour incentives that depended on the organisation creating the conditions 
required for employees to behave securely and were related to (1) low security compliance costs for 
employees, (2) effective communication of related risks and recommended practices from the 
organisation, and (3) the presence of enforcement procedures and mechanisms. 
5.2.1.3.1.1 Compliance easy/supported by environment 
Low cost of compliance, stemming from easy to comply security policies, was reported by 47 employees 
(40%) as a secure behaviour driver. The ease of locking a screen for example was reported as a driver for 
doing so (P57: “you can also just do Alt Control Delete and walk away, that’s what I normally do”).  
Easy to use and readily available architectural elements of the security implementation also acted as 
drivers of secure behaviour for 29 employees (25% - e.g. P55 discussing encrypted USB drives: “we use 
the security enabled ones.  Well, we get a lot of gifts off suppliers that involve those and some people do 
use them but I bought for our team all us the security enabled flash drives.”).  In both the above 
examples, the low overhead of behaving securely made it easy for employees to keep the organisation in a 
secure state. 
5.2.1.3.1.2 Effective communication 
Despite the identified problems with security communication, 65 employees (55%) explicitly mentioned 
that one of the main drivers for their secure actions was the communication of the need for those (as 
discussed later this does not necessarily mean communication from the organisation’s security enforcers): 
P86: “We’ve just been told not to mention it on social networking sites, because of the critical importance 
and the kind of environment we live in now, it’s best not to share that kind of stuff.  It’s just company 
policy, that’s the way they want it.” 
5.2.1.3.1.3 Enforcement 
The presence of enforcement mechanisms and potential consequences (e.g. clear desk inspections) also 
acted as a secure behaviour driver for 31 employees (26%):  
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P94: “There’s a very strong clear desk policy, it gets checked fairly regularly, we have sort of office 
walkabouts where people walk around…a desk that’s got masses of paperwork scattered everywhere and 
some of that is commercially sensitive tends to get picked up as well.” 
5.2.1.3.2 Unofficial 
Unofficial incentives were driven by factors elements outside of central organisational control.  These 
were related to: (1) Peer pressure amongst colleagues, together with line manager communication and 
motivation to behave securely and (2) Past incidents that increased employee awareness of the need for 
security. 
5.2.1.3.2.1 Peer and manager pressure and motivation 
Peer pressure and manager pressure were reported as individual secure behaviour drivers by 87 
employees (74%).  
P74: “managers will go round and check if anything’s left out that’s confidential after normal office 
hours, and people are told that you shouldn’t be leaving company confidential information out you should 
clearly mark it if it is company confidential, and then not leave it lying around” 
P95: “I have somebody on my team who likes to change the mouse buttons round and turn your screen 
upside down if you don’t, so you get used to locking your screen when you leave your desk.” 
Proactive communication of the need to be secure and actions to remind colleagues about it, was also 
present in one participant’s reports that they remind their managers about the need to lock their screen 
when they notice them not doing so:   
P116: “But my line manager was not until I insisted that he locked it.” 
5.2.1.3.2.2 Past incidents 
21 employees (18%) mentioned that awareness of past security incidents acted as a reminder for them to 
behave securely:  
P61: “When I saw some of the recent security breaches, people losing disks and CDs and laptops, things 
like that.  It is something that I'm aware of and do try and minimise what's on there.”  
5.2.2 Effects of friction-inducing security  
Despite recognition of the need to protect the organisation, which led to the secure practices presented in 
the previous section, a significant number of employees spoke of security as something that creates 
significant friction in their attempts to proceed with their primary tasks.  In employee reports, the impact 
of that friction was articulated in terms of (1) time, (2) cognitive load and (3) disruption. 
5.2.2.1 Time  
88 employees (75%) discussed time-related problems, emerging in situations where enacting the 
prescribed security behaviour led to slower completion of primary task related processes.  The source of 
the reported problems was varying, with a number of different mechanisms being reported as friction-
inducing: slow connection to the organisational network via VPN, slow encrypted USB drives slowing 
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down data transfers, or SharePoint setup and access taking significant amounts of time.  Employees then 
had to find other, less taxing ways to proceed with their primary tasks.  Problems in the VPN connections 
for instance, led to 39 employees (33%) maintaining local versions of active files or copying those on 
unencrypted USB drives:   
P111: “At times we do have to transfer the data to our laptops because the network is slow, response 
times can be really bad and some of the files are quite large so we transfer them to our laptops to work on 
and then transfer them back at the end of the day.” 
P49: “You should use an encrypted one but, for ease and generally because, I haven’t got an encrypted 
one so I just use an unencrypted one, whip it across and then just delete the copy off the flash stick which 
isn’t perfect but it’s quicker, easier than having to follow the policy.”   
Access control setup was also reported as slow and inconsistent by 44 employees (37%), who then 
resorted to USB and email file sharing:   
P64: “but people send you links to SharePoint areas, saying here’s the document in a certain area you 
don’t have access to it because it’s in a different SharePoint area that the one you have access to.  You 
have to request access, or, more commonly, they actually send you a copy of the document across. Which 
obviously (is) against the whole value of having SharePoint access, where you don’t send documents 
across.”   
The slow or unresponsive nature of IT support also led to employees procuring their own access control 
solutions.  A demonstrative example mentioned by 61 participants (52%), involved employees using the 
system accounts of their colleagues to afford access to information, when immediate access was required 
and access control setup processes took a long time:   
P91: “That does happen sometimes. It’s just partly to fill a gap in IS, you know - because we use lots of 
systems here, and they take ages to set up, and sometimes when someone joins a team, […] he actually 
only obtained access to the systems about four months later, when he was going to leave, so in the interim 
time, he was sort of using other people’s logins.” 
5.2.2.2 Disruption  
In other cases, organisational security mechanisms disrupted employee primary tasks, completely 
blocking productivity-related activities.  Problems with organisational email filtering and website 
blocking systems for example, often blocked employee access to work-related information (38 employees 
– 32%):  
P101: “Sometimes it can be quite frustrating because you are genuinely waiting for work documents to 
come in from external sources, and where our security’s so tight, some of the documents that we’re 
waiting for can’t get into us, so sometimes that can be a hindrance as well.”   
In response to the above problems, 7 employees (6%) reported that they had to resort to other non-
prescribed practices, devised by themselves and their colleagues:  
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P2: “The first trick that was taught to me was you tell them to send it as a different type of file. Change 
the extension so you can get the file so that you can get your work done”  
P70: “...Gmail you can’t access that and the trouble is that's actually sometimes that would be useful to 
use as another way of sending emails. And I happen to know that someone was sending me a document 
that wasn’t coming through because our firewall was blocking it.  He sent it to my Gmail account and it’s 
still there now.  And I was planning when I get an opportunity to print it when I get a chance…At home or 
somewhere yeah.”   
Other examples of disruptive organisational security provisions included connectivity problems (e.g. VPN 
connection not being always available), limited capacity of employee’s personal network drives and 
problems with shared drive access.  These problems led to 83 employees (70%) storing files locally or on 
USB drives, and sharing information using USB drives and emails; often reporting to recognise 
potentially increased information security risks: 
P62: “I do sometimes put it on an encrypted flash drive-y thing just in case I can’t log on cause there are 
times when it doesn’t like you logging.” 
P33: “Then I called and I got 500 more MBs.  Then I called and I got 500 more MBs.  So, it was, it's 
difficult for me because I have to call every month to get some additional space.  (Easiest to do) for me is 
to store the work that I do on my office laptop.”  
P107: “we try and send as much as we can via the e-mail.”  I: “And do they customer details and things 
like that?” P: “I guess you could identify the address from the information.  For that respect for support 
information it is whatever the supplier requests.” 
Problems were also reported in the organisational process to provide employees with encrypted USB 
flash drives, with 19 employees (16%) reporting that not everyone has one.  As a response they started 
using their own personal ones:   
P115: “Yes personal USB ones so you can, instead of ordering one through the company they have 
already got ones they just use their own […] particularly is to move documents from one laptop or 
desktop to another, if they are a desktop user they might be taking it home to work on their own desktop 
or transferring it from their laptop onto somebody else’s laptop for presentations, meetings.” 
5.2.2.3 Increased Cognitive Load  
Another aspect of the organisational security implementation that created problems for employees was the 
cognitive overload created by friction-inducing organisational security provisions.  This stemmed both 
from the amount of security-related information they had to recall, but also from security mechanisms 
that appeared to demand high cognitive effort; primarily the need to manage passwords for a large 
number of systems. 
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5.2.2.3.1 Password overload 
The presence of a large number of organisational systems to which employees had to authenticate to, 
combined with password expiry windows that varied across those systems, led to a number of different 
employee responses: 
 31 employees (26%) reported they had to devise their own coping mechanisms to deal with the 
password expiry window: 
P77: “I know frequent password changes force people to use a password generating mechanism 
that’s quite easy to guess, because you have to change your password every month, people 
would use a football team and just add on the number of the month, for instance, if it’s May, it’s 
gonna be Arsenal 5.  I think people just go round robin, because they have to change their 
passwords so frequently. Because it takes you probably a week to remember what you’ve 
changed your password, and you’re comfortable with it, and then all of a sudden you’ve got to 
change it again.” 
 45 (38%) reported they felt necessary to write their passwords down, either physically (e.g. P58: 
“I have got a list of passwords written down somewhere unfortunately.  I just find there’s too 
many to remember otherwise, and we’ve got a different username and password most of the time 
for each of each of the logins, so it’s written down on a bit of paper.”) or in digital documents 
(P71: “I’ve got a Microsoft Word document that contains passwords for everything in my life, 
but mostly work, cause I don’t do a lot of stuff on the internet personally…I think the amount of 
password-protected things leads you to the necessity to write them down, which introduces a 
risk.”) 
 37 (31%) also reported to recognise the risks involved with this practice and applying self-
devised security practices to protect the physical artefact recording their passwords: P58: “...it’s 
locked in my desk when I’ve not got hold of it, probably along the laptop, which is probably not 
too clever.” or P3: “I keep them all on a note on my phone. And that’s password protected as 
well”. 
5.2.2.3.2 Policy content problems 
The second source of cognitive overload reported by 76 employees (64%) was the volume of the contents 
of the security policy and security-related communication.  Both were reported as generic and not role-
specific, thus leaving employees having to go through large amounts of information in order to identify 
clauses relevant to their roles.  Organisational pressure to complete primary task-related activities within 
tight timeframes, left employees with no choice other than completely dismissing the communicated 
information: 
P41: “You’ve got probably ten hours of work to do in an eight hour day, you come to work, you look 
through some kind of weekly highlights of some important email notices you should know about and in 
one there’s a link that refers you to three pages of PC security that you need to know about as an 
employee.  Now, are you going meet that noontime deadline or are you going to go through that?” 
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As a response to this information overload, 47 employees (40%) reported they need to decide by 
themselves on which part of the communicated information they think is more relevant to them and 
adhere to it:  
P64: “I’ve read through the policy and try and keep to the policy.  Well, I won’t say I know it off by heart. 
I guess you tend to read it, try and get out the salient points for yourself, two or three key cues what 
shouldn’t you be doing, things like not using, common USB sticks to pass information around and things 
like that which is a recent one that’s been put in place and we’ve got special USB sticks – and never leave 
a laptop in the back of the car and things like that.” 
5.2.3 Security mediation at team level 
A significant proportion of organisational information security management appeared to rely on line 
managers of local divisions. They were reported as directly responsible for managing a number of 
security activities within their teams, taking access control decisions, providing security decision support 
and prescribing behaviours to team members.   
5.2.3.1 Line manager and peer support 
100 interviewees (85%) reported that central security communication from the organisation is inadequate 
and that the current organisational setting relies on managers to do so:  
P96: “Well basically we were introduced to the security policy through my team leader.  He outlined and 
gave us a site tour of what we can and cannot do… like you know a door being left open or your 
computer left being switched on or not been locked or any sensitive information lying on your desk, to be 
mindful of putting away security information also using a flash drive which are not company issued and 
stuff like that really.”  
In addition to line managers communicating desired behaviours, 68 employees (58%) employees also 
consulted their line managers and their peers when they need support on security decisions:  
P29: “I know from my point of view being an analyst.  If I were to ever share any information with any 
priority, even if I was not sure I would first go to my manager and ask him about it.”   
In addition, security messages were internalised at team level through discussion or manager/colleague 
initiative:   
P14: “One gentleman that works in my group gave us a whole workshop at one of our team meetings, on 
how to create secure passwords.  Not to use your pet’s name and your birthday, you know, simple things 
that people could figure out, like your phone number.”  
5.2.3.2 Access control – manager authorisation 
In addition to communication, 87 employees (74%) reported that their managers are responsible for 
managing access control within their teams, authorising and granting employee access to data and 
resources:   
P79: “the manager of each team is responsible for allocating permissions”  
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In some cases managers also had to approve centrally-managed access: 
P49: “what would happen is, you fill in a form online saying you need this software, your manager would 
approve it saying, “Yes, you do need that software for this reason.”  It gets sent over to IS, they receive 
the request and send the software down to your laptop.”   
Despite their key role in managing security within their teams, three managers participating in the study 
reported that no security training was provided to them and they did not have security included in their 
responsibilities:  
“I: Are you responsible for their security awareness in any sense?” P98: “That’s an interesting point. 
That’s not something that has ever been particularly made clear to me. I suspect I would take that on 
board as a normal encompassing responsibility with regards to having people at work for me doing the 
right thing but I don’t recall any specific guideline”.   
Examining security-related manager decisions (on communication, authorisation and support), those were 
usually ad-hoc, based on their own understanding and perception of security risks and best mitigation 
practices (9 employees – 8%).  One manager even explicitly reported that the advice they provide is based 
on their personal beliefs, not company policy:  
P36: “You know, because my responsibility is protecting the financial data. I take it upon myself to make 
sure that we’re staying abreast of what is appropriate, what's not appropriate.  What some of the new 
requirements may be as they’re released. Not that I'm aware of.”  
In addition, 16 interviewees (14%) reported that security communication and employee behaviours vary 
both by location and manager:  
P53: “Again, it’s down to the area manager and no one else...the reason I diverted away from policy has 
been driven by a business requirement”.   
5.2.4 Employee perception of security management  
As discussed in section 5.2.1.3 employees are motivated and behave securely when easy to use security 
mechanisms and processes are present: employees reported that if security appears to demand reasonable 
time or effort and they understand existing risks, they follow recommended practices.  Despite being 
aware on the need for security, when asked to further discuss their security perceptions, employees 
reported the organisational security implementation to suffer from a number of problems, relating to: (1) 
impact on productivity, (2) organisational adaptability problems and (3) ineffective security management. 
5.2.4.1 Productivity impact 
The negative impact of friction-inducing security mechanisms on their primary task, provided 
justification for non-compliant actions for 90 employees (76%): 
P42: “So I have huge amounts of data that I have stored multiple gigabytes of email of storage going back 
over 10 years.  Very much contrary to the written policies, but if I’m really expected to be able to use past 
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experience, I need to be able to use my records for that experience.  Email’s one of the most convenient 
ways to do that”. 
5.2.4.2 Organisational Adaptability  
Employees reported that the failure of organisational IT systems to be adaptable and account for changing 
organisational conditions also caused problems to their primary task.  In many cases employees did not 
have timely access to information necessary for their role, so they had to either wait (6 employees – 5% - 
P70: “I think you can now phone them up, IS helpdesk direct and they’ll do it there and then…it works in 
a day or so which is a bit annoying.”), or resort to self-devised ad-hoc solutions when a problem arose (73 
employees – 62%), for example sharing passwords when they encountered problems in 
delegation/allocation of responsibilities:  
P97: “…I was off for a month earlier this year and because of the resolutions were coming through and 
no-one had an idea what these resolutions or this packs were not being resolved so I gave it to one of my 
colleagues for him to go to my e-mail to check for the resolutions.”  
5.2.4.3 Not managed well 
Management of security was also perceived as ineffective and inconsistent.  When employees were 
probed to discuss their overall perception of organisational security approaches, 111 (94%) referred to 
security rules as unhelpful:  
P41: “...they tell you to do some things, but they don’t really tell you how to do them” 
Housekeeping around access control, for example, was seen by employees as not being managed 
properly, with 19 participants (16%) expressing concerns about it:  
P66: “It sometimes takes a week, two weeks, maybe a month before they even get done and it’s down to 
that person really more than anything chasing it to get it done.  So if you've got someone who’s not really 
bothered then they've probably still got access to it now.” 
8 employees (7%) also reported that attempts to communicate problems in the security implementation 
back to security management seem to go unnoticed.  The organisation appears as not caring to improve, 
despite some employees taking action and reporting their concerns:  
P53: “I’ve raised security issues and you never get anywhere with them.  I raised the issue of memory 
sticks, I also raised an issue where I had a contractor came to work for the company and he was given a 
laptop.  And it had belonged clearly to one of the directors and it had all his information still on it. [..] 
you could flag your reservations up but they wouldn’t be listened to”  
As one employee said, the organisation prefers to attempt to educate people instead of implementing 
solutions to solve the problems in security employees report:  
P97: “I think they just kept it at one level and just try and educate people instead of actually physically 
putting things in process” 
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In general organisational security strategy was perceived as sanction-driven in theory, but with no 
effective enforcement in practice:  
P52: “looking around the office I can see lots of stuff lying around on people’s desks that’s been there for 
a long time.  And I don’t believe that the ‘clear desk policy’ is administered or audited on a regular basis.  
Perhaps the occasional walk but I can’t recollect any signs of one recently.” 
80 employees (68%) also reported that security did not manage to serve their own primary-task related 
priorities, causing frustration (e.g. closed-built laptops - P66: “But some of the things I want to take and 
use in some way that other people have done which would help me quicken my job up I can’t do so yeah it 
can be frustrating.”) 
This perceived inflexibility and inability of security management to serve employee priorities, combined 
with the ineffective communication and training approaches discussed earlier, and the perceived lack of 
enforcement, led to 68 employees (58%) perceiving security as less important than other organisational 
issues:  
P62: “I don’t see security being driven from the top in the same way as safety and the carbon footprint.” 
5.2.4.4 Culture perception 
When probed to discuss the security culture of the organisation 51 employees (43%) described their 
colleagues as willing to comply and stay secure, but also that everyone in the organisation is driven by 
productivity targets:  
P50: “But in all honesty I’m not too sure about the Security Policy, I haven’t been really introduced to it 
and in all honesty I’ve not read it.  I actually have not received any formal training regarding 
Information Security, all I’ve ever been taught is how to create things.” 
This, combined with the identified lack of awareness of many security issues, led to the development of 
an organisational security culture where oversharing of information is widespread.  24 employees (20%) 
reported it as common practice, also recognising the significant risks that emerge from it:  
P111: “We have a part of the site which is only for resource management staff only so only those people 
can see that part of the site, and then we have the different areas of the business that can only see their 
part of the of the site.  So it is quite a big concern sometimes because we have like three, four hundred 
staff potentially that could have access to it.” 
Problems and concerns with contractor access were also reported as a concern by 43 employees (36%), 
who considered treatment of contractors as inconsistent with the security posture of the rest of the 
organisation:  
P66: “...but also it’s not just that but it’s internally as well when we have contractors coming in who are 
replacing people who have been here longer for the sake of saving money...for instance at the moment 
we’ve had an instance where this person’s sent out a couple of documents that really aren’t for private 
viewing but they're unprotected you know.” 
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When discussing their overall perception or organisational security culture, 36 employees (31%) referred 
to it as static and that the organisation needs to be more proactive:  
I: “So, which way would you say the culture is moving? Is it that, security is getting tighter, or it is 
weakening?” P110: “To be honest from day to day things, I do not really see it moving to be honest.” 
5.3 The Emergence of Shadow Security 
The narratives presented in the previous section revealed the existence of a previously unknown 
behavioural paradigm in organisational security environments; the shadow security.   Borrowing the term 
from “Shadow IT” (“employees going around IT to get the IT services they want on their own”, Nelson, 
2013), shadow security represents “the sum of self-made security measures created by productivity-
focused, but also security-conscious, employees when the organisation’s official security implementation 
does not meet their needs (or are unaware of relevant elements of it)”.  Rather than remaining passive, 
employees, peer groups, and managers who have their own understanding of security, individually or 
collectively devise their own adaptations to unsatisfactory security measures, introducing their own 
workable “secure workarounds”: novel solutions, designed to fit their own primary tasks, also perceived 
as serving the purpose of maintaining security.  These workarounds may not provide the same level of 
security risk mitigation as employees following the official security policy, but they reflect the best 
compromise employees can find between getting the job done and managing the risks to the assets they 
use in their day to day tasks. This section presents the drivers of shadow security development, based on 
narratives identified in the grounded theory interview analysis, also discussing the risks emerging from its 
development in an organisation.  It also presents the lessons security management can learn from shadow 
security development to deliver more effective protection. 
5.3.1 Drivers of shadow security behaviour 
The conditions leading to employee deviation from prescribed security practices can be grouped under six 
major categories: (1) impact of friction-inducing security on employee productivity, (2) lack of 
organisational response to employees reporting security problems, (3) reliance on local security decision 
making without providing effective guidance, (4) security communication and training being generic, 
overloaded, and thus ineffective, (5) ineffective security management perception by employees, and (6) 
perceived problems in organisational culture that reduce employee motivation to follow organisational 
processes. This section discusses each of the above, explaining their effect on employee primary task and 
security perceptions, also explaining how those led to employees having to devise their own adaptations 
to organisational security.   
5.3.1.1 Productivity impact – security-productivity friction 
Contrary to the archetypal view of “lazy, ignorant and wilfully disobedient users” held by security 
managers (Adams and Sasse, 1999), employees appear sufficiently motivated to comply with security and 
demonstrate some individual capacity to do so effectively.  The problems start when security starts 
negatively affecting productivity.  Time overheads, disruption in primary task completion and increased 
cognitive load in order to deal with security mechanisms, all damage employee ability to proceed with 
productivity related activities, causing disgruntlement.  Employees then come up with their own 
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solutions, based on their own understanding of what workable security should look like.  Inflexible 
organisational provisions for file sharing for example, led to employees having to either wait for central 
IT management to approve requested access to resources, or find less taxing information sharing 
mechanisms.  They address this by either (1) sharing information using unencrypted USB drives, deleting 
the information once file transfer is completed, (2) sharing files using emails (potentially leaving 
permanent impressions of documents on their local drives) or (3) using third party provisions for 
document and information sharing (e.g. DropBox), believing that careful access granting solely to their 
colleagues provides adequate information protection.  In the majority of the examples presented in the 
previous section, participants recognised their chosen approaches as insecure, but provided some 
reasoning to legitimise their behaviour; either due to compliant behaviour creating unreasonable time 
overheads, or due to compliance being regarded as simply impossible.  Employee self-devised practices 
are less demanding and less disruptive, supporting what employees believed to be more proportionate and 
appropriate effort for security behaviour.   
5.3.1.2 Lack of feedback response 
The second driver of shadow security development comes from employees perceiving the organisation as 
unable to respond to their reports about security creating problems to employee primary tasks.  
Employees report to their managers or central security on both primary task overheads created by security 
mechanisms and potential security risks they identify within their working environment (e.g. problems 
with access revoking leading to potential unauthorised access to information).  In many cases, where the 
organisational response appears inadequate, employees believe the organisation demands security but 
does not listen to their feedback.  This also negatively affects employees’ perceived importance of 
security to the organisation’s leadership, providing additional validation for their decisions to adapt 
security in their own way when productivity reasons justify this. 
5.3.1.3 Communication and training problems 
Based on the narratives presented in this chapter, the overall organisational security communication and 
training processes emerge as dysfunctional.  There is limited awareness amongst employees of the 
existence of security policies and formal procedures that aim to mitigate organisational security risks.  
Employees also lack accurate knowledge of role-related risks, also perceiving information included in 
security communication and training as not useful to them.  Confusion is also present on how to identify 
and protect sensitive information, but also on how organisational mechanisms (e.g. physical security 
desk) may be bypassed by attackers.  As employees mentioned, the above problems were a result of: 
1. Lack of effective security training from the organisation: employees reported that some security 
training was provided when they joined, with no follow up after that.  They also referred to the 
content as generic and could not recall the desired behaviours described in it. 
2. Security communication emerging as dysfunctional: sending large amounts of information to all 
the employees creates a negative attitude towards security managers and security in general.  
The communicated information is then ignored, dismissed as useless and, when employees are 
aware of the need for security, drives the deployment of shadow security solutions. 
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5.3.1.4 Ineffective security management perception 
Inability of the organisation to enforce its security policy and respond to reported risks also leads to 
shadow security development.  Non-enforcement of policy (e.g. clear desk) is perceived by some 
employees as lack of interest from the organisation to achieve security.  They then disregard official 
security principles and behave in ways they know can get away with, to efficiently proceed with quick 
primary task completion.  Their negative perception of security is accentuated by the inability of the 
existing processes to accommodate for organisational conditions that deviate from normal day-to-day 
working practices.  For example, employees who find the systems in place as not supporting 
responsibility delegation to their colleagues when they need to go away, find it easier to just share their 
passwords with them.  In addition, employees often identify problems and potential risks in the security 
implementation (e.g. leavers access not revoked promptly) and even go the extra mile to report those.  
But, as they said, the organisation appears not to respond to the reported problems, which further 
accentuates their perception that security is not a top organisational priority. 
5.3.1.5 Reliance on local decision making without effective guidance 
Deployment and evolution of security behaviour within organisational sub-divisions mostly relies on 
managers as a conduit.  Managers constantly face the challenge of having to communicate behaviours that 
minimise work-related organisational risks, but also focus on ensuring uninterrupted completion of 
productivity-related tasks within their teams (e.g. how to seamlessly share information).  But the 
organisation did not provide adequate security support or training to them, so they prescribe practices 
they see as best fitting (e.g. use self-procured USB drives).  This invites the evolution of local, ad-hoc 
habits and security culture, which may significantly divert from the organisation’s policy.  The emerging 
perceived absence of a consistent organisational security position encourages independent action to 
manage security at team level, based on manager’s own knowledge and interpretation.  In addition, the 
lack of effective guidance and enforcement, leads to shadow security through manager recommendation 
and procurement of own solutions perceived as implicitly permitted by the organisation.  Similarly, the 
procurement of employee-devised strategies is also seen as implicitly permitted by the team manager.  As 
a result, shadow security practices become standard practice (e.g. P118: “not policy, my own best 
practice”), fostering many differing and inconsistent security behaviours within the same organisation; 
potentially increasing organisational exposure to security risks. 
5.3.1.6 Organisational security culture problems 
The widespread problems with security mechanisms led to an overall disregard for those.  With their 
colleagues not following the recommended security practices, employees are likely to follow suit, further 
fostering the development of a non-compliant, ad-hoc and self-devised security culture within the 
organisation.  Deploying self-devised security may initially start as a “one-off solution” (e.g. use an 
unencrypted drive to transfer data and delete the data immediately afterwards), but can eventually become 
standard practice amongst team members.  When this happens, new joiners are also likely to mimic their 
more experienced colleagues’ behaviours, with the emerging practices becoming part of team security 
cultures in an organisation. 
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5.3.2 Effectiveness of shadow security 
Shadow security is developed as employees’ response to security that creates significant friction with 
their primary tasks.  Revisiting the definition of information security from section 2.1 (a discipline 
attempting to mitigate risks from identified threats by implementing appropriate controls), shadow 
security emerges from employees managing security themselves at the individual or team level. They 
assess the severity of threats and vulnerabilities based on their own risk perception and understanding, 
adapt existing security goals, and devise their own controls that better fit their productivity requirements.  
Shadow security then emerges as a realistic form of security, developed as a response to unrealistic 
organisational demands.  The emerging employee-procured security practices may often not be as 
effective as behaviours and controls procured or advocated by organisational information security 
management.  But, when employees are unwilling to comply with the latter due to high friction, shadow 
security provides better protection for the organisation than employee non-compliance. 
5.3.3 Risks to the Organisation 
Despite contributing to organisational protection, widespread deployment of shadow security solutions in 
an organisation negatively impacts attempts to provide effective, centrally-coordinated protection.  
Turning a blind eye to this “Do It Yourself” security approach harbours a number of potential risks for the 
organisation: (1) security develops outside organisational control, (2) shadow security consumes 
employee security resources (compliance budget), and (3) the perceived security self-sufficiency by 
employees can lead to alienation from central security. 
5.3.3.1 Security development outside security management control  
Significant shadow security development can lead to employee security behavioural habits that 
significantly deviate from official policy, thus reducing security management’s ability to monitor and 
control security behaviour development.  In addition, without assessment of the effectiveness of 
employee-procured security controls, the organisation is left unable to assess the effectiveness of its 
information security implementation.  This loss of control can be accentuated by (1) line managers not 
accurately understanding security risks, but significantly influencing employee behaviours, (2) 
development of varying security “micro-cultures” within organisational subdivisions, and (3) emergence 
of a false sense of contribution towards organisational protection amongst employees.  The three above 
factors are discussed in detail below. 
5.3.3.1.1 Inaccurate and insufficient line manager understanding  
Ineffective communication of policy and security risks to managers accentuates security development 
outside organisational control.  Managers are the best-placed people to convey desired behaviours to 
employees within their teams, but without appropriate training, they lack sufficient understanding of the 
policies and risks that exist within the organisation.  The emerging self-devised security advice, leads to 
the security of the organisation becoming that which managers consider to provide the best fit for their 
business processes.  This can result in behaviours that diverge from the organisation’s security policy.  
Security managers also lose control and understanding of security behaviours, leaving the organisation 
vulnerable to insecure line-manager advice that can become common practice.  
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5.3.3.1.2 Security “micro-culture” development 
The presence of a shadow security environment can lead to the emergence of a non-compliant 
organisational security culture.  Key stakeholders in the organisation (line managers, for instance) appear 
to be complicit in the development of shadow security, primarily because it moderates the negative 
impact of friction-inducing security on productivity: like their employees, they value productivity over 
security compliance.  The absence of a consistent organisational security position, leads to shadow 
security practices devised at organisational subdivision level, which can result in divergent behaviours 
developing independently within those subdivisions.  The emerging security “micro-cultures” provide 
freedom for the development of team security folk models (Wash, 2010), which are reinforced by both 
team managers and team members who aim to support each other in their security decisions.  In addition 
to the immediate risks from the subsequent loss of control and inability to capture current behaviours, the 
presence of local “security micro-cultures” can also act as an additional level of resistance to 
organisational security awareness, education and training attempts.   
5.3.3.1.3 Emergence of a false sense of security 
When adopting shadow security practices, employees rationalise that they acting appropriately to protect 
the organisation, but their understanding of the risks the organisation faces can be incomplete or 
inaccurate. This approach could be effective if employees are significantly aware of related risks or 
choose actions that protect the organisation; but employees cannot be assumed to be security experts.  In 
addition, the identified absence of accurate risk understanding (e.g. “I delete data from unencrypted USB 
drive”) demonstrates that employees are not always up to date with current information security threats.  
In such a case, organisational willingness to let them act as they see fit can significantly increase 
organisational risk exposure. 
Employee and manager own rationalisations also create a false sense of security existence at team level.  
This provides justification for shadow security behaviours, as employees believe they are contributing to 
organisational protection, even when they act in contrast to the security policy.  When the organisation 
takes no action against this policy non-compliance, violations and insecure behaviours become a cultural 
norm.  This is significantly risky, as a non-security conscious culture can lead to employees feeling 
disconnected from security management, perceiving it as unnecessary, thus being less likely to follow 
centrally-administered security advice.  This can act as an additional level of resistance to organisational 
behavioural change attempts, providing further justification for divergence from prescribed behaviours or 
current mechanisms. 
5.3.3.2 Reducing employee resources available for security 
Employee resources expended on friction-inducing security, together with related shadow security 
behaviours reduce their ability to comply with well-designed centrally-administered security mechanisms 
and processes.  In some increased cognitive load conditions where compliance with official security 
policy clauses is impossible (e.g. multiple password management without writing those down), the chosen 
“shadow” employee actions consume their time and effort available to security (e.g. having to maintain a 
password protected document with their password list, regularly updating it when different systems 
require a password change).  This can quickly exhaust the employee’s compliance budget (Beautement at 
al., 2008), reducing their willingness to comply even with well-designed security mechanisms. 
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5.3.3.3 Alienation from central security 
Friction-inducing technical solutions that the organisation refuses to change or replace cause 
disgruntlement amongst employees.  This can create alienation between employees and central security 
management, accentuating the existing user-security divide (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009), and 
compounding resistance to centrally-dictated security expectations.  This divide can be further 
accentuated when employee reports of potential concerns (as in 5.2.4) appear to remain unaddressed by 
central security.  Not responding to employee feedback about identified security shortcomings is seen to 
validate their decisions to adapt security when they believe an alternative solution is needed.  When 
central security support appears inadequate, shadow security practices may indirectly serve to reduce their 
frustration with security.  In addition, attempts to enforce compliance by putting restrictions in place (e.g. 
blocking certain types of documents from corporate email systems) may partially prevent shadow security 
practices from developing, but they negatively affect employee productivity, create disgruntlement and 
can lead to further alienation of employees, who will eventually still manage to find ways around 
restrictions (e.g. change file extension to get an attachment past the organisational firewall).  In general, 
the development of shadow security signifies the presence of significant problems in organisational 
security management, with shadow security offering a less taxing alternative to employees.  Attempts to 
suppress this without improving organisational security systems only manage to disengage employees 
from security management attempts to protect an organisation.  
5.3.4 Lessons from Shadow Security 
The risks identified in the previous section suggest that the potential for shadow security development 
should not be ignored by organisational security managers when designing, or attempting to improve 
existing security mechanisms or processes.  As discussed in the previous section, in many cases the 
presence of shadow security can be a positive sign: instead of staying away from unworkable security 
completely, employees act in ways they perceive as providing at least some protection.  But the emerging 
practices often do not manage organisational risks adequately.  Despite that, shadow security behaviours 
presented in this chapter revealed a number of insights on employee security behaviours that can be 
useful to organisational security management, which are discussed in this section.  
5.3.4.1 Employees want easy to use security  
In general, employees appeared motivated to invest some proportion of their time to keep the organisation 
secure.  The development of shadow security confirms the existence of employee capacity to behave 
securely.  It also suggests that employees are able to relate security consequences to personal practices, 
which can act as a motivator to improve their security behaviour.  They appeared willing to take action to 
address potential risks when insecure conditions or behaviours were identified (i.e. take care to protect 
information in transit or behave securely when the overhead is minimal).  They also encouraged their 
colleagues and superiors to act in a secure way, implying that if security enforcers manage to instil 
appropriate behaviours in employees, these can then be reinforced across the employee base.  In addition, 
the findings of this section reinforce past research and previous chapter reports that security mechanisms 
imposing minimal additional workload have positive effect on employee compliance behaviours 
(Beautement et al, 2008).   The findings also contradict Pallas’ (2009) findings that “an increase of 
opportunistic behaviour is exactly what can be expected to happen within strongly decentralized settings”.  
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There is sufficient evidence in the emerging behavioural paradigms that employees want security and, 
what Pallas presents as opportunistic behaviour, is actually their attempt to deploy the required workable 
solutions that security management failed to deliver.  In addition, the results suggest that the value 
misalignments between security management and employees (principal-agent problem - section 2.6.1) are 
not as severe as previous research suggested (Gurbaxani and Kemerer, 1999; Holmstrom, 1989; Pallas, 
2009): employees felt they were responsible for keeping the organisation risk-free.  They even went the 
extra mile of devising their own “affordable” security provisions when the productivity overhead created 
by the friction-inducing official security and their primary task activities was perceived as uneconomic. 
5.3.4.2 Usable security is still not available to users 
Many drivers of shadow security development were a result of the organisational security design not 
providing employees with workable security solutions.  Organisations would do well to consider that 
shadow security happens naturally and is a valuable indicator that security solutions are not serving the 
business.  When the organisation fails to align security with productivity goals, employees take action, 
rather than doing nothing or passively relying on the organisation to remediate.  For an organisation, 
ignoring the presence of unusable and friction-inducing security mechanisms and processes is dangerous: 
errors and workarounds create vulnerabilities (Adams and Sasse, 1999), people ignore security advice that 
requires high effort for little benefit (Herley, 2009), and systemic non-compliance creates noise that 
makes precursors of even severe attacks hard to detect.  
5.3.4.3 Employees can participate in security 
While shadow security practices persist, the organisation has an inconsistent security posture which does 
not align with its productivity goals.  However, the existence of shadow security also suggests the 
presence of a latent capacity for employees to appreciate and play an active part in the provision of 
security, albeit driven by their internalised sense of what security should achieve for the primary task.  
Employees deploy their own security solutions when they believe an easy to follow policy or 
infrastructure is missing, instead of doing nothing or passively relying on the organisation to remediate.   
Security management should not encourage shadow security development simply through ignorance.  
Security experts should be aware of this individual capacity and the potential for employees to 
consciously consider well-designed and low cost security in their activities.  Security management needs 
to listen and learn from shadow security development 
In many ways, perceptions of the organisation's existing security implementations, as elicited from 
employees, indicate where they believe the organisation has failed to provide them with workable 
security, adequate security support, or indeed failed to keep the organisation secure.  User reaction to an 
organisation’s security implementation needs to be heard, lest it weaken the organisation's security 
posture: learning from, and not ignoring, employees can enhance security, aligning it with organisational 
goals and increasing its effectiveness.  If users are not heard, they can become disenfranchised, and 
should they have a legitimate concern about security, they will not remain passive in the face of ill-fitting 
solutions: they will engineer their own shadow security environment, either individually or collectively.  
Organisations must be able to recognise when and where shadow security is created, factors that 
contribute to its development, and in turn how to adapt security provisions to respond to user needs.  In 
order to achieve this there needs to be: (1) recognition of individual employee capacity for consciously 
138 
 
considering security as part of work activities (2) a strategy for engaging with employee security needs, 
and (3) two-way channels implemented within the organisation that support engagement and dialogue.  
The emerging employee participation in security design can allow for better alignment of security with 
organisational productivity priorities, thus improving employee compliance.  
5.3.5 Shadow security as a learning opportunity 
The above lessons suggest that shadow security development comes as a result of employee attempts to 
achieve workable security.  Its development does not necessarily mean that security as a notion is 
disregarded, but that productivity-focused employees perceive the provisioned approach to one or more 
security elements as either inadequate or too expensive.  They then solve the emerging productivity-
security conflict that the organisation failed to resolve, as best as they know for their specific tasks and 
risks: rather than remaining passive, employees, peer groups and managers use their own understanding 
of security, individually or collectively, to devise adaptations of unsatisfactory security or introduce their 
own novel solutions.  Shadow security emerges as the realisation of employee attempts to behave 
securely, even when provisioned security appears incompatible with their primary task, or dysfunctional 
security communication provides very limited awareness of security policies and formal procedures.   
Effective security management should treat shadow security behaviours as a learning opportunity.  Its 
development and identification can improve understanding of how the existing security mechanisms and 
processes create security-productivity friction.  The emerging employee responses can then provide 
valuable insights that security management can use to drive security improvements.  Further discussion 
and analysis of how shadow security can be identified and leveraged to deliver effective security are 
presented in Chapter 7. 
5.4 Results validation 
As explained in section 3.4 of the methodology chapter, the validity of case study findings can be 
improved by using different triangulation approaches.  To improve the findings presented in this chapter, 
additional data collection and analysis were conducted in Company A and a second organisation, 
Company B.  This aimed to provide both methodological and data triangulation, improve the validity of 
the findings and provide better characterisation and understanding of the identified phenomena.  This 
section presents the process and emerging findings of additional data collection and analysis.  It also 
discusses the contribution of this additional research on understanding the evolution of shadow security in 
organisations and the opportunities it presents for organisational security management. 
5.4.1 Methodological triangulation - Survey  
As explained in section 3.4.1, a large set of survey data with 1488 employees of Company A was 
available for secondary analysis.  The data was not used to confirm the presence of shadow security, as 
data collection was already completed before commencing this research; instead, it was used to 
demonstrate that the behaviours which lead to shadow security identification and definition were widely 
prevalent in the organisational environments examined.  
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5.4.1.1 Analysis of results 
In order to provide validation for the insecure behaviours identified in the interviews, the analysis of the 
survey results focused on: (1) verification of employee propensity to act in a secure way and (2) 
identification of the existence and prevalence in Company A of friction-related insecure behaviours on a 
wider scale than the 118 interviewed employees.   
5.4.1.1.1 Attitude 
5 security attitude-related scenarios were analysed to verify the validity of the suggestions presented in 
section 5.2, stating that employees are aware of the need for security, motivated to protect the 
organisation, willing to report potential security risks, able to identify insecure practices, and willing to 
challenge those.  This section presents the attitude scenarios included in the interviews, together with the 
number of employees that responded to each one and the numbers that chose each of the available 
actions. 
1. In a scenario of unsupervised people without a visible visitor's badge waiting near the barrier 
door and occasionally ‘tailgating’ to get into the main building, answered by 359 employees. 
a. 123 (34%): Notify security that you have observed visitors tailgating past the barrier.  
b. 206 (57%): Confront the people tailgating, ask them to show you some ID (if they are 
not known) and supervise them back to reception.  
c. 16 (5%): Assume the people have access and have been checked by the reception staff 
and continue with your work so as not to disrupt their work or yours.  
d. 14 (4%): Confront the people and then report their names to either your manager or 
security.  
2. Identification of access to information and sharing with others by people not gone through 
vetting process to handle sensitive data  (796 employees) 
a. 581 (73%): Report observations to manager, and urge them to take action.  
b. 107 (13%): Send violators an informal email, reminding that sharing sensitive 
documents with non-cleared employees is not allowed.  
c. 107 (13%): Initiate an audit of other department to attempt to track the use and 
distribution of the sensitive documents.  
d. 1 (1%): Do nothing - If something goes wrong, the Senior Manager in charge of the 
department that is sharing the information will be held responsible.  
3. Colleague often prints out confidential documents to work whilst travelling on the train to/from 
home - not always using the Confidential, but normal recycle bin as the paper will be destroyed 
when it is recycled anyway (133) 
a. 0: working practises are acceptable; recycling the paper is good for the environment and 
destroys any sensitive information at the same time.  
b. 95 (71%): Should ensure any paper copies are disposed of specifically in a confidential 
recycle bin to ensure secure shredding once finished with them – hard copies are a 
major source of information leaks.  
c. 0: Is right to work in the way that suits him best – without access to the company 
systems even if someone did get hold of a few bits of information they couldn’t damage 
the company anyway.  
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d. 38 (28%): Employee is totally reckless with customer’s information – should stop 
printing out work unless it is absolutely necessary.  
4. Notice a blue van parked outside the entrance gates - several times over the last couple of weeks. 
Inside are two individuals who appear to take pictures of the building/people around the 
building. As soon as the individuals are noticed, the van pulls away in a hurry. (347) 
a. 1 (1%): Ignore it. The van was there several times and nothing has happened at the site 
so it probably isn’t a threat.  
b. 53 (15%): Report the incident to line manager; it is better to report such incidents even 
if no obvious breach is noticed.  
c. 292 (84%): Report suspicions directly to security so they can take the appropriate 
action.  
d. 1 (1%): Do nothing now but keep an eye out for the van in the future to confirm his 
suspicions. Report if it shows up again.  
5. Employee notices that several confidential documents/records were missing and there was no 
audit trail of who had used them last.  Colleague behaves weirdly and objects to being 
challenged (877) 
a. 8 (1%): Do nothing, colleague has always been eccentric 
b. 581 (66%): Discuss colleague’s behaviour with the department manager – it isn’t 
acceptable for an individual in the department to have their own methods.  
c. 8 (1%): Accommodate their work practises by adjusting their own.  
d. 280 (32%): Call the Business Conduct helpline and make a report about colleague’s 
behaviour – it is suspicious that there appears to be no proper audit of his work. 
The above results confirm the identified employee awareness of the need to protect the organisation: the 
majority of employees chose actions that indicate an understanding of the risks related to potentially 
insecure behaviours.  They were also willing to take action when they observed such behaviours, either 
directly or, most of the time, by reporting potential concerns to appropriate authorities.   
5.4.1.1.2 Behaviour 
After confirming the existence of employee awareness of the need for security, 5 behaviour scenarios 
were analysed to identify employee chosen courses of action when security requirements created primary 
task overheads.   
6. Problematic SharePoint setup scenario (slow approval, need for urgent access - 877).  
a. 74 (8%): Request that those with access share their (main log-in) account details and 
passwords with others to allow them access to the information.  
b. 261 (30%): Burn a copy of the files onto a CD/DVD and distribute to the work group.  
c. 412 (47%): Email the document archive directly to the general work group mailing list 
using your company email address.  
d. 130 (15%): Move the files to an unrestricted folder on the internal network to allow the 
work group to have continued access to it.  
7. Problems in delegating access-granting responsibilities when going away.  In addition, 
guidelines for granting access are not always clear and require some degree of discretion (865) 
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a. 154 (18%): Leave password with secretary who, although temporary, is a trusted 
employee, with instructions to use account to resolve "emergency situations". 
b. 454 (53%): Leave password with a trusted member of the department and ask them to 
handle "all decision making" while they are away.  
c. 64 (7%): Grant blanket access rights to the whole department for the duration of 
absence.  
d. 193 (22%): Give out login details of a range of access permissions (used by temporary 
workers) with instructions that they be used where existing permissions do not allow 
access.  
8. Unavailable encrypted USB stick, client presentation includes embedded media too large to 
email, problems accessing internal network from outside (133) 
a. 49 (37%) Take the required data on an unencrypted USB stick they have available.  
b. 61 (46%) Borrow an encrypted stick from a colleague - make a note of their password. 
Colleague asked not to share / erase the confidential data already on the stick.  
c. 13 (10%) Use the available unencrypted stick to put a copy of the data on a colleague 
laptop and ask them to take it to the client's site.  
d. 10 (7%) Upload the files to a public online storage service and recover at client's site.  
9. Occasionally works from home in the evening, gets there by train. Leave laptop at work - 
recently had it stolen. Backup all work files on personal computer to access without having to 
connect to the company system - home network connection is not always reliable.  Knows this is 
against policy, but lives in a safe neighbourhood. To transfer files to home computer, uses a 
variety of methods (278).  
a. 60 (22%) Use own USB sticks to carry current work on the train.  
b. 15 (5%) Email files to your personal email account and download at home.  
c. 11 (4%) Use an online storage service such as DropBox, deleting files once you have 
made a local copy.  
d. 192 (69%) Log in to the company VPN and make local copies via that connection.  
10. Contractor asks for some commercially sensitive information not publicly available through the 
company’s web site without following request procedure 3rd-parties need to go through. 
Contractor becomes persistent, reminds that they used to be colleagues, mentioning the names of 
several senior people in both companies that would be extremely unhappy if she does not get this 
information that day. Also says she is still in contact with line manager and will explain 
everything to him later, so it should be ok to provide this information today. (359) 
a. 28 (8%): Accede to the request for information to ensure that senior personnel are 
satisfied and contractor’ productivity isn't hampered.  
b. 18 (5%): Send the information requested but immediately inform line manager of what 
information has been provided.  
c. 29 (8%): Ask specifically which pieces of information contractor needs - send through a 
redacted or edited version of the documents.  
d. 284 (79%): Send the information through but password protect the file and wait until 
they have spoken to line manager before releasing the password.  
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5.4.1.2 Survey discussion 
The attitude scenarios provided additional evidence of employee goodwill and understanding of the need 
to take action and contribute to delivering organisational security.  The majority of employees were 
willing to act when they identified potential security risks, challenge insecure behaviours of their 
colleagues, report violations to central security, securely dispose confidential information, and discuss 
security concerns with their line managers.  Despite the identified willingness to act securely, the 
behaviour scenarios demonstrated that when security created problems in proceeding with their primary 
task activities, a large proportion of employees chose to proceed with insecure options (e.g. sharing 
credentials, using unencrypted drives, emailing sensitive documents).  These findings strengthen the 
results of the interview analysis, suggesting that employees consider non-compliant behaviours as 
acceptable when they encounter friction-inducing security.   
5.4.2 Data triangulation - Company B 
The survey results from Company A verified the identified employee willingness to bend security rules 
and bypass mechanisms that create significant overheads or disrupt their primary task.  Despite that, they 
provided little evidence to support the emergence of shadow security as a response to this productivity 
impact.  In order to improve the validity of the identified paradigms on shadow security development 
discussed earlier in this chapter, data triangulation was also required.  As discussed in section 3.4, cross-
case data triangulation can significantly improve the validity of paradigms emerging from case study 
research.  In order to do so, a similar interview set from the second partner organisation, Company B was 
collected and analysed, with a second survey also taking place to confirm identified behaviours (details 
on the interview data collection process are presented in 3.2.1).  The remainder of this section summarises 
the results of the interview analysis from 82 Company B interviews and uses the narratives identified in 
the new analysis to revisit the shadow security paradigms identified in Company A.  It then explains how 
the new analysis allowed confirmation of the presence of shadow security in organisations and its impact 
on employee behaviours or the organisational environment. 
5.4.2.1 Interviews 
The question set for the semi-structured interviews was very similar to Company A, with small 
adaptations to reflect identified differences in the organisational environment between the two 
organisations.  The analysis process followed was also the same as Company A (section 5.1), using the 
grounded theory process of open, axial and selective coding (the emergent grounded theory categories can 
be found in Appendix I).   
5.4.2.1.1 Security awareness and compliance 
The majority of employees in Company B (78 – 95%) reported that they see value in security and the 
benefits it can provide to the organisation.  As a result, when mechanisms or recommended behaviours 
demanded reasonable time or effort, secure practices were present (e.g. taking care to protect their 
corporate laptops to protect both company property and the information stored on those).  Employees 
were also willing to challenge their colleagues and reported to actively do so (77 - 94%).   
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5.4.2.1.2 Secure behaviour drivers 
The presence of supporting mechanisms and procedures (mostly absent from company A) was reported to 
encourage secure behaviour.  Employees mentioned, for example, that quick access control setup (43 – 
52%) and easy password resets (29 – 35%), reduced the need for password sharing.  In addition, the 
presence of a usable password manager, reduced employee need to write passwords down (38 – 46%).  55 
others (67%) reported that the presence of Non-Disclosure Agreements on some projects led to taking 
more care when dealing with project-related information.  Perceived responsibility, peer and manager 
pressure were also reported as drivers for secure behaviour for the majority of Company B employees (70 
– 85%). 
5.4.2.1.3 Effects of burdensome security 
A number of friction-inducing elements of the organisational security implementation were identified that 
affected employee primary task completion ability, or increased the perceived effort required to follow 
secure practices.  This led to a negative attitude towards security and provided justification for insecure 
employee behaviours.  The identified friction-inducing mechanisms and processes were categorised based 
on the workload impact categorisation devised during company A interview analysis, presented in 5.2.2: 
(1) Disruption, (2) Time and (3) Increased cognitive load25. 
5.4.2.1.3.1 Disruption 
When systems in place prevented completion of primary-task related activities, employees devised their 
own procedures.  For example: in order to help employees manage their credentials for different systems, 
the organisation deployed a password manager that stored employee username and passwords on their 
computers.  52 employees (63%) mentioned that the provided software did not work for all systems they 
had to authenticate to.  As a result, they resorted to writing their passwords down (either in physical or 
electronic form) and then took self-devised measures to protect the password storage location (e.g. 
encrypting password holding document, or carrying notebook with passwords with them all the time) 
5.4.2.1.3.2 Time 
Employees also reported that they avoid mechanisms that slowed down their primary task completion, 
choosing to adopt other less-disruptive practices.  Problems with setting up team access to organisational 
data sharing systems for example, led 64 employees (78%) to use email or other external third party 
services (e.g. DropBox) to share files; they assumed those provide adequate protection for their corporate 
information.  As one employee (PB40) explained, fine-graining access within DropBox to only include 
colleagues’ accounts is a “secure enough” approach. 
5.4.2.1.3.3 Increased cognitive load 
The interviews also revealed that, when the amount of information employees had to memorise in order to 
behave securely became unmanageable, they resorted to other, less strenuous activities.  The large amount 
                                                          
 
25 For space and readability reasons I will not present the full list of the narratives that emerged from the analysis at 
this point, but they can be found, together with related interview extracts in Appendix I 
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of information included in the organisational security policy, together with training and communication 
content appearing irrelevant to their day to day activities, led to employees perceiving policy, training and 
communication as “tickboxing” exercises required just to pass organisational audits or comply with 
regulatory requirements.  66 employees (80%) dismissed policies as irrelevant, interpreted desired secure 
behaviours in their own way, and sought support from their line managers and colleagues when in doubt 
on what a secure course of action would be. 
5.4.2.1.4 Team level security mediation 
Similarly to Company A, a large proportion of security mediation in Company B happened at team level.  
Employees sought support from their line managers when they encountered problems with security, or 
when they were uncertain on the actions required to keep the organisation safe.  In addition to providing 
support, line managers were often also responsible for authorising access to information, systems and 
resources.  This reliance on managers was not formalised in their responsibilities or the security policy 
though, and the lack of accurate policy and security understanding led to managers adopting approaches 
they themselves deemed as more appropriate to protect the organisation (65 employees - 79%).  These 
approaches were often devised outside of central security control, giving rise to a number of shadow 
security practices, this increasing organisational exposure to potential risks (e.g. the example in the 
previous section about DropBox use when corporate file-sharing systems created problems – for more 
examples please refer to Appendix I).   
5.4.2.1.5 Security perceived as ineffective 
The identified problems in the security implementation, combined with weaknesses employees saw in 
organisational security management (e.g. access revoking for people leaving the company being slow or 
using CBT completion rates as an indicator for security), and the observation of various insecure 
behaviours around them (e.g. over-sharing of information), led to them perceiving the organisation as 
unable to provide effective and usable security.  As a response, 67 employees (82%) reported they devise 
their own security solutions.  Problems with organisational back-up systems for example, combined with 
limited network storage space, led to employees deploying their own backup solutions by using personal 
(or team) drives, outside of central information systems controls; in some cases those drives were even 
reported to be unencrypted. 
5.4.2.1.6 Culture perception 
As with Company A, employees reported that organisational culture is mostly productivity driven.  The 
variation in behaviours across different organisational locations and the perceived need for the 
organisation to be more proactive, led to the belief that it is OK to bypass security (or procure own 
solutions) when it created primary task problems.  This led to the emergence of varying norms and 
security micro-cultures across different organisational subdivisions (clear desk behaviour for example, 
differed significantly between employees based in two different organisational sites). 
5.4.2.2 Survey 
Aiming to confirm the identified employee willingness to bypass security when it created excessive 
primary task friction, a survey was also conducted in Company B, confirming the results in a similar way 
to the findings of the survey in Company A: employees appeared security risk-aware and willing to 
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challenge insecure behaviours of colleagues or outsiders, but also willing to bypass security when it 
created significant negative impact on their ability to proceed with their primary tasks (for the full survey 
analysis and data please refer to Appendix J). 
5.4.3 Revisiting shadow security 
5.4.3.1 Drivers of shadow security development 
The drivers behind shadow security development in Company B were based on the same elements of the 
organisational security environment as Company A: (1) productivity impact of friction-inducing 
mechanisms, (2) problems in security training and communication, (3) lack of feedback response, (4) 
problematic security management perception, (5) reliance on local decision making without effective 
guidance, and (6) insecure culture development. 
5.4.3.2 Lessons learned from Company B 
In addition to verifying the drivers of shadow security behaviour, the Company B analysis led to 
identification of an additional property of shadow security development: ill-though organisational 
attempts to address some of the emerging insecure behaviours can only alter the nature of the problem, 
without fixing it.  For example: 
 Company B deployed a password manager, aiming to help employees manage the many 
passwords they had.  But problems in its operation (did not work with all systems employees 
needed to use), turned a cognitive load problem (having to remember the passwords) to a 
disruption one (a security mechanism not working).  This still leaves employees having to 
manage the emerging security-productivity friction, justifying potential decisions for deployment 
of shadow security solutions. 
 Connectivity to organisational systems from outside the organisation through VPN was reported 
as very good, preventing the emergence of disruption identified in Company A analysis from 
problematic network connections.  The lack of available individual network storage for 
employees though, ended up changing the nature of the disruption employees faced from lack of 
connection to lack of storage.  Consequently, employees had to use other means to store and 
backup information (local storage on laptops and personal external drives for backup), and 
deploy their own security on those (e.g. take initiative to encrypt external drives). 
5.5 Revisiting Research Questions 
1. Do employees understand the need for security mechanisms in the organisation? If yes or no, why? 
The interview analyses revealed some general awareness and understanding amongst employees about the 
need to protect organisational information.  Despite that, they appeared to ignore many of the security 
policy clauses explaining how to act in order to achieve that protection.  The findings presented in this 
chapter suggest that the main reason for this was the ineffectiveness of organisational security 
communication and training (scarce, not followed up, and mostly based on generic content that provided 
no visible benefit to employees).  This led to employees dismissing the communicated information, 
turning to their line managers for support or selectively applying the principles they themselves identified 
as relevant to their roles (section 5.2) 
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2. What security-related challenges do employees find when attempting to proceed with their primary 
tasks? How do they respond to friction between their primary task and security mechanisms and 
processes? 
Security causes disruption and slowdown to employee primary tasks, or unmanageable cognitive load.  
They respond to this by devising their own, or adapting existing security solutions, to achieve the level of 
security they perceive as necessary, while minimising its impact on their primary task activities.  This 
shadow security development process can happen both at an individual level (employee devising own low 
cost solution to a security challenge) or team level (solutions are devised by colleagues collectively and/or 
also advocated by their line managers).  Employees also take additional actions to report the existence of 
disruptive security mechanisms to their managers or central security.   
3. When organisational security provisions appear to provide inadequate risk mitigation, what do 
employees do? 
Employees find themselves in situations where they identify potential security risks (e.g. the need to 
protect their laptop) for which an official policy did not exist, or they were unaware of it.  As a result, 
they devised their own solutions, often advocated by their managers in team meetings (e.g. don’t leave 
laptop in car).   
4. How do employees respond to a perceived lack of organisational security support? What are the 
risks from their behaviours and what can organisations learn from those? 
Lack of organisational support (e.g. not responding to employee reports of problems with security 
mechanisms or potential risks that are left unaddressed) leads to employees justifying their decisions to 
procure self-/team-devised solutions.  This increases the risk of security behaviours developing outside 
central security control, suggesting the need for an organisation to improve its security implementation, 
based on lessons learned from employee behaviours.  Organisations need to recognise that if they appear 
not to care about security, employees will have minimal incentive to follow the practices prescribed in 
security policies. 
5. How can the improved understanding from the previous questions be used to transform the systems 
in place to eliminate the problems discovered, avoiding the need to redesign the systems completely? 
Employees respond to friction-inducing security mechanisms using the resources they have available (e.g. 
lack of connectivity leading to storing files locally), deploying shadow security solutions to deliver some 
security protection.  When these solutions become common practice, the organisation loses control of 
security management, reducing alignment of deployed security approaches with organisational security 
risk appetite.  This calls for a security management approach that will allow adapting friction-inducing 
elements of the existing organisational environment to ones that can provide effective security protection; 
as discussed in section 2.8.4, for most organisations redesigning security from scratch is not an option.   
The definition of shadow security as the “sum of self-made security measures created by productivity-
focused, but also security-conscious, employees when the organisation’s official security implementation 
does not meet their needs (or are unaware of relevant elements of it)” provides a good starting point to 
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deliver workable and secure approaches.  Organisations can use shadow security as an indication of what 
mechanisms create friction between security and primary tasks, but also to identify employee awareness 
and current security behaviours; shadow security can act as a starting point for workable security, 
providing the basis for effective organisational protection (for further discussion on how this can be done 
please refer to Chapter 7) 
6. What trust relationships develop in an organisation and how do they influence security behaviours?  
A number of the identified paradigms presented in this chapter suggest that trust relationships exist in the 
organisation that also influence employee security behaviours.  For example, the action of employees to 
share passwords with colleagues despite security policy prohibition, suggests the presence of mutual 
understanding that their colleagues will not report their policy-violating action.  To identify, understand 
and characterise those relationships and their effect on employee security behaviour, an additional 
grounded theory analysis on both the Company A and B interview sets was conducted, presented in the 
next chapter.  
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 Trust and security behaviours 
The findings of the analysis presented in chapter 5 provided preliminary evidence for the existence of 
trust in the organisational environments examined, together with its influence on employee security 
behaviours.  A number of different situations were identified where the organisation did not attempt to 
enforce the content of the security policy through assurance.  Instead of implementing mechanisms to 
enforce or detect non-compliance, the organisation relied on its employees to behave as instructed.  In 
Company A for example, employees were given the freedom to manage access rights for their documents, 
while in Company B information classification requirements relied on employees assessing the sensitivity 
of information and marking documents appropriately.  The findings also identified instances where 
employees showed trust towards their colleagues: they shared their credentials with them to aid quick 
system or information access (an action prohibited by the security policy) and shared sensitive 
information outside official organisational channels.  Employees considered both these behaviours as 
necessary to proceed with their primary task-related activities, when they came across friction-inducing 
security.  In other cases, they left their screens unlocked because they knew the people physically present 
around them, so the perceived risk of not following the policy appeared to be lower.  As discussed in 
sections 5.2 and 5.3, employees often recognised the above practices as potentially increasing 
organisational risk exposure, but provided efficient primary task completion as a justification for their 
actions. 
Despite the identified indicators on the presence of trust and its influence on employee security 
behaviours, the findings presented in chapter 5 were insufficient to provide solid conclusions: the focus of 
the grounded theory analysis was not to examine the role of trust on security behaviours, but the drivers 
behind insecure behaviours and the impact of friction-inducing security on employee security practices.  
As a result, further analysis of the available dataset was required, to examine the existence and the 
prevalence of trust relationships in organisational environments, characterise those and identify their 
impact on employee security behaviours.  Aiming to deliver this understanding, this chapter discusses 
security-related trust development in organisations based on a secondary trust-focused analysis of the 
available interview sets.  It starts by presenting related literature on trust in organisational environments, 
together with a framework of trust interactions developed by Riegelsberger et al. (2005) and its 
application to organisational security behaviours by Fléchais et al. (2005).  The chapter then presents a 
new grounded theory analysis, examining the development and impact of trust relationships in Companies 
A and B.  Using the results, it then identifies two different security-related trust relationships in 
organisational environments: (1) organisation-employee trust and (2) inter-employee trust.   The chapter 
also explains how the two relationships often come to conflict, with employees having to choose between 
keeping the organisation secure or preserving already established trust relationships.  It also presents the 
impact of trust on shadow security development and the risks from the emerging behaviours that 
organisations need to address. 
6.1 Trust, risk and uncertainty  
Trust plays a vital role in the modern world: most economic, political and societal agreements strongly 
rely on the ability of two or more parties to trust each other, enabling collaboration to achieve mutual 
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benefits.  The presence of trust allows parties to engage in transactions where increased risk and 
uncertainty exist (Giddens, 2013).  Risk arises for a trustor (the transaction partner who moves first) when 
they cannot control the actions of the trustee (the person on which the trust is placed).  By making the 
first move in the transaction, the trustor then stands to lose something of value (valuable information, 
time or money).  The less information a trustor possesses about the ability and motivation of the trustee to 
hold up their part of the commitments made, the higher the uncertainty they face on the outcome of the 
transaction (Deutsch, 1958).  Based on this risky and uncertain nature of trust placement, Mayer et al., 
(1995) define trust in social interactions as:  “the willingness to be vulnerable based on positive 
expectation about the behaviour of others”, or, as Clark (2014) put it, “to assume that the other party will 
act in my best interest”.   
6.2 Trust-warranting properties 
Despite the existence of risk and uncertainty, a trustor may consciously decide to expose themselves to 
the trustee’s actions, due to potential benefits they may receive from the trustee’s later fulfilment.  On a 
single transaction basis, a trustee would be better off defecting after receiving the benefits of the trusting 
action: they have already received all the potential rewards from the transaction, so they are at a point of 
maximum gain, having invested minimal effort.  Any attempt to fulfil their part, honouring the trust 
shown towards them, requires investment of additional resources that will reduce their net benefit 
compared to the pre-fulfilment state (Sasse and Kirlappos, 2014 – Figure 10).  
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒′𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 − 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
Figure 10: Trustee benefit equation (Sasse and Kirlappos, 2014) 
Fulfilment motivation for the trustee comes from the existence of trust-warranting properties (Bacharach 
and Gambetta, 2001): properties of the environment or the parties involved, the long-term effects of 
which outweigh immediate non-fulfilment gains. These trust-warranting properties can be distinguished 
between intrinsic and contextual, based on the factors that drive their development (Figure 11).   
6.2.1.1 Intrinsic properties 
Intrinsic properties are relatively stable attributes of the trustee that affect their ability and motivation for 
fulfilment in the trust transaction.  Ability of a trustee characterises the possession of the resources or 
knowledge required for fulfilment of the trustor’s requirements.  Motivation on the other hand stems from 
existence of factors internal to the trustee that provide incentives for trustworthy behaviour (e.g. 
propensity to do good, personal costs of breaking trust).  It is driven by internalised norms or benevolence 
that dictate doing what a trustee perceives to be “the right thing” and provide non-monetary fulfilment 
rewards to the trustee, like personal satisfaction.  Essentially, intrinsic properties provide motivation for a 
trustee to behave as the trustor expects, without any immediate gain from fulfilment. 
6.2.1.2 Contextual properties 
Contextual properties are attributes of the context of the interaction that provide motivation for 
trustworthy behaviour by dis-incentivising non-fulfilment.  Their presence creates incentives for self-
interested trustees to fulfil in a transaction, in order to gain potential short and long term benefits, also 
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avoiding potential negative consequences.  Depending on the conditions that drive their development, 
contextual properties can be temporal, social or institutional:  
 Temporal embeddedness: Non-fulfilment can damage the potential of future trust shown towards 
the trustee. The prospect of benefitting from future interactions becomes an incentive for 
fulfilment (Axelrod, 1980). 
 Social embeddedness:  Performance information about a trustee’s past behaviour may be shared 
amongst trustors.  The potential for reputational damage from fulfilment failure leading to 
reduced future trust placement can act as a fulfilment incentive for a trustee (Corritore et al., 
2003). 
 Institutional embeddedness: The presence of external enforcement authorities penalising non-
compliance also acts as a non-fulfilment deterrent for a trustee (Schneier, 2012). 
 
Figure 11: Model of a trust interaction (adapted from Riegelsberger at al., 2005) 
6.2.1.3 Intrinsic vs Contextual properties 
The important distinction between intrinsic and contextual properties is to whom the trustor’s trust is 
placed.  Intrinsic properties lead to the development of party trust: trusting the other party’s (trustee) 
internal ability and values.  Contextual properties on the other hand lead to control trust: the trustor relies 
on the existence of mechanisms that dis-incentivise non-fulfilment by the trustee (Tan and Thoen, 2000).  
Fulfilment due to control trust does not imply a trustee is intrinsically trustworthy, as trustworthy 
behaviour is a result of external factors and motivation for long-term personal benefit, but in most cases it 
is “good enough”, as it still allows for successful transactions (Riegelsberger et al, 2005). 
6.3 Trust and organisational security  
Examining the available literature on information security in organisations, limited previous research was 
identified on the development of trust relationships in organisations and their effect on employee security 
behaviours.  To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the only past attempt to do so was the work of 
Fléchais et al. (2005), where they adapted a model of trust in technology mediated interactions by 
Riegelsberger et al. (2005) to discuss how trust affects security behaviour in organisations, also providing 
some suggestions for improving trust management by security managers (presented and discussed later in 
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this chapter).  This section presents the rationale behind conducting further research on the relationship 
between trust and security, presented later in this chapter.  It starts by bringing together research on the 
impact of trust in organisations and past research on information security behaviours.  It then revisits the 
drivers behind insecure employee behaviours identified and discussed in chapter 5, presents the economic 
impact of trust and assurance in security implementations, discusses the strengths and limitations of 
Fléchais et al.’s suggestions, and explains why further research was required. 
6.3.1 Trust and security management 
In an organisation, security management is part of a wider socio-technical environment, where the 
primary target is effective and efficient completion of production tasks (Brostoff and Sasse, 2001; 
Weirich and Sasse, 2001).  The existence of trust in that environment significantly contributes in realising 
organisational goals: it aids the development of social norms amongst employees, improving 
collaboration and leading to more effective production task completion (Mayer et al., 1995).  Despite this 
important role, the term trust is currently heavily misused in information security management; it is 
primarily used to describe what security experts call trusted components: “systems or components whose 
failure can break the security policy” (Anderson, 2008).  This definition refers to system components 
(hardware or software), certified to exhibit a specific behaviour under specific conditions.  Essentially, by 
referring to trusted components, security experts refer to assurance mechanisms that have been rigorously 
tested, often accompanied by appropriate “certifications of trustworthiness”.  Revisiting the definition of 
trust presented in section 6.1 (“…vulnerable based on positive expectation about the behaviour of 
others”), the current use of the term by security managers needs to be reconsidered: the only element in a 
security implementation that can potentially break the security policy is the people who use the systems in 
place.  In addition, positive expectations exist by the organisation on employee values and corresponding 
behaviours, as total control over their actions is both impossible and impractical.  Trust then emerges in 
the organisation when the impossibility of controlling what employees can do leads to security managers 
choosing to trust and encourage them to behave in a secure manner, instead of attempting to enforce 
stringent security (Fléchais et al., 2005). 
6.3.2 Employee trustworthiness and security violations 
Organisational research has already proven that employees are emotionally attached to the organisations 
they work for (Love and Singh, 2011; Rousseau, 1989).  The findings from the research presented in 
chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis also showed that, when employees understand related risks and the need for 
security protection, they are sufficiently motivated and capable to act appropriately to protect the 
organisation and its information.  Despite this, current organisational security approaches, often treat 
employees as untrustworthy, implementing excessive restrictions, mostly driven by “just in case” security 
management attitude (Silowash et al., 2012), or regulatory requirements for such restrictions (section 
2.5.3).  Chapter 5 identified many instances of this: security communication, for example, was overloaded 
with information that was irrelevant to many employees’ day-to-day tasks (section 5.2.1.2), while systems 
or information access granting decisions administered by central security made the approval process slow 
(5.2.2.1).  These excessive restrictions leave security-aware employees having to deal with strict policies 
and disruptive mechanisms that are either impossible to use or comply with, or that negatively affect their 
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ability to proceed with their primary tasks.  So, as section 5.3.3 explained in more detail, they end up 
having to choose between:  
1. Accepting the primary task impact of friction-inducing security.  An employee, and their 
colleagues and managers, accepting the delay in completion of a productivity-related task caused 
by high-cost security mechanisms (e.g. waiting for formal request for information access to be 
approved). 
2. Ignore recommended practices.  Employees resorting to actions explicitly prohibited by the 
organisation’s policy in order to proceed with their primary tasks (e.g. use unencrypted USB 
drives to share data with colleagues when encrypted ones are slow and take too much time – 
section 5.2.2.1). 
3. Adapt existing security solutions, or create their own.  This leads to employees creating and 
deploying ad-hoc security deployments outside security management’s control (either 
individually or collectively at team level), leading to the development of shadow security 
practices described in sections 5.2 and 5.3.  Password sharing, for example, is used when an 
employee’s colleague needs urgent system access, often impossible to achieve through official 
organisational processes (section 5.2.4.2).  Recognising the need to maintain security, some 
employees take the additional step of changing the shared password afterwards, considering this 
a sufficient action to mitigate potential risks emerging from their policy violations. 
The shadow security behaviours presented and discussed in Chapter 5 suggest that productivity-focused 
employees often resort to (2) and (3) when they come across friction-inducing security: they ignore or 
bypass official security and devise their own ad-hoc solutions that better serve their productivity needs.  
This leads to security spinning out of organisational control, with the emerging protection being based on 
employee-devised practices, potentially increasing organisational risk exposure due to inaccurate 
employee risk awareness.  Any attempts to eliminate such behaviours by threatening employees with 
sanctions essentially weaken organisational defences.  They also fail to include employee propensity to 
behave securely in information security management; especially when the organisation is unable to 
enforce those sanctions, due to widespread non-compliance making effective monitoring, detection and 
punishment impossible (section 2.6.3).    
6.3.3 The economics of assurance and trust 
For an information security manager, the definition of trust presented in section 6.1 (“willingness to be 
vulnerable…”) may sound unacceptable, given their role in protecting the organisation: protection of 
organisational information requires identifying security vulnerabilities and applying appropriate risk 
mitigation actions.  But the need for trust development in a security implementation needs to be seen in 
the context of expected benefits.  Trust-related risks are taken because the risk taker (the trustor) hopes to 
gain some benefit from a trustee’s fulfilment; in the organisation’s case an economic one:  the economic 
benefit of trust-based transactions lies in the resource savings  emerging from the reduced need for legal 
frameworks, policies, and technical controls required to detect and enforce violations (Fléchais et al., 
2005).  Organisational security management not only pays a cost for the operation of excessive controls 
(Pallas, 2009), but also creates constraints for honest employees that end up negatively affecting 
organisational productivity (e.g. the need to file requests to let legitimate websites through the corporate 
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firewall and subsequent slow response from the organisation described in section 5.2.2.2 – for more 
examples on security controls negatively impacting employee productivity see section 5.2).  In addition, 
security implementations based primarily on rules and enforcement may deliver effective risk mitigation, 
albeit at a higher cost, but they prevent trust from developing in the organisation (Clark, 2014).  This 
prevents the organisation, its employees, and its security managers from reaping the second-order benefits 
of trust development; those include enhanced cooperation, goodwill, adaptability, and creativity to 
address new problems (Handy, 1999).  In order to enjoy the potential benefits of trust, information 
security management requires better understanding of its role in security behaviours.  The need for this 
understanding acted as a motivator for the research presented later in this chapter.  
6.3.4 Using trust to manage security behaviours 
As explained in the previous section, security management currently neither recognises, nor attempts to 
manage the effect of trust on employee behaviours.  In an attempt to aid the development of an approach 
that allows for better security-related trust understanding and management, Fléchais et al. (2005) adapted 
Riegelsberger et al.’s model of trust interactions, examining the impact of trust-warranting properties on 
employee behaviours.  
6.3.4.1 Secure behaviour drivers 
Fléchais et al. start by suggesting that an organisation should not aim to achieve total assurance, if 
employees exhibit the intrinsic properties required to behave securely.  Well-trained employees (ability) 
that understand the risk mitigation effects of trustworthy behaviour (motivation) are likely to act in ways 
that protect the organisation, even with minimal assurance in place.  This was also discussed in section 
5.3.4: employees do want security, it just needs to be affordable. 
In addition to intrinsic motivation, Fléchais et al. also suggest that existence of contextual incentives can 
also affect security behaviours:  
 Social embeddedness: (Weirich and Sasse, 2001) report that newcomers’ security behaviour 
follows that of members of their immediate work team, even after receiving security training as 
part of their induction.  Their desire to “fit in” with their colleagues is usually stronger.  As a 
result, when the team culture is security aware, employees are more likely to behave in a secure 
way. 
 Temporal embeddedness: This is used by organisations to reduce risks from employee behaviour 
when they have minimal incentives to expect future interaction and associated benefits.  
Disgruntled employees ready to leave a company, for example, may be willing to cause damage 
to systems they have access to, since they lack expectation of future benefit from their employer 
and their colleagues.  If they are leaving to join a competitor, they may even have incentives for 
violations, like stealing sensitive intellectual property information to provide their new employer 
with competitive advantage.  This is why many organisations today have “exit protocols” aiming 
to eliminate this risk, making sure that people who are leaving the organisation cannot exploit 
trust that was extended to them as employees.   
 Institutional embeddedness: The presence of legislation or institutions with power to sanction 
untrustworthy behaviour (e.g. ethics committees of professional bodies) acts as a deterrent for an 
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employee considering a trust violation.  The emerging level of deterrence, and thus the effect of 
institutional embeddedness on behaviours, usually depends on the type, strictness and severity of 
punishment (e.g. the threat of being excluded from a professional group). 
6.3.4.2 Trust and security violations 
Fléchais et al. also discuss how, in addition to incentivising secure behaviour, the presence of trust-
warranting properties in an organisation can also lead to policy violations.  The presence of intrinsic 
properties (benevolence and social norms) and contextual properties (social acceptability, expectation of 
future relationships) can lead to security violations that aim to preserve trust developed between 
employees.  For example, an employee’s willingness to help a colleague locked out of a system by 
sharing their password may be stronger than their motivation to adhere to the security policy, also further 
incentivised by contextual pressure (be part of the group, potential of needing a colleague to do the same 
for them in the future).  After a number of successful trust violations to help their colleagues, a non-
compliant security culture amongst employees can emerge over time, increasing the organisation’s risk 
exposure.  Social engineering attackers for example, can exploit this by pretending to be a colleague that 
needs help when attempting to get hold of sensitive organisational information (e.g. asking their 
colleagues to provide them with information while being “snowed in” – section 2.4). 
6.3.4.3 Improving security 
Based on their aforementioned analysis, Fléchais et al. presented a number of potential trust-aware 
courses of action organisational security management can take to improve security: 
1. Simplify security: When a degree of flexibility is required, rigid policies cannot work because 
they are too complex, constraining or expensive, eventually exhausting employees’ security 
compliance budget.  In such cases, the only effective approach is to encourage and trust 
employees to behave in a secure manner, complementing this with effective monitoring to detect 
whether employees are actually complying with the policy. 
2. Improve education: Security awareness and training should be given continuously to all 
employees, as opposed to just giving it to newcomers, in order to improve motivation and ability 
for secure behaviour. 
3. Promote security culture: Ensure the security policy is neither excessive nor unfair, so that 
minimal circumventions are required.  
4. Adopt participative security: Involve various stakeholders in security design to increase 
perceived responsibility.  
5. Foster group cohesion: Group people into security groups, to improve their perceived social 
responsibility to collectively contribute to security. 
6.3.5 The need for further trust-driven security research 
Despite their potential usefulness (and consistency with the problems that lead to shadow security 
evolution presented in chapter 5), the above suggestions are only based on the findings of past security 
research, discussed in the context of Riegelsberger et al.’s framework.  The suggested effects of 
contextual and intrinsic properties on employee security behaviours, together with the proposed 
improvements emerging from those, were not grounded to any empirical data collection and analysis.  
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Combined with the suggestions that trust affects employee security behaviours, presented in chapters 4 
and 5, the need for further research to investigate the effects of trust in security implementations was 
identified.  This was required both to verify the suggestions made by Fléchais et al., but also to further 
examine the existence of security-related trust relationships in organisations, their effect on employee 
behaviours, and potential lessons for security management.  In an attempt to do so, the remainder of this 
chapter presents the analysis of the complete available dataset of 200 interviews from both Company A 
and B, and discusses the importance of the findings for security management. 
6.4 Interview analysis 
The secondary analysis on the available interview sets presented in this chapter aimed to answer the final 
research question that emerged in section 4.7.2, which could not be answered by the findings presented in 
chapter 5: “What trust relationships develop in an organisation and how do they influence security 
behaviours?”  The analysis presented in this section followed a grounded theory process, in a similar way 
as in chapter 5, as presented in section 3.5.2 of the methodology chapter, adapted to reflect the research 
question examined.  The process was done concurrently on both Company A and B interview sets.  
Coding was done using the software tool atlas.ti and the full list of the grounded theories categories that 
emerged from the analysis can be found in Appendix G. 
6.5 Understanding organisational trust relationships 
Two main paradigms emerged from the trust-focused grounded theory analysis: (1) employee 
understanding and acceptance of the need for some assurance in order to deliver security, and (2) the 
presence of two different security-related trust relationships that influence the design, implementation and 
evolution of security behaviours in an organisation: organisation-employee trust (willingness of the 
organisation to remain exposed to the actions of its employees, expecting them to behave securely) and 
inter-employee trust (willingness of employees to act in a way that renders themselves or the organisation 
vulnerable to the actions of another member of the organisation).  This section discusses both the above 
paradigms, based on narratives identified in the analysis, presents the effect of those on employee security 
behaviour, explains the long term implications for organisational security, and also discusses how the 
findings contribute to the development of shadow security in the organisation. 
6.5.1 Understanding the need for assurance  
The first main narrative emerging from the analysis was the identification of employee understanding of 
the need for security.  The majority (92%) of employees in both companies discussed potential 
consequences of a security breach for the organisation and recognised the need to implement security 
mechanisms in order to limit those.  A significant proportion (88%) also showed understanding of their 
own contribution and responsibilities to deliver that protection:  
PA60: “Certainly from financial information we have a lot of knowledge and information that could 
affect stock market value of the company.  You know we hear about recent things that maybe in advance 
to the public.” 
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Employees also reported that the actions they need to take to deliver that protection are outlined in the 
organisation’s security policy (48%): 
PB11: “There’s also pages on the intranet so the security team have their own section on the intranet 
where you can go and look for specific information if you’re unsure of what the policy might be around a 
particular type of access.” 
18% also mentioned that sanctions were in place for those caught bypassing security: 
PB14: “It could be dismissal and potential prosecution I would imagine, dependant on the sensitivity of 
the data, I mean we’re not allowed to talk about products to other peers in other companies, so we 
wouldn’t do that. Obviously that’s breaching data protection Act, it’s breaching copyright, it can be 
breaching all sorts of security risks.  So it’s certainly not something I’d do.” 
6.5.2 Organisation-employee trust 
Despite the presence of some assurance to limit potentially harmful employee actions (e.g. website 
blocking mechanisms, access control for information-handling systems), in many cases employees 
reported that the organisational security implementation was based on a security policy that defined 
desired behaviours, with no assurance mechanisms in place to enforce those (e.g. don’t share passwords, 
use encrypted USB drives etc., 37%): 
PB56: “I think it’s encouraged, whenever you talk to the right people it’s encouraged, but it’s not 
enforced…So there was a notice came round driven by security, saying these things were available, so if 
you must use sticks, we recommend you use these one.  So that was kind of the information and I actually 
proactively went and ordered it.  It was up to the individual to take action.” 
The access control procedures in both organisations highlighted this lack of control over employee 
actions. In many cases the organisation appeared to be reliant on employees to manage access control: 
Employees reported minimal central coordination of access granting procedures, shared information as 
they saw fit for business cases, and managers authorised access to information and systems for their team 
members. They also reported a lack of oversight after they were granted access to a repository, set of 
documents, or physical location: 
PA57: “somebody said “Oh, I’ll set you up on this, I’ll set you up on this” […] that’s just because they 
were sitting next to me, that wasn’t just their job, or anything, it’s no one’s particular job to set people up 
on different systems.” 
PB67: “I guess it’s judgement and what you’re working on and whether the data is sensitive (inaudible) 
so head count, people’s name and grades and stuff are obviously sensitive so I would put a password 
protection on that.  But if it’s just an overall (inaudible) that everybody can see then probably not.  If it’s 
budgets that need to be seen by everybody then probably not.” 
In general, both organisations appeared to accept some exposure of their systems and information to 
employee misbehaviours by trusting them to behave in a secure way.  This lack of strict assurance and 
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trust towards employees to behave securely, is defined as organisation-employee trust: “the willingness of 
the organisation to remain exposed to the actions of its employees, expecting them to behave securely”.  
In many cases, employees reported they understand the existence of organisational trust towards their 
behaviours (72%), and the potential for their behaviours to increase organisational risk exposure: 
PB23: “We tend culturally to be allowed more freedom and responsibility than some people might 
do…It’s almost impossible in security terms to stop a human actually attaching a document when they 
shouldn’t it’s very difficult to get round that.” 
PA99: “…I think there’s a balance to be struck between giving people trust and appreciating their 
common sense and their intelligence and also protecting one’s system from the occasional stranger who 
walks through the area.” 
Examining employee behaviours, both intrinsic and contextual motives encouraging employees to behave 
securely were identified (Figure 12): 
1. Intrinsic:  Employees exhibited both knowledge and risk awareness (ability) to protect the 
organisation (88%):  
PB69: (talking about USB drives) “No, they’re more trouble than they’re worth because you 
could potentially get into trouble with those things, leaving stuff on them that you shouldn’t do, 
and leaving them lying around, they’re just too easy to lose, so I don’t use them.”   
They also demonstrated propensity to do good and contribute to organisational protection 
(motivation) (41%):  
PA83: “I think all the data I work with is very sensitive. And, from what I’ve seen, you know, the 
company is quite serious about securing its financial information and all the applications I deal 
with are password-protected” 
PB58: “So maybe I’m not the right person to take those risks and make those choices, but I think 
we all have to share that that’s part of the ethos of the company.” 
2. Contextual compliance: In other cases, employees reported a need to comply with organisational 
policies to avoid potential sanctions (temporal incentives); 32% reported to understand the 
consequences of breaking security rules and that sanction avoidance acted as a secure behaviour 
driver: 
PA4: “…They do it only because “Oh, I might get into trouble if I don’t do it”.   
PB71: “The trust has always been there, but the consequences are also there if it’s broken.” 
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Figure 12: Organisation – employee trust development incentives 
Despite the existence of both intrinsic (ability, motivation) and contextual (temporal) incentives to 
comply with security, 90% of interviewed employees reported they occasionally deviate from policy-
prescribed behaviours due to friction-inducing security mechanisms, with 66% explicitly acknowledging 
this was a violation of the trust shown to them by the organisation: 
PA53: “the reason I diverted away from policy has been driven by a business requirement.  And it’s, it’s 
one of those things that’s always been discussed with seniors and it’s been seen as a work around 
because the policy doesn’t fit the business requirement.” 
The range of employee insecure behaviours identified, was grouped in three categories, based on the 
drivers behind identified behaviours: (1) friction-inducing security mechanisms and processes creating 
high primary task overheads, (2) inaccurate user risk perception and awareness, and (3) the need to 
develop or preserve existing inter-employee trust relationships prevailing over the need to preserve 
organisation-employee trust.  As (1) and (2) were extensively discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the next 
section focuses on the third driver of insecure employee behaviour: attempting to preserve inter-employee 
trust, when the actions required to preserve organisation-employee could end up damaging it. 
6.5.3 Inter-employee trust  
40% of the interviewed employees reported they have close relationships with their colleagues, also 
explaining how those relationships act as enablers to productivity: 
PB2: “You work with them so much.  God, the engineers that I work with for our company I spent hours 
with them on a daily basis, so you do get to know them very well.”  
Despite that, 94% of the interviewed employees reported instances where organisational security 
requirements demanded not showing inter-employee trust (e.g. no password sharing, no information 
sharing, challenge your colleagues).  In the majority of those cases (85%), employees reported that inter-
employee trust relationships prevail over policy clauses, either explicitly reporting trust presence as a 
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driver for non-compliance, or discussing how the close relationship they have with their colleagues lead 
to them not following the prescribed security practices: 
PA12: “…as far as “Oh, this contractor wants to get something done quick, here use my ID for doing 
that. You know, and then I’ll switch the password after.  Okay, he’s sort of protected it, but really is, 
you’ve just shared your ID, you just shared a password, and with a non-company person, you know, 
violation, but you need to get your work done.” 
Employees also reported that trust acts as an enabler to productivity when security creates friction (30%): 
I: “So if someone asked you to share your password with them, you’d have no problem with that?” PB5: 
“No, as long as it’s a trusted colleague.” 
Based on the above behaviours, inter-employee trust is defined as: “The willingness of employees to act in 
a way that renders themselves or the organisation vulnerable to the actions of another member of the 
organisation”.  It can be developed both inside and outside the security domain, and leads to behaviours 
that diverge from the security policy.  A few examples: 
PB18 (on sharing documents through non-official communication channels): “Well if someone’s into the 
company and they need a certain document they know where to find it then pass it on.” 
PA116 (on not locking their screens): “…because when you comment on it and say “Well you should 
actually be locking your screen when you walk away”, the comment you get back is the fact that “Well 
you know we should be able to trust people around.” 
Similarly to the drivers of employee secure behaviours, the development of inter-employee trust is also 
based on both intrinsic and contextual properties (Figure 13): 
1. Contextual:  Successful employee collaboration leads to social capital development (7%), based 
on both social embeddedness (increased feeling that collaborators are members of the same 
social group I: “So if someone asked you to share your password with them, you’d have no 
problem with that?” PB6: “No, as long as it’s a trusted colleague”) and temporal embeddedness 
(increased willingness to collaborate in the future PB3: “I spent hours with them on a daily basis, 
so you do get to know them very well.”).  Temporal incentives also lead to inter-employee trust 
turning to reliance over time, with employee work processes ending  up relying on collective 
trust violations (e.g. PA2“…a lot of times the field guys, they won’t tend to trust you initially 
you’ve got to be there for a while.  Like now that I’ve been here three years, “Oh, I’ve worked 
with him a lot.  Not a problem, I like working with him.””) 
2. Intrinsic: Employees feel the need to be helpful to someone within their social environment (7%) 
(PA31: “…there’s a policy that, shortly after we moved to this building they made a big deal out 
of “Don’t allow following access through doorways.” […] it seems kind of impolite to say, 
Sorry, I can't let you through, I’m going to have to slam the door in your face. Human nature 
tends to be I’ll hold the door for you” (motivation).  In addition, employees assumed their 
colleagues are as motivated as themselves to protect the organisation, and that they are also 
familiar with the security policy, so the risks from policy deviations to help a colleague were 
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minimal (PA78: “So when you’re an employee and I speak to another employee, it’s not a 
problem, because everybody knows what the security policies are with the company”).  They 
also appeared to assess their colleagues’ ability to protect the organisation before resorting to 
trust-driven violations:  PA30: “…But it was quicker sometimes to just throw it on a flash drive 
and chuck it over the cube wall.  We just didn't really see the point in needing to buy an $80 
flash drive to do that.  The people that I work with, I’m speaking from my experience, they’re all 
a lot smarter than me.  They all have grad degrees and PHDs and stuff, and they write really 
good programmes, I would trust them to take some information off their computers.”) 
 
Figure 13: Inter–employee trust development incentives      
6.5.4 Trust leading to shadow security development 
As discussed in chapter 5, when employees need to bypass or modify a friction-inducing security process 
or mechanism (thus breaking organisation-employee trust), shadow security emerges.  For example, the 
following self-devised security mechanism of an employee when working with contractors that needed 
wider access than what their permissions allowed: 
PA12: “…as far as “Oh, this contractor wants to get something done quick, here use my ID for doing 
that. You know, and then I’ll switch the password after.  Okay, he’s sort of protected it, but really is, 
you’ve just shared your ID, you just shared a password, and with a non-company person, you know, 
violation, but you need to get your work done.” 
In such security-productivity friction situations, employees use their own understanding and available 
resources to deploy self, or team-devised solutions.  The presence of inter-employee trust then acts as a 
readily-available resource, encouraging shadow security development; employees use inter-employee 
trust to deploy their own workable security solutions, addressing policy gaps or excessive burden from 
friction-inducing organisational security mechanisms: 
PB3: “… if we’ve had to give temporary passwords to an engineer, or someone like that, we will change 
the password, give them their own password, and once they’re done we will change them back, so nobody 
ever actually has the official passwords except the engineers themselves.” 
161 
 
6.6 The impact of trust on organisational security behaviours 
The findings of this chapter lead to the emergence of two trust-related paradigms in security management: 
(1) organisations place a significant level of trust towards their employees, even if they do not explicitly 
acknowledge it in their security strategy or policy; employees also understand this, together with the 
increased organisational exposure to their behaviour, and attempt to honour the trust shown towards them, 
(2) inter-employee trust acts as a readily available resource when security creates friction with primary 
tasks: in some cases employees need to break organisation-employee trust to avoid emerging overheads 
on primary task completion, and resort to trust they have developed amongst them to do so.  This section 
discusses both paradigms, together with their impact on shadow security development, the risks that 
emerge and the challenges they create for information security management. 
6.6.1 Employees understand and want to honour organisation-employee trust 
Many elements of the security implementation in both organisations suggested the presence of 
organisational trust towards employees through the identification of organisation-employee trust.  
Employees recognise that in many cases no assurance exists to ensure they behave securely, thus the 
organisation remains exposed to security risks if they do not act as required.  An example comes from 
organisational access control policies: employees are allowed to share information and grant access to 
their colleagues, with minimal organisation oversight of their decisions.  Despite this lack of control, the 
presence of contextual (temporal) and intrinsic incentives (motivation and ability), motivates employees 
to behave in a secure way, confirming the suggestions by Fléchais et al. that the presence of trust-
warranting properties in the organisational environment can incentivise secure behaviour.  This 
understanding of the need for security, also leads to employee acceptance of some productivity 
overheads, in order to protect the organisation.  They essentially appear willing to tolerate some friction 
caused by security, if they see a clear need for the mechanisms that caused it.  Employees also understand 
and accept the need for reprimands for people who violate organisation-employee trust.  
6.6.2 Inter-employee trust prevails over security 
When employees encounter friction-inducing security, inter-employee trust prevails over organisation-
employee trust, acting as a coping mechanism to minimise the emerging primary task overhead.  As the 
analysis findings demonstrated, employees knowingly diverge from recommended practices, disclosing 
information or performing actions for which they could be held accountable, either because they want to 
help a colleague in need (e.g. share a password or information), or because they trust people around them 
(e.g. leaving their laptops unlocked or letting them tailgate).  The identified drivers behind these trust 
violations are: 
1. Preservation of good relationship with colleagues:  Employees are willing to break the 
organisation-employee trust relationship to help develop, improve or maintain inter-employee 
trust that appears to be important and widely prevalent amongst them.  Many of the non-
compliance scenarios identified were related to security policies essentially asking employees to 
distrust their colleagues (e.g. no password sharing, lock screen, no tailgating).  But relationships 
between employees develop both inside and outside the security domain, as they collaborate on a 
day-to-day basis for effective and efficient primary task completion.  As a result, the social and 
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temporal elements of inter-employee trust, combined with intrinsic employee motivation to help 
their colleagues, lead to insecure behaviours.  Preserving or improving their existing relationship 
with their colleagues, eventually prevails over the need for security. 
2. Minimise overhead of friction-inducing security on primary tasks: As discussed in chapter 5, the 
presence of friction-inducing mechanisms and processes in organisational implementations 
leaves employees having to resort to other, less taxing actions for efficient primary task 
completion.  In those cases, they turn to their trusted colleagues for support.  They use a resource 
readily available (inter-employee trust) to cope with over-restrictive mechanisms that hinder 
their ability to do their job, while also improving their ability to collaborate with their 
colleagues.  For example, an employee who was locked out of a system by entering their 
infrequently used password incorrectly, and who cannot get it reset by the helpdesk immediately, 
can easily borrow a trusted colleague’s password to fetch some urgently required information.  
Willingness to help a colleague (motivation), recognition that they may end up in the same 
situation in the future (temporal), and the overall desire to be part of the overall organisational 
environment (social) provide enough incentives for their colleagues to help them, even if that 
means breaking the security policy, thus failing to honour organisation-employee trust.   
In general, when security and productivity came to conflict, employees often chose to break organisation-
employee trust, in order to proceed with their productive activities and preserve inter-employee trust. 
6.6.3 Risks from security-related trust conflicts 
Collaborative violations of organisation-employee trust, combined with shadow security development 
presented in chapter 5, lead to the emergence of two different types of organisational security: one 
defined in the policy, and one devised by employees on an ad-hoc basis, while they attempt to balance 
their own perception of how security should look like, their primary task focus and the need to be helpful 
to their colleagues.  The emergent security environment inevitably spins out of organisational control, 
leaving the organisation vulnerable to behaviours out of sight of security managers.  The risks emerging 
from this are: (1) development of an organisational security culture where breaking security is justified, 
(2) long-term reliance on trust violations, and (3) draining of existing employee capacity to behave 
securely. 
6.6.3.1 Culture where breaking security is justified  
The long-term development of employee belief that policy violations are necessary, can lead to the 
emergence of a corporate security culture reliant on security violations.  The benefits of breaking security 
(preserve colleague relationships, efficient primary task completion), combined with the reported lack of 
consequences and manager approval of violations (e.g. 6.5.2, PA53), lead to the development of a 
security culture where breaking organisation-employee trust for the benefit of inter-employee trust and 
productivity is considered acceptable.  The reported lack of follow-up enforcement accentuates this, as it 
reduces the impact of contextual incentives to preserve organisation-employee trust.  The emerging 
security behaviours, may not manage risks effectively, due to inaccurate employee understanding of 
security risks and countermeasures, but are the best available actions for employees to proceed with their 
primary tasks.  Collaborative non-compliance also encourages disregard for security in general, with non-
compliance eventually becoming the habitual behaviour amongst employees.  Once a security culture is 
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developed based on collaborative security violations, new employees that try to “fit in” and participate in 
inter-employee trust development are more likely to follow suit to their colleagues’ non-compliance.   
6.6.3.2 Long-term reliance on collective trust violations 
An insecure culture also develops from long term collaborative security violations.  Regular reliance on 
violations leads to the development of insecure behavioural norms that can then evolve to long-term 
information security culture (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010).  It also leads to the development of social capital 
(Schneier, 2012) amongst employees, grounded on collective security violations, and also increases 
organisational exposure to social engineering: employees willing to violate security to help their 
colleagues can be more vulnerable to attacks by impostors that rely on their willingness to share 
information through informal channels.   
6.6.3.3 Drains employee capacity to behave securely 
Employees appear sufficiently aware of the need for security, related risks and potential actions required 
to mitigate those risks, also possessing both ability and motivation to behave securely.  Friction-inducing 
security mechanisms fail to take advantage of this, damaging employee ability and motivation to comply 
with security: any attempts to enforce security end up alienating employees from security management, 
draining existing employee capacity to behave securely, thus decreasing their motivation in conditions 
where the organisation relies on their actions to address security risks.  The emerging low appreciation for 
security can accentuate the development of a non-compliant security culture, discussed in section 5.3.3 
(Pfleeger et al., 2014).  It also encourages further shadow security development, leading to the 
organisation losing track of employee actions, thus increasing the security risks it is exposed to.     
When the organisation demands security behaviours that employees consider unrealistic, employees may 
perceive this as lack of organisation-employee trust.  This creates resentment amongst them, increasing 
incentives for trust-driven collaborative non-compliance.  In addition, long-term resentment can have 
dangerous effects, as it damages psychological contracts between employees and the organisation 
(Morrison and Robinson, 1997).  This increases the risk for insider attacks and loss of valuable human 
capital, with disgruntled employees ending up leaving the organisation.   
6.6.4 Trust and shadow security development 
Employee decision to prioritise inter-employee trust over security adds an additional element to the 
complexity of modern information security management.  Past user-centred security research extensively 
discussed the usability-security trade-off, often suggesting that effective security management can 
achieve both (sections 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7).  The findings of this chapter demonstrate that the presence of 
trust in organisational environments also affects employee security behaviours: they break organisation-
employee trust to both strengthen and preserve their relationships with their colleagues, but also to 
minimise the impact of friction-inducing security mechanisms and processes on their primary tasks.  In 
both the above scenarios, trust acts as an additional driver for the development of shadow security, 
increasing organisational exposure to the risks presented in section 5.3.3 (security development outside 
organisational control, reduction of employee resources available for security, and alienation from central 
security).  To reduce this exposure, security management needs to understand the impact of inter-
employee trust on employee security behaviours, and take that into account in future attempts to design 
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security processes and mechanisms (in-depth analysis of how trust can be leveraged to improve security 
protection is presented in chapter 7). 
6.7 Revisiting research questions 
The main aim of this chapter was to investigate and answer research question number 6: What trust 
relationships develop in an organisation and how do they influence security behaviours? The findings 
also improved the ability to answer question 1 as well:  Do employees understand the need for security 
mechanisms in the organisation? If yes or no, why? 
1. Do employees understand the need for security mechanisms in the organisation? If yes or no, 
why?  Employees understand both the need for security and organisational reliance on them to 
participate in security risk mitigation.  They also understand the need for assurance mechanisms 
required to protect the organisation, but they also believe that they cannot be implemented to 
exhaustively cover all security risks an organisation faces.  As a result, a large proportion of 
security management relies on trusting employees to exhibit behaviours that protect the 
organisation, despite this not being formalised in organisational security strategies.   
6. What trust relationships develop in an organisation and how do they influence security 
behaviours?  Employee trust relationships with their colleagues and managers develop though 
interactions both inside and outside the security domain.  Inter-employee trust then acts as a 
readily available resource to deal with friction-inducing security.  It also prevails over 
organisation-employee trust, when security policies demand from employees not to trust their 
colleagues.  This leads to non-compliance with official security and shadow security 
development.   
The findings of this chapter suggest that both organisational productivity and security can benefit from a 
shift in security management: rather than restricting and controlling employee actions, security should 
aim to understand organisational trust relationships and incentivise trustworthy behaviour.  It also needs 
to accommodate for the fact that, for their employees, security is of lower priority to both productivity 
(primary task completion) and the need to develop and preserve a collaborative social environment (inter-
employee trust).  Further analysis and discussion of how the to combine the improved understanding 
emerging from this chapter with the shadow security findings of chapter 5 to deliver effective security 
protection is presented in the next chapter (chapter 7). 
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 Using shadow security to improve 
security management 
The findings of the analyses presented in chapters 4, 5 and 6 identified three previously unknown 
employee behavioural phenomena, together with their impact on organisational security management: 
1. Employee propensity to behave securely.  Employees understand the value of security to the 
organisation, which motivates them to participate in organisational efforts to deliver it.  But, 
despite this understanding and motivation, three categories of behaviours that increase 
organisational risk exposure were identified: (1) when organisational security communication is 
inconsistent with employee priorities, they fail to recognise some risks, and behave insecurely.  
(2) When friction-inducing security creates overheads for their primary tasks, employees 
passively bypass those, ignore policies and avoid organisational security mechanisms.  They 
then (3) use other resources available to them, actively taking initiative to protect the 
organisation, by adapting existing mechanisms and policies, or by devising their own “secure 
practices”. 
2. The shadow security.  When the organisation’s existing security implementation creates friction 
between security and productive activities, employee productivity focus and their awareness 
about the need for security leads to them adapting official security or procuring self-devised 
security practices, both at an individual and a collective level.  The emerging practices reduce 
security-productivity friction to acceptable levels for employees, while also serving their 
understanding of the need for security and contribution in organisational protection.  But shadow 
security also leads to security management losing control of security culture and habits 
development, exposing the organisation to risks employees cannot understand or mitigate. This 
eventually leads to security practices around the organisation being widely varying and out of 
security management control. 
3. Trust relationships and their impact on security.  Two security-related trust relationships 
develop in the organisational environment, influencing security management decisions and 
employee behaviours: (1) organisation-employee trust, allowing for flexibility in security 
implementation and reduced control over employee actions, with its visible presence also acting 
as a motivator for secure behaviour for employees, and (2) inter-employee trust, developed 
through activities both inside and outside security, acting as a readily available resource for 
employees to cope with friction-inducing security, also serving their need to preserve or improve 
their relationships with their colleagues.  
In-depth examination of the above phenomena led to the identification and characterisation of a number 
of different employee behaviour narratives, providing valuable insights to organisational information 
security management: 
1. Employees understand and accept the need for security, together with their responsibility and 
contribution in achieving it.  They also understand organisational reliance on their behaviour and 
the trust shown towards them by security management, realised through reduced controls 
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(organisation-employee trust).  They are also willing to invest some of their time and effort to 
keep the organisation secure. 
2. Friction-inducing elements of the security implementation cause disgruntlement: employees 
refuse to accept the resulting primary task overheads, which can often cripple their productive 
capabilities.  Subsequent security management attempts to enforce desired behaviours isolate 
employees from security managers, creating disgruntlement and a negative attitude towards 
security in general (perceived to be badly designed, implemented and managed, also creating 
overheads in their productive activities) 
3. Rather than remaining passive, either ignoring official security or working their way around it to 
avoid related overheads, employees, peer groups, and managers who have their own 
understanding of security, individually or collectively adapt unsatisfactory security measures to 
what they consider manageable (in terms of the corresponding primary task overhead) or 
introduce their own novel solutions. These solutions are perceived by employees as serving the 
purpose of maintaining security, but at the same time reducing friction and corresponding 
primary task overheads to levels acceptable to them.   
4. The emerging employee-devised shadow security practices often do not manage the 
organisation’s risks adequately: isolated from security management and without guidance on the 
actual organisational security risks, the alternative solutions are deployed based on employees’ 
own risk perceptions and understanding of what the security experience should be like.     
5. The existence of trust amongst employees (inter-employee trust) also affects their security 
behaviours: the need to preserve or improve their relationships with their colleagues, together 
with their belief in the ability and motivation of those to behave securely, leads to the perception 
that trust-driven security policy violations are a low risk option to reduce security overheads and 
proceed with primary task related activities.  As a result, inter-employee trust prevails over 
policy-prescribed behaviours when the two come into conflict: it becomes a readily available 
resource to cope with the overheads of friction-inducing security, further encouraging security 
violations and contributing to shadow security development. 
6. The development of shadow security, together with organisational inability (or perceived 
inability) to enforce policy-prescribed behaviours (or identify employee deviations from 
prescribed practices), leads to security behaviours and culture evolution spinning out of central 
security management control: employee-devised practices can often be inconsistent with 
organisational risk appetite, with trust-driven violations becoming the only way to preserve good 
relationships amongst colleagues.  When shadow security practices become part of 
organisational security culture, or varying micro-cultures developed within organisational 
divisions and sub-divisions, security behaviours become invisible to official security 
management, failing to deliver the required protection for the organisation. 
This chapter uses the lessons learned from chapters 4, 5 and 6 to provide guidelines that help 
organisations manage employee security behaviour, but also leverage it to align security management 
with organisational productivity targets.  The suggestions for improvements presented in this chapter 
focus on five distinct, but also interdependent, areas: (1) The need for security management to move away 
from its current binary understanding of user behaviour (compliant vs non-compliant), also (2) 
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understanding that friction-inducing “unusable” elements of security implementations need to be removed 
before attempting to influence employee behaviours, (3) the need to leverage shadow security as a 
learning tool to engage employees and line managers in security management and design, also (4) 
building on the presence of trust in the organisation, using it as an additional defence layer, and (5) 
deploying measurements using readily available or easy to collect data to identify areas for improvement, 
and use those to deploy improvements and assess their effectiveness and overall impact on employee 
behaviours.  All the findings discussed and suggestions made in this chapter are related closely to the 
experiences of individuals within both Companies A and B, focusing specifically on examples where 
friction-inducing security and the emerging primary task impact led to the development of shadow 
security activities or trust-driven security violations. 
7.1 Using employee behaviour to drive security management 
As discussed in section 2.8, there is a strong need for a process that will improve security management’s 
ability to accurately identify current employee behaviours and use those to drive subsequent security 
management decisions.  This section uses the paradigms that emerged from the research presented earlier 
in this thesis to: (1) revisit and enrich existing understanding of employee security behaviours, (2) use the 
improved understanding to update the security behaviour model of section 4.6.4 to reflect the presence of 
shadow security in the organisation, and (3) Explain how shadow security can be used to improve existing 
security management implementations. 
7.1.1 Revisiting security behaviour drivers 
Chapter 4 identified employee propensity for secure behaviour, but also conditions that lead to policy 
violations.  Employees followed policy-prescribed behaviours when the impact on their primary task was 
minimal, but also bypassed security when it disrupted or slowed down their primary tasks, even when 
they were aware of the need to behave securely.  Evidence of their awareness of the need for security was 
accentuated by chapter 5 findings: they even adapted friction-inducing policies and mechanisms to deliver 
some organisational protection.  The findings from chapters 4 and 5 suggest that employee awareness 
does not always lead to compliance; it is only the first step towards achieving it.  To improve on 
employee compliance, it needs to be encouraged by an organisation’s security implementation.  This can 
only happen if employee security behaviours are well understood and accommodated in information 
security management.  As discussed in section 2.8.3 of the literature review, employees were up to now 
considered as either behaving securely or insecurely, with insecure practices also seen as opportunistic 
behaviour:  
 Pallas (2009) claimed that employees will always go for low cost, opportunistic behaviour when 
no control is in place.   
 Weirich (2005) stated that users structure discourse about password security issues in a manner 
that makes it possible to justify malpractice. 
 Ashenden (2015) suggests that the presence of cognitive dissonance when employee behaviours 
were inconsistent with their attitudes, led to them changing attitudes to be consistent with their 
actions, thus rationalising their insecure behaviours.   
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Shadow security challenges the above suggestions.  Even when employees have perfectly valid 
productivity reasons to bypass security mechanisms, they take additional care to mitigate potential risks 
emerging from their malpractice (e.g. encrypting personal drives on which corporate data is backed up 
due to lack of sufficient backed-up network storage in company B).  The presence of shadow security 
suggests that policy-prescribed practices are not the only way to achieve security, especially if they give 
rise to significant security-productivity friction.  Security managers need to understand the presence of in-
between behaviours and leverage their presence to enhance both learning and better management.  
The identification of shadow security suggests a need to revisit Alfawaz et al.’s (2010) model of security 
awareness and behaviour presented in section 2.7.3. In that model, non-compliance with policies is 
attributed to lack of awareness, with “doing” referring to acting in accordance to the policy.  But, given 
the development of shadow security, and insecure behaviours being used as a coping mechanisms for 
high-friction security, the “knowing” stages of the model need to be modified in order to: (1) distinguish 
between malicious acts and employees choosing to do something else due to friction-inducing security in 
the “knowing-not doing” condition, and (2) distinguish between compliance with well-designed security 
and compliance with high-friction security that is unsustainable in the long-run (due to productivity 
overheads) for “knowing-doing”.  Using the shadow security findings to modify the Alfawaz model, led 
to the identification of six security behaviour levels (Table 8).  
Alfawaz state Revised security behaviour Description Related Findings  
Not knowing 
– not doing 
Unaware of security 
Lack of awareness from ineffective 
communication and training 
None of the employees was in this state 
Not knowing 
– doing 
Awareness from other 
sources (both personal, 
organisation, colleagues) 
Employee understanding is a 
combination of their own risk 
awareness and responsibility towards 
the organisation 
Lack of policy awareness, but secure 
behaviour die to peer-pressure 
Knowing – 
not doing 
Malicious, careless non-
compliance 
Maliciously choosing to ignore/no 
interest in protection 
Sanctions exist to deter this, but 
currently impossible to enforce 
Productivity-driven non-
compliance 
High friction security – employees 
choosing to do something else  
Trust – shadow security evolution, 
majority of examples discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6 
Knowing – 
doing 
Compliant but expensive Employees “do” because they have to 
Both due to enforcement and lack of 
alternative perceived as secure 
Well-designed security Policy compliance  
E.g. clear desk compliance when secure 
on-site lockers exist – employees only 
need to invest minimal effort 
Table 8: Security behaviour levels 
The above classification comes can be challenging for security managers attempting to rank these steps 
on an “insecure to secure” scale.  From a security point of view the security level would be 1 to 6 (from 
insecure to secure).  If productivity impact was calculated as part of a holistic risk management approach, 
4 and 5 may need to be swapped: shadow security behaviours may offer adequate cost-effective risk 
mitigation compared to expending employee resources to comply with friction-inducing mechanisms.  In 
addition, potential unsustainable long term compliance with resource-demanding mechanisms (level 5 in 
the above model) can easily exhaust employee’s compliance budget, influencing their ability to behave 
securely when interacting with other policies or mechanisms. 
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7.1.2 Updated security behaviour model 
The improved understanding of employee behaviours that emerged from shadow security identification 
and the factors that lead to its development, created the need to adapt the security behaviour model 
presented in section 4.6.4.  The new model ( 
Figure 14) incorporates the enriched understanding of employee responses to friction-inducing security, 
together with the effect of long term employee reliance on shadow security behaviours on organisational 
security culture development.  The emerging culture and habits cycle is where security management 
needs to act to (1) identify current shadow security behaviours and the specific elements of the security 
implementation that drive those, (2) disrupt the culture cycle by reducing the drivers of shadow security 
and communicate the changes to employees, in order to aid the development of new security behavioural 
norms and culture. 
7.1.3 Incorporating shadow security in security management 
Security managers need to consider the development of shadow security as an opportunity for 
improvements.  It suggests the presence of a latent capacity for users to appreciate and play an active part 
in the provision of security, driven by their internalised understanding of the need for security and their 
focus on their primary task.  Employees deploy their own security solutions when they believe a required 
“affordable” policy or infrastructure is missing, instead of doing nothing or passively relying on the 
organisation to remediate.  They take self-devised actions, still aiming to preserve security, both at the 
individual and the collective (team) level, often managed locally by their line managers.  In addition, the 
presence of inter-employee trust acts as an additional driver for shadow security development: it provides 
employees with a readily available resource to resolve the productivity impact of high-friction security.  
The perceived justification for security violations in order to preserve their relationships with their 
colleagues, leads to loss of control of security behaviours by security management, with employees 
essentially becoming “partners in crime”.  Attempting to reduce or eliminate the emerging shadow 
security practices through increased assurance, without attempting to reduce high-friction security in 
organisational production tasks, creates additional burden for employees: assurance mechanisms 
accentuate primary task impact, which leads to further non-compliance, shadow security emergence and 
insecure culture development.  Shadow security should be used as a tool to intervene and improve 
existing security implementations, to inspire more workable security that aligns with organisational 
productivity objectives, provides effective protection, and minimises security overheads.   
The development of shadow security suggests the need for security management to rethink organisational 
security practices, processes and mechanisms, and attempt to better align security with employee primary 
tasks.  Without actively soliciting feedback from employees to identify security-productivity friction 
points and their subsequent responses, the security of the organisation becomes that which managers and 
employees, assumed non-experts in security, consider as best fitting their business processes.  Despite 
potential risks, shadow security presents the only workable security for the organisation; its presence 
indicates that the organisation has an inconsistent security posture, which does not align with its 
productivity goals.  In order to eliminate this problem, security managers should aim to learn from 
employees and line managers, take advantage of their capacity to consciously consider security in their 
activities and use the emerging shadow security practices as a driver for improvements.  In order to 
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provide security managers with a research-inspired approach to identify shadow security and improve 
their security implementations, the remainder of this chapter discusses how shadow security and trust can 
be incorporated in attempts to holistically rethink organisational security management. 
 
Figure 14: Secure behaviour model 
 
Culture and habits cycle 
Security 
communication 
and training 
Risk/consequence 
Awareness  
Inaccurate risk 
perception 
Confusion on 
security purpose 
Effective 
Ineffective 
Downplay 
personal security 
contribution 
Friction-inducing 
security  
Support problems 
Negative 
attitude  
Justification 
to bypass 
Culture 
development 
Insecure 
behaviours 
Policy 
compliance 
Security habits 
Self-devised 
practices 
Negative Positive 
No sanctions 
Disregard 
security 
Secure 
behaviours 
Employee own 
risk perceptions  
Policy 
awareness 
Enforcement 
Peer 
pressure 
Line manager/ 
peer support 
Lack of 
organisational 
adaptability 
Security not 
managed well 
Culture 
perception 
Lack of 
feedback 
Reporting 
No central 
support 
171 
 
7.2 Improving security-productivity alignment 
The results presented in chapters 4, 5 and 6 show there has been little progress in identifying and 
removing ill-fitting security policies and mechanisms from organisational security implementations: 
organisations still do not track the effort that individuals have to expend on security and many elements of 
existing security implementations create significant friction between security and employee primary 
tasks.  Consequently, there exists no evaluation of policies and mechanisms in terms of fitness-for-
purpose in the real working environment.  As section 7.1 discussed, burdensome or disruptive security 
implementations promote shadow security as the only workable security, even for risk-aware employees.  
Security experts need to acknowledge that effective security can only be achieved if it fits and supports 
productive activity.  As a result, fitting security to the primary task should be in the centre of any security 
intervention, whether that aims to improve existing security elements or design new ones.  This section 
discusses the need to better align security with organisational production tasks, focusing on (1) the 
importance of usability, (2) careful planning of interventions to ensure primary task compatibility, (3) the 
need for effective security communication and training, and (4) the need to align employee security 
efforts with organisational risk appetite. 
7.2.1 The importance of security hygiene 
Usability of security implementations is still a major hurdle to employees trying to behave securely: the 
findings presented in this thesis show that current security approaches do not manage to effectively 
reduce friction between security and productivity.  Organisational security management appears to ignore 
user-centred security research findings that high friction security leads to errors and workarounds that 
create vulnerabilities (e.g. Sasse et al., 2001).  Organisations still seek to mitigate information security 
risks by implementing policies and technical mechanisms that specify and restrict employee behaviour, 
often also threatening sanctions in case of non-compliance.  This “comply-or-die” approach increases the 
cost for security mechanism operation, but also creates constraints for honest employees seeking to 
perform well in their primary tasks.  Security mechanisms and processes not designed around employee 
needs and priorities slow them down, sometimes even completely preventing primary task completion. 
They also increase the cognitive load required for employees to participate in organisational protection, 
eventually causing frustration and disgruntlement.  As a result, employees choose to ignore security that 
requires high effort for little benefit (Beautement et al., 2008), or use readily available resources (e.g. 
inter-employee trust or line manager support) to resolve the emerging conflict, which encourages the 
evolution of shadow security in the organisation.  This leaves security managers unable to manage the 
emerging organisational security environment, reducing their ability to effectively manage organisational 
risks.  The resulting high levels of security behaviours deviating from security policies, also increase the 
noise in organisational attempts to detect signs of malicious attacks (von Solms, 2006).  All the above call 
for a significant rethink of the way information security is implemented and managed, demonstrating the 
need for information security management approaches that put employee understanding and priorities at 
the centre of their risk mitigation strategy and actions.   
The first step for any user-centred security management approach is to realise that with high productivity 
impact security will never deliver effective protection.  Many security experts still talk (and think) that 
usability and security create a trade-off: that usability is nice, but security is more important, so asking 
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users to make extra effort is acceptable.  Usability is considered as an afterthought and a luxury security 
management can only afford to consider once security is assured.  But the findings presented in this thesis 
demonstrated that usability problems can lead to security mechanisms being perceived as incompatible 
with employee primary tasks.  Looking back at the definition of usability (“the extent to which a product 
can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in 
a specified context of use”, ISO 9241), any mechanism not designed to fit employees’ primary tasks will 
end up not being used, leading to further security violations and shadow security development.   
Security design should treat usability as a hygiene factor for security (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2014): 
solutions that are not usable disrupt and divert effort from employee primary tasks, thus will inevitably be 
circumvented.  Risk-aware employees, who understand their role in protecting the organisation will then 
resort to shadow security practices at best.  At worst they will become disgruntled and see security as an 
obstacle that they need to get around, resorting to high-risk behaviours, increasing potential organisational 
risk exposure.  The emerging employee disgruntlement can create serious risks for an organisation: it 
hinders the development of social capital and shared values (Moore et al., 2011), resulting in minimal 
incentive for secure behaviour, while increasing the probability of insider attacks (Vroom and von Solms, 
2004).  It also impacts the ability of an organisation to retain its valuable human capital; dissatisfaction 
can lead to employees eventually leaving the organisation (Fléchais et al., 2005).  Consequently, 
delivering security hygiene should be a key requirement for any security management approach; security 
rules should not need to be broken to maintain productivity.   
Security mechanisms need to be designed around employee primary tasks to reduce the need for 
productivity-driven trust violations, but also reflecting the trustworthiness an organisation should show 
towards its employees.  To eliminate the need for password sharing for example, an organisation should 
create mechanisms that provide quick account creation for employees that need access to new systems 
(e.g. through easy to use one time tokens).  This can be achieved by using human factors expertise and 
usability design methodologies in security system design process.  The resulting user-centred security 
design will allow designers to move away from the current “deploy, if too much noise, remove” approach 
that makes security implementations expensive to implement, difficult to use, ineffective and 
unsustainable in the long term.  Examples in the interviews have shown that parts of the security 
implementation can be integrated with productivity, essentially “piggybacking” security on other 
organisational needs (e.g. the use of personal network allocated storage for employees that provides 
automatic backups as well – see security hygiene example below).   
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Another important lesson for shadow security management emerging from the results in chapters 4, 5 and 
6 is that improvements required to eliminate shadow security cannot be limited to security mechanisms.  
In a number of shadow security practices, security-productivity friction that created those did not emerge 
from problems in the security mechanisms, but to reliability issues of organisational IT provisions (e.g. 
lack of easy to use collaboration platforms within the organisation leading to use of third party ones).  In 
order to eliminate such problems, security management needs to identify situations where functional 
requirements are missing and consider the impact of those non-security-related mechanisms on employee 
security behaviour.  As the results have shown, effective security protection requires IT in its entirety to 
be free from problems; any element of the organisational environment that can affect security behaviours 
needs to be designed around employee priorities, also ensuring its proper function.  Failure to achieve this 
can create a negative attitude towards organisational systems in their entirety, further encouraging trust-
driven security violations and shadow security development.   
7.2.2 Interventions need careful planning  
Attempts to disrupt current employee practices require careful pre-deployment suitability assessments.  
Current security intervention attempts fail to assess the impact of attempted improvements on employees, 
with security management not tracking the effort that they have to expend in order to comply with 
existing or proposed security mechanisms and policies (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009).  In addition, 
changes and attempted security implementation improvements are currently delivered reactively and 
impulsively.  When a security mechanism is causing friction, with employees often voicing their 
concerns, it may be removed or disabled, but the risks it aimed to address can remain unmitigated until 
another solution is found.  The new solutions are also deployed without proper design, testing and 
deployment, essentially only managing to modify the type of security-productivity friction employees 
have to incur (section 5.4.3.2).  As discussed in section 7.1, shadow security indicates an employee-
devised balance point to manage this friction.  Any attempts to alter that balance need to be well planned, 
otherwise they risk draining employee capacity for secure behaviour.  Effective protection can only be 
achieved with user-centred policy and mechanism design, taking into account the subsequent impact on 
an organisation’s existing production tasks.  To achieve this, security management needs to move towards 
Security hygiene example: Employees in Company B stored significant amounts of information 
locally on laptops due to problems in network storage capacity and connectivity issues.  They also 
recognised the importance of that information and the need for backups.  The lack of easy access to 
organisational drives (that are automatically backed up) led to employees having to devise own 
backup approaches: they used their own drives, either at team level or individually (both encrypted 
and unencrypted, with practices differing significantly across different groups).  
Secure behaviour (storing data on automatically backed-up network drives) can only exist if: 
a. Adequate network capacity is put in place 
b. Communication of the benefits it provides, also emphasising its productivity benefit (backup) 
c. Employees are provided with uninterrupted access to their personal network drives 
d. Any reported connectivity problems are quickly addressed 
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a participative security design approach that works with users to understand where and how security can 
align with the productive activity to protect valuable organisation assets.     
An example of the need for pre-deployment assessment of security improvements was identified in 
organisational attempts to provide password management solutions to employees.  The large number of 
systems to which employees had to authenticate themselves in both the organisations studied, led to 
writing down their account passwords being the only way to guarantee uninterrupted access to password-
protected systems.  This managed to reduce the increased cognitive load problem created by multiple 
password management.  Company B’s security management attempts to address this by providing 
employees with password managers failed when those tools were incompatible with some of the 
systems/websites employees had to authenticate to.  Employees were left with a security mechanism not 
working as intended, turning the cognitive load problem to a disruption one, with the burden of resolving 
the conflict between security and productivity being once again cast on themselves.  Employees then 
resorted to shadow security behaviours to solve the “too many passwords” problem (section 5.4.2).  As 
the above example suggests, if attempted security improvements are not well-designed to eliminate 
usability problems, and no continuous evaluation of their effectiveness and “goodness-of-fit” with the 
primary task exists, they run the risk of just changing the nature of the security-productivity friction 
instead of removing it. 
7.2.3 Importance of communication and training 
The findings also call for a change in current security communication and training approaches.  Lack of 
accurate knowledge on role-related risks, and lack of role-specific communication based on employee 
tasks, led to employees dismissing the usefulness of security communication and training.  This acted as 
another driver for shadow security development, with security communication done through line 
managers and colleagues.  To avoid this, formulation of communication content should aim to accurately 
represent everyday employee tasks.  User-centred security approaches like requirements gathering and 
understanding should be used, to ensure the communicated information is fit for purpose and in-line with 
the challenges employees face, also formalising current line managers’ role in delivering more context-
specific communication.  The emerging training and communication should be role-specific, with regular 
refreshing, ensuring employees understand role-related security risks, taking advantage of their identified 
propensity to behave securely.   
7.2.4 Align security effort with risk appetite 
Security management should also aim to align user resources required to bring security in line with 
organisational risk appetite; currently no formalisation exists on how much of employees’ time and effort 
should be spent on security.  Given that organisational risk management should be based 
on identification, assessment, and prioritisation of risks (ISO 31000 on risk management), the presence of 
shadow security suggests a potential mismatch between organisational risk appetite and current allocation 
of available employee resources towards delivering effective organisational protection.  Current 
organisational attempts to exhaustively eliminate all potential risks, lead to the implementation of a 
significant number of risk-mitigating mechanisms or policies (often required to meet the demands of 
relevant regulation or international standards).  But, when some of those lead to security-productivity 
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friction, security management adopts a post-deployment “ignorance is bliss” approach: they know some 
risks are left unmitigated, but are often left with inadequate resources to address those.  Openly admitting 
to this approach is often impossible due to regulatory requirements or pressure by the organisation’s top 
management to deliver the required protection without requesting additional resources, thus security 
management often chooses to ignore (and not report) the presence of some of the unmitigated risks.  In 
addition, the mere presence of too many security mechanisms or policies, even well-designed, context-
specific ones, can exhaust employee compliance budget, eventually leading to shadow security in the 
form of self-selection of mechanisms and policies to comply with.  This leaves little or no resources to 
mitigate more severe organisational risks that employees may perceive as less important.  It also prevents 
the organisation from accurately assessing the amount of employee resources currently invested towards 
implementing and sustaining the current security state: unless employee time and effort are invested in a 
centrally managed way, the organisation runs the risk of employee resources being allocated towards 
potentially insignificant security risks.  It is also important to understand that in risk management it is 
acceptable to do nothing about some risks if available resources can deliver higher risk mitigation in other 
areas.  In general, organisational security risk management needs to direct employee time and effort 
towards addressing most important risks first, minimising shadow-security-driven resource allocation by 
employees, thus ensuring available resources are invested towards maximal risk mitigation (a process of 
how to deploy a shadow security-driven risk management process is presented later in section 7.5).    
7.3 Using shadow security as a learning and diagnostic tool 
Understanding shadow security and its drivers can become a powerful tool for security management, 
providing a unique opportunity to deliver user-centred security improvements.  Shadow security should 
be treated as a learning opportunity, as it can help the organisation identify where employees are putting 
to practice what the organisation should be doing but refusing.  As Taleb (2010) notes, identification of 
problematic events within an environment can be used both to build robustness around negative ones and 
exploit positive ones.  Shadow security provides such an opportunity: it allows for engagement with 
employees to increase their participation in attempts to deliver the security improvements presented in the 
previous section, and implement new or adapt existing security controls to better fit employee 
productivity tasks, while still delivering organisational security goals. 
In order to take advantage of shadow security, security managers working within organisations need to 
understand the drivers behind its evolution and, as Schein (2010) puts it, aim to become perpetual 
learners.  Modern corporate environments are fast-paced and unpredictable: the nature of organisational 
operations and technologies change constantly, together with security threats becoming more complex 
(e.g. effective security management of BYOD and home working were amongst the challenges 
Companies A and B had to deal with).  Security managers can learn from shadow security in a number of 
ways: (1) engaging users to identify security problems and design appropriate solutions, (2) measuring the 
effectiveness of security mechanisms after deployment, and (3) leveraging the position of team managers 
as both a mediator for security and a conduit for feedback, as to the appropriateness of security solutions 
in supporting productive tasks.  In order to effectively develop this learning process, security managers 
need to start by accepting that employee responses to friction-inducing security happen naturally.  They 
are the first indicator of security solutions not serving the business, and security management must 
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engage with employees to identify security needs, perceived risks, impact of current implementation on 
their productivity, and the emerging shadow security behaviours.  Essentially, as the remainder of this 
chapter explains, shadow security should be treated as a diagnostic tool and an opportunity to identify 
shortfalls in current security implementations, their impact on the organisational environment, and 
leverage those to provide more effective security solutions for organisations.  
7.3.1 Involving employees in security management  
The development of shadow security suggests that employees are motivated to help the organisation and 
willing to suggest potential ways to improve existing security practices.  Their lack of accurate security 
risk awareness though, often leads to insecure behaviours.  Security management can leverage this 
employee goodwill to participate in security, by engaging with them in the design and operation of 
security controls.  Such an approach requires moving away from current solutions for mitigating security 
risks, towards a more participative approach that works with employees to understand where and how 
security can fit in the productive activities.   
7.3.1.1 User engagement and participatory security management 
The importance of involving users in systems design is well documented in approaches like Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM - Checkland and Poulter, 2006), and the value of participatory and contextual design 
is widely accepted among developers.  As Checkland and Poulter explain, a real-world system 
undergoing change to improve on a problematic situation needs to be understood in its entirety (or as 
much as possible) before attempting to deliver that change, but also during delivery as part of a 
continuous learning cycle (Figure 15).  Otherwise, deployed changes will fail to capture the tasks and 
priorities of different stakeholders and the impact of attempted changes on those.  Unfortunately, 
participatory approaches are currently not adopted by security design, with very limited research 
attempting to apply those in information security: Bartsch and Sasse (2013) used a participatory approach 
to provide guidance on improving the formulation of authorisation policies, while James (1996) 
demonstrated the potential of participatory design as a security management tool.  Creating a continuous, 
participatory design-based security management process using the lessons learned from shadow security 
(together with the metrics presented later in this chapter), can allow building more accurate employee 
activity models, improving the effectiveness of proposed improvements and their alignment with 
organisational productivity priorities. 
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Figure 15: The SSM learning Cycle (Checkland and Poulter, 2006, p13) 
7.3.1.2 Incorporating feedback-driven security design 
Security management should aim to use employees as a resource for learning to identify specific points of 
friction and candidate improvements.  As previously discussed, users do not dismiss security, but devise 
“more appropriate” shadow security solutions when they encounter unworkable security.  The emerging 
practices may not necessarily be those that the security experts expect, but employee rationalisations 
dictate how they interact with security, and the value they see in compliance.  This capacity of users to 
participate in security can provide leverage to create new, seamless security solutions that are better 
aligned with their primary tasks.  To take advantage of this capacity, two-way communication between 
security and employees needs to be implemented, repurposing user feedback to improve the 
organisation’s security approach.  This can also bridge the divide often observed between security and 
productivity-focused organisational divisions (Ashenden and Sasse, 2013).  The purpose of feedback 
solicitation is to learn something from users that security implementers could neither predict nor detect 
from their position outside of the primary task.  Security managers do not see security from the 
perspective of employees, and so cannot assume they have designed security that fits their primary task, 
unless they have otherwise engaged with them in the design and deployment of security solutions.  This 
learning and communication approach can be achieved through:   
1. Persistent and readily-accessible feedback channels as part of the organisation’s structure and 
culture (e.g. a “we’ve just upgraded your email client, is it working well for you?” pop-up that 
“gobbles up” any post-deployment frustration).  If an employee reports a security concern, there 
should be a visible response that describes the impact their feedback has made.    
2. Security enforcement among team members should be scaled to cover the wider organisation: 
employees can champion secure behaviour within their teams, situating security practices in 
primary roles in a more meaningful way than sanctioned security communications.   
3. By advertising a capacity to listen, security managers can leverage employee experiences as an 
additional layer of assurance that security mechanisms are serving the business.  In addition to 
receiving feedback for improvements on security mechanisms and policies, advertising 
organisational capacity to listen can increase employee positive attitude towards security, 
increasing their propensity for secure behaviour. 
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4. This approach also makes it possible to improve communication and training, by logging 
employee misunderstandings or reported insecure behaviours, identifying areas where actions 
are most urgently required.  
To conclude, engagement with employees should aim to reframe security in the organisation as a 
collaborative activity, not as a barrier to work, taking advantage of internal employee propensity to 
participate in security risk mitigation, and use it to deliver security implementations that accommodate for 
employee primary task priorities. 
7.3.1.3 Employee participation does not mean delegation of responsibility 
Adopting a participatory approach to security management should not be misinterpreted as delegation of 
responsibility for organisational protection to employees.  Pallas (2009) argues that the increasing 
decentralisation of modern IT implementations means that security challenges need to be solved in a 
decentralised, cooperative way, arguing that hierarchical security management leads to suboptimal 
outcomes.  He then argues for more autonomy, explaining that coordination costs for centrally-
administered security can be too high, and that formal rules are more expensive than delegating 
responsibility to employees.  But, despite the identified motivation for secure behaviour, delegating 
responsibility to employees also requires accurate risk awareness, which employees often do not possess, 
as the findings of this thesis suggest.  Information security is complex and quickly changing, with 
effective security risk mitigation being a challenge even for experts; delegation of more responsibilities to 
employees cannot provide effective protection.  Herley (2014) echoes this by also explaining that 
directing more responsibility towards users is not an effective way to manage security: employees should 
not be expected to incur additional costs due to the failure of security management to identify other 
solutions.  This cost can be prohibitive if no formal procedures exist to identify and eliminate friction-
inducing security: employee attempts to behave securely can consume a significant proportion of their 
resources, and thus the total organisational resources invested to deliver security.  In addition, the 
emerging primary task disruption can lead to further user alienation from security, reducing their 
propensity to contribute to organisational protection.   
Organisational security management should not try to shift responsibility for protection towards 
employees, but learn from them and improve its practices.  As the findings of chapters 4 and 5 
demonstrated, well-designed security acts as a secure behaviour driver.  Deploying a learning-based 
security management approach, reduces the coordination costs of security management, a factor that 
Pallas considered prohibitive to centrally managing security.  It is a cheaper approach to implement and 
much easier to control, while at the same time using employee understanding and behaviours to drive 
centralised security management decisions.  Well-designed security based on collaborative, participatory 
management can provide effective risk mitigation, leading to what Camp (2011) described as a 
“community based production of security”.  This can lead to the development of a security-conscious 
organisational culture, and enable better coordination and employee participation in security protection 
and improvements.   
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7.3.2 Management Training – Engage with Low- and Middle-Management  
A decentralised and collaborative approach to security management also requires effective low-to-middle 
management engagement.  As explained in chapter 5, line managers are in a powerful position to act as 
motivators for effective security behaviours.  Thus, it is important to ensure they possess adequate and 
accurate security awareness and understanding amongst them, in order to promote secure behaviours and 
culture development amongst employees.  Security managers need to be aware of this, and (1) understand 
manager role in shadow security development and that any security awareness or education they 
broadcast will be interpreted and mediated locally, (2) listen to managers’ questions, problems and 
concerns, incorporating those as another source of information in participatory security design, and (3) 
help them develop correct and consistent security advice for their teams through tailored training. 
7.3.2.1 Role in shadow security development 
Security is a collective achievement and line managers play a central role in shaping security decisions 
and behaviours within organisational sub-divisions.  In both companies examined, employees often 
turned to their managers for security support when existing security mechanisms created significant 
primary task friction (e.g. slow access control), or when policies did not provide comprehensive, role-
specific answers to security challenges (e.g. what to do under emergency need for access conditions).  In 
those cases managers had to prescribe actions that address the emerging friction, but also preserve team 
productivity.  They ended up making local, and often ad-hoc, decisions about security, like access control 
granting and recommending information sharing practices.  The emerging security practices lead to 
shadow security evolution, varying security behaviours, and micro-culture development across 
organisational sub-divisions, eventually leading to security behaviour spinning out of central control.  But 
the impact managers have on their teams also means that when individuals consult their managers, they 
are more likely to design novel solutions that better address the risks faced by team members, also 
preserving productive capabilities.  Their significant role in managing security at local level, together 
with their understanding of role-specific challenges, suggests that line managers are well-placed to help 
security management accurately capture security behaviours and learn from shadow security 
development.  
7.3.2.2 Provide role-specific training 
Security-specific training should be tailored for managers to acknowledge their role as mediators of 
security.  Rather than overloading them with security information, communication to managers should 
focus on role-specific goals and related security principles.  It should also formalise and communicate 
their team-level security management responsibilities, also providing them with adequate resources, 
support and knowledge to respond to those.  In this way, when managers need to support their team 
members, they will be more likely to come up with novel solutions that effectively address their role-
specific risks.   
7.3.2.3 Include managers in security improvements 
The importance of line managers in shaping organisational security behaviours, calls for inclusion of 
them as an integral part of organisational security improvements.  They frequently interact with 
employees and have a unique perspective of the friction between security and productivity tasks.  
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Soliciting feedback from them can contribute to an effective amalgamation of shadow and prescribed 
security practices.   Communication also needs to be two-way, extending participatory security design to 
include line managers: in addition to influencing their staff’s security decisions, they can also elicit 
feedback from them on the challenges creates for their primary tasks.  Security management should liaise 
with them to deliver role-specific and consistent security advice to different organisational divisions, also 
using manager feedback to drive security improvements.  Essentially managers need to act as a bottom-
to-top feedback channel for identification of friction-inducing security.  They can also communicate to 
security management on the evolution of informal rules (Pallas, 2009) at team level, which can then be 
formalised, if they are consistent with organisational risk appetite.  If organisations neglect to do so, 
managers and their teams will continue to create their own rationalisations as to what their interactions 
with information security mean, and how to balance their perceived need for security with their main goal 
of primary task completion.  
7.3.3 Employee involvement improves motivation 
Involving employees and managers in security improvements creates a participatory security environment 
that can improve employee security behaviours.  Pallas argues that, given lack of control, employees will 
always act opportunistically, which then increases non-cooperative behaviour and corresponding secure 
behaviour motivation costs for security management.  But the findings presented in chapters 4, 5 and 6 of 
this thesis suggest that, if employees understand the need for security, and security mechanisms and 
processes are well-designed (minimal cost), employees are sufficiently motivated to invest some 
resources (time and effort) to protect the organisation instead of behaving opportunistically.  This 
willingness to participate in security needs to be further encouraged by security management, through 
visible communication of the positive impact of employee participation and inclusion of security in group 
meeting agendas.  This can lead to increased employee awareness about the actions required to keep the 
organisation secure and improve employee ability to connect with the risks presented by their managers 
or colleagues.  This increase in their perceived contribution and ownership of security implementation 
amongst employees, can further trigger internalised norms and benevolence-related compliance identified 
in chapter 6, further discussed in the next section of this chapter.   
7.4 Trust as a security risk management tool 
Security management also needs to understand and allow for the effects of organisational trust 
relationships on security behaviours.  As discussed in chapter 6, in a highly social environment like a 
large organisation, inter-employee trust is often more important to employees than complying with 
security.  This should not be used as a pretext to treat employees as untrustworthy though: employees 
possess both the ability and motivation to exhibit trustworthy behaviour as long as their ability to 
complete their primary tasks is not significantly hindered by security.  Using the improved understanding 
of trust relationships and their impact on security behaviours emerging from chapter 6, this section 
discusses what organisational security management can do in order to accommodate for organisational 
security trust relationships in security implementations. 
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7.4.1 Ignoring trust creates problems 
Many organisational operations depend on the presence of trust (chapter 6), thus security cannot silently 
accept its presence but refuse to account for it.  Security management should aim to formalise trust 
presence, understand its impact on security behaviours, and manage it to deliver more effective risk 
mitigation.   The results of chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that organisational insistence on using technical 
mechanisms and sanctions to eliminate or reduce the need to trust employees has a number of negative 
effects: 
1. Friction between security and productivity: Attempts to restrict employee actions within pre-
defined domains often lead to high security-primary task friction, encouraging shadow security 
development.  Attempts to eliminate this through excessive assurance lead to a negative attitude 
towards security. The emerging disgruntlement drains identified employee capacity to behave 
securely and can damage employee emotional connections with the organisation, increasing the 
risk for insider attacks and loss of human capital.   
2. Increased security violations and shadow security development: Assurance often asks employees 
to treat their colleagues as untrustworthy (e.g. “don’t share your password”).  But employees 
prioritise inter-employee trust relationships from security compliance, with temporal and 
contextual incentives to develop and preserve relationships with their colleagues leading to 
violations of security policy (password sharing, information sharing through unofficial channels, 
tailgating etc.).  In the end, assurance ends up turning inter-employee trust to a readily-available, 
low cost resource for collaboration and enabler of productive activity when employees need to 
minimise the impact of friction-inducing security. 
3. Insecure culture development:  Lack of enforcement (e.g. password sharing not penalised when 
detected) leads to the development of a culture where breaking security is justified.  Long-term 
reliance on collective trust violations leads to security spinning out of organisational control, 
with security behaviours significantly deviating from security policies.   
The above points suggest that, in order to effectively manage security, the presence of trust relationships 
needs to be acknowledged and leveraged by security management in the organisational security 
implementation. 
7.4.2 Formalise trust presence in security management 
Organisations trust their employees, but currently there is no formalisation of this trust in security 
management.  Current approaches to organisational security implicitly trust employees: many of the 
policy clauses in the organisations examined were not accompanied by mechanisms to enforce those or 
identify policy violations.  Information handling for example, was significantly dependent on employee 
actions, with employees being free to copy information to external drives and share it with their 
colleagues.  The trust shown by the organisation towards employees has been defined in chapter 6 as 
organisation-employee trust.  This needs to be formalised and leveraged by security management to take 
advantage of both users and technology to achieve effective protection.  To deliver this, security 
management needs to (1) understand the importance of security hygiene as a trust prerequisite, (2) 
formalise a “when to trust” and “when to assure approach”, (3) support correct trust development through 
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inclusion of trust in security communication, (4) avoid over-enforcement where trust develops, but also 
(5) enforce assurance when required to mitigate risks where trust is not an acceptable risk mitigation 
approach. 
7.4.2.1 Understand the importance of security hygiene on trust incentives 
User-centred security is a pre-requisite to trusting employees.  Employee secure behaviour requires 
removal of unusable elements of the security implementation, with security communication and training 
providing sufficient motivation for secure behaviour.  As a result, user-centred security design and 
communication principles, discussed earlier in this chapter, should be treated as a prerequisite (or hygiene 
requirement) of any attempt to include trust in organisational security management.   
7.4.2.2 Formalise trust and assurance in risk management 
As previously discussed, implementing assurance mechanisms for all possible employee behaviours is 
prohibitively expensive.  The productivity benefits of trust have been identified in non-security related 
contexts: trust between members of an organisation leads to highly cooperative behaviours, acting as a 
substitute for control (Costa et al., 2001).  In addition, employees that feel connected to an organisation 
are more committed and involved with it (Bussing, 2002).  Organisations should aim to achieve similar 
benefits in a security context, leveraging already existing trust relationships to provide effective 
protection.  They need to take advantage of the intrinsic incentives driving employee secure behaviours, 
taking advantage of second-order trust benefits (goodwill, positive culture development and reduced 
assurance costs).  Ability to solve security challenges through goodwill and improved awareness also 
allows for efficient reallocation of resources available to security, to address other risks. 
Trust should also be part of organisational security risk management.  Formal decisions need to be made 
on where assurance is necessary and where trust is required.  Trust should be present when employees 
have adequate incentives (both contextual and intrinsic) to behave securely (e.g. when organisational 
provisions for sharing of information allow effective and efficient primary task activity).  Assurance on 
the other hand is required when the rewards from not playing by the rules are significantly higher than the 
consequences of not doing so.  In such cases an organisation needs to take actions to reduce potential 
exposure to malicious behaviours (e.g. block potential for leavers to access sensitive information, or 
monitor and audit access and copying of data from sensitive corporate fileservers from where employees 
should not be downloading vast amounts of information).  Some of the actions in question may not 
constitute an offence on their own, but can provide sufficient grounds for further investigation; where the 
line is drawn depends on organisational risk appetite.  Where an organisation decides to implement 
assurance instead of trust, the “business, not personal” nature of the controls put in place needs to be 
made clear to employees through security communication.  Employees are not deemed as untrustworthy; 
controls are required in order to protect the organisation from malicious outsiders and insiders.  Finally, 
where organisational reliance on employees exists, it should be formalised in order to be better reflected 
in information security management strategies: after identification of security-related risks the mitigation 
method (assurance vs trust), together with the related organisational actions required (mechanisms 
implemented, communication sent, training module content updates) should be recorded as a formal risk 
management decision and revisited over regular intervals to assess potential need to reconsider it.   
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7.4.2.3 Include trust in security communication 
Where security management decides trust is required and can be beneficial to the organisation, its 
presence should be made explicit.  After security mechanisms are implemented in a way that encourages 
trustworthy behaviour, Security Awareness, Education and Training campaigns (SAET) should be used to 
enable employees to better understand the actual risks the organisation faces.  For example, in Company 
B, home working is quite prevalent, with many employees being either full time home workers or 
working from home two or three times a week.  This makes it impossible for the organisation to restrict 
employee actions: if no trust is shown on their ability to protect the information they carry with them, 
they will be unable to proceed with their primary tasks.  This organisational dependency on employee 
behaviour should be communicated to employees, to explain their responsibility and contribution in 
keeping the organisation secure.  The emerging SAET approaches should: (1) make it clear to employees 
that they are trusted and supported in their security decisions (to improve motivation), also explaining the 
“it’s business, not personal” need for security vigilance, and (2) include information on current threats 
and how real-world trust development signals break down when using computer systems (improving 
ability).   
7.4.2.4 Once developed - don’t enforce it! 
If an organisation considers its employees as trustworthy, this decision needs to be formalised and 
honoured.  The first assessment of an employee’s trustworthiness comes even before they join the 
organisation, through recruitment background checks and vetting procedures.  This process uses past 
employee behaviour as an indicator of potential future actions.  When the organisation establishes that 
ability and motivation for trustworthy behaviour are present, there’s no need to over-assure.  Employees 
that pass the screening process should be considered trustworthy and treated as such instead of being 
subject to continuous restrictions.  Visible presence of trust towards employees can further increase 
employee trustworthiness, by injecting secure behaviour in the organisation-employee psychological 
contracts that dictate organisational employee behaviour.  The emerging cooperation can benefit all 
stakeholders (employees, top management and security management), providing three major advantages:  
1. People in an organisation develop shared values and a shared-sense of responsibility for the 
well-being of the organisation, based on shared formal or informal norms promoting cooperation 
(Fukuyama, 2001; Resnick, 2001), which also affect their security behaviour (Pfleeger et al., 
2014). Secure behaviour should be driven by a feeling of contribution to common organisational 
interests, rather than rule-driven actions to avoid sanctions. 
2. Organisational attempts to enforce friction-inducing security will be reduced.  This will reduce 
both productivity-driven and trust-driven policy violations, lowering the levels of “noise” the 
above introduce in security monitoring; precursors of serious attacks (e.g. intellectual property 
theft26) can be lost in false-positive alarms if employees frequently violate security for 
                                                          
 
26 Intellectual property theft accounts for a small percentage of all cybercrimes, but results to the majority of the 
resulting monetary losses, Rantala, 2008) 
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productivity or collaboration reasons.  As a result, organisational ability to monitor, detect and 
enforce its security policy will improve, improving the overall efficiency of the organisation’s 
security implementation.  The resources saved from reduced noise can be reinvested in 
implementing other more effective security mechanisms, enabling the implementation of clever 
monitoring to identify serious malicious activity (insider or outsider attacks - Caputo et al.,  
2009). 
3. Flexibility strengthens employee ability to defend the organisation.  Attackers are likely to adapt 
to new technologies, but attacks are much harder to succeed with suspicious employees, 
motivated to protect the organisation and a culture that favours secure behaviour.   This is not 
uncommon in other security implementations: for example biometrics at passport control points 
are considered to be more effective than individuals, but when a problem is identified, a human 
can take over and use a much richer and broader set of factors from the context of the 
environment to assess a passenger’s trustworthiness (Fléchais et al., 2005).  The presence and 
formalisation of trust, together with the emerging perceived responsibility, acts as an additional 
motivator for employees to behave securely. 
7.4.2.5 Enforce assurance through contextual incentives when necessary 
Trust should never be perceived by employees as inability of security management to enforce security 
rules.  Security management needs to accept that formal rules left unenforced are ineffective, especially if 
lack of enforcement is visible.  Risk-aware employees, interacting with well-designed security 
mechanisms, no longer have reasons to violate security.  As a result, when the rewards from not playing 
by the rules (benefits from malicious actions) are significantly higher than the consequences of not doing 
so, assurance mechanisms need to exist to change the risk-reward structure, thus dis-incentivising 
untrustworthy behaviour.  In such cases, violations can be detected by improving current monitoring 
implementations to include contextual information on user behaviours, which can be used to detect 
employee trust abuse and precursors of insider attacks.  Malicious actions should then be followed up 
with serious consequences that are visibly enforced.  Visible enforcement can act both as a deterrence for 
future misbehaviour and as a motivation improver, reminding employees that they are trusted and 
responsible to keep the organisation safe.  On the other hand, organisational inability or unwillingness to 
enforce the policy (as identified in the interviews) is seen as weakness, leading to security appearing as 
less important to employees, reducing compliance incentives (reduced motivation and perceived 
contextual incentives).  By making contextual incentives visibly enforceable through assurance and 
enforcement, security management deters potentially malicious behaviours or other actions that put the 
organisation at risk, but also reduces shadow security development stemming from perceived 
ineffectiveness of official security.   
7.4.3 Accommodate urgency, encourage self-reporting and follow it up  
Security management also needs to implement formalised processes for unusual circumstances where 
security may need to be bypassed.  Employees may, under rare and unusual conditions, have to 
circumvent security for productivity reasons.  In such cases mechanisms should be in place for employees 
to report their non-compliant behaviours (Bartsch, 2014).  Clear instructions should then exist for 
employees and security management on how to deal with emerging vulnerabilities.  For example, an 
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employee who shared their password with a colleague in an emergency situation should recognise this as 
a violation, then login to a “violation logging” system and report the behaviour.  The same should apply 
to physical access control: an employee who forgot their access pass should be easily able to get a daily 
pass through a simple verification process.  In both cases, the organisation should encourage self-
reporting by communicating that no action will be taken against employees who self-report, while those 
who do not should be susceptible to sanctions.  The organisation should also ensure adequate measures 
were taken to close any resulting loopholes (e.g. forcing the employee who shared their password to 
change it within two hours).  Accommodating for urgency should not be implemented as a substitute to 
usable systems though.  Violations, even reported ones, need to be infrequent enough to avoid non-
compliance becoming part of organisational security culture, also avoiding introducing significant 
resource overheads to address the loopholes created by frequent circumventions. Insecure behaviour 
cannot be totally eliminated, as this is both uneconomical and prohibitive for productivity, but 
enhancement of the organisation-employee trust relationship can ensure that it happens rarely and 
employees take appropriate mitigating actions. 
7.5 Measuring shadow security 
Measurement plays a key role in modern security management, but current attempts to devise behaviour-
related security metrics are ineffective, expensive and also fail to accurately capture employee security 
practices.  Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are widely deployed by organisations to benchmark their 
performance against set targets and competitors, often also driving security strategy decisions (Cai et al., 
2009).  The need for effective security metrics to aid security management decision making and risk 
assessment is widely accepted in information security (ISO 27004; Johnson and Goetz, 2007).  Currently 
information security uses metrics mostly focused on technical aspects; security managers have access and 
monitor detailed technical information on intrusion attempts, virus logs, access requests, traffic 
information and many more (Brotby et al., 2013; Payne, 2009; Wong, 2011).  An international standard 
on information security metrics also exists (ISO27004), defining a measurement processes for assessing 
the effectiveness of Information Security Management Systems.  Unfortunately, current use of metrics to 
measure security behaviour is of limited scope and expensive.  Metrics defined in the latest edition of 
ISO27004 consist largely of “tickboxing” elements (e.g. count of logs/registries with annual information 
security awareness training field/row filled as “Completed”) or require the organisation to manually 
collect information from its employees (ask each user about the number of their passwords that satisfy 
organisation's password policy).  Other attempts to measure security behaviour in the form of empirical 
guidelines from commercial security organisations, present no scientific justification for the 
measurements they recommend.  They also demand excessive effort for data collection, asking 
organisations to conduct surveys and phishing exercises to determine user awareness and benchmark the 
organisation (e.g. Bond et al., 2014), or manually collect the information required to assess employee 
behaviours (e.g. Rudolph, 2006).  
Security management needs to observe real usage data and user feedback to learn how to adapt security 
provisions to achieve both productivity and security.  Bartsch (2012) argues that organisations need to 
examine the presence of precise knowledge to guide authorisation decisions and reuse it to drive the 
deployment of those.  An attempt to achieve this is documented by Smetters and Good (2009), who 
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conducted an in-depth examination of access control in organisations.  Their findings revealed interesting 
insights on the state of access control in organisations, but only managed to capture a snapshot of the state 
of access control at a specific point in time.  Given the quick pace with which technologies and emerging 
security risks undergo change, conducting one-off work can be of limited usefulness to attempts to 
continuously monitor behaviour-related metrics.  Easy-to-collect security behaviour metrics that allow for 
a more accurate representation of employee behaviours than existing ones, can be a powerful tool for 
security managers.  They provide them with the ability to understand how security fits with productive 
tasks in practice, thus improving their security management decisions.  Shadow security provides the 
opportunity to collect such information.   This section discusses how shadow security indicators can be 
used to devise security behaviour metrics, using information that is mostly, readily available in an 
organisation.  It also explains how those metrics can be used to drive subsequent security management 
decisions for improvements, assess the effectiveness of those improvements, and allow for continuous 
monitoring to detect insecure behaviours and react before they become threatening to the organisation. 
7.5.1 Shadow security and measurement 
The presence of shadow security presents a good starting point for measuring employee behaviours in 
organisations.  The identified problems of current behavioural metrics suggest a need to look deeper into 
readily available, or easy to collect, information to develop more effective ones.  Security managers ought 
to consider how to identify the indicators and drivers of shadow security and develop a capacity to 
analyse and adapt, in cooperation with other functions in the organisation.  Unfortunately, periodic 
repetitions of the methodology presented in this thesis can be prohibitively expensive.  But many of the 
behaviours presented in chapters 5 and 6 can be identified through information that exists in abundance in 
modern organisational IT systems.  As Hubbard (2010, p. 48) puts it, “anything detectable at different 
amounts is measurable”.  Using readily available information signifying shadow security behaviours 
allows better understanding of the prevalence of those in the organisation, enabling more effective 
resource allocation for future organisational security improvements.   
In order to take advantage of the emerging ability to identify and measure shadow security, organisations 
need to adopt a risk-oriented behaviour measurement process.  This should aim to, identify target 
employee behaviours using the improved understanding emerging from shadow security, devise required 
metrics and identify sources of information, arrange access to those, and then adopt an iterative 
monitoring approach, as presented in Figure 16: 
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Figure 16: Risk-driven intervention process 
The above process allows security managers to continuously monitor their implemented shadow security 
metrics, assess the emerging risks and then take appropriate risk-mitigating actions, based on 
organisational security risk appetite.  The above process is also consistent with the security metrics 
process presented in the ISO27004 international standard for information security metrics. 
7.5.2 Sources of measurement 
In order to identify available information that could be used to develop shadow security metrics, the 
researcher worked closely with Company B, identifying a number of potential sources of behavioural 
indicators.  Information on a number of different shadow security topics was readily available through 
various organisational systems: network access logs, access control data, leavers’ process statistics, data 
on usage and availability of organisational systems for information storage and sharing, logs from clear 
desk checks, and statistics from IT support and employee feedback mechanisms.  All these can be used to 
identify elements of the security implementation that encourage shadow security development and 
quantify mechanism and process-specific behaviours.  The remainder of this section combines the 
improved understanding of employee behaviours that emerged from shadow security and trust 
development, together with information that is readily available in large organisations (or can be easily 
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collected), to (1) devise a set of security metrics that accurately capture shadow security presence, and (2) 
drive organisational security risk management and decision making to more effectively manage employee 
security behaviours.    
7.5.2.1 Information handling, flow, sharing and storage 
For large organisations like the ones investigated in this research, it is common for employees to engage 
with colleagues situated in various locations around the country, or even overseas.  Combined with the 
increasing prevalence of home working, remote collaboration results in sensitive organisational 
information being present at various locations and on many devices, increasing the potential points of 
failure that could lead to security compromises.  Both the organisations studied had implemented internal 
file storage and sharing systems that employees could remotely access, so in theory, provision for secure 
behaviour was in place.  But problems in capacity, slowdown in accessing the organisational systems and 
lack of flexibility (no access provisions for various types of devices) led to employees using other ad hoc 
practices to share information.  Employees resorted to using third-party cloud storage solutions for 
sharing sensitive information, due to a perceived lack of organisational support for effective file sharing, 
thus exposing the organisation to potential security risks.  To detect such behaviours, which also suggest 
problems in the usability, availability and effectiveness of the systems in place, an organisation’s security 
management needs to observe the following: 
1. Metrics generated by agents on managed organisational computers (e.g. Data Loss Prevention 
agents - DLP).  This software can provide quantitative data on the volume of information shared 
through emails or sensitive information stored locally on corporate machines, allowing deducing 
data handling information.  Security managers can track the number of attachments or pattern-
matched text excerpts being sent, or information sent to out-of-company email addresses.  As 
Smetters and Good (2009) identified, email mailing lists (and the dynamic groups generated in 
the “to” and “cc” lists of each message) are in fact the most commonly used access control lists 
encountered by users. 
2. Check volume of traffic to third-party cloud storage servers (from inside the corporate network 
and company computers).  This aims to identify the use of third-party storage to store and share 
corporate information.  It may be difficult to distinguish with absolute certainty on which parts 
of cloud storage traffic relate to corporate information, as opposed to employees accessing 
personal files while carrying out personal tasks on corporate machines, but extensive use of 
cloud providers can indicate a need to investigate current use of organisational systems.   
3. Check utilisation of internal file-sharing systems.  Does it make sense if an employee has not 
accessed their personal file space in two or three working days?  If network storage provisions 
are not used, can the organisation identify organisational information stored locally on employee 
computers?  If excessive use of and reliance on local storage is identified, the organisation 
should investigate organisational storage and connectivity problems, also gauging employee 
awareness of the existence of organisational storage provisions, together with feedback on usage 
experience. 
4. Monitoring external drive use (encrypted and unencrypted).  The results also suggested that 
some backups and sharing of information within the organisation was done using non-approved 
unencrypted hard drives and USB sticks.  Monitoring the use of those (e.g. through the use of 
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locally-installed software) can also allow the organisation to identify potential issues with 
organisational provisions.  It can also gauge potential employee policy awareness of the need to 
use encrypted drives. 
5. Clear desk logs.  Company B has clear desk checks that occur every night, after employees have 
left the office.  Those currently record the number of documents found on employee desks and 
potential classification markings on those.  By comparing the number of documents found 
during clear desk checks before and after clear-desk related communication has gone out, an 
organisation can assess its effectiveness.  In addition, close examination of some of the 
documents can reveal the understanding amongst employees of the organisational classification 
scheme.  This can drive both improvements in communication and training, but also attempts to 
improve the comprehensiveness and context-specific applicability of organisational data 
classification approaches. 
The metrics defined above can raise a number of questions that security management will need to address 
through a risk-driven intervention process: (1) if staff avoid using organisational systems, consider 
sending files to personal accounts via email easier, share information through third parties and 
unencrypted drives, and avoid classifying the information they use, what does this mean for the 
organisation?  Is the nature of the information mishandled sensitive? If yes, is the organisation willing to 
accept potential risks? If no, security management should then (2) consider where organisational 
information storage/sharing systems create problems in employee workflow (e.g. lack of adequate 
storage, problems in setting up file sharing mechanisms, problematic connectivity).  Where related risks 
may be considered less threatening, security management may choose to (3) consider providing 
employees with more flexible solutions (e.g. encrypting laptops to allow local storage of information and 
providing easy to use encrypted email communications), while for more severe risks it should (4) invest 
in improvements to reduce those disruptions.  In addition, security management should (5) investigate 
whether organisational training and communication effectively communicates the risks of identified 
practices and the presence of organisational mechanisms to mitigate those.  Applying the measurement 
process defined in the previous section (7.5.1) for information handling practices27, the process in Figure 
17 emerges. 
                                                          
 
27 This process should be applied to all the other measurement areas outlined in the remainder of this section.  For 
space reasons I only include this one example on information handling 
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Figure 17: Risk-driven intervention process for information handling systems 
7.5.2.2 Access Control - Provisioning of Accounts 
Quick deactivation of a leaver’s account was reported as being very important by the information security 
managers of both participating organisations (in one of the two companies there was a target of a 
maximum of 48-hours for deactivation).  But examination of organisational account control systems and 
discussions with account managers, revealed that in many cases leaver’s accounts are left active for much 
longer, either in case future need for system access emerges, or because accounts administrators were not 
informed about an employee having left the organisation.  An interesting example came from contractor 
accounts: many people whose contract expires, often re-join the organisation after short periods of time, 
so their accounts were left untouched “just in case they come back”.  Another example was the use by 
new starters of their supervisor’s accounts until their own account could be set up, while the supervisor 
remained close-by during use as a security precaution.  In order to identify these, and other account 
misuse cases, an organisation can measure the following: 
1. Mean time for leaver account deactivation: Measure mean time it takes for an employee that has 
left the company to have their access revoked and compare this to targets defined in the 
organisation’s security policy.  If this time is higher than what organisational security risk 
management considers acceptable, improvements are required in access revoking process; either 
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better connection between accounts management teams and HR, or delegation of access 
revoking to line managers. 
2. Mean time for new account creations: Measurement of account creation time is also important; if 
new accounts take long to create, teams will use what they already have: managers and teams 
use generic accounts, or accounts that are left active after people leave the company, or even 
share their passwords to provide access to new joiners.  The time between an account creation 
request and successful account creation, can indicate the perceived lead-in time required so that 
the creation process is completed by the day a new employee has joined the organisation.  In 
cases where emergency access is required, organisations should consider creating centrally-
managed short term access provisions. 
3. Prolonged account inactivity: If an account is showing no or limited activity, it could either be 
unused (and should be a candidate for deletion), or the owner has simply chosen to act outside of 
the access control system, accessing files in some other way.  In such cases, what barriers do 
organisational access-granting processes create?  Is there a way to mitigate this effect?  This 
metric can also indicate to security managers that a provisioned system is seeing inconsistent use 
and may also provide inconsistent coverage and security.   
These three metrics can allow security management evaluating the effectiveness of current account 
management provisions, taking actions to mitigate risks from account sharing.  Reduced account sharing 
will also allow for accountability in conditions where further investigation of employee actions and 
subsequent enforcement are required. 
7.5.2.3 IT support - Response to helpdesk requests 
Security management should also aim to assess the effectiveness of organisational provisions, aiming to 
support employees in their primary tasks.  As the results have shown, ineffective organisational support 
provisions can lead to employees distancing themselves from organisational security.  Support should be 
assessed using a number of indicators: 
1. Resolved/Not resolved problems and Time to fulfil request.  Security managers should be able to 
identify whether support provisions can meet employee needs and assess the impact of 
potentially problematic support functions on employee ability to comply with security.  Support 
processes may be appropriate, and employees instructed as to when to contact a helpdesk in 
specific circumstances, but then the response time becomes critical.  If call response times are 
slow, employees with momentary pressures (e.g., deadlines, one-off meetings with associated 
deliverables) will have to adapt there and then using their own understanding of IT and security 
expectations.  
2. Number of incidents responded to and time taken to respond.  In some cases employee requests 
may not be fulfillable.  Despite that, it is still important for support functions to communicate 
back to employees the reason for refusal.  The time taken for this response is equally important. 
Slow responses that lead to undesired outcomes can distance employees from security, reducing 
their willingness to request formal support in the future, which acts as a key driver for shadow 
security development.   In addition, details of “unusual” requests need to be recorded, to allow 
identification of potential lack of organisational provisions for some primary task needs.  
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Unusual requests can also aid identification of employee misconceptions and unrealistic 
expectation from security support that can then be targeted through communication and training.   
The above metrics can be useful for an organisation to assess the effectiveness of central security support 
provisions.  Target performance values (e.g. time to respond, number of issues resolved etc.) may differ 
across organisations, even across organisational divisions, due to varying security risk appetite, so the 
above metrics need to be adapted to the specifics of the target environments.  In addition, when support 
performs outside desired limits, helpdesk staffing and staff training may also need to be revisited. 
7.5.2.4 Employee feedback and reports  
The results from the interview and the survey analyses also showed that employees are willing to report 
security mechanisms that cause problems in primary task completion.  Despite that, in a number of cases 
they believed the organisation did not respond appropriately to their reports.  Security management needs 
to treat employee willingness to report as an opportunity to identify elements of security implementation 
that currently fail to serve the primary task purpose.  In order to achieve this, employee reports should be: 
1. Grouped based on related security implementation elements, combined with numerical metrics 
for each different element (e.g. remote access problems, password reset requests).  Interventions 
should then be prioritised to address high primary task impact problems first.  
2. Logged, in order to create an “end-to-end” story.  Employees should be informed about the 
number of new issues security management identified and resolved using their help, stressing the 
importance of their participation to deliver effective security.  The effectiveness of such an 
approach can be measured by logging employee reports and calculating the percentage of those 
where improvements were delivered and feedback was provided, with security management 
aiming to address as many of the reported problems as possible.  
Successful implementation of the above can increase employee participation in security management.   
The emerging participatory security environment can allow security management to create (or modify) 
solutions seamlessly integrated with employee primary tasks, thus reducing non-compliance and shadow 
security development.  In addition, communication of the influence on security management of employee 
feedback and reports, can increase employees’ perceived contribution in protecting the organisation, 
improving their motivation for secure behaviour and reporting of security problems, reducing their 
reliance on shadow security practices. 
7.5.2.5 Password behaviour 
Employees having to deal with friction-inducing password policies and mechanisms, often resort to self-
devised password management strategies, using their own risk awareness and the presence of inter-
employee trust to reduce emerging primary task impact.  In the interview analysis a number of practices 
were identified relating to password use: despite awareness of policy clauses on password selection, with 
writing down and sharing of those also not permitted, employees choose simple passwords to cope with 
frequent changes, write those down in password protected documents or notebooks they carry with them 
all the time, or share those with colleagues to ensure responsibility delegation or urgent access to systems 
is provided when access management is perceived as problematic.  Employees often also recognise the 
risks associated with their practices as well.  As discussed in section 7.2, security hygiene should be 
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security management’s priority in order to reduce emerging insecure practices; in this case realised 
through easy to use password managers compatible with all organisational systems and quick and 
effective access management procedures.  In order to measure the effect of attempted improvements, a 
number of sources of information can be used (in addition to the adoption of password manager discussed 
in section 7.5.2.2): 
1. Feedback and reports on password manager adoption.  Measure employee report of problems 
with password management software.  Line managers should also be probed to discuss the 
experience of their staff with the software at group meetings and communicate it back to security 
management.  Problems with password manager should be addressed to avoid creating the need 
for employees to resort to other practices. 
2. Abnormal access patterns.  Employee sharing of passwords can be detected through the presence 
of abnormal access patterns from employee accounts.  Those can be both geographic and 
machine-based mismatches, between subsequent log-in sessions or physical access control and 
attempts to access organisational systems.  High frequency of abnormal access patterns indicates 
a need to examine the effectiveness and response times of organisational access granting 
processes (also discussed in section 7.5.2.3). 
3. Password reset statistics. The number of password resets should also be measured (both through 
logs of calls to the security helpdesk and automatic reset mechanisms).  High number of 
password resets can indicate excessive employee reliance on those, due to either forgetting their 
passwords, or resetting those after sharing with their colleagues to eliminate potential risks.  
Frequent password resets can signal the need to increase timeframes for password expiry, again 
depending on organisational risk appetite, even considering providing one-time access tokens for 
infrequently used systems.  
When security management implements changes in security mechanisms or processes driven by the above 
metrics, security communication should aim to draw employee attention on those, with line managers also 
communicating the potential benefits to employees.  
7.5.2.6 Screen lock monitoring 
Employees often do not lock their computer screens when they leave their computers unattended, despite 
their awareness of the need to do so.  The main driver for this behaviour is the existence of inter-
employee trust, with the belief that their colleagues can be trusted to behave securely acting as a risk 
mitigating factor by itself; consequently it reduces their perceived need for screen locking practices.  For 
some organisations this may be acceptable, for example if the number of external people present in a 
specific environment is minimal, or when certain functions deal with non-critical data.  In other cases 
security management may decide unlocked screens are risky and should be eliminated.  In order to 
measure and influence such behaviour, organisations need to record the number of unlocked screens 
identified during regular checks, communicate the importance of screen lock policy clauses in mitigating 
security risks (through channels appropriate for each target organisational division), and eventually 
sanction violations.  Follow-up measurements of unlocked screens can assess the effectiveness of the 
above approach.  Contrary to other metrics presented in this section, the measurements required for screen 
lock behaviour monitoring cannot be easily collected from organisational systems or existing physical 
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processes, so investing some organisational resource for manual data gathering is required.  But if 
security management believes that related risks justify the required time and effort for data collection, 
either for the whole organisation or for specific functions, cost-effective ways should be found (e.g. 
security staff conducting random checks around organisational premises). 
7.5.2.7 Actual adoption and use of organisational systems 
The organisations examined implemented centrally managed systems to enable employee secure 
behaviour.  Password managing tools were present in Company B for employees to store their passwords, 
while network storage was available in both companies to provide secure and backed up storage for 
organisational information.  Shadow security practices emerged when those systems failed to meet 
employee productivity needs: (1) the password manager was incompatible with some systems, so 
employees had to find other ways to store their passwords, (2) network storage was limited, leading to 
local storage and ad-hoc backups, and (3) connectivity provisions were unreliable, leading to employees 
using self-procured approaches to transfer files.  The above practices increase organisational security 
risks, but there is currently no mechanism in either of the two organisations to identify such practices and 
take appropriate risk-mitigating actions.  Security management can identify potential disruption caused by 
such mechanisms by measuring:  
1. Password manager adoption and usage statistics.  Low adoption and usage of password 
manager can indicate that employees resort to other practices to manage the large number of 
organisational passwords they have (e.g. writing those down in documents).  
2. Utilisation of network storage.  Lack of usage of organisational storage provisions also indicates 
that employees resort to other practices (e.g. storing information locally and backing up to own 
drives). 
In both the above cases, lack of use of organisational provisions should be seen as a need to examine the 
fitness-for-purpose of related mechanisms, also requesting feedback from employees or their line 
managers on problems they encounter when using those. 
7.5.2.8 Assessing behaviours and SAET effectiveness 
As discussed in section 7.2.3, it is important to ensure that security training is tailored to employee tasks 
in order to address organisational security challenges.  But current metrics on user behaviour required for 
ISO standard compliance are related to completion rates of organisational training programmes, which 
only proves successful completion, without allowing for assessment of the effectiveness of the training.  
In addition, general employee security awareness and behaviours are hard to measure, without consuming 
significant employee time and effort through employee surveys and questionnaires.  Both the above 
approaches provide minimal ability to dynamically monitor employee responses to changes in the security 
environment and are also impractical for frequent use, thus unsuitable for a dynamic, metrics-driven 
security management approach.   The metrics defined in the previous sections can address the above 
drawbacks: they can be collated to create an overall indicator of employee security behaviour, which can 
be expressed as a function of (1) training completion rates, (2) employee actions to mitigate 
organisational risks (e.g. reporting potential security risks, screen lock, password manager adoption), (3) 
their information storage and sharing habits, (4) their willingness to report potential problems back to the 
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organisation and participate in security protection, also adding in (5) manager training completion rates 
(Figure 18). 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑟 = 𝑎(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝑏(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) + 𝑐(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠) +
𝑑(𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠) + 𝑒(𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔)  
Figure 18: Overall security behaviour formula  
The fifth element of the above formula, manager training, is hard to measure through readily-available 
organisational information.  It requires access to manually collected information for manager education, 
like measuring manager CBT success, also assessing management training effectiveness through possible 
questionnaires and surveys (that may still be expensive and time consuming, but are easier to conduct and 
cheaper if they are only targeting managers instead of the organisation in its entirety).  In addition, 
behavioural variations between different organisational divisions can also be attributed to differences in 
management, as one of the major factors for shadow security, and subsequent micro-culture development, 
was line manager communication.  It is also important for security management to understand that the 
coefficients presented in the security behaviour formula need to be organisation-specific.  Security 
managers in organisations need to decide on which of the metrics defined above matter the most, based 
on their own security challenges, risk appetite, resources available and mitigation priorities; this should 
then be incorporated in their models.  Security managers may also decide to remove or add elements to 
the equation, depending on organisation-specific requirements for risk mitigation or availability of 
information.  Coefficients may also need to be differentiated to reflect behaviours across different 
organisational divisions, allowing for differentiated risk management strategies for low and high risk 
areas.  As a result, the above formula should be seen as a basis for building a general security behaviour 
metric, adapted to better reflect specific organisational settings, related security challenges and risk 
appetite. 
7.5.3 Consider impact of interventions  
Security management should also use measurable information to aid system design and assess the effect 
of changes in security on employee primary tasks, together with subsequent behavioural responses.  
Modern system design methodologies call for assessment of the effort users need to expend on a system 
in early design stages, also recommending iterative development and deployment of technology solutions 
(Checkland and Poulter, 2006).  Despite that, updates to security provisions are currently deployed 
without testing, mostly in a reactionary way or to comply with regulation and international standards 
(Herath and Rao, 2009a).  In essence, there exists no pre- or post-deployment assessment of the impact of 
security mechanisms on employee productivity, with attempts for improvement only coming when 
security significantly disrupts productive activity.  To improve on this, security managers should aim to 
use measurable information to predict the potential resource overheads of proposed security changes, also 
creating processes for continuous assessment of the post-deployment impact of those. 
7.5.3.1 Pre-deployment suitability assessment 
Security management needs to adopt early user testing and piloting to improve the effectiveness of 
security changes, turning security management into an iterative process.  For example, the introduction of 
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a new business system that requires password authentication may seem a straightforward task, demanding 
minimal additional effort for employees.  But the cumulative effect of adding another username-password 
pair to the list employees need to remember can create problems: increasing the cognitive load placed 
upon them further strains their capacity to both recall individual passwords (encouraging the use of recall 
aids like writing passwords down) and generate truly unique credentials for individual systems (making 
re-use of existing passwords an increasingly attractive solution).  Such problems can be identified, and 
potentially avoided, if employee effort demands by existing security implementations are quantified using 
methods like the NASA TLX (Hart and Staveland, 1988). Incorporating these methods in security 
management and design allows for accurate estimation of the resources employees need to invest to 
comply with existing security, also assessing the additional workload created by a proposed new 
mechanism.  This, or other similar approaches, can assess the potential impact of proposed interventions, 
ensuring that they are well-aligned with employee primary tasks, but also quantifiable and compatible 
with the organisation’s security risk management strategies.  
7.5.3.2 Post-deployment monitoring 
Pre-deployment assessments can often fail to capture the full impact of a change in security: organisations 
are complex environments, with many people connecting from various locations, using different devices, 
and performing a wide variety of production tasks.  This complexity can prevent accurate assessment of 
post-deployment impact and prediction of emerging employee behaviours.  In addition, as employee 
resources invested for secure behaviour add up cumulatively (Section 2.6.2 - Beautement et al., 2008), a 
new security mechanism lead to exhaustion of employees’ compliance budget.  Employees can then just 
quietly resort to their self- or team-procured solutions, to achieve what they perceive as effective security-
productivity balance, strengthening the presence of shadow security in the organisation.  To alleviate this, 
pre-deployment impact assessments need to be combined with continuous measurement and monitoring 
of the impact of security on employee productive activity.  As Schein (2010) notes, if the environment is 
undergoing increased change, it is not appropriate to base decisions in the past or in the present, and that 
it is necessary to think “in terms of the near future to assess whether or not our solutions are working”.  
As a result, user reaction to security changes can only be accurately assessed after their deployment.  This 
post-deployment assessment process should be done in three distinct steps: 
1. Deploy a desired change, also defining a set period of time over which no other security 
interventions will take place, to allow isolating the effect of the intervention in question.   
2. Identify the expected impact on behaviour metrics.  Define what is considered as a positive and 
negative outcome and relate those to expected reductions or increases in metrics.   
3. If indicators of shadow security change negatively, the new system may have increased the 
burden of the new system on productive activity, so the source of negative impact needs to be 
identified and addressed.  
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Regular assessment of the suitability of systems allows security management to become an iterative 
process, moving away from the current static, “fire and forget”28 approach, enabling more dynamic and 
data-driven security behaviour management.   
7.5.4 Benefits of measurement 
The shadow security metrics presented in this chapter can improve current ability of security managers to 
make decisions in order to effectively mitigate organisational security risks.  This is a need identified by 
Bartsch and Sasse (2013), who called for approaches to increase security decision-makers’ expertise and 
awareness to support policy decisions.  Using human behaviour metrics as drivers for continuous 
assessment and improvement can provide a number of advantages, compared to current security 
management approaches: 
1. Data-driven security behaviour management.  The introduction of metrics allows for easier and 
cheaper employee behaviour assessment and integration of the findings in security management.  
Collating metrics to create one or more security behaviour super-metrics allows for continuous 
organisation-wide awareness and behaviour assessment, without the need for continuous, 
potentially disruptive, direct engagement.  This enables prioritisation of security deployments to 
address high risks and implementation of targeted security interventions to eliminate identified 
shortcomings. 
2. Reduces security management costs and makes security enforcement cheaper.  Instrumenting the 
infrastructure to measure shadow security could be relatively cheap compared to maintaining or 
rebuilding fractured security mechanisms, or managing a demoralised, fractious workforce that 
has developed too many non-sanctioned security habits.   It also allows accurate pre- and post-
deployment assessment of the impact of security mechanisms and processes on employee 
activities.  Using measurement to deploy more user-centred security mechanisms and processes 
also enables cheaper and more effective enforcement, as it reduces productivity-related shadow 
security behaviours that can complicate attempts to identify potential violations.   
3. Behaviour metrics included in risk management.  By collating shadow-security driven metrics, 
organisations can identify the proportion of time employees have to spend interacting with 
security mechanisms.  Based on organisational risk appetite, security management can then set 
targets of desired employee resources invested on delivering security.  This allows modifying 
elements of the security implementation to adjust those resources, bringing security behaviour 
management in line with the organisation’s risk management approach. 
4. Enable team-level security management.  Confining and fine-graining the proposed metrics can 
be used to capture team-specific behaviours and identify micro-culture development within 
organisational sub-groups.  This allows for targeted interventions, to improve specific 
mechanisms or deliver targeted communication, in areas where employee behaviour is not in-
line with organisational risk appetite. 
                                                          
 
28 Military term for missiles that require no further guidance after launch 
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5. Improves adaptability over time.  The existence of readily available information makes security 
management adaptable to external factors that influence security behaviour.   Internal security 
breaches communicated to employees, or security breaches affecting other organisations exposed 
in global media, can change employee risk perceptions and behaviours in an unpredictable way.  
Having the aforementioned shadow security metrics in place, allows assessing the impact of 
such events and focusing subsequent mitigation attempts to areas where allocated resources can 
have maximal impact. 
The above advantages suggest that shadow security-driven metrics are a powerful tool, which can 
improve security management attempts to better assess both current security approach performance and 
employee behaviour, in relation to the organisation’s desired security state.   
7.6 Chapter conclusion 
Shadow security creates a unique opportunity to consolidate security management goals with actual 
employee behaviours.  Instead of attempting to enforce compliance, security managers can leverage the 
existence of shadow security in an organisation, using it as a resource to call upon in order to adapt to 
turbulent times.  Measuring, learning and managing it provides organisations with the ability to improve 
their control-oriented security approaches, using current employee security behaviours as an input to their 
security strategy.  On the surface, control-oriented security may provide a sense of stability that negates 
the need to place faith in members of the organisation to do the right thing of their own volition.  But 
where it appears to be failing is to change and adapt to what individuals experience as time goes on (as 
already demonstrated in public transport systems, for instance Molotch, 2013).  To implement an 
adaptable and flexible security management strategy, security managers must be able to recognise when 
and where shadow security is created, its causes, and how to adapt security provisions to better align 
those with employee productivity needs.  Learning from, and not ignoring, employees can enhance 
security, aligning it with organisational goals and increasing its effectiveness.  If users are not heard, they 
can become disenfranchised and, should they have a legitimate concern about security, they will not 
remain passive in the face of ill-fitting solutions.  Instead, they will engineer their own shadow security 
practices, not to evade provisioned security, but as an attempt to balance security and productivity due to 
the perceived lack of organisational support.  The emerging user reaction to an organisation’s security 
implementation needs to be heard, otherwise it weakens the organisation’s security posture.  Once 
identified, shadow security existence should not be treated as a problem, but as an opportunity to identify 
shortfalls in current security implementations that can be leveraged to provide more effective security 
solutions for organisations.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, security managers can learn from shadow 
security in a number of ways: they can identify areas of security that require improvements, measure the 
effectiveness of security mechanisms after deployment, engage with users in the design of security 
solutions, and leverage the position of team managers as both mediators for security and conduits for 
feedback as to the appropriateness of security solutions in supporting productive tasks. 
Security management should also understand that shifting more responsibility for security towards 
employees is ineffective.  No matter how good employee intentions are, modern security challenges are 
getting more and more complicated, thus maintaining sufficient and accurate understanding of the variety 
of threats an employee may face is an unrealistic expectation.  Asking employees to take action to 
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mitigate a large number of risks significantly increases the emerging security-related cognitive load on 
them.  Combined with security management’s failure to deliver security hygiene, the emerging 
incompatibility of security with employee primary tasks leads to significant friction between security and 
productivity.  To effectively encourage employee participation in risk mitigation, security management 
should aim to listen to employees, understand the challenges they face and adapt security management to 
those, choosing solutions that are also compatible with role-related risks.  This allows emerging policies 
and mechanisms to be context-specific, eliminating the problems with blanket security rules discussed in 
section 7.3, improving alignment between security and primary tasks.  Attempts for improved alignment 
through learning may require increased resources at their early stages, but they should be seen as an 
investment: the more resources security management invests on aligning security implementations with 
employee priorities, the less the impact of the former on employees’ primary task, thus the less the 
employee resources that will be expended on security.  In addition, the emerging practices should deliver 
improved risk mitigation. 
Effective security also needs to aim for a productive balance between trust and assurance.  The findings 
of this work suggest that employees possess both the ability and motivation to behave securely, honouring 
the trust shown towards them by the organisation (organisation-employee trust), also aided by contextual 
motives to do so.  But when security creates conflict with other parts of their work and their relationships 
with their colleagues, non-compliance becomes their only option to preserve the existing trust 
relationships in the social environment of the organisation (inter-employee trust).  To reduce this conflict, 
security management needs to take advantage of trust and aid in its development, refraining from over-
assurance once trust is developed.  Employees that have been screened, trained and understand the risks 
of insecure behaviour, should not need to choose between organisation-employee trust and inter-
employee trust when interacting with security mechanisms: both trust relationships contribute to the 
organisation achieving its productivity targets while remaining secure.  Security design that 
accommodates for this can lead to the creation of a high-trust/low-assurance environment which can 
introduce significant economic benefits for organisations: compliance coming from employees motivated 
to behave securely, not forced to do so, reduces the need for expensive assurance mechanisms.  As a 
result, as long as everyone sticks to the rules, individuals or organisations can benefit from the cost 
savings of a trusted environment.  But when the rewards from not playing by the rules are significantly 
higher than the consequences of not doing so, assurance mechanisms need to exist to change the risk-
reward structure, dis-incentivising untrustworthy behaviour.   
The shadow-security driven metrics presented in this chapter make it possible to design and deploy more 
effective and efficient information security management.  All the suggested measurements can be 
generated without imposing significant resource overheads: much of the information needed to identify 
the existence of shadow security behaviours is already available in various forms around various 
organisational systems (or relatively easy to generate and collect).  A combination of the above metrics 
(together with additional ones organisations can implement based on their own security challenges) can 
provide a suite of indicators for not just the performance of technical systems, but also the performance of 
processes that support employee behaviours.  Security managers should use the metrics and security 
management processes presented in this chapter to build context-specific security mechanisms that 
effectively address security risks, according to their organisation’s risk appetite.  The aforementioned 
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metrics and processes should be used as the basis for creating an organisation-wide, continuous learning 
and improvement process for security management, allowing effective and efficient deployment of new 
security mechanisms and improvement of existing ones.  Despite that, they should not be seen as an off-
the-shelf solution to manage employee security behaviour, but as useful starting points, based on the 
improved understanding of security behaviours that emerged from the case studies presented in this 
thesis.  Each organisation should consider which of the metrics and processes are compatible with their 
security priorities, and then tailor their security management approach to match those.  The emerging 
improvements in security-productivity alignment can reduce the overhead of security on employee 
primary tasks, increase the levels of employee security compliance, and lead to more effective and 
efficient security implementations. 
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 Case study in industry and lessons learned 
As discussed in chapter 5, security non-compliance and shadow security behaviours were widely 
prevalent in Company B.  After presenting the research findings to the organisation, the researcher was 
asked to join them on a full-time placement for 6 months.  The purpose of the placement was to identify, 
propose and coordinate the delivery of improvements in Company B’s security implementation, driven by 
the knowledge that emerged from examining the non-compliant behaviours and shadow security 
development in the organisation.  This chapter discusses how the improved understanding of employee 
security behaviours that emerged from chapters 4, 5 and 6, together with the lessons learned and the 
emerging guidelines to improve security management presented in chapter 7, were used during the 
researcher’s placement in Company B to: (1) drive improvements in organisational security 
communication, (2) identify sources of data and devise metrics to assess the effect of deployed 
interventions on employee behaviours, and (3) identify potential improvements the organisation should 
incorporate in its long-term security strategy.  In the second half of this chapter the focus is shifted away 
from the practical application of shadow security, presenting the lessons emerging from the application of 
the work presented in this thesis in a corporate environment.  Those lessons are then used to provide 
advice and principles that can be useful to both researchers and practitioners aiming to apply user-centred 
security research findings in organisational environments. 
8.1 Placement purpose  
Company B is a global telecommunications organisation with strong UK presence.  The research findings 
from chapters 5 and 6 were presented by the research team to the organisation’s Head of Security and 
Chief Operations Officer.  They both understood the security challenges their employees faced, how those 
challenges lead to insecure behaviours and shadow security development, and also recognised the need to 
address those.  They also recognised shadow security as a phenomenon from which their security 
management could learn and benefit.  As a result, they asked the researcher to join Company B for 6 
months, to help them design and deliver security improvements.  The researcher would also remain in 
close touch with the UCL Information Security Research Group, in order to take advantage of the 
knowledge and potential support from the rest of the group while helping the organisation deliver the 
required improvements. 
The researcher was positioned as an information security consultant in the Company B’s information risk 
and security management team.  The role was based in their head office, but the researcher had to interact 
and collaborate with various teams across the country.  The researcher was responsible to review areas 
where non-compliance and shadow security behaviours were identified, devise a plan for the organisation 
to fix those, and deliver as much of those improvements as possible during the placement. 
After consultation with the organisation’s security leaders, it was agreed that the researcher would aim to: 
(1) improve understanding of shadow security development within Company B, (2) identify additional 
organisation-specific drivers of it, (3) identify sources of information that could be used to measure it, (4) 
suggest improvements of existing security mechanisms and processes, (5) align those improvements with 
organisational security audit requirements, (6) deliver a sample of those improvements while being 
employed by the organisation, and, based on the above, (7) provide guidance for delivery and 
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effectiveness assessment of future ones.  The length of the placement prevented delivering measurable 
improvements for all the elements of Company B’s security where problems were identified (described 
later in this section).  As a result, the researcher together with Company B’s security management decided 
to focus on improving employee awareness and the organisation’s security culture.  For the remaining 
areas requiring improvements, the researcher would create a report after the end of the placement, 
documenting suggested improvements, together with metrics to assess the effectiveness of those. 
8.1.1 Understanding shadow security drivers in the organisation 
As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, Company B employees possessed sufficient awareness of the sensitivity 
of organisational information, together with ability and motivation to behave securely in order to 
minimise organisational security risks.  Thus, where security mechanisms supported productive activity, 
they responded positively by following recommended practices.  In contrast, when friction-inducing 
security created problems in primary task completion, employee risk awareness and understanding of the 
need for security led to shadow security development.  Shadow security and insecure behaviours also 
emerged from employees’ inaccurate understanding of potential security risks and their lack of 
knowledge on the availability of appropriate organisational mechanisms or processes to mitigate security 
risks.  This section discusses each of the above security behaviour drivers based on example behaviours in 
Company B, as identified in the grounded theory analysis. 
8.1.1.1 Good architectural means leading to secure behaviours 
As discussed in Chapter 5, architectural means that supported employee activities towards primary task 
completion acted as drivers for secure behaviour.  Examples of these in Company B were identified and 
presented to security managers as examples of how “good security” can encourage secure behaviour and 
positive culture development within the organisation.  For example: 
1. Lockable drawers, hot-desking and clear desk checks acted as drivers for clear desk compliance.  
Employees who had no lockable drawers or had permanently assigned desks, reported lower 
levels of compliance. 
2. The presence of a reliable organisational VPN connection, allowing uninterrupted access to all 
organisational systems, minimised employee need to store information locally on laptops in case 
organisational access was not possible when working from home. 
3. Responsive helpdesk and easy access control setup reduced the need to share credentials where 
system access is required. 
8.1.1.2 Compliance expensive or impossible  
When architectural elements of the security implementation created high compliance overheads or made 
compliance impossible, employees resorted to insecure behaviours or shadow security practices.   
1. Lack of availability or problems in connectivity to the organisational network (e.g. due to lack of 
internet connection on a train or at a client site) led to employees requiring access to specific 
files storing those locally on their machines. 
2. The allocated network storage space each individual had was severely limited.  As a result, 
employees relied on local laptop storage for their past and currently-working documents. The 
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lack of official backup mechanisms for locally stored information, also led to teams and 
individuals devising their own ad-hoc backup strategies using self-procured drives.  Those were 
either encrypted and unencrypted and, in some cases, even kept at employees’ homes when they 
worked from there. 
3. Slowdown caused by lack of easy to use organisational file-sharing systems led to employees 
sharing files through multiple other organisational or third-party channels.  Decisions on file-
sharing practices were ad-hoc, both at individual and team level, with employees mostly sharing 
information through emails instead of SharePoint or shared drives.  In addition, where 
collaborative sharing was required, the use of third-party cloud storage services was also 
identified (e.g. Dropbox).  
4. Problems with company-provided encrypted USB drives led to employees using unencrypted 
ones.  Storage capacity of encrypted drives was insufficient for employee needs, due to the large 
size of diagrams and other information employees often had to store.  In addition, employees 
also reported problems in the procurement of those (not everyone had one), creating a need to 
find alternative solutions. 
5. The lack of lockable space for storing paper documents, combined with the need to comply with 
clear desk policy, lead to employees often having to carry sensitive documents at home in their 
laptop bags. 
6. Inconsistent email filtering and website blocking often prevented access to websites and blogs 
useful for work-related information.  This led to employees sometimes having to use personal 
accounts, or access the required information using their own personal machines, transferring it to 
their corporate ones later, thus bypassing organisational information filtering systems.   
7. Corporate password management software did not work for all systems employees had to use.  
The problem created by employees having to manage multiple passwords for various systems, 
was accentuated by different password change rules across different systems (e.g. different 
expiration periods and different password length and structure requirements).  In addition, an 
organisational password storage software, where employees could store their passwords securely 
instead of writing those down, was not installed by default on employee laptops and many were 
unaware of its existence.  As a result, writing down passwords was a common practice around 
the organisation, both in paper form (e.g. employee notebooks) and within digital documents. 
8. Employees reported that access revoking for leavers appeared to take long or never happened.  
Despite the security policy requiring quick account de-activation, accounts of people that had 
left the organisation appeared to remain active for some time after their departure.   This led to a 
perceived inability of account managers to effectively manage access to information, further 
encouraging employees to devise their own solutions to resolve access problems.   
9. Security and compliance across the company appeared to be measured using CBT completion 
rates.  But employees reported that they have to go through too many CBTs on various 
organisational topics, with communicated information often perceived as common sense.  
Having to take the majority of those CBTs at the same time increased the cognitive load placed 
upon them, with employees treating those as compulsory “tickboxing” exercises, not as 
something they could benefit from.  In the end, the information communicated through CBTs 
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was often ignored, with employee security behaviour being based on practices they themselves 
considered fit-for-purpose. 
In all the above cases, the security mechanisms or processes in place created either disruption in primary 
task completion ability, significant time burden, or increased the cognitive load required for secure 
behaviour.  When employees considered the disruption or the effort required as unmanageable, they 
resorted to self-devised security practices.   
8.1.1.3 Lack of knowledge and awareness 
The second major category of shadow security drivers related to the inaccurate security risk awareness 
amongst employees and the inadequate understanding of organisational risk mitigation mechanisms and 
processes.  Employees were aware of the importance of the information they deal with, potential security 
breaches and their impact to the organisation, thus recognising the benefit of security.  But the lack of 
accurate risk understanding and knowledge on behaviours required to keep the organisation secure (or 
related available mechanisms) also lead to insecure behaviours and shadow security development.  A few 
examples: 
1. The presence of encryption on employee computers left them feeling assured that storing 
information locally on their laptops is a secure practice.  No one appeared to acknowledge that 
hard drive encryption is vulnerable to a wide range of attacks if someone gets physical access to 
their laptop (e.g. cold boot attacks – Halderman et al., 2009).   
2. Storing files locally was also a result of lack of awareness among some employees of the 
existence of personal network drives.   
3. Perception of some organisational information as non-sensitive led to information being taken 
home on paper or other devices, or left around the office, later picked up by clear desk 
inspections (which “don’t happen often” in some locations, as employees said).  When asked to 
discuss potential risks from this behaviour, some employees downplayed the sensitivity of the 
information they deal with, also referring to data without classification markings as generically 
non-sensitive 
Examining the drivers behind the awareness problems, employees referred to central security 
communication and training mechanisms as irrelevant, generic, inconsistent and overloaded, also 
reporting to not always reading it.  Security communication is mostly done at team meetings by line 
managers and their colleagues, but both managers and employees reported that they do not know the 
complete in’s and out’s of policies.  As a result, they often have to apply their own role-specific content 
filtering, with managers communicating what they consider as the most critical knowledge for their 
teams.  In addition, the training content was referred to as common sense.  Marking documents using 
organisational classification guidelines for example, appeared to confuse employees, with the majority 
reporting not using those.  The risks from the development of such behaviours and their impact on 
organisational culture are extensively discussed in section 5.3.2: security management loses control and 
understanding of employee security behaviours, employee resources available to security are significantly 
reduced, and alienation between security and the organisation’s productive divisions also emerges. 
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8.1.2 Identifying potential improvements  
The next part of the process involved devising a plan for delivery of security improvements, driven by the 
security-productivity alignment guidelines presented in sections 7.2 and 7.3.  Using those, a number of 
suggestions emerged for the organisation:  
1. Simplify communication.  The organisation had to reduce the need for employees to filter though 
policy content.  Managers should be properly informed about security risks, assess those and 
decide which communication clauses apply to their teams.  They should then communicate 
appropriate risk mitigation practices at team meetings. 
2. Make CBTs role-specific and spread those throughout the year.  CBTs needed to better reflect 
context-specific challenges employees in different organisational divisions face.  For example 
not all employees need to use all data classification levels, but CBT content on data 
classification is generic for everyone.  In addition CBTs on different topics should be evenly 
spread throughout a calendar year, to ensure employees do not have to do all their CBTs at the 
same time, thus reducing the potential for those to become a tickboxing exercise. 
3. Provide secure physical document storage.  Employees need to have access to secure physical 
storage for any paper-based information they need to use.  This will reduce both the number of 
documents left around by non-hot-desking employees and the need for those who hot desk to 
take sensitive information with them when they have nowhere to store it. 
4. Provide password manager support.  Centrally procured official password managers should be 
fully compatible with all corporate systems in order to reduce the need for employees to write 
their passwords down, physically or electronically. 
5. Deploy centralised corporate file sharing with automatic backups.  Easy to setup and use 
information sharing mechanisms need to be put in place to avoid employee use of other 
information storage and sharing mechanisms like emails, or the use external cloud storage 
providers.  After deploying such mechanisms, security management also needs to communicate 
the presence of the new functionality back to employees, its improved usability, and the 
importance of using it to participate in organisational protection. 
6. Mandatory USB encryption.  Removable USB storage should automatically be encrypted by 
appropriate software on company computers.  If this is not possible, the organisation should 
provide encrypted USB drives of sufficient capacity to all its employees, also communicating the 
need to use company-approved approaches to store, backup and share company information. 
7. Improve leaver process.  Line Managers should ensure leaving procedures are completed in a 
timely manner, in collaboration with HR.  In addition, an automatic alert system should be in 
place to detect instances of people leaving the organisation that have not had their access 
removed automatically. 
8. Encourage reporting.  Employee willingness to report security concerns and seek support when 
in doubt should be encouraged by the organisation through security communication.  Reporting 
and support should be done through line managers, who should then communicate that 
information to security management directly, or through easy to use reporting mechanisms.  In 
both cases sufficient follow-up mechanisms need to be in place, for employees to be informed on 
security management actions driven by their reports. 
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The above improvements are presented in more detail in Appendix L, together with relevant metrics to 
assess the effectiveness of their implementation.  Unfortunately delivering all those in the 4 months the 
researcher had left in the organisation was not practically feasible.  As a result, the head of security asked 
the researcher to focus on improving organisational security communication practices, and then use the 
lessons learned to provide guidance on the delivery of the required improvements in other areas of the 
security implementation.  The remainder of this chapter presents the steps taken to achieve so, the 
problems encountered, and the lessons learned for both industry and research. 
8.2 Delivering security communication improvements   
In order to deliver the required communication improvements, the researcher started by (1) examining 
existing security communication and identifying its drawbacks, and then (2) devise a set of requirements 
for improved communication by liaising with various stakeholders around the organisation.  Based on 
those, the (3) desired communication content was identified and agreed with the information security 
team, together with (4) indicators that should be used to measure improvements.  After completing the 
above, the researcher was asked to liaise with the information security team member responsible for 
security awareness, and deliver required improvement in collaboration with corporate communications.  
This section describes the researcher’s actions in order to deliver those improvements, together with 
problems in the organisational environment that prevented successful deployment of those during the 
researcher’s placement within Company B. 
8.2.1 Identify problems with existing communication  
The first step towards delivering effective communication was to identify problems with the existing 
organisational security communications approach.   Examining the communications plan that has been 
delivered during the previous year (Appendix K), three areas requiring improvements were identified: 
1. Communication redundancy due to various audit requirements:  Company B had to comply 
with a number of different security standards (e.g. ISO27001, PCI-DSS and various sector-
specific others).  In many cases, responsibility for passing related audits relied on different 
stakeholders (e.g. different members of Information security team, IT security, Physical 
security, or corporate communications).  In order to fulfil the requirements for those audits, the 
person or team responsible for each one sent out security communication material, with minimal 
central coordination of the content and the timing of those communications.  This confirmed 
employee reports (presented in chapter 5) that security communication creates unmanageable 
information overload for them, consequently failing to improve their understanding of 
organisational risks and appropriate behaviours to mitigate those.  
2. Generic, not role-specific communication:  All employees in Company B received the same 
security communication through the same media (emails).  This observation also relates back to 
the findings of chapter 5 where employees referred to security communication as generic and 
unrelated to their role-specific security challenges. 
3. No effectiveness assessment:  The involvement of security management in delivering the content 
included in the communications plan ended when the content went out.  No mechanisms existed 
to assess the impact of the communicated risks, principles and desired behaviours on employee 
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actions.  The only way security management attempted to assess employee security compliance 
was by recording the rate of completion of CBT-based training modules, which, as discussed 
earlier in this thesis, had minimal influence on employee behaviour. 
In general, communication was not centrally planned, with different stakeholders sending out different 
information to employees.  In addition, the content sent to employees was generic, and the organisation 
had no mechanisms to identify the influence of communications on employee security behaviours. 
8.2.2 Requirements for improving communication  
Based on the identified problems (generic and redundant communication without adequate effectiveness 
assessment), two main areas for improvements were identified in order to deliver more effective and 
efficient security communication: (1) unify awareness requirements of the various security-related audits 
and emerging communication, in order to reduce employee overload, and (2) target communication to 
address current employee behaviours, identify where differentiation of communication for different 
employee roles was required, and use post-deployment measurements to assess the effect of it.  This 
section presents the steps taken in the organisation to deliver the above improvements. 
8.2.2.1 Unify different awareness requirements 
In order to reduce the amount of security communication sent to employees, it was important to unify the 
security awareness requirements for the various information security-related standards the organisation 
was audited for, and create a communications plan that would satisfy them all.  The researcher examined 
the standards in question (e.g. ISO 27001, SOX, PCI-DSS), discussed compliance requirements with the 
owners of various security audits, also taking into account awareness requirements emerging from the 
organisation’s plan to deliver the CESG 10 steps to Cyber Security (CESG, 2015) at the same time the 
researcher was there.  This led to the emergence of a communications plan that addressed the goals and 
priorities of all the stakeholders involved in security communication, satisfied awareness requirements 
from all the relevant standards, and reduced redundancy in security communication.   
To ensure centrally-coordinated delivery of the new communications plan and consistency with other 
corporate communication, the member of the security team responsible for communication would liaise 
with the organisation’s central communications team.  The communications team would then be 
responsible to deliver the finalised content to employees.  It was then agreed that no security-related 
information would be sent to the communications office for distribution to employees, unless it came 
from the aforementioned security team member.  
8.2.2.2 Identified target behaviours, desired metrics and hygiene requirements 
Based on the research findings, six areas where organisational communication had to be improved or 
deployed emerged.  For each area, sources of measurable information were identified, that would allow 
the organisation to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of the delivered changes.  In addition, security 
hygiene requirements were identified and recorded as prerequisites for employees to follow the 
communicated practices (Table 9).  To ensure compatibility of the above principles with Company B’s 
corporate security strategy, the researcher presented those to the Security Council.  They were positively 
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received and commended as a significant improvement over existing practices (the final communication 
plan can be found in Appendix K).   
Target 
behaviours  
Current state Ideal state Hygiene requirements Metrics 
Information 
exists - Yes/No?  
Privacy 
markings 
Employees aware 
what they are – not 
know how to use 
those 
Leads to over-
classification 
Information held or 
processed has value 
assessed by author or 
business owner - 
corresponding 
privacy marking 
assigned 
Easy availability of 
marking instructions 
Clear explanation of how 
to assess sensitivity of 
corporate documents 
Not all people use all levels 
– target communication 
content based on this  
Markings on 
documents left around 
- site security to 
provide this 
information 
Number of 
correctly/incorrectly 
marked documents 
Yes, through 
clear desk 
inspections logs – 
need to update 
logs kept to 
include 
classification 
Information 
handling 
and 
protection 
 
Employees 
downplay 
information 
importance  
Employees 
understand 
importance of 
information they 
handle 
Requires effective 
communication and 
training 
Volume of traffic to 
cloud providers 
Volume of email 
traffic 
Usage of internal file 
storage and sharing 
systems 
DLP data: number of 
sensitive information 
sharing attempts 
Yes, but need to 
create/deploy 
mechanisms to 
capture those 
Data sharing ad-hoc 
– using external 
cloud services, 
emails  
Centralised corporate 
file sharing, no cloud 
services used  
Shared drives managed at 
group level – allow easy 
sharing of information  
No centralised 
backup / data 
transfer strategy  
Centralised backup – 
no ad-hoc backups 
Network drives are 
sufficiently large and 
backed up 
Unencrypted own 
USB drives used  
Encrypted USB 
drives are used 
Centrally provided USB 
sticks or mandatory 
encryption of USB devices 
Encrypted vs 
unencrypted USB use 
statistics 
Clear Desk: 
documents left 
around  
No documents left 
around 
Lockable drawers for all 
employees 
Number of documents 
left around  
Yes, through 
clear desk logs 
Password 
behaviour 
Writing down 
passwords prevalent 
practice 
Employees download 
and use password 
storage tool  
Passwords never 
need to be written 
down 
Working password 
manager – no compatibility 
problems  
Password manager and 
password storage tool 
integrated  
Password tool usage 
statistics 
Yes, adoption 
and usage 
statistics of 
password 
management 
software 
Access 
control 
Slow leaver process 
Accounts remain 
active after 
departure 
Line Managers report 
departures promptly 
Access revoking for 
leavers done 
automatically 
through HR 
 
HR leaver process linked 
with account deactivation 
 
List of unused 
accounts  
HR leavers – time to 
deactivation list 
No, but possible 
to do by 
connecting HR 
with accounts 
Virus and 
malware 
Use of personal 
USB drives  
No personal USB 
drives used  
Provide corporate USB 
sticks to everyone 
Finely-tuned virus 
scanning at organisational 
email servers 
Reduction in own 
USB use  
Infected machines 
detected on the 
network? 
Yes, but need to 
create/deploy 
mechanisms to 
capture those 
Downloading 
information from 
own email accounts 
Malicious emails 
blocked 
Reporting 
security 
incidents 
Employees do not 
see response to 
reports 
Little or no 
employee 
willingness to report 
All problems are 
reported, directly or 
through line 
managers 
Followed up, 
feedback back to 
employees  
Easy to use reporting 
mechanisms 
Reported false positives for 
email and website blocking 
addressed  
Rapid response to response 
Effect of reporting 
communicated 
Helpdesk requests and 
aggregate reports 
Manager reports and 
of employee concerns 
Number of false 
positives reported  
Percentage of 
“feedback given” 
incidents 
Yes, but need to 
create/deploy 
mechanisms to 
capture those 
Table 9: Target behaviours with metrics, hygiene requirements and related metrics 
209 
 
Despite their usefulness in capturing various different elements of employee behaviours, even full 
deployment of the above security hygiene principles, communication and metrics in an organisation 
cannot accurately capture the full picture of employee security behaviours.  For example, the volume of 
traffic to cloud storage websites may be an indicator of their use for corporate file sharing, but can also be 
a result of personal employee use of the corporate network.  Despite this, the purpose of the proposed 
metrics is to identify indicators that can be combined to demonstrate potential effectiveness of improved 
security communication on employee behaviour.  In addition, hygiene requirements are used to 
demonstrate the need to remove friction-inducing security, underlining the importance of security hygiene 
as a pre-requisite to any attempt to influence employee behaviours.  The metrics and hygiene 
requirements constitute a significant improvement over the current organisational inability to quantify and 
measure security behaviours and evaluate the effectiveness of organisational security communication.   
8.2.3 Problems in delivery  
Despite initial adoption of the communication improvements plan by organisational security 
management, attempts to deliver the improvements presented in section 8.2.2 faced a number of 
challenges, caused by insufficient and slow access to organisational resources and information, problems 
in achieving security hygiene requirements, and unexpected changes in organisational strategy.  This 
section discusses how various elements of the organisational environment created obstacles in delivering 
the updated security communication plan in the available timeframe, and how they negatively affected the 
researcher’s ability to deploy changes in a controlled environment and assess their impact.   
8.2.3.1 Resourcing problems and unavailability of information  
Despite having board-level approval, access to key people and information required to deliver 
improvements and deploy corresponding metrics proved to be difficult for the researcher, even while 
situated inside the organisation.  Engagement with key people in the organisation was necessary to 
provide information required for metrics to assess the effectiveness of security communication.  People 
responsible for network monitoring for example, were asked to provide data on traffic towards third-party 
cloud storage servers.  Helpdesk managers were asked to share the number of calls they received per 
month.  Physical security was asked to keep logs of the number of documents found around every day, 
also noting their classification.  In addition, account security was asked to provide information on the 
time it takes to revoke leaver accounts, and the number of unused accounts that are still active in the 
organisation.  Unfortunately many of the employees acting as contact points in those divisions often 
reported to be busy with their day-to-day tasks.  Without any formal responsibility to provide the required 
information or instructions to cooperate by their managers, engagement with this project became a low 
priority task for them.  For example, information on network and account usage was held by different 
organisational divisions, outside of central security management, making access to it challenging to 
achieve.  Even physically visiting information owners in various locations around the country did not 
provide access to the required information.  In most cases there was a visible reluctance of individuals to 
share that information.  This could be attributed to attempts to avoid the effort required to collect and 
provide the information, but also avoidance of the potential for the information provided to reveal 
problems in the security implementation, for which some of the information holders could be held 
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accountable.  In the end, the only division that provided the requested data was the IT support helpdesk 
on the number of calls received and reporting on information security issues. 
8.2.3.2 Lack of security hygiene  
A number of security hygiene elements identified as prerequisites for secure employee behaviour were 
not present in the organisation.  For example, asking employees not to store information on personal 
drives made no sense, due to the absence of a centrally backed-up solution that also satisfied employee 
primary task requirements.  Increasing employee personal network storage space (a hygiene requirement 
for this behaviour), could not be delivered due to the lack of available storage on company servers; any 
attempts to increase server capacity had to go through a formal approval process, subject to available 
funds in the coming financial year.  This meant that delivering communication asking employees not to 
use personal drives to backup information would be ineffective, due to the lack of a viable alternative 
solution.  In general, attempts to remove friction-inducing security elements always stumbled on the lack 
of budget or available planning.  The subsequent failure to deliver many of the hygiene requirements of 
section 8.2.2 by the organisation, reduced the potential effectiveness of the improved security 
communications plan.   
8.2.3.3 Personnel changes disrupting delivery 
Delivering security communication was made harder when the person responsible for creating the content 
and coordinating communication delivery was sent on an international placement.  This happened two 
months into the researcher’s 6-month placement, after identifying and agreeing on target improvements, 
courses of action and delivery dates.  Having to recruit another person for the role took an additional two 
months, which meant the communication plan could not be delivered in its entirety in the remaining 2-
month period.  Despite that, an opportunity to deliver some tangible improvements appeared when the 
organisation decided to deploy an encrypted USB and DLP system.  It was agreed for the researcher to 
focus on the communication required to be delivered with it, also measuring potential changes in 
employee behaviour after communication delivery (through the metrics on encrypted USB and DLP use 
presented in Table 7).   
8.2.3.4 Changes and delays in agreed deployment of systems 
The initial plan for encrypted USB and DLP deployment, required piloting and initial measurements to be 
completed before the end of the researcher’s placement, but once again, significant delays prevented this.  
Despite full deployment of the system being set to start after the end of the placement, it initially appeared 
to be possible to get access to software generated logs on user behaviour, through an early pilot scheduled 
to start earlier.  Unfortunately, the implementation was also pushed back a number of times, due to 
contractual problems between the software provider and the company’s 3rd party internal IT provider.  In 
addition, after helping the organisation design the pilot, the researcher was informed that the organisation 
had inadequate storage space to store required logs generated by the encrypted USB and DLP systems, 
which made assessing the impact of any communication related to user information storage and sharing 
habits impossible.  The above problems created significant challenges in delivering an end-to-end project 
within the short time the researcher was present in the organisation, with controlled end-to-end 
interventions and measurement becoming impossible. 
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8.2.3.5 Outsourcing complicating data access  
A large part of IT was externally managed (outsourced) with service providers having no obligation to 
provide the information required for this project.  In addition, half-way through the placement, a large 
part of Company B’s operations was outsourced, with most employees only finding out on the day it was 
officially announced.  The short timescale of the researcher’s placement made it impossible for 
information security to re-negotiate the outsourcing contract terms to include the sharing of information 
required for measuring effectiveness of the security improvements (e.g. access to virus logs on company 
computers managed by a service provider). 
8.2.3.6 Post-placement collaboration 
After the end of the placement, the researcher produced a list of improvements required for the 
organisation to improve its security posture and use shadow security to improve security-productivity 
alignment.  The suggested improvements were discussed with the head of security who acknowledged 
those as useful for the organisation.  They then assigned a member of the information security team as the 
main contact between the university and Company B, to ensure collaboration would continue and deliver 
those improvements.  Despite continuous communication between the researcher and Company B, 
improvements could not be implemented due to the same problems identified while the researcher was on 
site (lack of budget for security hygiene and lack of access to measureable information).  In addition, the 
person responsible for delivery of the changes was not very responsive to queries from the researcher, as 
delivering the improvements was not their primary job. 
8.2.4 Placement review  
Despite the failures in delivering desired improvements, attempting to apply the findings of this thesis 
internally within an organisation provided a number of valuable outcomes: 
1. Shadow security metrics were directly related to information readily available, or easily 
obtainable in the organisation examined.  This suggests that security managers interested in 
applying the findings have significant amounts of the information required to measure it if 
effective collaboration with information owners can be achieved. 
2. The metrics-based approach outlined in chapter 7 was used to create an organisational security 
communications plan, which was presented to the organisation’s Security Council.  It was 
positively received as a novel approach to measure and manage employee security behaviours, 
which is currently a significant challenge in modern organisational security management. 
3. Based on the improved understanding of organisational systems and processes gained through 
the placement, at the end of the six-month period, a report was created that included the 
identified drivers behind shadow security evolution, security hygiene problems with suggestions 
for improvements, and metrics that could be used to assess the effectiveness of attempted 
changes (Appendix L).  The organisation agreed to use this approach in the future and 
communicate the results back to the researchers, but unfortunately they have not done so to date.  
Despite the organisation agreeing to deploy the new security communication plan and allow the 
researcher to access related information to assess its effectiveness, after the end of the 6-month placement 
security communication reverted back to their old “fire and forget” approach.  Upcoming audits require 
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security communication to be delivered within short periods of time and, without planning for metrics 
deployment, various audit owners reverted back to their old approach of just sending the information to 
employees directly.  In addition, despite the researcher providing support and advice to the organisation 
for a significant period of time after the end of the placement, the slow improvements delivery meant that 
the researcher had to stop after some time, as this research had to be completed within the timeframes of a 
PhD project.  There was also a lack of response from the new employee responsible for organisational 
content delivery after the end of the placement, which made access to information required for research 
purposes even harder.  In the end, despite some preliminary momentum built by security management and 
their support for delivering shadow security inspired improvements, the organisation never managed to 
deliver the hygiene requirements and metrics required to put those improvements to practice.   
8.3 Lessons learned for research 
This case study presented a unique opportunity to apply security research findings in a corporate 
environment.  Despite the problems in delivering and measuring the required improvements within the 
available timeframe, the experience and the lessons learned are useful for any security researcher 
attempting to deliver improvements in a commercial environment.  The emerging lessons can be grouped 
in four main areas: (1) interventions and changes in organisations can take significantly longer than 
academic experiments, (2) inclusion of desired changes in corporate governance and strategy is key to 
their successful deployment, (3) security hygiene is expensive and slow to achieve, and (4) lack of 
complete control of the organisational environment makes many interventions difficult.  This section 
discusses the lessons learned from the researcher’s placement in Company B, providing advice and 
guidance to researchers who want to apply their findings to deliver security improvements in 
organisations.  
8.3.1 Interventions take time and require good planning 
Research-driven interventions in organisational environments can take a significant amount of time and 
need to be part of corporate security strategy to be effectively deployed.  Changes need to be outlined as 
medium-to-long term projects, included in corporate security strategy, and accompanied by detailed 
planning by the organisation to enable successful delivery.  In addition, related stakeholders should be 
identified before commencing intervention attempts and provided with a clear description of the role they 
play in recommended changes, together with their emerging responsibilities.  In addition, resources 
required for intervention delivery need to be allocated as part of annual budgets, with people who need to 
engage and aid delivery having this included in their job descriptions and annual performance targets.  If 
this does not happen, delivering changes can become a secondary priority for them; in a modern 
organisation, where employees have to meet tight deadlines, interventions will inevitably run the risk of 
not being delivered.  In general, any attempt to apply research in practice and deliver changes in corporate 
security needs to be part of an organisation’s security strategy, to ensure availability of required time and 
resources. 
8.3.2 Need for corporate governance adoption 
Research in organisations cannot deliver effective changes, unless organisational leadership understands 
the importance of required interventions and is willing to provide adequate support and resources for their 
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deployment.  In a corporate environment with low profit margins, high competitiveness and tight 
deadlines, delivering security improvements often runs the risk of becoming a second-rate requirement.  
Security is considered important in principle, but in practice productivity prevails.  While this is 
acceptable for a profit-driven organisation, ignoring security can often lead to damages in ability to 
proceed with productive activities: security incidents are on the rise year on year and their impact can 
bring an organisation’s productive activities to a halt (CEBR, 2015).  As a result, security improvement 
attempts should be a concern for everyone in corporate governance: security is a collective achievement 
and effective improvements require engagement of a number of different stakeholders across 
organisational divisions to work.  Before commencing attempts for research-driven improvements, a 
researcher needs to ensure corporate governance is content with required changes, understands the 
benefits for the organisation, and is willing to allocate the resources required for successful delivery. 
8.3.3 Align delivery targets with regulatory requirements 
It is important for researchers to align the end-result of research-driven improvements with the various 
regulations and industry standards that organisations have to comply with.  Frequent audits against a wide 
range of information security standards and regulation (see section 8.2.2.1) create pressure for the 
stakeholders responsible for those to perform required risk mitigation actions (e.g. communicate at least 
some security principles to employees to “tick the box” and meet the audit requirements for actions taken 
to improve user awareness).  This requires careful planning of research-driven interventions, considering 
the requirements of organisational audits, thus ensuring emerging actions and related metrics provide 
sufficient evidence for the organisation to satisfy audit requirements.  This can introduce long term 
benefits for audit owners: a centrally-coordinated security improvements program, combined with good 
security metrics can provide readily-available information on the effectiveness of various security 
controls, reducing the need for manual evidence collection to pass their annual or bi-annual audits. 
8.3.4 Lack of total control and the need for adaptability 
An organisational environment undergoes changes constantly (e.g. during the researcher’s engagement in 
Company B, outsourcing of an important organisational division took place, with people even high above 
in the organisation not knowing about it until the day it was publically announced).  Constant changes 
prevent researchers from conducting controlled experiments (to statistically test hypotheses), as control 
over other external factors that can affect employee security behaviours is often impossible (for example a 
high-profile breach at a competitor that received media attention may act as a motivator for secure 
behaviour for employees).  In order to reduce the effects of this unpredictability, researchers need to: 
1. Be adaptable and willing to change. Sometimes experiments may need to be postponed until 
after significant organisational changes have been completed.  If projects are planned over 
periods longer than the one described in this chapter (i.e. 6 months), it may be possible to plan 
proposed interventions and measurements to adapt to future changes in the organisational 
environment. 
2. Aim for learning when control is impossible.  Where controlled experiments are not possible 
security research should aim to learn from access to organisations, using it as opportunity to 
apply and refine emerging theories and devise hypotheses to be tested in the future.  
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3. Divide work to be done to smaller independent sub-tasks.  Breaking down research in smaller 
sub-tasks that can be independently investigated reduces the complexity of having to manage a 
potentially volatile organisation-wide project.  Instead, it allows focusing on a sample of 
improvements that can be delivered in shorter timeframes.  Presenting security hygiene 
requirements to an organisation for example, should be done by understanding that some of 
those may never be fully achieved due to budget constraints. As a result, it would be unrealistic 
for a research project to assume all proposed hygiene requirements will be adopted by an 
organisation.  Instead the project should focus on the simpler ones and attempt to deliver those to 
demonstrate the benefits of using a science-based approach in information security management. 
In general, researchers need to understand that modern organisations are constantly evolving in order to 
remain competitive and maintain their ability to innovate.  As a result, researchers should be willing to 
adapt to changing conditions and be flexible and willing to learn through exploration if controlled 
experiments cannot be conducted. 
8.4 Lessons learned for industry 
The lessons learned from this case study also provide valuable insights for organisations who seek to 
improve the effectiveness of their information security approaches.  Attempts to deliver such 
improvements require a number of different steps: (1) understanding the importance of security hygiene 
in delivering security behaviour changes, (2) formalisation of individual employee contributions in 
security, (3) promotion of a learning-oriented security management approach, (4) understanding of the 
benefits of measurement in effective security management, (5) improvement of existing information 
security standards and regulation, (6) reframing security improvements as investments that improve 
organisational long-term viability, and also (7) encouragement of further collaboration between 
government, academia and industry to provide more scientifically driven security management.  This 
section discusses each of the above steps, outlining what organisations need to do to effectively achieve 
those. 
8.4.1 Hygiene is an (expensive) necessity  
As discussed extensively in chapters 7 and 8, the presence of security hygiene is a vital requirement for 
any attempt to deliver security behaviour improvements.  Unfortunately hygiene sometimes comes at a 
high cost, requiring significant changes in an organisation’s security mechanisms and processes to make 
compliance easy for employees (e.g. providing additional network storage for employees to store 
information).  In addition, again for cost-saving reasons, third-party security solutions are often deployed 
that lack adequate customisation to fit organisation-specific needs (for example the password manager 
that failed to work with a number of organisational systems).  In those cases security hygiene needs to be 
looking for the “least-bad” solution: security management should test pilot deployments of as many 
alternatives as possible, and deploy the solution that creates minimal disruption to employee productive 
activities.   
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8.4.2 Formalise everyone’s security contribution 
Security responsibilities need to be included in employees’ job descriptions.  Blanket security policies, 
threatening sanctions for non-compliance have minimal impact on employee behaviours, especially when 
non-compliance is widespread and has become part of corporate security culture (or local micro-cultures 
within organisational subdivisions).  The findings of this thesis have shown that employees understand 
the need for security and are willing to take actions to protect an organisation, as long as they understand 
related risks and what actions they are expected to take.  Those actions should be context-specific, based 
on employee roles and tasks, and also better communicated, through their line managers that are best 
placed to communicate context-specific security advice. 
8.4.3 Promote a learning-driven security culture 
Organisations should aim to listen to their employees and incorporate their feedback in managing 
security.  As discussed in section 7.3.3, line managers have considerable influence on employee 
behaviours, thus part of their responsibilities should be to encourage employees to communicate problems 
they encounter in security implementations.  That information should then be communicated back to 
security managers, in order improve their understanding of the impact of the security implementation on 
employee primary tasks, and re-design security to reduce security-productivity friction.  Employee 
reporting should be complemented with continuous feedback back to employees, presenting the impact of 
their reports on organisational security management.  This can lead to the development of a more 
collaborative security culture, improving alignment of security with organisational goals, thus also 
improving its effectiveness. 
8.4.4 Metrics are vital for security management 
Deploying security metrics can improve the effectiveness of information security management compared 
to current “fire and forget” approaches.  Despite the potential benefits of metrics deployment, their use in 
Company B was limited.  The existing audit-driven security culture encouraged deploying the minimum 
security controls required to satisfy audit requirements, with minimal assessment of their effectiveness.   
This turned the company’s security management process to a tickboxing exercise, without a systematic 
way to assess its effectiveness, other than the lack of severe security incidents.  This can be changed by 
capturing snapshots of various security-related information sources (see sections 7.5.2, 8.2.2), through 
which an organisation can measurably assess the effect of attempted improvements in its security 
implementation.  In order to do so, appropriate channels need to be created for security management to 
have direct and uninterrupted access to that information, which can be then automatically included into 
deployed security metrics (e.g. access to network storage usage by employees).  Automation is a key 
requirement for such an approach, as the volume of information generated by various organisational 
systems can be unmanageable on a day-to-day basis.  Minimal disruption to both information owners (e.g. 
network administrators) and security managers should also be a key requirement for such a measurement 
approach.  The end result should be a list of readily available metrics, which can enable more informed 
decision making, both for high-level security strategy, and day-to-day security management. 
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8.4.5 Need for more effective standardisation 
Today a number of security standards exist with which organisations need to demonstrate compliance.  
The ISO27000 series of standards for example, is used to cover many aspects of information security 
management (deployment of information security management systems and related controls, security risk 
management, security metrics deployment etc.).  Industry-specific standards also exist (e.g. PCI-DSS 
required for organisations accepting card payments on their retail operations), with various governments 
often also providing additional security good practice guidelines (e.g. UK CESG 10 steps to Cyber 
Security).  Unfortunately in the organisation studied, effective deployment of those standards was 
prevented by two main factors: (1) lack of security hygiene consideration in the standards the organisation 
had (or had chosen to) apply, and (2) extensive cross-standards content redundancy.  This section 
discusses what actions organisations that create the above standards need to take to eliminate the 
aforementioned problems. 
8.4.5.1 Include security hygiene in standards and good practice 
Despite all modern information security standards including user education and awareness as a key 
element of an effective security implementation, the need for security hygiene as a prerequisite of secure 
behaviours is not part of the standards’ content and recommended controls.  This often leads to the 
deployment of systems that fail to effectively support employee primary task activities (e.g. slow or 
problematic corporate file sharing provisions), with employees inevitably deploying their own, more 
appropriate shadow security solutions.  To avoid this, it is important to assess the usability of security 
controls included in standards in addition to their effectiveness.  Security managers need to understand 
that secure behaviour principles, presented to employees through communication and training, cannot be 
followed if related mechanisms or processes they need to interact with are either friction-inducing or even 
completely absent. 
8.4.5.2 Eliminate redundancy 
Redundancy elimination from various standards organisations need to comply with is also key to a more 
effective security implementation.  If an organisation has already been through an audit of a standard that 
includes a number of clauses on user awareness, why would they need to go through the same process 
again for another standards with similar clauses?  The overheads created from this redundancy consume 
valuable resources, with the owners of various audits often having to collect similar information more 
than once during each audit period.  Information security standardisation bodies need to collaborate to 
remove this redundancy, by allowing cross-referencing between clauses in standards and providing 
exemptions from required evidence, if audits of other standards with similar clauses have already taken 
place.  This requires various standardisation bodies agreeing on acceptable timeframes between different 
audits, potentially including other parameters like depth of coverage and authority that conducted the 
audit. 
8.4.6 Security improvements are long-term investments 
Effective security does not come cheap: significant time, effort and organisational resources need to be 
invested into achieving effective risk reduction and deployment of appropriate measurements.  As recent 
industry data demonstrate, current organisational approaches to security do not manage to keep 
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organisations secure: the number of security breaches continues to increase year on year with their impact 
becoming more and more expensive (PwC, 2015).  Organisations need to accept that investments in 
improving security are the only way to fortify themselves from potentially catastrophic future attacks.  
Investing towards metric development, mechanism improvements to improve security hygiene, and 
improvements in employee security behaviours, may demand significant initial costs, but long term 
benefits can outweigh those costs: reduced exposure to breaches reduces organisational costs of breach 
recovery, also saving employee resources (both time and effort) consumed by the presence of friction-
inducing security mechanisms.  As a result, the high fixed cost of implementing a metrics-driven security 
management approach, which also has security hygiene at the centre of it, should be seen as a long-term 
investment to deliver effective security protection. 
8.4.7 Government – Academia – Industry relationships 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the research conducted was part of a larger project, Productive 
Security, funded by UK Government research grants.  The continuous engagement of an academic 
research group (ISRG) with both industry partners and government departments allowed better 
understanding of the existing relationships between the three (academia, government and industry), also 
identifying potential areas for improvement.  This section outlines the lessons learned from this 
interaction, using those to suggest improvements in future collaboration between academia, government 
and industry, in order to create more effective security solutions.   
8.4.7.1 Improving existing Academia-Government-Industry relationships 
 
Figure 19: Existing Academia, Government and Industry security challenges and relationships  
Currently academia, industry and the government interact through three two-way relationships that face a 
number of challenges (Figure 19): 
1. Government-Industry:  UK enterprises value advice coming from government sections on cyber 
security (e.g. CESG 10 steps to cyber security).  Panels also exist for government to listen to the 
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challenges industry faces and provide advice to them.  But, unfortunately current threat of 
potential sanctions driven by existing legislation makes it hard for organisations to report 
security breaches or near misses, as those sanctions often come with prohibitively high costs 
(e.g. fines - European Commission, 2015). 
2. Academia-Government: The government is still the main source of funding for academic 
research, with emerging knowledge being communicated back to the funding providers in the 
form of academic publications.  Government funding usually comes with some impact 
requirements, but facilitation to deploy the findings outside academia is currently minimal.  
Academic institutions are currently required to build their own relationships with potential 
industry partners interested in deploying their findings and then report potential impact back to 
the funding providers. 
3. Industry-Academia: Academic researchers often build relationships with collaborators in 
industry, but access to and use of corporate data in academic research is currently minimal.  In 
addition, academia rarely gets to influence corporate security strategy and decision making, for 
reasons similar to those outlined in section 8.2.3.  There is some use of academic research 
findings by industry, but this does not happen often. Research-driven security improvements 
rarely get to be included in long-term corporate security planning.  This prevents the authors 
from investigating the effectiveness of their research findings in practice, also reducing the 
potential for improving those.  In addition, instead of engaging with academia, organisations 
nowadays mostly rely on external consultants to provide security advice.  This advice is often 
based on best-practice industry principles rather than scientific ones, often failing to effectively 
manage organisational security challenges. 
As the above suggest, currently there is a disconnection between government, industry and academic 
research.  The existing two-way relationships need to be replaced by a centrally-coordinated three-way 
collaboration. The government can act as a facilitator in the industry-academia relationships, encouraging 
and leading collaborative projects that can benefit all three sides: (1) universities will secure access to 
high quality industry data, allowing (2) formulation of better security advice for organisations based on 
scientific principles, thus resulting to (3) higher impact emerging from government-funded information 
security research.   
8.4.7.2 The importance of collaboration to deliver better security 
The complex and ever changing nature of modern information security breaches makes it almost 
impossible for organisations to achieve effective security protection in isolation.  Collaboration between 
organisations and communication of lessons learned from breaches and near misses should be encouraged 
by the government, in order to improve available knowledge on latest attack methods, thus improving 
ability to defend against those.  Unfortunately organisations are currently reluctant to openly discuss 
security problems, mostly due to the severity of potential consequences, like increased customer churn 
(Ponemon Institute, 2014) or the danger of having to pay severe fines (European Commission, 2015).   
Recent data released by the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office suggests that less than 1 in 10 
organisational data breaches are reported (Frearson, 2015).  Organisations should be encouraged by the 
government to come forward about those breaches, in order to improve collective defence abilities.  
Academia can play a key role in such an approach, acting as an independent mediator, which collects, 
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anonymises and analyses breaches and near misses that are reported confidentially by organisations.  The 
lessons learned can then be communicated back to organisations as research reports, together with 
suggestions on how they can improve their existing security approaches to avoid their reoccurrence in the 
future.  Adoption of such a collective learning approach can provide a number of advantages, as it  (1) 
provides organisations with real-world data on latest attack trends so that they can prepare for future ones, 
(2) creates a collaborative defence culture, where organisational security professionals can share 
information, moving away from today’s deniability-based culture, and (3) allows academic research to 
access rich, real-world data to produce high-impact research that can solve significant problems of 
modern information security management. 
8.5 Case study conclusion 
The case study presented in this chapter aimed to investigate the potential of incorporating the research 
findings presented in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, in order to deliver improvements to an organisation’s current 
security management strategies.  Despite frequent changes in the organisational environment and lack of 
available resources for end-to-end intervention delivery, the lessons learned from working closely with an 
organisation revealed insights valuable for both academia and industry: 
1. Measurable information on employee behaviour exists in abundance across various 
organisational systems.  By implementing mechanisms to continuously assess employee 
behaviour-related risks, organisations can align their security communication and training with 
organisational risk appetite, taking appropriate corrective measures when behavioural risks 
increase above accepted levels.   
2. Problems in improvement delivery due to lack of resources or the presence of friction-inducing 
security systems, exemplify the importance of security hygiene as a prerequisite for delivering 
effective behavioural change interventions. 
3. The experience the researcher gained by attempting to deliver improvements in an organisation, 
allowed better understanding of the constraints concerning the deployment of research findings 
in organisational environments and the importance of top management support in attempts to 
deliver security implementation or behaviour improvements.  
4. The improved understanding of the challenges modern organisations face when attempting to 
deliver effective security (e.g. lack of resources, lack of knowledge exchange), allowed 
identifying areas for improvement in the relationship between academia, government and 
industry.  Improving the current state of the relationship could lead to improved future 
collaboration, enhancing organisations’ ability to defend themselves from modern security 
attacks.  Using academia as a proxy to encourage information sharing on security incidents and 
leveraging the emerging knowledge to provide effective defence, can improve ability of modern 
organisations to stay secure in today’s challenging security landscape. 
To conclude, despite the case study presented in this chapter not managing to deliver the desired 
measurable improvements in Company B’s security implementation, the lessons learned led to the 
emergence of valuable insights for both academics and practitioners aiming to collaborate to deliver 
security improvements in organisational environments.   
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 Conclusion and contributions 
9.1 Overview 
Motivation for this research stemmed from the researcher identifying the inability of current security 
management attempts to create security solutions well-aligned with employee productivity priorities.  
Despite security managers acknowledging the contribution of employees in delivering effective risk 
mitigation, current security mechanisms and processes are often incompatible with employee primary 
tasks, creating friction between security and productivity (section 2.6.1).  Employees then refuse to accept 
the emerging productivity overhead, resorting to insecure behaviours (section 2.6.2).  Subsequent security 
management attempts to eliminate such behaviours through implementation of additional security 
controls have proven to ineffective (section 2.6.3), sometimes even increasing organisational risk 
exposure (section 2.6.4).  The emerging need for a less taxing, more flexible security approach, which 
also provides adequate risk mitigation, calls for user-centred security research that improves existing 
understanding of employee responses to security-productivity friction, also using the emerging paradigms 
to provide security management principles that accommodate employee priorities. 
As a first step towards achieving the employee behaviour understanding discussed above and provide 
security management with improved understanding and guidelines to design more productivity-driven 
security, the research presented in this thesis engaged directly with employees in two large organisations, 
discussing and analysing their responses to friction-inducing security.  The research commenced by 
looking at past research investigating security behaviours, identifying a number of drawbacks (Section 
2.8):   
1. The majority of research on user beliefs and perceptions driving security behaviours focused on 
individual home users, while organisational security research focused on higher level risk 
management and policy formulation approaches. 
2. There were only minimal attempts to directly engage with organisational security users using an 
exploratory research approach to identify and understand the challenges they face in their 
everyday interactions with security. 
3. Research did not attempt to investigate employee responses to friction-inducing security, only 
characterising employee behaviours as either compliant or non-compliant with organisational 
security policies. 
4. Attempts to identify and consider employee priorities in security design only focused on 
designing new systems, without attempting to provide knowledge and tools to enable 
improvements in existing ones.  
5. Research has not managed to devise effective security behaviour metrics.  Thus it failed to 
enable security management driven by organisational ability to identify and measure current 
behaviours, deliver attempted improvements in line with the organisation’s security risk appetite, 
and prioritise allocation of available resources.   
In an attempt to improve on the above drawbacks, this thesis presented two case studies conducted in two 
large organisations, directly engaging with employees, examining their interaction with organisational 
security provisions, the problems security creates in their primary tasks, together with subsequent 
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employee responses and coping mechanisms.  The case study design was driven by 6 research questions, 
driven by 5 case study propositions, devised from the problems identified in past organisational security 
research (section 3.3.1).  This chapter (1) uses the findings presented in this thesis to answer the research 
questions, (2) discusses the validity of the case study propositions, (3) presents the emerging research 
contributions for both industry and academia, (4) presents a critical review and limitations of the research 
presented in this thesis, and (5) outlines potential future research directions based on the emerging 
paradigms. 
9.2 Revisiting research questions 
The depth of the investigation the grounded theory analysis allowed, provided significant insights on 
employee behaviours that enabled the researcher to answer all 6 research questions presented at the 
beginning of Chapter 5. 
1. Do employees understand the need for security mechanisms in the organisation? If yes or no, why?  
The results of the analysis demonstrated that employees who understood the need for security were 
following the official organisational security practices, when the related effort did not create 
prohibitive primary task overheads (sections 4.6.1 and 5.2.1.3).  Contrary to past research presenting 
them as opportunistic and willing to bypass security when control is not present (section 2.6.5), 
employees in both organisations examined were willing to invest some of their time and effort to 
contribute to security risk mitigation, even when no controls and enforcement existed.  In other 
cases though, employees appeared to lack awareness of security risks or mitigation mechanisms, 
which led to the development of insecure behaviours.  The main driver of those was the 
dysfunctional and generic organisational security communication and training, which failed to 
provide adequate risk awareness and motivation for employees to participate in security protection 
(sections 4.6.2.1 and 5.3.1.3). 
2. What security-related challenges do employees find when attempting to proceed with their primary 
tasks? How do they respond to friction between their primary task and security mechanisms and 
processes?  Despite their awareness and understanding of the need for security policies and 
mechanisms, employees chose to procure their own security solutions when security blocked or 
slowed down their primary tasks (section 5.3.1).  They used readily available resources (their own 
knowledge and inter-employee trust), to devise their own shadow security approaches that eliminated 
or reduced emerging security-productivity friction, while also attempting to deliver some risk 
mitigation.  In other cases they chose to just ignore security.  Employee decision between shadow 
security practices and ignoring security depended on their perceived availability of the less taxing 
option.  For example they password-protected sensitive files shared through emails (shadow 
security), but used unencrypted drives for larger file sharing in the office when encrypted drives were 
either unavailable or created problems (insecure behaviour).  Decisions were made at an individual or 
team level (or sometimes both), depending on the team culture and their line manager’s advice.  In 
essence, shadow security behaviours, presented employees’ own understanding of how workable 
security, well-fit to their primary tasks, should look like.  Their development was accentuated by a 
lack of accurate risk awareness, ignorance about policies, and employees’ need to preserve their 
relationships with their colleagues.  In a number of cases employees also recognised that their 
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behaviours went against the organisation’s security policies, but felt they were the only way to 
preserve productivity.  The wide deployment and variation of emerging shadow security behaviours 
leads to loss of security management’s ability to monitor current state of security in the organisation, 
also increasing organisational risk exposure, as employees often do not possess accurate risk 
awareness to make ad-hoc security decisions (section 5.2.3.1).   
3. When organisational security provisions appear to provide inadequate risk mitigation, what do 
employees do?  A number of cases were identified where existing organisational security systems did 
not manage to effectively mitigate security risks, or no risk mitigation provisions existed at all (e.g. 
Company B security policy not providing guidance on how to protect laptops).  Employees then took 
actions to mitigate perceived risks themselves (e.g. not leave it in the car, take it home overnight), 
often supported by their line managers or colleagues (section 5.3.1.5).  In other cases, they 
downplayed the need for security due to a perception that security management was not interested in 
delivering effective risk mitigation (e.g. not taking action to remove leavers from access control 
systems - section 5.3.1.4).  This increased their disregard for centrally administered security, 
providing justification for shadow security development. 
4. How do employees respond to perceived lack of organisational security support? What are the risks 
from their behaviours and what can organisations learn from those?  When security support is slow 
to respond to employee requests, or fails to provide solutions to their reported problems, they turn to 
their colleagues and managers for support.  This increases shadow security development at team 
level, also leading to the emergence of varying security micro-cultures across different organisational 
divisions.  These micro-cultures reduce security management’s ability to monitor and control 
employee security culture development, or to assess the compatibility of the emerging culture with 
the organisation’s security risk appetite.  As a result, security managers are left unable to assess the 
effectiveness of deployed risk mitigation approaches.  In addition, the lack of accurate risk 
understanding amongst employees and line managers, due to the complexity of information security 
risks, results in the behaviour and habits emerging from the above micro-cultures failing to provide 
sufficient risk mitigation.  Despite the risks the above practices create, organisations can take 
advantage of employee reports to identity areas where improvements in security implementation are 
required, also tracking the number of reported problems successfully resolved to assess whether 
improvements are required in organisational security support provisions. 
5. How can the improved understanding from the previous questions be used to transform the systems 
in place to eliminate the problems discovered, avoiding the need to redesign the systems completely?  
Shadow security is an indicator that existing security management approaches are failing to provide 
employees with workable security.  It presents conditions where security better-fitted to productive 
activity is required, so its presence should be seen as an opportunity to identify potential 
improvements to better align security with productivity requirements.  Attempts to deliver that 
alignment, should aim to use readily available (or easy to collect) information from around the 
organisation to develop metrics that enable identification of shadow security behaviours.  Those 
metrics should then be used to drive security management decisions, driven by the organisational 
security risk appetite.  A set of example metrics was presented in section 7.5, based on the available 
information identified in the two organisations examined.  While those may not be applicable to all 
organisations, they can provide a basis for developing similar approaches, where security 
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management can use other organisation-specific information to develop their own relevant security 
behaviour metrics. 
6. What trust relationships develop in an organisation and how do they influence security behaviours?  
The shadow security analysis of chapter 6 also led to the identification of two security-related trust 
relationships in organisations: organisation-employee trust (shown by the organisation towards its 
employees) and inter-employee trust (developed between employees during their interactions both 
inside and outside of the security environment).  The two relationships come into conflict when the 
security policy asks employees to show distrust towards their colleagues, for example by prohibiting 
password sharing.  Inter-employee trust then prevails due to contextual and intrinsic incentives that 
encourage employees to preserve their relationships with their colleagues, in order to maintain a 
collaborative environment and benefit from it in the future (section 6.6.2).  The immediate 
availability of inter-employee trust also makes it a readily-available resource to cope with friction-
inducing security, accentuating shadow security development (section 6.5.4).  As a result, any 
attempt to use shadow security to deliver improvements in organisational security implementations 
(discussed above in relation to question 5 and extensively in chapter 7), needs to also understand the 
effects of trust relationships on employee security behaviours and formalise their presence in 
emerging security mechanisms and processes (section 7.4). 
9.3 Revisiting research propositions 
The research propositions (originally defined in section 3.3.1), aimed to assess the effectiveness of the 
chosen research methodology (case study directly engaging with employees, also using grounded theory 
as a data analysis tool) as a security behaviour research tool, also providing the ability to answer the 
research questions discussed in the previous section.  Early indications on the validity of those 
propositions emerged from the analysis in chapter 4 and were discussed in section 4.7, explaining that 
further research was required to be able to provide solid evidence on their validity.  The findings that 
emerged from chapters 5 and 6 both strengthened evidence on proposition validity emerging from chapter 
4, and are discussed in detail in the remainder of this section 
P1. “Directly discussing problems of security implementations and compliance with employees can lead 
to improved understanding of the reasons driving employee insecure behaviours”  
Using semi-structured interviews to discuss employee experiences with organisational security 
mechanisms, policies and processes lead to a number of previously unidentified insights on employee 
behaviours: (1) identification of employee willingness to participate in security, contrary to past research 
that presented them as opportunistic, (2) identification of employee drivers for secure behaviour, (3) 
identification, characterisation and categorisation of insecure behaviours, based on specific elements of 
the security implementation or the organisational environment that led to their development.  The wide 
number of example behaviours identified and their prevalence in the organisations examined (presented in 
detail in chapters 4, 5 and 6), together with steps taken to improve outcome validity and generalisability 
(section 3.4) provide sufficient evidence that P1 is a valid proposition. 
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P2. “Engagement with employees can allow falsifying current beliefs that employees can be forced to 
comply with security” 
Security implementations that fail to provide uninterrupted protection to organisational productive 
activities create significant overheads for employees.  Security management attempts to enforce such 
friction-inducing security on employees through security controls (technical and policies with sanctions) 
lead to: (1) employees always finding ways to bypass friction-inducing security, even when restrictions 
are implemented to prevent this.  Any subsequent attempts to tighten controls (2) increase policy 
enforcement costs, due to the need to anticipate for all potential non-compliance behaviours and 
exhaustively eliminate those.  Excessive enforcement attempts also create a (3) negative attitude towards 
security, reducing security management’s ability to leverage security-awareness of its workforce and 
encourage increased participation in security protection, thus (4) decreasing security management ability 
to defend itself against constantly changing threats.  It also (5) prevents organisations from formalising 
the trust shown towards their security-conscious employees and providing flexibility to address security-
related friction to be able to proceed with their productive tasks.  In addition, (6) given the high-number 
of identified violations emerging from employees bypassing friction-inducing security, security 
management attempts to sanction violations would result to an unmanageably large number of employees 
being disciplined.  The above six points emerged from the findings of the analyses presented in chapters 
4, 5 and 6, and demonstrate the importance of security hygiene (section 7.2.1) as a prerequisite to any 
attempts to enforce security policies through controls.  As a result they provide sufficient evidence on the 
validity of P2. 
P3. “Engagement with employees can allow identification of employee responses to friction-inducing 
security” 
The identification, characterisation and understanding of shadow security presents a new paradigm for 
security management, providing significantly improved insights compared to past research on employee 
behaviours.   Initial indications of employees adapting security were made by Inglesant and Sasse (2010), 
who identified that employees re-organise their primary tasks to reduce exposure to friction-inducing 
security, and Bartsch and Sasse (2012), where employees responded to problematic access control 
provisions by sharing information through informal channels.  Building on those reports, shadow security 
identification manages to capture employee responses to a variety of different friction-inducing elements 
of the security implementation (section 5.2).  Employees who come across friction-inducing security, 
ignore, bypass or modify official security, attempting to mitigate risks using less taxing, self-devised 
practices.  In addition, when official security comes into conflict with their relationships with their 
colleagues, asking them to treat those as untrustworthy, shadow security develops at team-level.  This 
leads to collaborative violations, as employees often consider their colleague relationships as more 
important than behaving securely.  The above findings constitute a significant improvement in the 
understanding of employee responses and coping mechanisms with friction-inducing security, providing 
significant evidence on the validity of P3. 
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P4. “Engagement with employees can allow the identification of problems in security implementations 
(both policies and mechanisms) that organisations have not currently identified through other 
means” 
As discussed in section Error! Reference source not found., past research in organisational information 
security primarily focused on using research tools like questionnaires to test pre-defined hypotheses, with 
limited attempts to examine employee interaction with security implementations in their entirety.  The 
exploratory nature of this work attempted to build on early insights of exploratory security behaviour 
research (section 2.8.2), to identify and describe previously unidentified problems in security 
implementations, improve security managers’ ability to capture those, and provide guidance on 
addressing the risks emerging from their existence.  Some of the behaviours emerging from this research 
(e.g. clear desk, screen lock, employees using own USBs) were often easy for organisations to capture 
using their current security processes, but the improved understanding of the drivers behind those 
(friction-inducing security and inter-employee trust) also improves security management’s ability to 
deploy appropriate improvements.  In other cases though, the open and exploratory approach of 
interviews and analysis process managed to capture a number of otherwise hard to identify friction-
inducing mechanisms and processes, together with corresponding employee behaviours (e.g. 
ineffectiveness of organisational security communication, employees sharing passwords or storing 
documents locally on laptops).  This led to improved understanding of situations where existing security 
implementations fail to accommodate employee priorities, providing sufficient evidence that P4 is also a 
valid proposition. 
P5.  “Engagement with employees can improve existing organisational ability to manage current 
information security challenges” 
The identification of shadow security, together with its characterisation and understanding of factors that 
drive its development, led to the creation of a number of different tools that security managers can use to 
identify, understand and improve security implementations.  The emerging model of employee security 
behaviours (7.1.2), the risk-driven security intervention processes (7.5.1), the metrics allowing 
identification and prevalence assessment of friction inducing security (7.5.2), together with the pre-
deployment intervention impact assessment and post-deployment monitoring process (7.5.3), manage to: 
(1) improve security management’s ability to understand how friction-inducing security affects employee 
behaviours,  (2) identify and prioritise improvements based on risk assessment and available resources to 
deliver the best possible security risk mitigation, also (3) aligning security mechanisms and processes 
with organisational productivity.  Improved alignment (4) enables employees to behave securely, (5) also 
allowing security management to implement a continuous, metrics-driven monitoring process, to capture 
a holistic understanding of the state of information security behaviours in the organisation.  All the above 
points suggest that research directly engaging with employees can improve security managers’ ability to 
deliver less taxing and more effective security, providing sufficient evidence that P5 is also a valid 
proposition. 
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9.4 Contributions 
This thesis presented a number of new paradigms, models and processes that allow security managers to 
effectively understand and manage employee security behaviours.  The emerged knowledge on shadow 
security development (section 5.3), security-related trust relationships (section 6.5) and their impact on 
the effectiveness of current security management attempts (sections 5.3.4 and 6.6), improves current 
understanding of the security challenges faced by employees in modern organisations (security and 
productivity coming to friction), the effect of the above paradigms on their security decisions (security 
violations or shadow security), and the consequences to the organisation (reduced security 
implementation effectiveness).  In addition, the emerging tools and processes (shadow security metrics – 
section 7.5.1, risk-driven behaviour measurement and decision making process – section 7.5.2), and the 
lessons learned from attempts to apply those in an organisation (section 8.4), provide practical guidance 
for both researchers and security managers to aid the delivery of a metrics-driven security management 
approach, using readily available or easy to collect information.  This section presents the thesis 
contributions to research and industry in detail. 
9.4.1 Research 
9.4.1.1 Substantive 
This thesis revealed a number of employee security behaviour insights, improving on the findings of past 
security research.  It (1) identified employee willingness to invest time and effort in order to behave 
securely, but only when security was compatible with their primary tasks.  It (2) enriched current 
understanding of employee responses to friction-inducing security (the shadow security), also (3) 
demonstrating the importance of the need to stop considering employee security behaviours as a binary, 
compliant or non-compliant decision.  It also (4) revealed a number of different elements of security 
implementations that drive shadow security development.  Another contribution is (5) the emerging 
model of employee security behaviour that improves current understanding of the influence of various 
elements of the organisational environment on employee security decisions, culture and habit 
development.  The model also (6) provides focus for future research attempts to disrupt the security 
culture and habits cycle presented in section 7.1.2, in order to deliver long lasting security behaviour 
change.  In addition, (7) the trust relationships identified provided a new paradigm for employee security 
behaviour, which further improved understanding of the drivers behind policy violations and shadow 
security practices.  Finally, (8) the metrics-driven shadow security improvements process also 
demonstrates the feasibility of delivering improvements to existing security, based on information 
collected within the organisation. 
9.4.1.2 Methodological 
The thesis also (1) provided sufficient insights to confirm the validity of research propositions, (2) 
demonstrating the usefulness of case study as an information security research tool and (3) grounded 
theory as an analysis approach to enable in-depth exploratory investigation of employee behaviours.  In 
addition, (4) closely working with organisations and directly interacting with employees can also improve 
outcome validity and subsequent research impact.  The case study findings also revealed that, (5) in order 
to be able to deliver effective security interventions, researchers need to understand that organisational 
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security changes take time, require good planning and need to be part of a formalised information security 
strategy approved by top management.  
9.4.2 Industry 
9.4.2.1 Substantive 
The main industry-related contribution emerging from this thesis is the identification and understanding 
of shadow security and its usefulness as a security management tool.  The research presented in this 
thesis, improved understanding of how shadow security develops and how it can help security 
management.  It provides a unique opportunity to re-think current security management approaches and 
deliver more effective protection for organisations, while still serving the business strategy.  In order to 
deliver that protection, organisations need to: 
1. Take advantage of intrinsic propensity of employees to behave securely.  The first and foremost 
benefit of the findings of this work provides is the clear evidence that employees want security.  
They feel connected to the organisation, they are motivated to participate in protection and 
willing to do so if the current security implementation does not create prohibitive time and effort 
overheads.  But, when security-productivity friction emerges, employee productivity focus leads 
to shadow security development.  To reduce emerging friction, employees should be involved in 
security design, in order to deliver security mechanisms better fit around their productivity 
priorities (section 7.3.1).   
2. Measure behaviour, but deliver hygiene first.  Before attempting to measure and improve 
security behaviours, security management needs to understand that the most important 
prerequisite for learning and data-driven behavioural change is security hygiene.  Security 
mechanisms and processes not designed with employee priorities in mind will inevitably lead to 
security-productivity friction.  Employees will then bypass those and deployed security will 
never manage to deliver adequate risk mitigation (7.2.1).  Security hygiene may require some 
additional resource investment at its early stages, but in the long run it can drive cost-effective 
risk mitigation, by reducing shadow security development, thus improving security 
management’s ability to detect and further investigate potentially malicious security violations. 
3. Implement metrics driven, learning-based security management.  The identified metrics provide 
a unique ability for security management to quantify its decisions and align those with 
organisational risk appetite (section 7.4).  Shadow security metrics can reveal areas where 
security management interventions are required, with subsequent resource allocation being based 
on organisational risk priorities, thus providing the best possible risk mitigation given the 
available resources. Over time this approach can evolve to an automated and low-resource 
approach to manage security, allowing for continuous assessment of mechanism and process 
effectiveness in both a pre- and post-deployment way.  It is important to also note that, in 
accordance with the ethical principles presented in section 3.6, the deployed metrics should not 
be used to enable mass identification and sanctioning of employees, but should be treated as an 
opportunity for organisations to deploy a learning-based security management approach. 
4. Formalise trust presence, avoid excessive enforcement but sanction misbehaviours.  The 
findings of this thesis also present a good starting point to understand how trust plays a crucial 
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role in delivering security protection for an organisation (sections 6.6 and 7.4).  Trust shown 
towards employees should be formalised in security implementations and its presence should be 
a central part of security communication (section 7.4.2), with appropriate processes implemented 
to sanction violations; once again security hygiene is key to delivering this (section 7.4.2.1).  
When this is achieved, trust also becomes an effective risk management tool: where security 
risks are low, trusting employees enables resources to be invested in mitigating more important 
ones (section 7.4.2.2).  The emerging employee responsibility should be visible to employees, 
with consequences for misbehaviours being both communicated and enforced (section 7.4.2.5) 
The above four points should be treated as the pillars on which modern organisations should aim to build 
effective security management approaches.  They provide a unique opportunity to manage security 
behaviour using a centralised, learning-oriented approach, decrease security-productivity friction and 
provide more effective security risk mitigation.  Initial resources required to put the above to practice 
should be seen as investments to deliver a sustainable, predictive, adaptable and effective security 
implementation.   
9.4.2.2 Methodological 
The findings and emerging paradigms allowed reframing modern security management as a continuous, 
learning-based approach that can be adaptable to the continuously changing modern security challenges 
(section 7.5.1).  They also present the importance of metrics to the success of such an approach, allowing 
easier identification of employee responses to friction inducing security (section 7.5.2).  It is also 
important for both security managers and top-level organisational managers, to understand the 
impossibility of delivering effective security improvements without corporate governance adoption.  
Security decisions should be driven from the top of an organisation, ensuring formal allocation of 
resources and access to information required to implement such a security management approach.   
Another paradigm that emerged from the case study in chapter 8, is the need to create comprehensive and 
well-integrated standardisation programs for information security management.  Organisational attempts 
to comply with a wide range of information security standards lead to redundancy, with valuable 
resources being expended on passing various audit processes (section 8.4.5).  Standardisation bodies 
should aim to eliminate this redundancy, by creating standards compatible between them that include 
interchangeable clauses, allowing the emergence of more effective and easy to apply standards that aid 
effective security management, rather than creating overheads.  
Both the substantive and methodological contributions for industry will be easier to put to practice if 
organisations understand the benefits of seeking help from academia.  Organisations should take 
advantage of existing academic knowledge on human behaviour and methodological principles required 
for effective metrics deployment, to improve their existing security management approaches (section 
8.4.7.1).  Governments should also be involved in this approach, further encouraging industry 
collaboration with academia: government bodies are often the main source of funding for academic 
research, so enabling collaboration between industry and academia can maximise the real-world impact of 
allocated funds and resources (section 8.4.7.2). 
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9.5 Research limitations  
Despite the importance and applicability of the contributions of this thesis, looking back to the analysis 
process, a number of potential drawbacks can be identified:   
1. The 30 interviews used for the thematic analysis (chapter 4) were randomly chosen.  Given the 
purpose of that analysis (provide preliminary understanding of employee behaviours to guide 
further analyses), it would have been beneficial to select interviews covering a wide range of 
employee backgrounds and organisational positions.  The negative effects of this were later 
alleviated by the subsequent grounded theory analysis of the entire company A dataset and 
iterative analysis to ensure no behaviours of interest were missed.  Despite that, achieving a 
wider representation would have possibly improved the emerging preliminary employee 
behaviour understanding.  This would have made the analyses presented in chapters 5 and 6 
easier to conduct.  
2. The time limitations, created by the need to complete this research within the timeframe of a 
PhD degree, limited the number of organisations that could be examined to two.  The time 
required to analyse the available dataset from Company A (also liaising with the company for 
clarification on identified security problems, access to resources/policies required etc.), collect 
and analyse data from Company B, together with subsequent analyses to confirm and better 
characterise the paradigms presented in this thesis, made it impossible to conduct a third 
analysis29. Despite the drawbacks, the identification of similar behavioural patterns in both 
organisations, both in terms of shadow security and trust relationships, provided sufficient 
evidence on the validity of case study propositions.   
3. Despite some attempts to deploy shadow security-driven security management approaches in 
Company B (discussed extensively in chapter 8), time constraints and structural problems in the 
organisation (section 8.2.3) prevented successful application of the findings of this research in an 
organisation.  The emergence of the presented models and security management processes from 
direct engagement with organisations provides some evidence on their suitability to 
organisational security management, but putting those to practice would have strengthened that 
evidence. 
9.6 Future work 
The exploratory nature of this work, together with the above critical review, present a number of potential 
opportunities to build on the findings and the suggestions of this thesis, which could not be explored 
during the course of a three year PhD project.  This section provides potential directions for future 
research, in order to expand the scope of the emerged paradigms, but also deploy and assess the 
effectiveness of the presented security management processes. 
                                                          
 
29 Despite attempting to work with a third organisation, limitations in their security management resources, together 
with other logistical and time constraints did not allow for this to happen 
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9.6.1 Improve shadow security understanding 
This work allowed identification of shadow security as a phenomenon, together with its development 
drivers and its effect on employee behaviours.  Based on the findings, two major areas where further 
research can improve shadow security understanding were identified:  
1. Security “micro-culture” development within organisational sub-divisions needs to be further 
examined.  Micro-cultures develop within teams and are reinforced by both team managers and 
team members providing support to each other.  Future research needs to examine those to 
identify how variations within different organisational subdivisions, like differing primary task 
and security requirements, physical arrangements (e.g. working from home, between-office 
differences) and line management practices can affect micro-culture development and 
subsequent security behaviours.  In order to achieve this, shadow security measurements need to 
be deployed in an organisation and then comparisons being drawn between subdivisions, 
attempting to correlate between division variations and emerging security behaviours.  This can 
improve security management ability to target shadow security-driven interventions towards 
specific organisational subdivisions, delivering targeted risk mitigation (section 7.5.4). 
2. Employee risk perceptions regarding their chosen shadow security practices also need to be 
assessed.  In many of the shadow security and trust-driven policy violation examples presented 
in chapters 5 and 6, employees acknowledged that some of their practices were compromising 
security.  Further interviews and in-depth analyses are required, to investigate employee 
perception of risks associated with those practices (e.g. when cloud storage is used to store 
corporate data, are employees aware that cloud storage providers may be compromised? If yes 
do they take any mitigating actions?).  Better characterisation of employee risk perceptions can 
allow security managers to better assess the risks emerging from current employee security 
practices, but also target future behavioural change attempts towards changing those risk 
perceptions. 
9.6.2 Expand scope 
Future research also needs to investigate and characterise shadow security development in environments 
that vary from those examined in this work.  Organisations of varying sizes, with diverging operational 
procedures, operating in different countries and different corporate cultures need to be examined.  As 
discussed in section 7.5, one of the main advantages of shadow-security measurement approaches is the 
ability of security managers in different organisations to flexibly adjust the proposed metrics, based on 
organisation-specific risks, security risk appetite, risk prioritisation and resources available.  Shadow 
security may emerge with different characteristics in organisations of varying size and industries.  
Examining shadow security development in varying contexts can allow researchers to create improved 
guidelines for managing shadow security development in different organisational settings. 
It is also important to further examine the compatibility of shadow security-driven information security 
management with current regulatory frameworks and international standards (some preliminary 
discussion on this was is presented in section 8.4.5).  The security management process that emerged 
from the findings needs to be examined for compatibility with modern information security legislation 
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and standardisation requirements.  Providing sufficient compatibility evidence, combined with the 
shadow security benefits presented in section 7.5.4, can encourage adoption of shadow security in 
organisational attempts to deliver effective and efficient security.   
9.6.3 Testing emerging paradigms and models 
The metrics-driven security management approach presented in section 7.5 should be put to practice in a 
few organisations.  Potential resource and security effectiveness gains should be recorded and subsequent 
communication should encourage organisational adoption of shadow security measurement as a “tried 
and tested” security management approach.  The effect of trust relationship formalisation on security 
behaviours should also be assessed (section 7.4.2), by putting it to practice and measuring its impact on 
employee behaviours through the deployed shadow security metrics.  
Another area that requires further research is the potential to quantitatively test the model of security 
behaviour presented in section 7.1.2.  This may be difficult though, due to the complexity and inter-
relations between various elements of the model and emerging behaviours.  It may prove to be hard to 
conduct controlled experiments to test individual cause and effect relationships in isolation, or isolate the 
effect of individual factors on emerging security behaviours.  Despite this, attempting to formally assess 
the validity of the model may also reveal other elements of the organisational environment affecting 
employee security behaviours that the analyses presented in this thesis may have failed to capture. 
9.6.4 Potential extensions to the devised models 
Despite the security behaviour model presented in section 7.1.2 providing valuable employee behaviour 
insights to organisational security management, a number of potential areas for further research were 
identified: 
1. Research needs to investigate the impact of the changing organisational environment on security 
management approaches.  Outsourcing, for example, is increasingly popular amongst large 
organisations, in an attempt to save money and receive better service from specialist providers.  
Its impact on employee security trust development and its effects on security behaviour have not 
been examined to date.  Employee responses to outsourcing and other changes in the 
organisational environment should be examined (e.g. increased amount of employees working 
from home and deployment of schemes like Bring Your Own Device), identifying their 
influence on security-related trust relationships and shadow security development.   
2. Security self-reporting by employees also deserves to be further researched. As part of a 
participatory security management approach (section 7.3.1), it is important to evaluate whether 
employees would be willing to report security problems, but also security violations, if sufficient 
assurance is provided that such reporting will have no negative impact on them.  Past research 
already suggested that users are willing to participate in security and that the presence of 
organisation-employee trust can improve motivation to cooperate even further, acting as a 
substitute for control (section 7.4.2).  As a result, it is important to encourage organisations to 
deploy the employee reporting mechanisms and corresponding feedback mechanisms presented 
in section 7.3.1, and assess the effects of this deployment on employee behaviours.  
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3. The need for mutual authentication mechanisms also needs to be examined.  Fléchais et al. 
(2005) suggested that the creation of simple, reliable means of mutual authentication for 
employees to authenticate to each other can significantly reduce the risks from social 
engineering.  Unfortunately no evidence was found in the work presented in this thesis to 
support that statement, but this is a promising suggestion that deserves to be part of further future 
research on the subject.   
In general, all the steps of the shadow security management process (section 7.3) can be investigated in 
depth.  For many of those though, it can be impractical or even impossible to be tested using traditional 
hypothesis testing approaches; as explained in section 8.3.4, controlled experiments are hard when the 
researcher requires control over many elements of the organisational environment.  Despite that, 
deploying the above process and collecting targeted measurements to assess the impact of specific 
elements of the security implementation, can provide sufficient indication of their effectiveness.  This can 
provide security managers with a new and powerful tool for effective security risk management decision 
making and resource allocation. 
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Appendix B: Sample interview questions  
Interview topics 
Introductory Questions 
1. What do you do at the organisation? 
2. How long have you been working at the organisation? 
3. What does your usual day involve? 
Security Awareness 
1. How does security fit in to your day? 
2. Do you think your work has any security implications? 
3. Do you encounter information that is in any sense confidential or sensitive? 
Clear Desk Policy 
1. Is there a policy that says what you should do with your desk when leaving in the evening? 
2. Do you have a secure draw or storage area you can use? 
3. Do you ever work on paper at all? 
Laptops, Remote working and Removable Media 
1. Do you ever use a laptop in the course of your work? 
2. How do you share information with colleagues? 
3. Do you ever use removable storage devices such as USB sticks? 
4. When working from home what systems or technologies do you use? 
Leadership and Management Roles 
1. Do you supervise any other people? 
2. Does your supervisor ever mention security issues to you? 
Policies, Reporting and Training 
1. How much would you say you know about the security policies at the organisation? 
2. Have you ever received any security training? 
3. Do you think people generally follow the policy rules? 
4. Who would you report a security concern to? 
5. What do you think of the use of Yammer at the organisation 
6. Is anything security related every posted on Yammer? 
7. Have you ever posted anything security related on Yammer? 
Optional Topics 
1. Compliance and security culture 
2. Personal/mobile devices 
3. Locking screens  
4. Password behaviour 
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5. Password resets 
6. Physical security 
7. Customer data 
8. Data classification 
9. Trust 
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Sample of detailed interview questions (to aid interviewers) 
Job/role description 
1. What is your Job Description?  
a. What does your job involve? 
2. How long have you been doing this job? 
a. How long you’ve been at the organisation? 
3. How does security fit in to your day? 
4. What is your background? 
Security awareness  
1. In the course of your work do you encounter information which is in any sense confidential? 
2. Do you think your work has any implications for the security of the organisation?  
3. What would be your main security concern? 
a. Are there any other concerns you can think of? 
4. Could your work be misused by malicious individuals? 
a. Are you mainly concerned by competitors or by others? 
b. Do you think it is possible that a member of the organisation might pose a threat? 
Clear Desk policy 
1. Is there a policy that says what you should do with your desk when leaving in the evening?  
2. Do you have a secure drawer which is just for your use? 
3. Do you work on paper at all? 
a. Do you have papers on your desk? 
b. Do any of them contain information that might be useful to a competitor or that might be 
considered confidential?  
4. Do you use a laptop or desktop in the office? 
a. Do you leave your laptop on your desk when going for lunch? 
b. Is it locked physically? 
c. What do others do with their laptops? 
5. Is it password protected? 
a. Just on start-up or is there an automatic password-protected screensaver? 
File Sharing and Removable computer media 
1. Do you ever share information that is confidential? 
2. How do you do this? 
a. To someone inside the company? 
b. To someone outside the company? 
3. Do you ever use removable storage devices, such as USB sticks?  
4. Is that your own one or was it given to you by the organisation? 
a. Is it just for your use or is it shared by the office? 
5. What sort of uses do you have for that? 
a. How important is it to you to be able to use [storage devices] at work? 
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6. Do you take data home on it? 
7. So when you’re at home working do you have to use the company laptop or can you take data home 
on the [storage device] and use it on your personal computers? 
8. Was any of this data in any sense confidential?   
9. What precautions do you take to protect that data? 
10. Is that common in the organisation? 
Laptop use 
1. Do you ever take a laptop home with you? 
2. Is this for working from home or for something else? 
a. How often do you do this? 
3. When you take the laptop home what is your usual form of transport? 
4. Do you go straight home or do you take your laptop to other locations, for example the gym? 
5. Do you think that is the general practice for other colleagues as well? 
6. Do you ever have any concerns that it might be lost or stolen? 
7. Is there any confidential data stored locally on the laptop itself? 
8. Do you store any other information locally or do you mostly use a shared file store?  
9. Do you take regular backups? 
10. Do you use your own file store somewhere? 
11. On your laptop, can you install your own software on it or is it managed by the organisation? 
a. Have you ever installed any software other than that provided by the organisation? 
b. Did you take any precautions when doing so? 
12. What’s the general view amongst employees on installing software on laptops by yourself? 
13. When you take it home can you access your work from home? 
14. Would you be accessing a company service from home to do this? 
15. What’s the process for doing that? 
16. Is that any extra procedure compared to what you have to do in the office? 
a. So, when you are in the office what do you have to do?  Do you have to log on to the laptop 
itself or connect to another system? 
17. Is it the same password that you use when you’re in the office? 
18. Are you on the company network once you’ve done that or is there another password? 
19. How do you manage when there is a service outage? 
Supervising others 
1. Are you responsible for anybody else?  Do you supervise anybody else? 
2. Are you responsible of making sure that they are aware of the general security procedures and 
policies? 
3. When someone you supervise leaves their organisation I presume they have their access rights 
revoked? 
a. Are old accounts ever used in the organisation? 
4. Do you need to take some action for this to happen? 
5. Who supervises you? 
6. Do you think your supervisor is concerned with whether you comply with security processes or not? 
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7. Do they ever mention security issues to you? 
Security policies and Training 
1. How much would you say you know in general about the security policies? 
a. Do you think in general the policies are well known? 
2. Have you had any training about it recently? 
a. Was it new information or just a refresher? 
3. How long was that? Was that a day or less than a day? 
4. Was it computer based?  
5. Was it more actually training or just information delivery?   
6. Did everybody in your team do that? 
7. Can you remember anything specific that was in it?  Any particular points? 
8. Were you given any other sort of security training? 
9. Are you aware of anything being done to keep people aware of security?   
10. How long do security training sessions last for?   
11. And do people tend to go to them? 
12. Do you receive emails bulletins about security, perhaps reminding you to do a certain thing? 
13. Who would you report a security concern to? 
14. What do you think of the use of Yammer at the organisation? 
a. Do you use it yourself? 
15. Is anything related to security ever posted on Yammer? 
16. Have you ever posted anything security related on Yammer? 
17. Do they put notices around the company, on notice boards and such like? 
18. And does it ever get mentioned in team talks or meetings? 
19. Were you aware of any kind of vetting going on, such as people checking your criminal records? 
Compliance 
1. Would you say the people follow all of the rules all the time in terms of security?  Or most people 
follow them most of the time?  Or somewhere in between? 
2. Can you think of a reason why somebody might not follow one of them? 
3. Are there any policies or procedures that you routinely don’t comply with? 
a. Why do you do this? 
4. Would people get reprimanded for anything like that, for example if somebody was in the habit of 
not putting the lock on the screen when they left their desk? 
5. Does the organisation check whether employees comply with security policies? 
6. So how would someone get caught if they did not follow those? 
7. What sanctions or punishments are used against people that get caught? 
a. Do you think these are appropriate? 
8. What risks do you think failing to comply with security policy poses to the organisation? 
9. What do you do when someone doesn’t follow the security policy?  
10. Would you report them? 
11. Have you ever come across something that you consider to be a vulnerability that the organisation 
hasn’t thought of? 
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12. What do you think about the security culture in general?  Do you think it’s quite a security conscious 
organisation or not very security conscious? 
13. In general what do you think of the policies?  Do you think they are too strict, too soft, or about 
right? 
14. How would you say that the Information Security compares with other issues, such as health and 
safety, or carbon reduction, that the organisation also cares about? 
Password behaviour 
1. Are you the only one that uses your password? 
2. Have you ever shared it with anybody else? 
3. Do any of your systems use shared passwords or anything like that? 
4. How many different systems or services do you use that require a password? 
5. Are the passwords you use all the same or are they all different? 
6. When a change is required do you change them all at the same time? 
a. Even if they don’t all have to be changed at the same time? 
7. How often do you need to change your passwords? 
8. Do you ever change your password without being prompted to? 
9. Did you invent the passwords you use yourself or are they given to you? 
a. Do you have any system for creating new passwords? 
b. Do you create completely new passwords or do you modify your old one, perhaps by 
incrementally adding to a number in it? 
10. Are there any restrictions, such as it has to have capital letters or certain characters? 
11. Are you allowed to re-use the same password when you have to reset it? 
a. What about similar passwords but perhaps with a single letter or number changed? 
12. So would a typical password be a word with a capital letter at the beginning with a number at the end 
or something like that? 
a. Is the number on the end something you change when you need to update your password? 
13. How do you remember these passwords? 
14. Do other people share their passwords to get access to systems? 
a. How often does that happen? 
Customer data 
1. Do you take any special precautions when dealing with customer data? 
a. What about when it is on a removable storage device? 
2. Do you share customer data with your colleagues? 
3. Are there guidelines regarding with whom you should share the data? 
4. Have you ever refused to pass some information to someone in the organisation? 
5. Have others refused to provide you with any information you needed for your work? 
Personal devices 
1. Do you connect personal devices to the company network? 
2. Is the process different than for corporate ones? 
3. Are there any particular properties of features your device must have to be used on the network? 
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4. Is it a common practice to bring in your own devices amongst the employees? 
Lock Screen and Confidential Information 
1. When you leave your desk do you always lock your workstation? 
a. Even if it’s just for a cup of coffee? 
2. Is there ever confidential information on your screen that somebody could perhaps see if they’re 
walking through the office? 
3. Within the office where you work, are there people you don’t know who might be able to perhaps see 
over your shoulder if they were wandering around? 
4. Do you personally do anything to prevent this from happening? 
5. Do people around you tend to lock their screens when leaving their desks? 
a. How often do you see unlocked screens? 
6. Have you ever seen confidential information on someone else’s screen?  
a. Was this information you had access to yourself? 
b. How often does this happen? 
7. Is there any information that some people in your team have access to but others don’t? 
a. Is that controlled by your password? 
Helpdesk  
1. Have you ever forgotten your password and had to have it reset? 
2. What’s the process for doing that? 
a. Is it automated or do you need to speak to a helpdesk or the IT department? 
b. Do you think they might be able to see your password? 
3. What sort of procedures do they ask you to go through for checking that you are who you say you are 
before you reset it? 
4. Does that happen often in the organisation? Do others need to get resets often? 
5. Apart from changing passwords have you had any other dealings with a helpdesk for any reason?  
6. So where are they physically located?  Is it somebody in the office are they outside the organisation? 
a. So there isn’t somebody locally that you can go and see if you want something done 
quickly?  
Data Classification 
1. Does the organisation have any data classification scheme? 
2. How is the classification done? Who assigns those? 
3. What is the difference between classification levels? 
4. If you need to share some information with a colleague, do you check that they are eligible to view 
that information? 
5. Did you ever need to access some information that you were not allowed to? 
a. How did you get access? 
6. Do you pass information to colleagues over the phone? 
a. How do you verify who they are? 
7. Is it common to share information through the phone? 
8. Do you share classified information via email? 
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a. To someone outside the company? 
9. Do you use any shared folders for collaboration purposes?  
10. Do you check the access rights of members before putting something there? 
11. Can you set file permissions yourself? 
12. Do you know who can change permissions, or what the procedure is? 
a. How long does this usually take? 
13. Are people happy to share information in there or do they worry about security a lot? 
Website/email access 
1. Do you have access to a shared area and your own personal space? 
a. What else do you have access to? 
2. Are certain kinds of email blocked, for example if it is too big? 
a. Are there other rules and restrictions around email use? 
3. Have you received emails from colleagues that they shouldn’t have sent? 
4. Have you ever fallen foul of the rules or had anything blocked or undelivered? 
5. Have you ever heard of anybody being reprimanded for inappropriate email use for example? 
6. Do you do any casual browsing (e.g. personal email, news) while on company networks?  
7. Are there certain web pages that you can’t access? 
8. Is there ever an occasion where you legitimately have a need for getting onto something and find you 
can’t? 
a. Have you ever used a workaround to get passed the restriction? 
b. Do you know if other people do? 
c. How often does this happen? 
Physical security 
1. What about the physical security.  How do you enter this site here for example?   
2. Can you see a way someone could get into the building without authorisation? 
3. Do you wear your passcard all the time? 
4. How easy is it for somebody to walk in from the street? 
a. Have you seen anyone tailgating in to the building? 
b. How often does this happen? 
c. Would you stop them if you noticed it happening? 
5. Is there any other security to prevent them moving between the different blocks, for example? 
a. Have you observed tailgating inside the building? 
b. How often does it happen? 
c. Would you confront someone if you saw them doing it? 
6. Have you ever bypassed any of the building’s physical security? 
7. If you notice somebody that you didn’t recognise without a passcard would you challenge them or 
something?  I mean, somebody came and sat down in one of your colleague’s desks or anything like 
that?  Would you think they’re a hot-desker from another office?  Or would you wonder who they 
are? 
8. Did you have, sort of, hot-desking spaces in the office that people who are visiting would use? 
261 
 
General ISec Issues 
1. Have you got any other thoughts about the Information Security here that we haven’t covered? 
2. In general would you say you trust your colleagues and the other people and around the offices? 
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Appendix C: Individual responses to risk 
Schwarz and Thompson (1990) work on politics, technology and social choice present four commonly-
encountered responses to risk, labelled as the individualist, fatalist, hierarchist and egalitarian, presented 
here in the form adapted by Adams (1995). 
Individualists: Enterprising ‘self-made’ people, relatively free from control by others, and who strive to 
exert control over their environment and the people in it. Their success is often measured by their wealth 
and the number of followers they command. They are enthusiasts for equality of opportunity, oppose 
regulation and when they need moral justification of their activities, they believe that self-interested 
behaviour in a free market operates to the benefit of all. Nature, according to this perspective, is to be 
commanded for human benefit. 
Egalitarians: They have strong group loyalties but little respect for externally imposed rules, other than 
those imposed by nature. They believe human nature is – or should be – cooperative, caring and sharing, 
and believe in trust and fairness. Group decisions should be made by direct participation of all members, 
and leaders should rule by the force of their arguments. The solution to the world’s environmental 
problems is to be found in voluntary simplicity. Nature is to be obeyed and respected and interfered with 
as little as possible. 
Hierarchists:  They inhabit a world with strong group boundaries and binding prescriptions, with 
hierarchical social relationships, where with everyone knowing his or her place.  The hierarchy certifies 
and employs the scientists whose intellectual authority is used to justify its actions. They are devotees of 
cost–benefit analysis and nervous in the presence of uncertainties that preclude the possibility of attaching 
uncontested numbers to the variables they are supposed to be managing. 
Fatalists: have minimal control over their own lives and belong to no groups responsible for the 
decisions that rule their lives.  They are resigned to their fate and see no point in attempting to change it. 
Nature is to be endured and, when it’s your lucky day, enjoyed. Their risk management strategy is to buy 
lottery tickets and duck if they see something about to hit them. 
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Appendix D: Security Behaviour Maturity Model 
(adapted from Paulk et al., 1993 by Adam Beautement) 
When considering a Security Behaviour version of this model we must consider how to convert these 
organisational indicators to ones of personal behaviour. The cleanest way to do this is to consider how the 
individual is managing or motivating their own behaviour – what factors are they considering when 
planning their security actions. At the highest level they will be actively working toward an improved and 
improving security culture. At the lower levels employees will be following the policy by rote (possible 
reluctantly, ineffectively or incompletely) or simply taking actions as they see fit, based on their own 
internal security model with no input from the organisation. The following levels represent this range of 
behaviours. 
Level 1 – Uninfluenced: At this level user behaviour is mediated only by their own knowledge, instincts, 
goals and tasks. Their actions will reflect only the needs of their primary task and will only deviate from 
that where their internal security schema conflicts with those actions. While some members of the 
organisation may be sufficiently knowledgeable to act securely it is expected that employees at this level 
will introduce a range of vulnerabilities in to the system. In practice this level can only exist where 
employees are working on non-organisational systems, as even the act of logging in to a managed 
network means that organisational security is exerting an influence. 
Level 2 – Technically Controlled: Employees at this level act as in Level 1 except where technical 
controls exist that enforce policy on a case-by-case basis. Technically controlled employees will follow 
their own security rules except where they must use organisational systems in the execution of their 
primary task, and those systems enforce policy at the software or hardware level. Realistically this is the 
lowest practical level that employees working in an office environment could function at. 
Level 3 – Ad-Hoc Knowledge and Application: Employees at Level 3 follow policy without necessarily 
a deep knowledge of what it contains. Their security knowledge comes from the ‘best practise’ or habits 
associated with their work environment, rather than from being aware of, and understanding, 
organisational policy. 
Level 4 – Policy Compliant:  Level 4 behaviour demonstrates knowledge and understanding of the 
policy, and compliance with it, even in situations where the local work environment may include the use 
of workarounds and frequently made excuses. At Level 4 employees can be considered to be useful role 
models and guides for security culture within the organisation. 
Level 5 – Active Approach to Security:  At Level 5 employees take an active role in the promotion and 
advancement of security culture within the organisation. The serve not just the letter of the policy but the 
intent as well and will challenge breaches at their level appropriately. They see security as a valuable part 
of the function of the organisation and have internalised this motivation. Level 5 employees are not 
security zealots, but rather understand the need to balance the security and business processes and 
champion the cause of security intelligently and effectively. 
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Appendix E: Survey scenario topics 
Scenario A – File Sharing  
Jessica, a Business Analyst at a utility company, needs to share a large volume of files with colleagues in 
her department as part of a high priority task she is undertaking. These files contain “Confidential” 
company information for “internal use only”. Jessica has made the files available through Microsoft 
SharePoint, restricting access to certain team members. Some team members tell her they cannot access 
the files due to incorrect permissions, so Jessica has submitted a request for changes to be made to her 
colleagues’ permissions and escalated this due to the urgency. However, she knows from past experience 
that it may take up to 1 week for the changes to be approved and applied. If these files are not made 
available within the next 2 working days, this will severely impact delivery and quality. As not all of her 
colleagues require access to all the files, to manually distribute them would involve her identifying the 
subset of files for each person - this will be a very time-consuming task, so Jessica creates an archive of 
all the relevant documents and considers how best to deliver it to the group.  
1. Option A: Request that those with access share their (main log-in) account details and passwords 
with those without to allow them access to the information.  
2. Option B: Burn a copy of the files onto a CD/DVD and distribute to the work group.  
3. Option C: Email the document archive directly to the general work group mailing list using your 
company email address.  
4. Option D: Move the files to an unrestricted folder on the internal network to allow the work group to 
have continued access to it.  
Scenario B – Managing Permissions  
John is a System Administrator at a utility company responsible for deciding who has access to 
confidential information.  John normally reviews each request and then applies the most appropriate 
permissions, or the request is denied according to established procedures and guidelines. He undertakes 
this task every 24 hours to ensure there is no risk of maintenance schedules slipping due to a lack of 
access to records.  John is called away from the office on short notice by a family emergency and he is 
concerned about how this task will be managed during his absence. The system used to set the 
permissions does not easily allow him to deputise the task to another account, so he must find another 
way to ensure this activity is completed while he is away. He is also concerned that as the guidelines are 
not always clear and require some degree of discretion when granting access, deputising the task may 
mean there is a higher risk of incorrect permissions being granted. This makes the choice of who to trust 
this task to in his absence an important one.  
1. Option A: Leave your password with your secretary, who although temporary, is a trusted employee, 
with instructions to use your account to resolve "emergency situations". 26  
2. Option B: Leave your password with a trusted member of the department and ask them to handle "all 
decision making" while you are away.  
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3. Option C: Grant blanket access rights to the whole department (clone of the permissions of an 
individual with the most access rights) for the duration of your absence to forestall many of the 
access requests you are usually is asked to deal with.  
4. Option D: Give out login details of a range of access permissions (used by temporary workers) with 
instructions that they be used where existing permissions do not allow access.  
Scenario C – USB Stick Usage  
Jason works for a utility company as a Commercial Analyst and is currently involved in an important 
project that requires him to present progress updates to clients, often in offsite locations.  Jason would 
normally use his laptop to take presentations to clients but his laptop is currently in for maintenance. 
Instead he decides to use an encrypted USB memory stick to transfer the required files to the client site. 
Unfortunately, shortly before he is due to leave for the meeting, Jason realises he lent out his encrypted 
USB stick and cannot recall who to. He knows he will not get a replacement at such short notice. In the 
meantime he still needs some way to transfer information. The presentation includes embedded media and 
is therefore too large to email and he knows that offsite locations cannot access the internal network.  
1. Option A: Take the required data on an unencrypted USB stick - you have one to hand.  
2. Option B: Borrow an encrypted stick from a colleague. You would have to also make a note of their 
password so you can access the data at the client's site. The colleague had asked that you do not share 
/ erase the confidential data already on the stick.  
3. Option C: An employee of the client has been visiting the utility company and is due to travel back 
with you. Use the available unencrypted stick to put a copy of the data onto their laptop and ask them 
to take it to the client's site.  
4. Option D: Upload the files to a public online data storage service and recover them at the client's 
site.  
Scenario D – Tailgating  
Agnes works for a utility company as a Customer Account Manager and often has meetings on site with 
external visitors.  Agnes is aware that visitors need to be supervised at all times and security / reception 
are made aware of all visitors. She therefore personally receives visitors and allows them entry/exit 
through the barrier door which requires an ID pass and further supervises them whilst they are on site.  
Whilst collecting visitors she often sees unsupervised people without a visible visitor's badge waiting near 
the barrier door and occasionally ‘tailgate’ (follow closely behind another person) to get into the main 
building. Although Agnes appreciates that this is a security risk, she is also aware that this is a common 
occurrence which is normally overlooked.  
1. Option A: Notify security that you have observed visitors tailgating past the barrier.  
2. Option B: Confront the people you see tailgating directly and ask them to show you some ID (if they 
are not known to you) and supervise them back to reception.  
3. Option C: Assume the people have access and have been checked by the reception staff and continue 
with your work so as not to disrupt their work or yours.  
4. Option D: Confront the people and then report their names to either your manager or security.  
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Scenario E – Document Control  
Anne works for a utility company as a Compliance Officer and is responsible for managing and handling 
documents containing sensitive Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) information. Only certain people 
can access and use this information, provided they have gone through the appropriate vetting.  
Anne recently received an angry phone call from Bob (Senior Manager) who is not happy that his staff no 
longer have access to important information they need. Anne explains the vetting procedure to him, but 
he is still not happy and asks to speak to her boss Cyril, who supports Anne and tells Bob that his staff 
require clearance to access the documents.  A couple of weeks later Anne reviews the access logs to the 
documents, and notices that Dave (who works for Bob) has been accessing a large number of CNI 
documents. Anne looks into this further and finds that Dave is widely sharing this information to others in 
his team, none of whom have been through the vetting and managing of privileged information training.  
1. Option A: Report your observations to Cyril, and urge him to tell Bob formally that this is not 
acceptable.  
2. Option B: Send Dave an informal email, reminding him that sharing CNI documents with non-
cleared employees is not allowed.  
3. Option C: Initiate an audit of Bob's Department to attempt to track the use and distribution of the 
CNI documents.  
4. Option D: Do nothing - If something goes wrong, Bob has to deal with it as he is the Senior Manager 
in charge of the department that is sharing the information.  
Scenario F – Information Disposal  
James works for a utility company as a Senior Contracts Manager and regularly reviews confidential 
contracts, which contain sensitive commercial information and customer data. He prefers to review 
documentation in paper form, so he often prints out confidential documents to read and make notes on 
whilst travelling on the train to/from home.  When he is finished with these documents, as an 
environmentally conscious person, he places them in the recycling bin.  At home there is no secure 
disposal available so he uses the standard recycling service. The risk of ’dumpster diving’ (people 
stealing documents from rubbish bins) has been communicated in a recent Internal Awareness Campaign. 
It specifically recommends disposing of confidential information in the confidential bin but James feels 
that this is overly cautious and does not always use the Confidential but the normal recycle bin as he 
thinks the paper will be destroyed when it is recycled anyway, so there is no need to be concerned.  
1. Option A: James’ working practises are acceptable; recycling the paper is good for the environment 
and destroys any sensitive information at the same time.  
2. Option B: James should ensure any paper copies he makes are disposed of specifically in a 
confidential recycle bin to ensure they are securely shredded once he has finished with them – hard 
copies are a major source of information leaks.  
3. Option C: James is right to work in the way that suits him best – without access to the company 
systems even if someone did get hold of a few bits of information they couldn’t damage the utility 
company anyway.  
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4. Option D: James is being totally reckless with customer’s information – the major threat caused by 
hard copies is to the customers via identity theft and he should stop printing out work unless it is 
absolutely necessary.  
Scenario G – Backing Up Information  
Emilia works for a utility company as a Finance Analyst and is a very conscientious individual who 
occasionally works from home in the evening to catch up on things she could not complete during the 
day. Emilia normally uses the train to get home. She chooses to leave her laptop as she has recently had 
her laptop stolen when travelling home from work.  Emilia keeps a backup of all her work files on her 
personal computer so she can access files without having to connect to the utility company system as her 
home network connection is not always reliable. She knows this is against company policy, but she lives 
in a safe neighbourhood and does not consider this to be a great security risk. In order to transfer files to 
her home computer she uses a variety of methods.  
1. Option A: Use one of your USB sticks to carry your current work with you on the train.  
2. Option B: Email the files to your personal email account from your work account and download 
them at home.  
3. Option C: Use an online storage service such as Drop box as an interim transfer location, deleting 
the files once you have made a local copy.  
4. Option D: Log in to the company VPN and make local copies via that connection.  
Scenario H – External Threats  
Andrew works at a utility company site, and he walks there each morning from the local station. One 
morning he notices a blue van parked outside the entrance gates. He thinks he has seen the van parked in 
the same spot several times before over the last couple of weeks. Andrew becomes suspicious so he notes 
down the van details so he can check again if it is the same van. A few days later, Andrew notices the 
same van parked in the same location. As he passes the van he observes two individuals, one of whom 
appears to be taking pictures of the building/people around the building. As soon as the individuals see 
Andrew, the van pulls away in a hurry.  
1. Option A: Put it out of your mind; you have seen the van several times and nothing has happened at 
the site so it probably isn’t a threat.  
2. Option B: Report the incident to your line manager; it is better to report such incidents even if 
nothing has happened.  
3. Option C: Report your suspicions directly to security so they can take the appropriate action.  
4. Option D: Do nothing now but keep an eye out for the van in the future to confirm his suspicions. If 
it shows up again then report the incident.  
Scenario I – Information Requests  
Mohammed is a Contract Support Assistant at a utility company who manages 3rd-party contracts. One 
afternoon, he receives a phone call from Alison who used to work with him at the utility company but 
now works for one of the utility company’s trusted 3rd-party companies. She asks Mohammed for some 
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commercially sensitive information that is not publicly available through the company’s web site.  While 
the company she works for is allowed access to the information, Mohammed is aware that there is a 
procedure 3rd-parties need to go through to obtain that information. Mohammed politely refuses the 
request and reminds Alison of the procedure she should follow. Alison now becomes very persistent and 
reminds Mohammed that they used to be colleagues as well as mentioning the names of several senior 
people in both companies, saying they will be extremely unhappy if she does not get this information that 
day. She further says she is still in contact with his line manager and will explain everything to him later, 
so Mohammed should be ok with providing this information today.  
1. Option A: Accede to the request for information to ensure that the senior personnel are satisfied and 
Alison's productivity isn't hampered.  
2. Option B: Send Alison the information she requested but immediately inform your line manager of 
the call and that information has been provided.  
3. Option C: Ask Alison specifically which pieces of information she needs and send through a 
redacted or edited version of the documents.  
4. Option D: Send the information through but password protect the file and wait until you have spoken 
to your line manager before releasing the password to Alison.  
Scenario J – Working Practises  
Sanjeeta has worked with Kevin at a utility company for a number of years. Kevin has always been an 
effective member of the team, but is known for ’having his own way of getting things done’. A few 
months ago Kevin left the utility company to work for one of the utility company's Service Partners. They 
still maintain a close working relationship and are located at the same site. Recently Sanjeeta noticed that 
several confidential documents/records were missing and there was no audit trail of who had used them 
last.  Sanjeeta then recalls that Kevin had accessed the documents to resolve a query associated with a 
project he had recently been working on, so she decides to ask Kevin about the missing documents next 
time she saw him.  When asked about the missing documents, Kevin becomes very defensive and objects 
to being challenged, telling Sanjeeta that she should “stick to her own work and stay out of mine”. 
Sanjeeta was very taken aback by this response.  
1. Option A: Do nothing, Kevin’s working practises have always been eccentric and this seems to be 
no more than a product of his usual attitude.  
2. Option B: Discuss Kevin’s behaviour with the department manager – it isn’t acceptable for an 
individual in the department to have their own methods that conflict with the company best practice 
and policy.  
3. Option C: Accommodate Kevin's work practises by adjusting your own, it will be easier and more 
productive for you both.  
4. Option D: Call the Business Conduct helpline and make a report about Kevin’s behaviour – it is 
suspicious that there appears to be no proper audit of his work. 
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Appendix F: Thematic analysis codes, themes, 
categories and relationships 
Security awareness and understanding 
Awareness of the importance of for information security  
Aware of the sensitivity of organisational information  
Code Description 
External risk more careful when dealing with outsiders  
Responsibility they know the risks, feel proud to be responsible 
Role awareness sensitive operations so people know they should be careful 
Value security needs it in their job due to a lot of information exchange 
Problems from potential misuse or leak to unauthorised sources (both from a security and a commercial 
perspective)  
Need for security confidentiality of info protects commercial environment,  
Sensitivity awareness hold and see a lot of confidential information, if someone wants to 
harm the company can pass that to competitors, easy to do so 
Impact Awareness malicious behaviour can have significant impact on organisations 
service providing capability 
Reputation value embarassment for organisation if some things were left to leak out, 
Some of the information could affect the stockmarket 
Regulation driver not allowed to share some information between some parts of the 
organisation (regulation 
Risk awareness aware they should be careful with email/internet usage/passwords etc. 
data potentially useful to competitors for commercial gain 
Potential problems to themselves as individuals (shaming, potential sanctions imposed by the 
organisation)  
Sanctions exist (some action was taken against them) 
 
Policy communication and training  
Personal information sensitivity 
InfoSec 
misunderstanding 
Information they deal with will be of interest to other internal parties, 
NO SECURITY CONCERNS on their job though 
Policy content and understanding 
Low policy familiarity No line for line policy knowledge 
Own policy 
understanding 
had to figure out most good practice information on their own 
Policy ok Thinks policy is adequate 
Policy perception  “about right” 
Policy overloaded Too much information to read 
Policy common sense new people don't follow common sense rules 
Policy location 
awareness 
knows where to find information if needed 
Low policy 
knowledge 
can’t recall password security policy, people not aware of the policies 
in general 
Not read policy knows extensive guidelines exist if you have time to read those 
Security team 
communication 
Communication usually done at team talks 
Rare central 
communication  
Centrally, rarely receive security advice, occasionally emails about it, 
changes in policy 
Communication could explain to them a bit more why they should behave in specific 
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unhelpful ways 
Communication not 
read 
rarely reads those 
Security 
communication mixed 
within other bulletins 
security changes only communicated through at a glance bulletin 
Knowledge gap not very confident on knowledge about policy 
No training No security-related training delivered in the organisation 
Training common 
sense 
most things are common sense, “just remember this and that” 
Training occasionally some computer-based training 
Training not relevant finds some questions asked irrelevant, Many things were not 
interesting to them 
Training not on ISec no specific training on Isec 
Security team 
Induction 
security induction through team talk 
Training needs 
improvement 
thinks that approprate training would solve a lot of problems, 
Tickboxing currently 
 
Downplay own responsibility 
No sensitive 
information  
information they see not commercially sensitive, information on 
laptop of limited interest 
Low awareness people surprised when told not to share everything with everyone 
around them 
Compromise hard more than one compromises required to get useful data (like a jig 
saw), someone would need to know may pieces of jigsaw to extract 
conf info 
Equipment 
uninteresting 
Laptop, phone etc not interesting information-wise 
Downplay risk doesn’t think anyone intercepting emails would benefit from it, 
information about projects is available for anyone that can drive to the 
locations 
ISec is confidentiality Isec is different than commercial confidentiality, NOT SECURITY - 
JUST CONFIDENTIAL DATA, initial training about confidentiality 
Confusion on 
information sensitivity 
Not sure if information sensitive or not  
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Security mechanisms 
USB stick use 
Compliant with policy 
Encrypted USB Use company provided encrypted drives 
Encrypted USB 
driver: 
communication 
Because they told them to 
Unaware of policy 
No USB policy 
awareness 
No idea they had to use company ones 
Low encrypted USB drive adoption 
Encrypted USB: cost not all people who need to transfer data have those as they cost too 
much 
Use unencrypted 
USBs 
Use unencrypted USBs in the office, for data transfers between home 
and work, for file sharing in office 
Borrow USB 
password 
Borrow someone’s USB with password 
Post-it USB password They use post-it notes for password of encrypted USB sticks 
Using unencrypted drives 
Fear for encryption  Fear for loss of access 
Unencrypted backup for backup reasons 
USB at home Download blocked information, transfer work data 
Trust colleagues Shows confidential information to other people. They know 
information is confidential so they won’t share anything they are told. 
trust the others that they know policies 
USB misconception Deleting data from unencrypted USB immediately after use 
USB policy awareness No idea they had to use company ones 
Not using USB 
USB risky Avoid usb: virus 
Encryption problems Authentication fails in crucial moments, easier to carry laptop around, 
not enough capacity 
Email to personal 
account 
Sends documents at home address to ensure access (sometimes cant 
access from outside) 
 
Email filtering, Website blocking   
Email filtering inconsistent 
Email filtering 
inconsistent  
Infected emails pass through firewall, useful ones dont 
Website blocking problematic 
Website blocking 
problematic 
Not well targeted, inconsistent website blocking 
Website blocking 
annoying 
Frustration from website restrictions, often blocks work-related sites 
Download 
information at home 
And bring in the office when websites are blocked 
Own assessment of 
external content 
security 
check downloads before bringing it in (think they could spot it if 
malicious), but did not have time to do so 
USB use at home Using USBs on home machines 
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Security helpdesk experience 
Slow helpdesk  Some weeks to sort out problems via helpdesk, Support terrible 
Software access slow Time to get S/W on laptop “about a week” p48 
Not using helpdesk Horrible service 
 
Security experience and perception 
Majority compliant Perception of a compliant environment within organisation 
Security culture (from employee perspective) most people follow most of the rules 
most of the time 
ISec highly regarded No one fired for carbon footprint 
Non-compliance 
prevalent 
no way people follow all the rules all the time  
Experience impact people longer in organisation understand what they should/not do, 
people long in the organisation know what is required from them 
No separation Chinese walls exist (not really enforced though - people know each 
other too well) 
Contractor access laptops given to contractors without much care taken 
Contractors less 
motivated on security 
contractors need to be motivated a bit more to follow rules 
Productivity conflict Policy sometimes conflicts with business -> need to bypass, Rule 
breakers have reasons for doing so 
Productivity 
slowdown 
colleagues have been unable to work for weeks 
Login slowdown Takes about 20 mins to log-on on the good days, 
 
Enforcement and sanctions 
Behaviour driver: 
sanctions 
would like to be aware so that they cannot be blamed for things they 
are not aware of 
Sanctions drive 
behaviour 
careful about sec policy as they have seen people suspended for 
relatively minor things 
Misbehaviour 
warnings 
warnings for people that misbehave, e.g. people given warnings for 
leaving piles of documents lying around 
No sanctions they can get away with missent emails and misplaced usb sticks, no 
one cares for screen lock 
Health and safety 
prevails over security 
Nowhere near as health and safety 
 
Security behaviours 
Screen lock 
Screen lock awareness On the need to do it, potential risks 
Screen lock 
sometimes 
Not always, sometimes forget, when coming back quickly not doing it 
Screen lock 
motivation 
open plan office, colleague peer-pressure 
Auto-lock reliance “Will lock itself anyway” 
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Laptop usage 
Label on laptop Company label – everyone knows who it belongs to, employee name 
on laptop 
Takes laptop home To be able to work if something happens 
Protect laptop: 
awareness 
Put it in boot, don’t leave it in the office 
Laptop risk awareness That data can be accessed easily 
Laptop protection 
measures 
Make sure not leave it anywhere, don’t like travelling with them, 
“biggest risk to the organisation”, need to be careful with the 
information they put on laptop as they travel a lot, 
lock it in car boot, make sure it is not obvious they carry a laptop, hide 
it somewhere when leaving house 
 
Password use  
Protection perception Presence of passwords meaning that no one can hack a system 
No write password Aware on sensitivity 
Password choice and handling 
Burden: many 
passwords 
Too many to remember, hard to keep track, hard to manage all of 
those 
Set passwords same All passwords for all systems set to the same 
Writing password 
allowed 
Thinks policy allows writing down password 
Password in document Write in a word document, or on encrypted USB 
Password in PDA Store list of passwords on pda 
Password in book Writing at back of book to remember, full page of passwords 
Protect physical copy 
of password 
On paper in desk, post it in drawer - lock 
Password changing 
Password change: 
annoyed 
need to be reset at different points in time 
Access loss If passwords expire and they go on holiday, need to remember to 
change before they go to avoid being locked out 
Never changed 
password 
Never changed given password 
No password change  Not forced so not do it 
Negative effect “if they didnt have to reset so often would probably have a stronger 
one” 
Simultaneous 
password change  
Change all passwords together when a change needed (if all are set to 
the same) 
Simple password 
change 
changed slightly every month 
Add month to 
password 
Add month at the end when they need to change 
Last digit change Change one digit at a time when passwords require change 
Own password 
mechanisms 
Not allowed to use months so uses summer01, summer 02 
Password sharing 
Password sharing 
reason 
See others email when covering for them, access right takes ages, 
“when they need to get things done”, Has left a senior manager 
working on their laptop and assumed they would lock it 
Password sharing – 
peer pressure 
“Feels uncomfortable but reservations wouldn’t be listened anw” 
Password sharing 
mechanism 
Share passwords through the phone 
See other’s mail when When on leave, covering for them 
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covering 
 Trust colleagues shows confidential information to other people. They know 
information is confidential so they won’t share anything they are told. 
trust the others that they know policies 
Manager  trusts 
employees 
On policy awareness 
Generic accounts On rarely used site (passwords keep expiring) 
No password sharing Too risky 
 
Document handling 
Document storage  
Network drive 
Network drive Store files on personal network drive 
Network drive 
motivation 
Backup 
No backup Data locally stored not backed up 
Locally on their computers 
Work on documents 
locally 
Data stored on laptops 
Laptop password 
protected 
Password protection makes laptop safe 
Storage 
misconception 
Confidential stuff on desktop, nothing on c drive though so safe 
Work locally 
motivation: 
connection problem 
VPN problems, no internet, lazy 
Store locally: driver Storing data locally to access when network drive is unavailable (e.g. 
home, train, other offices) 
Network drive 
problem 
Drives inaccessible or too small 
Also using personal computers 
Own computer 
motivation: 
connection issues 
When connection not good 
Own computer use Works on corporate data at home on personal computer 
Use two computers for productivity reasons 
Two devices For employees that work in more than one subsidiaries 
Document sharing 
Contractor Risk people are aware they shouldn’t pass some information to contractors 
Information 
separation 
Tries to keep information separate from different divisions, need to 
keep information separate between regulated and unregulated parts of 
the business 
Email sensitive emails can flow around without being monitored 
Email document 
sharing 
Use emails to share documents  
Password protect 
sharing 
If information is deemed as sensitive, send password separately 
When sending things outside make sure recipient correct, password 
protected files 
Physical documents – Clear desk 
Clear Desk awareness Clear Desk motivation: sensitivity awareness 
shouldn’t leave confidential stuff lying around 
Clear desk driver: 
awareness 
Open plan office, colleague pressure (jokes) 
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Secure disposal For documents that they think are confidential 
Clear desk - not doing it 
Clear desk violation No risk, physical security good so no risk 
No clear desk 
enforcement 
Clear desk inspections were done in the past, not anymore 
Laptop physically 
unlocked 
On desk unlocked (screen lock pointless in that case).   
 
Physical Security 
Passive on physical Outsiders would be picked by someone else 
Physical security 
perception  
Physical security not hard to get into office, Easy intrusion 
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Relationships between themes 
Cause Effect Examples 
Employee risk 
awareness 
Laptop Usage, Screen Lock, Password 
Sharing, Document storage and sharing, 
Physical documents, Clear desk 
Write password in protected document, not sharing 
passwords with colleagues, not storing information on 
laptop 
Confusion on 
security purpose 
Employee risk awareness 
Downplaying risk: Compromising information is hard 
Considering information they use as not-sensitive 
Policy 
awareness 
Laptop Usage, Screen lock, Password choice 
and handling/changing/sharing, Clear desk, 
physical documents, USB stick use 
Locking screens, securely disposing physical documents, 
clearing desk, using encrypted drives 
Policy overload Policy awareness 
Too much information to read, impossible to know 
everything 
Security Culture Risk awareness 
No-one fired for carbon footprint, but has happened for 
security so security must be important 
Encrypted USB 
stick problems 
Document sharing/storage, laptop usage, 
USB stick use 
Encrypted USB drives provided by organisation too small, 
so alternative file-sharing methods such as using 
unencrypted drives or emailing files had to be used. 
Storage 
problems 
Document sharing/storage, laptop usage, 
USB stick use 
Insufficient space on network drive 
Experienced problems accessing files needed from home 
or while travelling 
Employees justified copying files to laptops because 
Network drive is full - Copying files locally 
Password 
overload 
Password choice and 
handling/changing/sharing, 
Large number of passwords required for various corporate 
systems resulted in employees being unable to recall those 
from memory. 
Led to writing their passwords down (on laptop or 
document) 
Email filtering 
and website 
block 
Document storage and sharing 
Websites needed for work purposes blocked Downloading 
content at home and bringing it in the organisation 
Communication 
problems 
Confusion on security purpose, policy 
awareness, security culture 
Not explaining how they should behave 
Rarely read 
Mixed with other things 
Training 
General Information security awareness, 
Confusion on security purpose, policy 
awareness, security culture 
Most things common sense,  Training occasionally and 
not relevant, security induction at team talks 
Currently tickboxing 
Support 
problems 
Security culture, USB stick use, Password 
sharing 
Not using helpdesk – “support horrible” 
Getting access to software is slow 
Other security 
problems 
Security culture 
Slowdown caused by security – negative feelings: takes 
20 minutes to log on on good days 
Violators have reasons to do so – problematic security 
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Appendix G: Axial coding results 
Company A 
Category 
Properties 
characteristics or 
attributes 
Dimensions 
values of a 
property 
Conditions 
elements of the security implementation, employee 
knowledge and beliefs that drive security behaviours 
Actions/Interactions 
behaviours or beliefs of employees that resulted from 
the identified conditions 
Consequences 
conditions from employee 
behaviours and impact on 
organisation 
Risk / need for 
security 
awareness 
Understanding of 
security risks, 
potential impact to 
the organisation, 
reasons driving 
understanding 
Risk awareness 
and  
understanding 
Regulation for data protection and handling of sensitive 
information 
Chinese wall business separation behaviours 
Need to know information sharing 
Risk mitigation 
Avoid penalties for organisation  
Employee own risk awareness (need to uninterrupted 
information access, information useful to competitors, 
outsiders could damage the organisation, reputation 
damages) 
Understand the need for security to exist in the 
organisational environment 
Realising the impact loss of access can have on their 
workflow 
Understand the need to follow 
security policy  when using 
sensitive information 
Confidentiality agreements exist 
Downplaying own 
security 
responsibility 
Problematic organisational security communication  
Lack of security training 
Employees believe information they handle is not-
sensitive (confidentiality, not security) 
Outsiders would be picked up by someone else or have 
right to be there (not easy to get in) Minimal motivation to behave 
securely 
Insecure behaviours 
Puts organisational information at 
risk 
No perceived 
security risks 
Employees believe no security risks exist in their role 
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Policy 
awareness 
Aware of policy 
content 
Fully aware: of 
security policy 
content 
Aware of policy importance Visit policy website and actively try to stay up to date 
Increased policy awareness 
More likely to follow recommended 
practices 
Unaware: of 
policy 
Lack of awareness regarding their role 
Some still aware that they should protect confidential 
documents  
Ad-hoc password behaviour, information 
handling/sharing strategies 
Self-devised security solutions 
Risky data handling behaviours 
No action against non-compliance  
Violations become norm 
Partly aware: 
aware of some 
elements of the 
policy 
 
Aware on role-related clauses 
Encrypted USB use 
Clear desk and screen lock 
Refusal to share passwords 
Believe not applies to them (e.g. challenging strangers) Not following recommended practices 
Training problems (training is superficial on security, 
provided only to new people)   
Communication problems (inconsistent, security 
included among other things, seems less important than 
health and safety) 
Downplaying security importance 
Lack of accurate risk awareness 
Misconceptions, own understanding 
Own interpretation of desired behaviours (e.g. “should 
write password down”) 
Content problem: Overloaded, vague, inconsistent, 
unrelated to role 
Perceived as common sense 
Ignore policy content 
Dismiss policy usefulness 
Devise own practices (e.g. own USB use, own 
password management strategies) 
No enforcement 
Reduced employee motivation 
Policy appears unimportant 
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Secure 
behaviour 
drivers 
Elements of the 
organisational 
environment that 
incentivise secure 
behaviour 
Official (under 
organisational 
control) 
Effective security communication 
Architectural means make compliance easy (provided 
encrypted USB drives, personal network storage 
backed-up) 
Understanding benefits of security mechanisms and use 
those 
Challenge colleagues when needed 
Secure state 
Low cost of compliance  Screen lock easy to do 
Clear Desk enforced by property not security Not leaving documents around 
No connection between actions and 
information protection 
Unofficial (no 
central 
organisational 
control) 
Responsibility   
Manager pressure 
Peer pressure 
Past events 
Secure behaviours 
Actions to protect computers 
Screen lock 
 
Secure behaviours based on own 
employee understanding 
Security culture developed out of 
organisational control 
Collaborative team level 
enforcement 
  
280 
 
Time impact  
Time-related 
information 
security overheads 
– Security slowing 
down primary task 
Mechanism 
problems 
VPN Slow 
encrypted USB sticks slow 
productivity focus 
Unencrypted USB drives 
Copy data locally 
Increases data leak risks 
Lack of perceived security 
usefulness (or corresponding 
support) 
Increases need to come up with ad-
hoc solutions 
SharePoint slow to setup USB and email file sharing 
Process 
problems 
Access control setup slow 
Slow IT support 
Password reset slow 
Share passwords 
Frustration 
Disruption  
Security blocking 
primary task – 
unable to 
complete tasks 
unless they bypass 
security 
Mechanism 
problems 
Filtering and blocking problematic 
Block work-related information  
Send it as different file type 
Download at home and bring in on unencrypted drive 
People feel not trusted by excessive 
blocking 
Increasing virus risks  
Personal network drives full 
Store files locally 
Recognise increased risks 
Feel central security support 
inadequate 
Non-compliance habituation Shared drives problematic USB and email file sharing 
Connectivity problems (VPN, lack of connection) 
Send files to home accounts 
Store files locally 
Increases data leakage risks 
Depend on employees to keep 
personal computers/email accounts 
secure 
Process 
problems 
Encrypted flash drive procurement problems – not 
everyone has one 
Use unencrypted ones 
Store information locally 
Email (personal and business accounts) 
Security appears problematic 
Non-compliance justified for 
employees 
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Increased 
cognitive load 
Hard to manage 
mechanisms 
High mental 
effort required – 
can be 
impossible 
Different services require different passwords 
Write passwords down 
Own mechanisms to protect passwords Inaccurate risk understanding, 
dangerous to let them choose Too much in the policy 
No role-specific communication 
Need to decide what they think is more relevant 
Organisational 
adaptability 
Organisational 
ability to 
accommodate 
changes to the  
environment  
Flexible Can request removal of websites from blocked list 
Slow process  
No alternatives provided 
Employees need to come up with 
own solution  
Inflexible No effective delegation of responsibilities 
Password sharing 
Access using other’s accounts 
Violations become norm 
Team level 
security 
communication 
and mediation 
Elements of 
information 
security 
management 
happening at 
team-level 
Security 
communication 
and support 
Lack of central communication 
Lack of security training 
Reliance on managers 
Employees seek support from line managers  
Advice between peers 
Managers advice on security challenges 
Ad hoc – based on manager 
understanding and perception 
Varies by location and manager - 
inconsistent behaviours around 
organisation No security guidance for managers Based on own best practice and understanding 
Permissions, 
access control 
decision making 
Access control decision making by managers 
(authorising access to resources) 
Management authorisation for information access 
Ad hoc – based on manager understanding and 
perception 
Varies by location and manager 
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Security 
perception 
Overall perception 
of organisational 
security 
Positive Required to protect organisation Motivation to comply 
Easy to use mechanisms and 
processes are used 
Problematic 
Impacts productivity Non-compliance justified 
Justification for coming up with 
own solutions 
Increasing organisational risks 
Accentuates non-compliant, ad-hoc 
culture 
Blanket rules  
No effective guidance 
Access control housekeeping problematic (revoking not 
quick) 
Feedback goes unnoticed 
No attempts to improve 
Sanction based 
People just comply to avoid trouble 
Job security – lack of motivation 
No enforcement 
Varies by location 
If security appears to demand reasonable time/effort 
AND employees understand role-related risks they 
follow recommended practices 
Security perceived as inflexible and not serving 
employee priorities 
Security rules perceived as unimportant  
Employees doing what they believe they can get away 
with 
 
Culture 
perception 
Employee 
perception of the 
overall 
organisational 
security culture 
Security 
important 
Colleagues willing to comply and be secure  
Employee participation in 
protecting the organisation 
Security 
unimportant 
Productivity driven culture 
Health and safety more important 
Lack of awareness on many security issues  
Oversharing information 
Contractors have different values than employees 
Culture static - Need to be more proactive 
Perception of security as non-willing to improve 
Perception as less important than other organisational 
issues 
Employees disconnected from 
security 
Justifies doing “own thing” on what 
they perceive to be right for 
protecting information they handle 
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Company B  
Category 
Properties 
characteristics or 
attributes 
Dimensions 
values of a 
property 
Conditions 
elements of the security implementation, employee 
knowledge and beliefs that drive security behaviours 
Actions/Interactions 
behaviours or beliefs of employees that resulted from 
the identified conditions 
Consequences 
conditions from employee 
behaviours and impact on 
organisation 
Risk / need for 
security 
awareness 
Understanding of 
security risks, 
potential impact to 
the organisation, 
reasons driving 
understanding 
Risk awareness 
and  
understanding 
Awareness on the importance of information they 
handle, potential breaches, impact to the organisation 
and the need for security 
Actions to protect laptops 
Not share passwords 
Screen lock 
Clear desk 
Protects organisation and 
employees  
Communication of relevant regulation on sensitive 
information 
“Need to know” information sharing 
Password protecting important documents 
NDA people are more aware on the need to be careful 
with information. 
Distrust – creates problems in 
planning and delivery – Legal team 
needs to be involved NDA presence on some projects 
Downplaying 
own security 
responsibility 
Problematic organisational security communication 
(among other things, generic, not done, role-based) 
Problematic security training (CBT based, generic, 
tickboxing) 
Rely on managers and colleagues 
Ad-hoc culture creation, out of 
organisational control 
No understanding of data classification Less care in protecting it 
No perceived 
security risks 
Downplay sensitivity of information they use 
Communication partially influence 
employee actions 
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Policy 
awareness 
Aware of policy 
content 
Fully aware: of 
security policy 
content 
Policy awareness Actively look for policy updates 
Increased policy awareness 
More likely to follow recommended 
practices 
Partly aware: 
aware of some 
elements of the 
policy 
Not everything relevant  
Aware on role-related clauses 
Policy perceived as common sense 
Own mechanisms (e.g. use USB, erase afterwards) 
Downplaying some risks 
behaviour has some security merit – 
but not aligned with policy  
“common sense” risk understanding 
can be inaccurate 
Policy on website Not check 
Aware of privacy marking existence  
Marking depends solely on owner 
Admit to not knowing how to use these 
Gets support from line manager 
Overclassify 
Potential of desensitisation  
Microculture development 
Unaware 
Unaware of marking guidelines 
Information left around – picked up by clear desk 
inspections (“don’t happen often”) 
No reprimands or enforcement 
No understanding on handling 
documents marked by others 
Non-compliant culture 
Unaware of physical security policy 
Not wearing pass  
Not challenged 
Non-compliant culture 
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Secure 
behaviour 
drivers 
Elements of the 
organisational 
environment that 
incentivise secure 
behaviour 
 
Official (under 
organisational 
control) 
Awareness about clear desk 
Hot desking 
Lockable drawer  
Secure disposal bins 
Clear desk enforcement 
Clear desk compliance 
Good architectural means - low cost 
of compliance 
VPN provides adequate access – reliable 
Personal network storage 
No local file storage 
Responsive helpdesk 
Reported problems followed up 
Report problems 
Password resets easy Uninterrupted access 
Access control easy to setup No password sharing 
Usable password manager No writing down 
Unofficial (no 
central 
organisational 
control) 
Responsibility   
Manager pressure 
Peer pressure 
Past events 
Secure behaviours 
Actions to protect computers 
Screen lock 
Secure behaviours based on own 
employee understanding 
Security culture developed out of 
organisational control 
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Time impact  
Time-related 
information 
security overheads 
– Security slowing 
down primary task 
Mechanism 
problems 
VPN Slow Local storage  Computers are vulnerable 
Encrypted USBs sometimes don’t work  Use unencrypted ones 
Disgruntlement - interference with 
primary task  
Technology perceived as hindrance 
to complying with policy.  
Process 
problems 
SharePoint slow to setup 
Access control setup slow 
Slow IT support 
Password reset slow 
Perceived inability of the technical side to get some 
things right  
Some generic accounts appear to exist  
Sharing files through multiple formal/informal channels 
Reduced accountability 
Reduced perceived support 
Disruption  
Security blocking 
primary task – 
unable to 
complete tasks 
unless they bypass 
security 
Mechanism 
problems 
Network drive small 
Connectivity problematic  
Encrypted drives - feel safe 
Reliant on local storage  
Ad-hoc backups (to external drives – sometimes 
personal)  
“Unintentional backups” onto local laptop systems,  
Laptops are vulnerable to cold boot 
attacks  
No backups exist  
Data from past projects stored on 
local machines forever 
Forget encrypted USB password – lose access Carry laptop with data  
Sharing drives hard to manage 
Share information through emails 
Also third party services used 
Emails stored locally 
No accountability and audit 
possible 
Dependence on third party security  
Inconsistent email filtering 
Website blocking problematic - Prevents access to 
blogs useful for work 
Access the information at home 
Interference with primary task - 
disgruntlement 
Increased risks 
Password manager not work for all systems Write passwords in documents or on paper  
No lockable space  
Clear desk problematic  
Need to carry documents with them 
Potential loss of information 
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Increased 
cognitive load 
Hard to manage 
mechanisms 
High mental 
effort required – 
can be 
impossible 
Various passwords for different systems 
Password change rules across different systems  
Keep passwords same 
Passwords similar after changes 
Write passwords down 
Increasing risks 
Too much in the policy 
No role-specific communication 
Own interpretation 
Role-specific awareness 
Not checking website 
Not everything relevant 
Colleague/line manager support 
Ad-hoc security culture 
Inaccurate risk perception can lead 
to dangerous behaviours 
Marking guidelines confusing Not using those 
No understanding on handling 
documents marked by others 
Non-compliant culture 
Organisational 
adaptability 
Organisational 
ability to 
accommodate 
changes to the  
environment  
Flexible Can request removal of websites from blocked list Reported problems followed up 
Risk of employees not reporting 
problems Inflexible 
Not many employees report concerns or problems 
 
No reporting culture 
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Team level 
security 
communication 
and mediation 
Elements of 
information 
security 
management 
happening at 
team-level 
Security 
communication 
and support 
Managers not know complete policies 
Problematic central communication and training 
(irrelevant, generic, inconsistent and overloaded) 
Reliance on managers not formalised   
Communication at team meetings  
Security support by line managers and colleagues 
Devise own adaptations to unsatisfactory security 
measures or  
Introduce own novel solutions 
Solutions deployed are based on 
their own understanding of what the 
security experience should be like.   
May not manage the organization’s 
risks adequately 
Culture defying central security 
Permissions, 
access control 
decision making 
Employees not fully aware of policies – also partially 
dismiss their usefulness 
Managers not know complete policies Ad hoc – based on manager/colleague understanding 
and perception 
Varies by location and manager 
Access control decision making by managers 
(authorising access to resources) 
Management approval for information access 
Security 
perception 
Overall perception 
of organisational 
security 
Positive 
Protects the organisation adequately 
Closed-build, encrypted password protected laptops 
Considered in requirements 
Importance of security well understood 
Employees see value in security 
Compliance motivation 
Problematic 
Impacts productivity (e.g. email filtering/access 
problems, password reset problems) 
Negative attitude 
Insecure behaviours justified 
Justification for coming up with 
own solutions 
Increasing organisational risks 
Accentuates non-compliant, ad-hoc 
culture 
Security and compliance measured using CBT 
completion rates.   
Too many CBTs 
Information appears irrelevant/common sense 
Communication perceived as unimportant  
Self (or team)-devised security behaviours 
Access revoking problematic 
Should be doing more - No enforcement 
Information oversharing prevalent 
Central security appears ineffective 
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Culture 
perception 
Employee 
perception of the 
overall 
organisational 
security culture 
Security 
important 
Employees want to comply/contribute to security 
Challenging colleague behaviour 
Mechanisms demanding reasonable time/effort are 
followed IF employees understand why  
Employee participation in 
protecting the organisation 
Security 
unimportant 
Productivity driven culture 
Security considered tickboxing 
Lack of awareness on many security issues  
Varies across locations 
Need to be more proactive 
OK to bypass security when it creates primary task 
problems 
Employees disconnected from 
security 
Justifies doing “own thing” on what 
they perceive to be right for 
protecting they handle 
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Trust 
Category 
Properties 
characteristics or 
attributes 
Dimensions 
values of a 
property 
Conditions 
elements of the security implementation, employee 
knowledge and beliefs that drive security behaviours 
Actions/Interactions 
behaviours or beliefs of employees that resulted from 
the identified conditions 
Consequences 
conditions from employee 
behaviours and impact on 
organisation 
Assurance 
Assurance 
mechanisms in 
place and impact 
on employees 
Understand 
need for 
restrictions 
Understand potential problems to the organisation by a 
security leakage 
Accept the need for security mechanisms and policies to 
protect the organization  
Understand their contribution in protecting the 
organisation 
Motivation to behave in a 
trustworthy way 
Mechanisms 
and policy 
compliance 
Desired behaviours outlined in policy 
Mechanisms implemented to prevent insecure 
behaviours 
Potential sanctions defined in policy for bypassing 
security 
Temporal incentives: Sanction avoidance 
No culture development – no long 
term compliance incentives 
Not taking advantage of employee 
goodwill and motivation 
organisation-
employee trust 
Trust shown 
towards 
employees and 
impact on security 
Employees are 
trusted by the 
organisation 
Policy clauses defining desired employee behaviour 
without enforcing it (e.g. don’t share passwords, use 
encrypted drives) 
Communication of related risks and the need to protect 
the organisation  
Employees recognise organisational reliance on them 
Intrinsic compliance: 
 Ability: Employee knowledge and risk awareness to 
protect the organization  
 Motivation: understanding responsibility - propensity 
to do good  
Dependency on employees – can 
expose the organisation if they do 
not act as required 
Benefits of implementing trust-
based rather than assurance-based 
security (cheaper, long term 
effectiveness etc) 
Breaking trust 
Problematic assurance mechanisms slow down or 
disrupt primary task  
Need to bypass mechanisms or ignore policy  
Recognize breaking organization-employee trust 
Drains capacity to behave securely  
Violations considered justified 
Non-compliance culture 
development 
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inter-employee 
trust 
Existence of trust 
relationships 
between 
employees and 
impact on security 
Trust between 
colleagues 
Close relationship with their colleagues 
Policy demands no inter-employee trust (No password 
sharing, No information sharing etc) 
Trust relationship conflict 
Need to decide which trust 
relationship to preserve 
Prevailing over 
organisation-
employee trust 
Conflict between trust relationships 
Inter-employee trust relationships prevail 
Trust enabler to productivity when security is 
problematic 
Self-devised security mechanisms 
Long-term reliance on collective 
trust violations 
Security spins out of organizational 
control 
Behaviours out of sight of security 
management 
Culture where breaking security is 
justified 
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Appendix H: Grounded theory emerging themes 
Company A 
 
Total Percentage   
access control 83 70.34% Number of 
themes  
47 
awareness 98 83.05% 
burden 55 46.61% Average per 
employee 
20.3559322 
circumvention 32 27.12% 
circumvention driver 96 81.36% Stddev 4.927483326 
clear desk 85 72.03% Median 20.5 
communication 108 91.53% Average per 
theme 
51.10638 
computer 1 0.85% 
contractors 44 37.29% Stddev 35.82833 
culture 80 67.80% median 46 
data sharing 73 61.86%   
data storage 65 55.08%   
document handling 11 9.32%   
email documents to personal account 3 2.54%   
email filtering 18 15.25%   
frustration 17 14.41%   
helpdesk 38 32.20%   
hot desk - no hot desking 3 2.54%   
insecure behaviour driver 53 44.92%   
laptop 72 61.02%   
length of service 105 88.98%   
misconception 27 22.88%   
outsourcing 23 19.49%   
own mechanism 38 32.20%   
password 103 87.29%   
physical security 76 64.41%   
policy 89 75.42%   
process problem 8 6.78%   
reprimands - for inappropriate emails 1 0.85%   
role 113 95.76%   
screen lock 66 55.93%   
secure behaviour driver 110 93.22%   
security driver 88 74.58%   
security implementation 46 38.98%   
security perception 87 73.73%   
security problems 17 14.41%   
sensitivity - people don't know what to 
redact 1 0.85% 
  
separation - personal from work devices 5 4.24%   
social engineering 15 12.71%   
support 24 20.34%   
training 75 63.56%   
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trust 46 38.98%   
USB 92 77.97%   
vendor 2 1.69%   
vetting 27 22.88%   
VPN 34 28.81%   
website blocking 49 41.53%   
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Company B 
 
Total Percentage   
access control 55 67.07% Number of 
themes 
46 
awareness 77 93.90% 
burden 56 68.29% Average per 
employee 
20.69512 
circumvention 9 10.98% 
circumvention driver 44 53.66% Stddev 
Median 
4.98703 
20.5 clear desk 60 73.17% 
communication 72 87.80% Average per 
theme 
37.48889 
contractor risks 2 2.44% 
culture 66 80.49% Stddev 25.15253 
data classification 43 52.44% Median 32 
data sharing 72 87.80%   
data storage 69 84.15%   
document handling 18 21.95%   
email filtering 14 17.07%   
experience of security problems 15 18.29%   
helpdesk 10 12.20%   
home working security 1 1.22%   
insecure behaviour drivers 51 62.20%   
laptop use 56 68.29%   
length of service 73 89.02%   
manager responsibility 13 15.85%   
misconception 17 20.73%   
network drive 30 36.59%   
own mechanism 24 29.27%   
password 64 78.05%   
physical security 49 59.76%   
policy  56 68.29%   
role 54 65.85%   
screen lock 67 81.71%   
secure behaviour driver 72 87.80%   
security driver 66 80.49%   
security hygiene 1 1.22%   
security perception 63 76.83%   
separation 13 15.85%   
shadow security 15 18.29%   
social engineering 17 20.73%   
support 32 39.02%   
training 67 81.71%   
trust 20 24.39%   
USB 20 24.39%   
vendor access 8 9.76%   
vetting 1 1.22%   
VPN 12 14.63%   
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website blocking 13 15.85%   
yammer user 30 36.59%   
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Appendix I:  Category list and example extracts 
Shadow Security - Company A 
Category name No Percent 
Access control decision making by managers, Management authorisation for information 
access 
87 73.73% 
Access control setup slow, Slow IT support, Password reset slow 61 51.69% 
Ad hoc – based on manager understanding and perception - Varies by location and 
manager 
16 13.56% 
Ad-hoc password behaviour, information handling/sharing strategies 89 75.42% 
All employees realise the impact loss of access can have on their workflow 87 73.73% 
Architectural means make compliance easy 29 24.58% 
Aware of policy importance 57 48.31% 
Aware on role-related clauses 38 32.20% 
Believe policy not applies to them 51 43.22% 
Can request removal of websites from blocked list - Slow process, No alternatives 
provided 
6 5.08% 
Challenge colleagues when needed 30 25.42% 
Chinese wall business separation behaviours 27 22.88% 
Clear desk and screen lock 52 44.07% 
Clear Desk enforced by property not security 3 2.54% 
Colleagues willing to comply and be secure 51 43.22% 
Communication problems 106 89.83% 
Confidentiality agreements exist 17 14.41% 
Connectivity problems, Personal network drives full, Shared drives problematic 16 13.56% 
Contractors have different values than employees 43 36.44% 
Culture static - Need to be more proactive 36 30.51% 
Devise own practices 104 88.14% 
Different services require different passwords 31 26.27% 
Dismiss policy usefulness 32 27.12% 
Downplaying security importance 28 23.73% 
effective security communication 65 55.08% 
Employee own risk awareness 101 85.59% 
Employees believe information they handle is not-sensitive 75 63.56% 
Employees believe no security risks exist in their role 39 33.05% 
Employees doing what they believe they can get away with 16 13.56% 
Employees seek support from line managers, Advice between peers, Managers advice on 
security challenges 
68 57.63% 
Encrypted flash drives procurement problems – not everyone has one 19 16.10% 
Encrypted USB use 45 38.14% 
Filtering and blocking problematic, Block work-related information 38 32.20% 
Health and safety more important 66 55.93% 
If security appears to demand reasonable time/effort AND employees understand role-
related risks they follow recommended practices 
104 88.14% 
Ignore policy content 52 44.07% 
Impacts productivity - Non-compliance justified 90 76.27% 
Lack of accurate risk awareness 88 74.58% 
Lack of awareness on many security issues 94 79.66% 
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Lack of awareness regarding their role 56 47.46% 
Lack of central communication, Lack of security training, Reliance on managers 100 84.75% 
Lack of security training 73 61.86% 
Low cost of compliance 47 39.83% 
Misconceptions 27 22.88% 
Need to decide what they think is more relevant 47 39.83% 
No effective delegation of responsibilities - Password sharing, Access using other’s 
accounts 
73 61.86% 
No enforcement 7 5.93% 
No security guidance for managers - Based on own best practice and understanding 9 7.63% 
Not leaving documents around 31 26.27% 
Outsiders would be picked up by someone else or have right to be there 58 49.15% 
Oversharing information 24 20.34% 
Own interpretation of desired behaviours 72 61.02% 
Own mechanisms to protect passwords 45 38.14% 
Perception as less important than other organisational issues 68 57.63% 
Policy appears unimportant 53 44.92% 
Policy content problem 44 37.29% 
Policy perceived as common sense 14 11.86% 
Problematic organisational security communication 103 87.29% 
Problematic security perception 111 94.07% 
Productivity driven culture 18 15.25% 
Refusal to share passwords 31 26.27% 
Regulation for data protection and handling of sensitive information 95 80.51% 
Required to protect organisation - Motivation to comply 87 73.73% 
Responsibility, Manager pressure, Peer pressure, Past events 87 73.73% 
Secure behaviours, Actions to protect computers, Screen lock 43 36.44% 
Security perceived as inflexible and not serving employee priorities 80 67.80% 
Security rules perceived as unimportant 50 42.37% 
Send it as different file type, Download at home and bring in on unencrypted drive 7 5.93% 
Share passwords, Frustration, Write passwords down, take own measures to protect 
password storage location 
100 84.75% 
SharePoint slow, USB/email file sharing 44 37.29% 
Some still aware that they should protect confidential documents 56 47.46% 
Store files locally, send to home accounts, Recognise increased risks, USB and email file 
sharing 
83 70.34% 
Too much in the policy, No role-specific communication 76 64.41% 
Training problems 75 63.56% 
Understand the need to follow security policy when using sensitive information 98 83.05% 
Understanding benefits of security mechanisms and use those 29 24.58% 
Understanding the need for security to exist in the organisational environment 102 86.44% 
Unencrypted USB drives, Copy data locally 39 33.05% 
Use unencrypted ones, Store information locally, Email (personal and business accounts) 83 70.34% 
Visit policy website and actively try to stay up to date 5 4.24% 
VPN Slow, encrypted USB sticks slow, productivity focus 88 74.58% 
Write passwords down 56 47.46% 
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Risk / need for security awareness 
Regulation for data protection and handling of sensitive information - Chinese wall business separation 
behaviours 
P65: Because they’re in tune with a couple of other things like the regulatory model, separation and stuff 
like that, so having to do things for a reason even though it might not seem like it’s a good thing 
Employee own risk awareness:  
need to uninterrupted information access 
P114: We are so IS dependent, that when it goes down, it affects us greatly 
information useful to competitors, outsiders could damage the organisation, reputation damages 
P3: I am more aware of IT in general and so I know how sensitive this stuff is and how easy it is to leak it 
out. It’s more self-awareness that keeps me.  I can’t say that everyone thinks like that, obviously. 
Confidentiality agreements exist   
P55: We have a lot of confidentiality agreements between us and a customer, obviously we won’t share 
that information and hope to God that they don’t either. 
Understanding the need for security to exist in the organisational environment,  
P79: Security implications well clearly were they to be compromised there’d be massive impact so it’s 
very important in that respect and there are increasing reports of systems around the world being attacked 
Understand the need to follow security policy when using sensitive information 
P36: So if it's HR Payroll data, make sure that we pull the employees Social Security, date of birth out 
and scrub the data before we publish it to whoever’s asking for it. 
Problematic organisational security communication,  
P66: I think it goes back to what I was saying before which is I don't think enough is known or it’s 
coming across in the right way or to the right audience. 
Lack of security training  
P67: They’re given a building induction and a company induction, but it’s pretty limited in terms of 
computer security. 
Employees believe information they handle is not-sensitive (confidentiality, not security),  
P104: Not at my level. there’s obviously other people here, you know operational managers and things 
like that that might have more commercially sensitive information but at my level I wouldn’t have 
anything that’s that sensitive. 
P47: Oh, Information Security rather than commercial confidentiality?   
P51:  So it’s not strict Information Security, it’s more commercial information that we have to be aware 
of. 
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Outsiders would be picked up by someone else or have right to be there (not easy to get in) 
P72: That's not something I would do as my general process and then you’d send out the details so, I 
think they have to present ID at the door, the security desk that was their name and possibly that they 
work for a certain company. 
Policy awareness 
Aware of policy importance 
P75: So I think this company’s quite good at explaining why we need to have security in this manner 
Visit policy website and actively try to stay up to date 
P40: actively seek that out and read it and know that that’s where I’m going to go to find the information 
Lack of awareness regarding their role, Some still aware that they should protect confidential documents 
- Ad-hoc password behaviour, information handling/sharing strategies 
P29: Probably, I would say around 15. I: So how do you manage that? P: On an Excel document. 
P111: at times we do have to transfer the data to our laptops because the network is slow, response times 
can be really bad and some of the files are quite large that we use, so we transfer them to our laptops to 
work on and then transfer them back at the end of the day. I: And then presumably you would delete it 
from your own laptops as well? 
Yes and then from, obviously the recycle bin. 
Aware on role-related clauses  
P66: You know you've got (what) you can and can’t do, what you can send through your emails.  You 
know the virus software that's going on, your security ID passwords, checklists, everything like that that 
goes on.  So yeah little bits and bobs I suppose.  
Encrypted USB use, Clear desk and screen lock, Refusal to share passwords 
P72: Not to use your own memory sticks but to use the memory sticks that we’ve now got where you 
have a password for them, they’re approved memory sticks that the company’s got  
P48: That’s something I always do every time.  If I go to the printer that’s about ten steps away probably 
not but every other time I do. It’s just a habit that you get into. 
I: So would you ever share your account with anybody else? P104: No, no, everyone that works, that 
needs access will have it. 
Believe not applies to them (e.g. challenging strangers) - Not following recommended practices 
P89: I’m relatively new and there’s a lot of people coming from outside reception that would come – but 
because everybody else is okay with them, I think it’s okay.  
Training problems (training is superficial on security, provided only to new people),  
P55: I’ve never had any formal training. Um, everything we’ve been made aware of was on the induction 
day, “This is your password,” and you’re drummed in then, “Don’t share it,” but there’s been no formal 
half day workshops or anything. 
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P8: Um, any training about security?  Not really.  I do know that, coming into the company, I don’t know 
if it was a training type thing or like I said, something I just signed, but about internet usage and stuff like 
that, supposed to be for the company using that stuff, not really wandering around the internet 
Communication problems (inconsistent, security included among other things, seems less important than 
health and safety)  
P106: We might get an email to say, change it, but I think the five years in this office, one of the 
applications I’ve had, I’ve only ever seen one email to say, it’s been noted, you know, whether IS has run 
a report to see whose changed their password. 
P98: Um, that’s generally a problem with most of the Company.  You either get lots of communication 
that’s not necessarily relevant and sometimes I think they miss the communication that is very relevant. 
Downplaying security importance  
P106: I just think it’s low on peoples’ priority list.  I think we’re so busy and we work in a culture where 
we prioritise everything we do and we pay compensation on job if they go. 
Lack of accurate risk awareness 
P79: I wouldn’t think people do that. I mean I certainly on my desk is far from clear, but there’s nothing 
that I consider risky or insecure left on my desk, scraps of paper notes in the margin and that sort of thing. 
Misconceptions 
P107: we have got firewalls and other protection, I know incoming emails are scanned for viruses, they 
are scanned for material that might be inappropriate, so I have got a fair degree of confidence that when 
things go out, when they are sent out or they come in that they are very sort of screened, and to a degree 
kept confidential. 
Own interpretation of desired behaviours (e.g. “should write password down”) 
P56: I don’t know the reason why. If I’ve ever had to take something to a formal presentation, if I’m 
travelling overseas or anything, then I’ll use it, if I’m in the office, I’ll just use a normal USB stick and 
then it just sits on there until it gets deleted again. And normally that’s not a Company USB stick, that’s 
one that I’ve bought or been given or something.  
P3: I also made sure to delete them after I was done helping them out, so I don’t have any use of it and I, I 
know that’s sensitive information. 
P55: Yeah, it’s an encrypted stick, yeah. In the past I did have it written down in a book but I thought, 
“Well, what’s the point of putting it in my book, if someone finds the book they’ve got access to 
everything.”  So I, I put them all on a small flash drive. 
Content problem: Overloaded, vague, inconsistent, unrelated to role, Perceived as common sense  
P46: Off the top of my head I, it’s not something I could really talk about with any authority but I know 
we did have a computer training that we did fairly recently.  Um, it was just things to do with 
confidentiality and a lot of it was common sense.  To be honest with you, it’s nothing I could just 
[inaudible] and can relate back it’s just common, a lot it’s common sense. 
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Ignore policy content,  
P87: You don’t have to read it, no. It’s like the locked policies we have, you kind of know they’re there, 
but nobody actually really sucks you down to say that you’ve got to read it, and understand it. 
Dismiss policy usefulness,  
P41: Well I mean, it is sort of like a very, I hate to use the word legalese, but it’s a document that I’ve 
opened up the link before and I’ve skimmed through it and I said “I don’t have a chance to read this.”  It 
seems to be very much in audit speak. 
Devise own practices (e.g. own USB use, own password management strategies) 
P95: So I always make a point, if I’ve ever had to give my ID to somebody, I reset my password as soon 
as I can afterwards… it minimises the risk … I trust people I work with but the point is that you still take 
the contingency measure. 
No enforcement - Reduced employee motivation, Policy appears unimportant 
P52: looking around the office and I can see lots of stuff lying around on people’s desks that’s been there 
for a long time.  And I don’t believe that the ‘clear desk policy’ is administered or audited on a regular 
basis.  Perhaps the occasional walk but I can’t recollect any signs of one recently. 
Secure behaviour drivers 
Effective security communication, 
P32: I think the policies have taken steps and bounds since I passed out in the company 23 years 
ago…now it's a lot of online training.  And I believe the company communicates very well about what 
their expectations are for their employees. 
P86: “We’ve just been told not to mention it on social networking sites, because of the critical importance 
and the kind of environment we live in now, it’s best not to share that kind of stuff.  It’s just company 
policy, that’s the way they want it.” 
Architectural means make compliance easy (provided encrypted USB drives, personal network storage 
backed-up)  
P17: I remember when I would go around, their hard drives would crash…lose all their documents. And 
we started telling people stop saving stuff to your hard drive.  We have shared drives for a reason.  I saw a 
lot of that, so I think people are getting better.  I think over the past couple of years our IS security has 
gotten more involved than what we did. 
P55: we use the security enabled ones.  Well, we get a lot of gifts off suppliers that involve those and 
some people do use them but I bought for our team all us the security enabled flash drives.  
Understanding benefits of security mechanisms and use those,  
P95: I’d look at password protecting the sheet so that you couldn’t open it or view it without having the 
password.  If it was something that needed to be shared, then you could put it on a shared area providing 
you’ve got the password protection. 
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Challenge colleagues when needed 
P99: just being wary of phone conversations et cetera so making sure that one doesn’t talk about issues 
that people would not be otherwise aware of.  
Low cost of compliance - Screen lock easy to do  
P57: you can also just do Alt Control Delete and walk away, that’s what I normally do - mainly because I 
don’t want people looking, because e-mail could come in and somebody could see it, delete it, or 
whatever, and I might not see it when I get back to my desk.  I can't imagine that anyone in my office that 
do that but, I mean, people send stuff to you, which is - you have no control over what people send to 
you, so I don’t want to walk back to my screen and see something on my desktop which I didn’t even put 
on my computer 
P108: They are not allowed anything at all on their desks and they have a little locker, for their personal 
belongings, and a locked cabinet for their files, but they are not allowed to have any files at all out on 
their desk. 
Clear Desk enforced by property not security - Not leaving documents around  
P94: There’s a very strong clear desk policy, it gets checked fairly regularly, we have sort of office 
walkabouts where people walk around. Looking at safety access, so hazards and that type of thing but 
they’ll also check clear desk, a desk that’s got masses of paperwork scattered everywhere and some of 
that is commercially sensitive, and that also, that tends to get picked up as well. 
P96: There’s a clear-desk policy and I like to think I’m quite tidy on my desk and I’d like to keep stuff 
out of the way, so stuff that is important goes in the drawer and gets locked away and then I’ve got some 
general folders and stuff on my desk. 
Responsibility, Manager pressure, Peer pressure, Past events  
P41: I don’t think I’ve ever seen a company policy about it.  It’s just a given in the corporate culture that 
you would never sharing passwords… I guess what I’d say is not only is it a given for Company, I think 
it’s just given, first time you picked up a computer and anything was password protected, it became pretty 
clear on and in the internet age, when you find out all the things that can go wrong on the internet, that’s 
even more important.  So I don’t think it’s because of a policy that I remember reading, it’s just 
something that we’re working on as a given. 
P74: managers will go round and check if anything’s left out that’s confidential after normal office hours, 
and people are told that you shouldn’t be leaving company confidential information out you should 
clearly mark it if it is company confidential, and then not leave it lying around 
P115: it is certainly covered again in the team talk, it is certainly again covered when you join the 
company as part of your induction.  I think it is more like a peer pressure that if you do forget to lock your 
screen, the chap who you are sat next to is more likely to come in and write a little message on your 
screen  
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P79: you know when there are recorded attacks on systems but…lots of businesses have been attacked, I 
mean I think if you could see the this attack happened on this company and the consequence was this, that 
puts it into perspective for you and you can see that actually this is real, I do need to be more careful. 
Secure behaviours, Actions to protect computers, Screen lock  
P52: Certainly in the team, everybody around me does the same thing.  I don’t think it’s a conscious thing 
in the sense of, “Oh, there’s an IS Security Policy that says I must lock my screen.” 
P46: ‘cause the stress would be far too much to handle if I left it anywhere. 
Time impact 
VPN Slow, encrypted USB sticks slow, productivity focus  
P18: So, I try to keep less and less on my local drive, unless I am working with a really big document, 
or something where I would think that if I am going to go through VPN, the speed issues might create a 
problem for me, saving the document type of thing. 
P111: at times we do have to transfer the data to our laptops because the network is slow, response times 
can be really bad and some of the files are quite large, so we transfer them to our laptops to work on and 
then transfer them back at the end of the day.  
P115: personal USB ones so you can, instead of ordering one through the company they have already got 
ones they just use their own. 
P108: I think they will have had half a dozen or so individuals that needed this software to download the 
information to feedback to the team members taking part.  I think it took about six weeks actually from 
when I put the request in, to when I actually got the software installed. I did get around it by installing it 
on my home laptop to be able to get some information back to the colleagues that are taking part to save 
them having to wait too long. And also the colleagues taking part there is a software disk in with the 
monitor when they take it so if they want to they can install it and have a look at their own data before it 
comes back to us, but it was just that we needed that software to be able to report back to them, so it could 
be who is winning the competition I suppose. 
Unencrypted USB drives, Copy data locally 
I: Do you know if there is a particular brand that you have to use or? P116: No, nothing. We just have one 
that we share in the office anyway.   I: Is that password protected at all or? P: not to my knowledge no. 
P49: You should use an encrypted one but, you know, for ease and generally because, I haven’t got an 
encrypted one so I just use an unencrypted one, whip it across and then just delete the copy off the flash 
stick which isn’t perfect but it’s quicker, easier than having to follow the policy. 
P102: I save most things to my documents or my desktop if I need to 
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P111: At times we do have to transfer the data to our laptops because the network is slow, response times 
can be really bad and some of the files are quite large so we transfer them to our laptops to work on and 
then transfer them back at the end of the day. 
SharePoint slow to setup - USB and email file sharing  
P64: but people send you links to sharepoint areas, saying here’s the document in a certain area you don’t 
have access to it because it’s in a different sharepoint area that the one you have access to.  You have to 
request access, or, more commonly, they actually send you a copy of the document across. Which 
obviously (is) against the whole value of having sharepoint access, where you don’t send documents 
across. 
Access control setup slow 
P84: It’s not very smooth. It takes weeks to get something up. 
Slow IT support 
P60: well we don't find them particularly useful in guiding us how we then go and resolve something.   
Password reset slow 
P97: Oh yes that’s been done a few times. Usually on a Monday morning people forget or if you’ve just 
recently changed it and it can take about 15 to 20 minutes because Monday mornings is usually busy and 
any other time they do it there and then.  
Share passwords  
P51: sometimes people don’t have access to information or systems that they need to do their job and 
therefore they’re shared within teams.  And I flagged that before that it shouldn’t happen but it does.  
Because it can take so long to get something through that they might need to do their job.  So it would be, 
“Use somebody else’s account.” 
P91: That does happen sometimes. It’s just partly to fill a gap in IS, you know - because we use lots of 
systems here, and they take ages to set up, and sometimes when someone joins a team, […] he actually 
only obtained access to the systems about four months later, when he was going to leave, so in the interim 
time, he was sort of using other people’s logins. 
Frustration  
P44: (Changing passwords) it gets a little frustrating sometimes, but certainly I understand reasoning for 
it, there’s nothing you can do.  I wish they were all during the same timeframe so that you could sync 
everything, but they’re all in different schedules, I don’t have anything synced, they’re all different.  
Disruption 
Filtering and blocking problematic, Block work-related information 
P46: Yeah, we have a spam manager thing and so it will tell you…nine times out of ten it’s just harmless, 
harmless stuff.  And it doesn’t seem to be consistent because I will have had an email from that source 
that’s come straight into my inbox and yet on another occasion it will get blocked by spam manager. 
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P110: …so that you have got something that you do not quite understand, so you try and search for it on 
the Internet to try and find out a bit more about it and then something will be blocked because it is an 
educational reference.  It does not quite make sense to me why it would be blocked...public information.  
Send it as different file type 
P2: the first trick that was taught to me was you tell them to send it as a different type of file…Change the 
extension so you can get the file so that you can get your work done. 
Download at home and bring in on unencrypted drive  
P70: ... oh that's just reminded me that Gmail you can’t access that and the trouble is that's actually 
sometimes that would be useful to use as another way of sending emails. And I happen to know that 
someone was sending me a document that wasn’t coming through because our fire wall was blocking it.  
He sent it to my Gmail account and it’s still there now.  And I was planning when I get an opportunity to 
print it when I get a chance…At home or somewhere yeah.   
P115: Yes personal USB ones so you can, instead of ordering one through the company they have already 
got ones they just use their own...particularly it is to move obviously documents from one um, laptop or 
desktop to another so whether that, if they are a desktop user they might be taking it home to work on 
their own desktop or transferring it from their um, laptop onto somebody else’s laptop for presentations, 
meetings those sort of tasks…you are not really supposed to take work home, but for certain Word 
documents, I am aware that it does happen. 
Personal network drives full, Shared drives problematic - Store files locally  
P33: Then I called and I got 500 more MBs.  Then I called and I got 500 more MBs.  So, it was, it's 
difficult for me because I have to call every month to get some additional space.  (Easiest to do) for me is 
to store the work that I do on my office laptop.  
P58: I know you have to request access to specific areas if you want to do something, for example, we’ve 
got a guy from university who’s working with us for a few weeks at the moment. And he doesn’t have 
access to various files and a lot of the system areas that are on our actual S drive, so we’re just having to 
e-mail backwards and forwards bits of files…but that can make it quite difficult  because of the nature of 
the project we’ve been working on spreadsheets that are shared, so two or three people using it at the 
same time and if we need to get this guy to do something for us as well, we have to sort of send it across 
to him to update it. 
Recognise increased risks 
P71: “I don’t know how you get around that. But it’s so easy to send emails to the wrong [person]”. 
P93: effectively, you will get onto the machine and once you’ve done that, then everything is accessible. 
such as outlook, there’s no, server level of authentication or security, so, if anyone wants to keep their 
mail on their C drive, then potentially that could be an expose.  
USB and email file sharing  
P115: Yes personal USB ones so you can, instead of ordering one through the company they have already 
got ones they just use their own […] particularly is to move documents from one laptop or desktop to 
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another, if they are a desktop user they might be taking it home to work on their own desktop or 
transferring it from their laptop onto somebody else’s laptop for presentations, meetings. 
P107: we try and send as much as we can on, via the e-mail. I: And do they customer details and things 
like that? P: I guess they would yes. I guess you could identify the address from the information.  For that 
respect for support information it is whatever the, the supplier requests. 
Connectivity problems (VPN, lack of connection) - Send files to home accounts, Store files locally 
P62: I do sometimes put it on an encrypted flash drive-y thing just in case I can’t log on cause there are 
times when it doesn’t like you logging on so I tend to put it on the flash drive, it seems to work just as 
well at home, when it’s working, it’s just as here and sometimes it seems faster at home, for some 
unknown reason. 
P109: I store too much actually to be honest, on my hard disc, I have been told off for that a few times. 
Encrypted flash drive procurement problems – not everyone has one - Use unencrypted ones, Store 
information locally, Email (personal and business accounts)  
P59: there were lots of people that needed a portable means of carrying things around. And they were hit 
by and order for about 800 or something of them. And I don’t think those orders were all approved, 
because the cost was just too much.  
P30: …if I need to move a file from my computer to my co-workers computer right over there, they have 
the old communicator, we couldn’t email a database.  Which is stupid, because you could just zip the 
database and send it as a zip file and get around it anyway.  But it was quicker sometimes to just throw it 
on a flash drive and chuck it over the cube wall.  We just didn't really see the point in needing to buy an 
$80 flash drive to do that.  The people that I work with, I’m speaking from my experience, they’re all a 
lot smarter than me.  They all have grad degrees and PHDs and stuff, and they write really good 
programmes, I would trust them to take some information off their computers.  Especially if I had already 
worked with it in the past.  
P49: So they will send me an email to fill in or ask me to look over it.  And if I do need to make any 
changes I’ll save another copy to the desktop send the copy I’ve just saved in an email and then delete the 
copy off the desktop.   
Increased cognitive load 
Different services require different passwords   
P86: I think some of them require six characters, and the other one it has to be eight 
P77: I know frequent password changes force people to use a password generating mechanism that’s quite 
easy to guess, because you have to change your password every month, people would use a football team 
and just add on the number of the month, for instance, if it’s May, it’s gonna be Arsenal 5.  I think people 
just go round robin, because they have to change their passwords so frequently. Because it takes you 
probably a week to remember what you’ve changed your password, and you’re comfortable with it, and 
then all of a sudden you’ve got to change it again.  
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And quite a lot of the other people would write down their passwords and probably put them in their desk 
drawer, so I don’t think that’s very secure - I don’t write my passwords down. 
Write passwords down (ensure they don’t forget those) - Own mechanisms to protect passwords  
P57: I've got a book full of passwords, page full of passwords written down everywhere. 
P58: I have got a list of passwords written down somewhere unfortunately.  I just find there’s too many to 
remember otherwise, and we’ve got a different username and password most of the time for each of each 
of the logins, so it’s written down on a bit of paper. 
P71: I’ve got a Microsoft Word document, which is 5 pages long now, that contains passwords for 
everything.  Everything in my life, but mostly work, cause I don’t do a lot of stuff on the internet 
personally…I think the amount of password-protected things leads you to the necessity to write them 
down, which introduces a risk. 
Take own measures to protect password storage location  
P58: I have got a list of passwords...I just find there’s too many to remember and we’ve got a different 
username and password most of the time for each of the logins...it’s written down on a bit of paper...it’s 
locked in my desk when I’ve not got hold of it, probably along the laptop, which is probably not too 
clever. 
P3: I keep them all on a note on my phone. And that’s password protected as well so no one can… 
P83: it’s just in my diary in very small print.  
Too much in the policy, No role-specific communication 
P84: usually it’s aimed at people who work in the larger offices rather than the operational field depots 
P41: You’ve got probably ten hours of work to do in an eight hour day, you come to work, you look 
through some kind of weekly highlights of some important email notices you should know about and in 
one there’s a link that refers you to three pages of PC security that you need to know about as an 
employee.  Now, are you going meet that noontime deadline or are you going to go through that? 
Need to decide what they think is more relevant  
P60: You’d spend so much time thinking about every rule you might be breaking by doing anything that 
you didn't do anything. 
P64: I’ve read through the policy and try and keep to the policy.  Well, I won’t say I know it off by heart. 
I guess you tend to read it, try and get out the salient points for yourself, two or three key cues what 
shouldn’t you be doing, things like not using, common USB sticks to pass information around and things 
like that which is a recent one that’s been put in place and we’ve got special USB sticks – and never leave 
a laptop in the back of the car and things like that. 
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Organisational adaptability 
Can request removal of websites from blocked list - Slow process, No alternatives provided  
P70: I think you can now phone them up, IS helpdesk direct and they’ll do it there and then.  Or you can 
do an electronic query type of thing and you’ll go into a queue and at some point in the future they will 
contact you.  Yeah it works in a day or so which is a bit annoying. 
No effective delegation of responsibilities - Password sharing, Access using other’s accounts  
P81: It’s not unknown for people out in the field to actually share laptops, and also share user IDs and 
passwords, for their convenience...it’s not unknown for very senior people to share their passwords with 
their secretaries or PAs when, what they would see as a fairly menial task needs to be done and they want 
somebody else to do it for them 
P97: There has been an instance where I have, I was off for a month earlier this year and because of the 
resolutions were coming through and no-one had an idea what these resolutions or this packs were not 
being resolved so I gave it to one of my colleagues for him to go to my e-mail to check for the resolutions 
and that’s been the only instance I think.  
Team level security communication and mediation 
Lack of central communication, Lack of security training, Reliance on managers  
P57: don’t leave your laptop in your car, even if it’s in a boot unattended, if you’re putting stuff on a 
memory stick, make sure it’s encrypted. You’ll get a little things like that, and you’ll see things on the 
Intranet, so there is a need for security, and people do tell you, I can remember that old manager - when I 
first joined, he used to go on at the end of the day, and when you left, like, contract stuff on top of the 
desk and went home he’d pull you up on it. 
P100: We actually have monthly meetings, and that is where those things are highlighted. Monthly 
meetings where we discuss stuff across board...security stuff comes up before. 
Employees seek support from line managers, Advice between peers, Managers advice on security 
challenges 
P17: Well, like I said, we’re a small group, so it’s not like we have to reiterate things, told it once or twice 
and kind of understand so, we kind of look after each other as well. 
P14: One gentleman that works in my group gave us a whole workshop at one of our team meetings, on 
how to create secure passwords.  Not to use your pet’s name and your birthday, you know, simple things 
that people could figure out, like your phone number. 
P96: Well basically we were introduced to the security policy through my team leader.  He outlined and 
gave us a site tour of what we can and cannot do.”…“(in team talks we discuss)…if we have encountered 
what we could identify as a security moment it could be like you know a door being left open or your 
computer left being switched on or not been locked or any sensitive information lying on your desk, to be 
mindful of putting away security information also using a flash drive which are not company issued and 
stuff like that really. 
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P97: I think it’s just kind of more, sort of, word of mouth and training, that you know you’re not allowed 
to discuss that type of thing. 
P66: as a manager you've obviously got to highlight what the areas of security are but you can only 
highlight more or less what you know.  So you can only direct them to pages that are relevant, send them 
to speak to the teams that are relevant, people or if there's, if there's briefings going on they do some like 
brown bag lunches here,  but it used to be just briefings, staff briefings.  You know, you’d obviously get 
people involved in that but also you, you're constantly looking at yourself as a manager, checking that 
they're following the guidelines you’d expect.  So when they are sending things out, you know, you're 
checking that they're not sending the wrong data to the wrong person.   
They're not messing around...you know there has been instances where we’ve had to go through 
disciplinaries for  people using email...you know IT abuse.  So it’s just moderating it really. 
P95: Aside from that, if I thought there was more measures needed, then I’d speak to my manager and see 
whether they’d happy for it to be transferred into a different environment where they’d want it. 
P108: “…I have got my immediate manager that helps me understand what I need to do and what needs 
to go out and not.” 
P29: “I know from my point of view being an analyst.  If I were to ever share any information with any 
priority, even if I was not sure I would first go to my manager and ask him about it.”    
No security guidance for managers - Based on own best practice and understanding  
P71: But predominantly the things I reinforce are the things I know I need to adhere to, so memory sticks, 
password protections. 
P54: For managers I was thinking ‘cause there’s no induction, most people I suspect come in and don’t 
get an induction. I would expect to tell them a little bit about their laptop and what they’re supposed to do 
with it and how to use it.  And a bit of the security stuff on that.  But that’s whether I can remember 
everything relying on me knowing what to tell people. 
P118: I have sat down with every person that I have inducted and made very clear that if you go away 
from your desk lock your machines and not put sensitive documents on your desktop, try and back them 
onto a shared area, try to use (secure) cards etcetera, so that is still from a personal security point of view, 
it is not from (inaudible) or this is what the company believes is best security.  
Access control decision making by managers (authorising access to resources), Management 
authorisation for information access - Ad hoc – based on manager understanding and perception - Varies 
by location and manager 
P31: ...one of my supervisors requested access for me 
P49: what would happen is, you fill in a form online saying you need this software, your manager would 
approve it saying, “Yes, you do need that software for this reason.”  It gets sent over to IS, they receive 
the request and send the software down to your laptop.   
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P53: Again, it’s down to the area manager and no one else...the reason I diverted away from policy has 
been driven by a business requirement.  And it’s one of those things that’s always been discussed with 
seniors and it’s been seen as a work around because the policy doesn’t fit the business requirement... 
P79: the manager of each team is responsible for allocating permissions  
“I: Are you responsible for their security awareness in any sense?” P98: “That’s an interesting point. 
That’s not something that has ever been particularly made clear to me. I suspect I would take that on 
board as a normal encompassing responsibility with regards to having people at work for me doing the 
right thing but I don’t recall any specific guideline”  
Security perception 
Required to protect organisation - Motivation to comply  
(on no password sharing) P70: Because it’s something that I think we very infrequently do because once 
you're onto the main network obviously someone can access all the information, send emails as yourself, 
change all your permissions around.  So I always avoid it.  Sometimes it comes up as a bit of any solution 
and I've always refused to do that actually.  More for personal reasons I would say.  Not because I think 
there's particularly a big corporate risk, it’s just, certainly for my own risk it’s a significant risk to take. 
P75: I’m kind of lucky because most of the team members that I deal with are within this (sensitive) 
section so they’re already very security-focused. So they’d be the other way around, they would say “No, 
I don’t want this to happen because it could open up - it could be less secure by doing this.” 
If security appears to demand reasonable time/effort AND employees understand role-related risks they 
follow recommended practices 
P84:  all this information was usually kept on paper form in boxes somewhere, and then usually sort of 
lost, so we got it all electronic and all on a shared area that we’ve got access to. 
P72: you don’t accidentally disclose information of one bidder to another, which means keeping 
information secure and kind of being aware about who you share it with and what information gets into 
the public domain, particularly during a tender process 
Impacts productivity - Non-compliance justified 
P91: I suppose I’ve got a skewed way of doing it, because I’ve never really given out any of my details to 
people, but I have used other people’s...sometimes (I feel) a bit uncomfortable, you have to get a job 
done, and then that’s how they’d justify it. 
P42: So I have huge amounts of data that I have stored multiple gigabytes of email of storage going back 
over 10 years.  Very much contrary to the written policies, but if I’m really expected to be able to use past 
experience, I need to be able to use my records for that experience.  Email’s one of the most convenient 
ways to do that. 
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Problematic security perception: Blanket rules  
P60:  I think occasionally we may be, possibly, overdo the rules or maybe sort of there's a little bit too 
much red tape that starts to make things counterproductive. 
No effective guidance 
P41: ...they tell you to do some things, but they don’t really tell you how to do them 
Access control housekeeping problematic (revoking not quick) 
P66: But I would imagine there's still going to be instances where people still had access a week later or 
they've still got access to the shared areas...their profiles haven't been updated to reflect their changes.  It 
sometimes takes a week, two weeks, maybe a month before they even get done and it’s down to that 
person really more than anything chasing it to get it done.  So if you've got someone who’s not really 
bothered then they've probably still got access to it now. 
P109: There is five or six people that have since left the business or, have gone elsewhere in the business 
but that they have the password. 
Feedback goes unnoticed  
P51: it was closed down five minutes later, I replied to the email and said I didn’t think it should be 
closed down and I haven’t heard anything more.  My manager’s now trying to chase it but that’s been 
nearly a month, that call is unresolved...There’s no channel to escalate it.  And there’s no ownership in IS 
I think is the problem because it isn’t our own IS whereas before you’d know that you could go to that 
person’s manager or they would know who to take it to who specialised in that. 
No attempts to improve  
P97: I mean they are talking about it, I can see there are flaws and it can be improvements so if anyone 
wanted to get data they could, I mean they have not followed, the USBs cannot be used but I think they 
just kept it at one level and just try and educate people instead of actually physically putting things in 
process.  
Sanction based, People just comply to avoid trouble, Job security – lack of motivation  
P71: I’d probably be more worried about the implications on myself, rather than other company. I don’t 
think the company would be impacted that greatly, but it wouldn’t be good. 
No enforcement  
P52: looking around the office I can see lots of stuff lying around on people’s desks that’s been there for a 
long time.  And I don’t believe that the ‘clear desk policy’ is administered or audited on a regular basis.  
Perhaps the occasional walk but I can’t recollect any signs of one recently. 
Varies by location 
P109: I get down to (location of other office) quite a lot, specifically in dispatch area, it does not seem to 
happen as much, people just leave their machines open and walk away for a coffee or a cigarette or 
whatever 
312 
 
 
 
Security perceived as inflexible and not serving employee priorities 
(Closed-built laptops) P66: You know if you want to download something sometimes, like for instance I 
build and design spreadsheets and sometimes I’ll download that bit of code and I can’t do anything with 
it.  For me it’s frustrating.  But some of the things I want to take and use in some way that other people 
have done which would help me quicken my job up I can’t do so yeah it can be frustrating.  
Security rules perceived as unimportant 
P87: the volunteers got big concerns really and the company doesn’t seem to be doing too much about it.  
P109: ...it is something that does worry me a little bit a lot of the systems that we have, they sit on a 
shared area where,  anyone who knows the password can get in and change anything and the passwords 
are not really hidden that well, I mean, even if you did not really know, but you had a knowledge of the 
job, probably give you about five attempts and you could probably guess what it is anyway. 
Perception as less important than other organisational issues 
P99: What, IT security as compared to health and safety? I would say less than visible. 
Employees doing what they believe they can get away with  
P52: obviously there are cases and disciplinary cases where people abuse the policy and action is taken.  I 
don’t believe the management particularly follow up a lot of perhaps what the audit trail might show in 
terms of internet usage.   
Culture perception 
Colleagues willing to comply and be secure  
P54: I think most of the people follow most of the rules most of the time 
Productivity driven culture 
P57: obviously security, you have to consider it. But it’s never at the front of the supplier. 
P84: they wouldn’t’ve downloaded the policy and read through it, they’d’ve just used the common sense 
approach. 
Health and safety more important 
P62: We sometimes do go over the top, like all those messages about holding on to the handrail, now I 
always hold onto the handrail, because I tend to be clumsy and trip over but we got over the top, but I 
don’t see security being driven from the top in the same way as safety and the carbon footprint. 
Lack of awareness on many security issues  
P50: And sometimes documents can’t be sent.  But in all honesty I’m not too sure about the Security 
Policy, I haven’t been really introduced to it and in all honesty I’ve not read it.  I actually have not 
received any formal training regarding Information Security, all I’ve ever been taught is how to create 
things. 
Oversharing information 
P111: We have a part of the site which is only for resource management staff only so only those people 
can see that part of the of the site, and then we have the different areas of the business that can only see 
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their part of the of the site.  So it is quite a big concern sometimes because we have like three, four 
hundred staff potentially that could have access to it. 
Contractors have different values than employees 
P66: ...but also it’s not just that but it’s internally as well when we have contractors coming in who are 
replacing people who have been here longer for the sake of saving money...for instance at the moment 
we’ve had an instance where this person’s sent out a couple of documents that really aren’t for private 
viewing but they're unprotected you know. 
Culture static - Need to be more proactive  
P112: I think it probably remained about the same but at the same time I think they are going through a 
little drive of just doing it and then it just kind of stops so it is either full on, never leave your computer 
unlocked or nothing is said about it, but it is amazing like the difference from one building to the other, 
but considering, when someone starts they are not shown anything on security, that is probably not a good 
sign. 
P100: I just think people should be encouraged to be a bit more vigilant because people don’t really 
realize how serious it can be, so I think they should focus on security, highlight it more. 
I: So, which way would you say the culture is moving? Is it that, security is getting tighter, or it is 
weakening? P110: To be honest from day to day things, I do not really see it moving to be honest. 
Shadow Security - Company B 
Category name No Percent 
Access control easy to setup - No password sharing 43 52.44% 
Access revoking problematic, Should be doing more, Information oversharing prevalent, 
No enforcement - Central security appears ineffective 29 35.37% 
Actions to protect laptops 43 52.44% 
Aware of privacy marking existence, Marking depends solely on owner, Admit to not 
knowing how to use these - Gets support from line manager, Overclassify 47 57.32% 
Awareness about clear desk, Hot desking, Lockable drawer, Secure disposal bins, Clear 
desk enforcement - Clear desk compliance 55 67.07% 
Awareness on the importance of information they handle, potential breaches, impact to 
the organisation and the need for security 78 95.12% 
Can request removal of websites from blocked list - Reported problems followed up 3 3.66% 
clear desk 42 51.22% 
Communication at team meetings, Security support by line managers and colleagues, 
Devise own adaptations to unsatisfactory security measures or Introduce own novel 
solutions 65 79.27% 
Communication of relevant regulation on sensitive information 28 34.15% 
Downplay sensitivity of information they use 42 51.22% 
Downplaying some risks 43 52.44% 
Employees not fully aware of policies – also partially dismiss their usefulness, Managers 
not know complete policies, Access control decision making by managers (authorising 
access to resources), Management approval for information access - Ad hoc – based on 73 89.02% 
Employees want to comply/contribute to security, Challenging colleague behaviour - 
Mechanisms demanding reasonable time/effort are followed IF employees understand 
why 77 93.90% 
Encrypted USBs problems - Use unencrypted ones 10 12.20% 
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Forget encrypted USB password – lose access - Carry laptop with data 47 57.32% 
Impacts productivity (e.g. email filtering/access problems, password reset problems) - 
Negative attitude, Insecure behaviours justified 66 80.49% 
Inconsistent email filtering, Website blocking problematic - Access the information at 
home 30 36.59% 
Information left around – picked up by clear desk inspections (“don’t happen often”), No 
reprimands or enforcement 20 24.39% 
Managers not know complete policies, Problematic central communication and training 
(irrelevant, generic, inconsistent and overloaded), Reliance on managers not formalised 40 48.78% 
Marking guidelines confusing, Not using those 30 36.59% 
NDA people are more aware on the need to be careful with information 55 67.07% 
Need to know information sharing 28 34.15% 
Network drive small, Connectivity problematic, Encrypted drives - feel safe - Reliant on 
local storage, Ad-hoc backups (to external drives – sometimes personal), “Unintentional 
backups” onto local laptop systems, of e.g. emails. 64 78.05% 
No lockable space - Clear desk problematic, Need to carry documents with them 46 56.10% 
No understanding of data classification 14 17.07% 
Not everything relevant, Aware on role-related clauses, Policy perceived as common 
sense 34 41.46% 
Not many employees report concerns or problems - No reporting culture 11 13.41% 
Not share passwords 30 36.59% 
Own interpretation, Role-specific awareness, Not checking website, Not everything 
relevant, Colleague/line manager support 66 80.49% 
Own mechanisms 67 81.71% 
Password manager not work for all systems - Write passwords in documents or on paper 52 63.41% 
Password protecting important documents 34 41.46% 
Password resets easy - Uninterrupted access 29 35.37% 
Perceived inability of the technical side to get some things right, Some generic accounts 
appear to exist, Sharing files through multiple formal/informal channels 62 75.61% 
Policy awareness - Actively look for policy updates 13 15.85% 
Policy on website – Not check 25 30.49% 
Problematic organisational security communication 45 54.88% 
Problematic security training 71 86.59% 
Productivity driven culture, Security considered tickboxing, Lack of awareness on many 
security issues, Varies across locations, Need to be more proactive - Perception of 
security training as non-important, OK to bypass security when it creates primary task p 72 87.80% 
Protects the organisation adequately, Closed-build, encrypted password protected 
laptops, Considered in requirements - Importance of security well understood, 
Employees see value in security 44 53.66% 
Rely on managers and colleagues 52 63.41% 
Responsibility, Manager pressure, Peer pressure, Past events - Secure behaviours, 
Actions to protect computers, Screen lock 70 85.37% 
Responsive helpdesk, reported problems followed up - Report problems 3 3.66% 
Screen lock 37 45.12% 
Security and compliance measured using CBT completion rates, Too many CBTs, 
Information appears irrelevant, Communicated information perceived as common sense - 
Communication perceived as unimportant, Self (or team)-devised security behaviours 68 82.93% 
SharePoint slow to setup, Access control setup slow, Slow IT support, Password reset 
slow 63 76.83% 
Sharing drives hard to manage - Share information through emails, Also third party 
services used 64 78.05% 
Too much in the policy, No role-specific communication 29 35.37% 
Unaware of physical security policy - Not wearing pass, Not challenged 19 23.17% 
Usable password manager - No writing down 38 46.34% 
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Various passwords for different systems, Password change rules across different systems 
- Keep passwords same, Passwords similar after changes, Write passwords down 58 70.73% 
VPN provides adequate access – reliable, Personal network storage - No local file 
storage 43 52.44% 
VPN Slow - Local storage 61 74.39% 
 
Risk / need for security awareness 
Awareness on the importance of information they handle, potential breaches, impact to the organisation 
and the need for security  
P46: Very sensitive information, like customer information in VIP accounts and all this kind of stuff. 
Actions to protect laptops 
P70: …my laptop is never left in the car.  It is left in my home obviously in my home office and it’s either 
there or at work and if I leave it at work unattended because I’ve gone off to a meeting or whatever then I 
would lock the screen as well as that’s one of the other things we’re encouraged to do 
Not share passwords 
P54: My view is that no one will get my password, so even if I’m dead and buried, they’ll have to try and 
work it out. I’m sure there’s a way around that somewhere, but no, they don’t. 
Screen lock 
P25: Yes I always screen lock it before I walk away, but in any case it screen locks automatically after 15 
minutes. 
Clear desk 
P4: …But then you have to be more careful as to what people can see or what papers you have on your 
desk...I tend to not have paper but just a few notes.  I don’t print anything out. 
Communication of relevant regulation on sensitive information 
P19: if we do not adhere to CBTs and other things like that we can be taken to Court by either the 
regulator because we are not compliant with the business standards and so on that are required by Law 
and that would have consequences in terms of potential fines as well as brand reputation or impact 
NDA presence on some projects  
P39: Very strict on competition law, we have competition law guidelines, we’ve all signed NDA’s, 
documents of what you can and what you can’t do basically.   
“Need to know” information sharing 
P58: Basically, it’s on a need to know basis, if someone’s job role requires that information and it’s 
confirmed that they’re allowed to have that information, then you would supply them with that 
information. 
Password protecting important documents 
P33: If I was to produce statistics about the whole of Company B’s something or other, then it becomes 
much more significant…there are certain elements of security there. A) My PC’s encrypted and B) I get 
the statistics through an encrypted link.  
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P73: Yes, yes, we would password protect them, not all the time because generally they may not be saved 
for very long.  So we have a drive that’s specific for our team and no one else has access to that.  So it’s 
quite secure, but if there’s something on there that I no longer need then I would just delete it.  But there 
will be occasions when I password protect. 
NDA people are more aware on the need to be careful with information 
P39: I can send stuff to Company B employees and I can send stuff to Company Z employees, but I can 
only send stuff that’s relevant to their networks…Very strict on competition law, we’ve all signed 
NDA’s, documents of what you can and what you can’t do basically.   
Problematic organisational security communication (among other things, generic, not done, role-based) 
P18: A massive amount of anacronims that aren’t defined and whoever’s written it assumes everyone’s 
going to read it and spend as much time on the document as they have and understands it like they do, 
which is clear not the case? 
P34: The other thing is of course that whilst we state the policy and we sent a note out to everybody that 
was misusing encrypted USB sticks, we don’t ratify or remind people about the policy on a regular basis 
or tell them what the consequences of not using a USB stick is. 
Problematic security training (CBT based, generic, tickboxing)  
P22: It’s for our auditors to be happy…I think we could do with doing something a little bit more 
interesting and a bit more of a floor stand out in the foyer, and then some education through that way. 
Rely on managers and colleagues 
P62: I do remind them every now and again that it’s probably not best to be emailing things around. But 
nothing more than that I think. 
P73: not really because the team’s quite big and there’s quite a good mix of experience so you tend to 
find if there’s something you don’t know, someone else on the team does.   
No understanding of data classification  
P61: I don’t think that’s widely understood, the different security classifications and the different 
treatment that that should be 
Downplay sensitivity of information they use 
P67: With my sort of stuff I don’t think they could do any harm to the company because a lot of it is just 
budget information and head counts.  So they’d know who was where and what grade and what pay and 
stuff which is confident but it’s not damaging to the company I wouldn’t have thought. 
P34: Whereas the problem is, they’re probably right, 99.9% of the time the data is not confidential, the 
issue is for a corporation like us, it’s that 0.1% that somebody does by accident and then leaves a list of 
people’s phone numbers along with photos of the family and leave the stick on a bus. 
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P65: Yes, I guess I’ve seen, I don’t know how sensitive- I’ve never seen customer information, for one 
thing, but I have seen marketing information which, again, would be useful not necessarily to me, but 
useful to a competitor, if they found that. Yeah, quite often you do see, probably not confidential, but 
quite often you do see documents left on printers, and you know that they’ve been there for like 24 hours, 
which is always strange.  
Policy awareness 
Policy awareness - Actively look for policy updates 
P12: … provided you’ve done your CBT, the point of it is, so that you know where to go and find that 
information even if you can’t remember it. 
P78: The policies that have applied to us, I’m pretty clear on; I could probably, maybe go through and list 
80/90%, where I’m not sure, then I do know where to look and the policies are all documented on our 
local intranet pages.  
Not everything relevant, Aware on role-related clauses, Policy perceived as common sense  
P43: The policies that have applied to us, I’m pretty clear on; I could probably, maybe go through and list 
80/90% of, where I’m not sure, then I do know where to look and, the policies are all documented on our 
local intranet pages. So I’ve probably got something like an 80/90% understanding of the policies, and the 
finer detail I’ll just go and find the documentation. 
P52: I don’t think if you go through the security one or any of them a light bulb doesn’t flash and think, 
“oh I must remember that for the future, I didn’t realise that or think about that.” I think it’s really 
common sense looking at them. 
Own mechanisms (e.g. use USB, erase afterwards), Downplaying some risks 
P46: Oh, in a follow up email once they’ve received the email. They’ll phone me up to say they’ve 
received it and I’ll send the password. I don’t know if that’s the right way but that’s the way I was 
instructed to.  
P55: But the other thing I tend to do with that sort of thing is to use a USB stick to record the data on and 
to delete the data once I’ve finished, so the data is never left with a permanent impression on my hard 
drive of my home computer. 
P6: Not that I am aware of. There probably is but not something that I’m consciously think about on a 
daily basis...you can probably assume that if you were looking at an account problem and the person had 
an issue with their billing, their billing information it’s probably more important that you keep that secure 
than the security of the password to their mail account.  You can sort of be logical really. 
P34: You only follow policy when you know and understand the reason for that policy and that you’re 
impacted by the reasons for that policy. In most instances most people aren’t impacted by the reason the 
data they think they’re transferring, they don’t see as confidential so it’s fit within the policies where 
concerned.  
P5: It’s unlikely. But there’s no password information or anything like that. All they can literally see is, 
“This bit’s attached to this, and attached to this and to this.” So… I suppose if someone was trying to 
work out the structure of our network then it might aid them in that, but it’s not much use to anyone.  
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Policy on website - Not check 
P46: Over the years we’ve been told not to do certain things. We also have some official policy that you 
can refer to if you think you’re doing something wrong. I never used it. You can usually tell in your gut if 
you’re doing something wrong. If I have any queries, I’ll just ask my manager. 
P57: I think one of the obligations when you start is to read security policies document, which to be 
honest is a huge document and don’t know how many people actually do read it, but I suspect very few 
read it end to end.  But that was certainly sort of part of the new starter activities. 
Aware of privacy marking existence, Marking depends solely on owner, Admit to not knowing how to use 
these - Gets support from line manager, Overclassify 
P64: There are a range from ‘highly confidential’ … In fact I think there’s one above ‘highly 
confidential’. I can’t remember what that is, but yes, we do have a range and all of our documentation 
should be marked with that and generally speaking it is. I couldn’t give you a definition of what each of 
those were, though.  
P55: No, see that’s something that does strike me as being a bit odd.  I sometimes see documents that 
have got a classification label on them, which is confidential or whatever.  But I don’t think I’ve ever 
really come across strict definitions of what they mean. 
P61: No, I don’t think that’s widely understood, the different security classifications and the different 
treatment that that should be. 
P58: If I was to share something that I hadn’t been advised I was allowed to share, that impacts my own 
personal performance and rather than share the information, I would check with someone more senior 
than myself whether I’m allowed to share that information with these people and whether they should 
have this information.  
P45: So I don’t necessarily think about the other level it’s either sensitive information or not, and I just 
kind of do it on that because it’s then kind of a bit of a safer way doing it. 
Unaware of marking guidelines  
I: You have a division, that’s important. Do, do you have an official classification of data, for example, 
the customer data? P6: Not that I am aware of. There probably is but not something that I’m consciously 
think about on a daily basis...you can probably assume that if you were looking at an account problem and 
the person had an issue with their billing, their billing information it’s probably more important that you 
keep that secure than the security of the password to their mail account.  You can sort of be logical really. 
P73: I would just mark them as confidential, I don’t use an official classification. I: Are you aware of 
your classification?  P: No, in honesty, I’m not. 
Information left around – picked up by clear desk inspections (“don’t happen often”), No reprimands or 
enforcement 
P60: …I have seen marketing information which would be useful not necessarily to me, but useful to a 
competitor, if they found that…quite often you do see documents left on printers, and you know that 
they’ve been there for like 24 hours, which is always strange.  
P62: In my personal opinion. I think there is still too much left lying around. I don’t think it’s difficult to 
find out about things if you look hard enough. 
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P53: Yeah, the security chaps go round at night when there’s nobody around. They’ll leave little notices 
saying they’ve “picked so and so off, it’s in the security room if you want it” and things like that. 
Unaware of physical security policy - Not wearing pass, Not challenged 
P73: I think there is a policy, I don’t know how strongly it’s enforced because I don’t wear mine around 
my neck, I always have it with me but I don’t wear it so that it’s visible. 
P57: We don’t challenge people if they’re not wearing a pass. If we started doing that then I think 
everybody would because people just sort of fall in line, but I wouldn’t say that we are security conscious. 
I don’t think we’re particularly lax but I don’t think that’s by choice. It’s just a herd mentality. People just 
do what they’ve always done and it’s sort of alright, is my impression. 
I: So, if you see a stranger, your assumption is that they should be, somehow, there? P36: Well, if they 
got passed security somehow.  
Secure behaviour drivers 
Awareness about clear desk, Hot desking, Lockable drawer, Secure disposal bins, Clear desk 
enforcement - Clear desk compliance 
P29:… you’d be in a lot of trouble anyway if you know, someone went past your desk, and any sort of 
paper work was left lying by your desk. 
P72: They collect it and lock it away when they’re at work and then take it away and it goes into a secure 
cabinet. 
P70: I say, those sort of documents tend to only stay around for a short period of time because the only 
the place I’ve got to keep documents is my carry case and I like to keep that fairly light so I’ll probably 
just get them shredded once we’ve been to the meeting. 
VPN provides adequate access – reliable, Personal network storage - No local file storage 
P18: Yeah initially when I first got a laptop and first started working from home there were some 
technical glitches but that was a year and half ago, since then it’s been smooth. 
P32: Yeah, it’s the same. What you do is you have your password to log in to your laptop. Once you’ve 
logged it’s effectively just a dead laptop because you can connect to your internet at home, but you can’t 
connect to Company B’s network at all until you log in with this PIN code that you’ve got that no one 
else knows. 
P30: I use that rather than my C drive, because yes, if my C drive ever broke or my PC goes missing then 
I lose everything and people get access to it. 
P81: so from my point of view everything’s backed up on the central drive; I don’t keep no Company B 
data at home on separate discs or hard drives.   
Responsive helpdesk, Reported problems followed up - Report problems 
P57: I think helpdesk broadly are okay…we realised you could literally log into anyone’s machines, so it 
wasn’t just customer services’; you could go round the director’s and all sorts of stuff. I think we flagged 
that and it got changed quietly. 
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Password resets easy - Uninterrupted access 
P59: Yes, home page; you find the password reset form drop-down box; it's fairly straightforward. 
P19: So it works, shall we say, in terms of checking that people should continue to have access to 
systems. 
Access control easy to setup - No password sharing 
P14: No, you have to wait… Once you’ve got authorisation you’re talking minutes, if not seconds.  
Generally the IT people are pretty good at return, giving you access work when the authorisation has been 
cleared. 
P1: Everyone has their own discrete access…You have to log in on your own user name and password. 
Usable password manager - No writing down 
P41: it’s like a little security tool and if someone boots an application up, it’s auto-stored the user and 
password for it and therefore it will auto-populate and log them in, so you don’t have to remember all the 
different users and passwords that they’ve got.  
P37: we don’t have to remember our passwords; it does it for you, which is great, so you don’t feel 
tempted to write it down, so that’s a great help. 
Responsibility, Manager pressure, Peer pressure, Past events - Secure behaviours, Actions to protect 
computers, Screen lock 
P19: we have a huge privilege of access to a lot of information about our customers that is at the heart of 
our business and that the trust our customers give us in holding that information is incredibly important. 
P59: If laptops have been left on the desk overnight, I might be the last person to leave the office and I 
may have put them in a draw or taken them home with me and brought them back in the morning.  
P4: If I had an attitude where I said “oh well let’s not worry about PCI Compliance for these systems” 
then yes I think she (their manager) would be very worried. 
P55: Someone who sits near me actually used to write them down in the back of their book, simply 
because they had so many.  I kept pointing it out. It’s also one of those things about people walking away 
from their desk and leaving their laptop unlocked.  I know that it will eventually lock itself, but they go, 
“Coffee, do you want anything?” and it’s like, “Okay, I’m fine,” and they wander off, so I’ll send 
someone an e-mail from them. 
P80: I hear a lot of stories of people leaving them on tubes and stuff like that.  Most of my experience is 
that when people have lost them it’s been in a bar in their bag and their bags been stolen.  Yeah well 
people who’ve lost it in a bar essentially had it nicked…their bag will just disappear. 
Time impact 
VPN Slow - Local storage and external backup 
P51: Yes, and I’m actually in that situation now, would you believe.  It may not be completely related to 
password, but my VPN stopped working on Sunday, which means I cannot log on at all, other than I can 
still get e-mails on my iPad, but for everything else I can’t get on.   
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P50: It’s establishing the VPN that’s more painful and more awkward so it’s that sort of thing.  To be 
honest, say for example, you are up and down on the train, the connectivity is not there to keep the VPN 
maintained so you need to keep a local copy a lot of the time so that’s the reason. 
Encrypted USBs problems - Use unencrypted ones 
P42: Well, sometimes it just hasn’t worked and it’s really let me down which is really annoying because 
it’s not like I’ve forgotten the password or anything like that, it’s just sometimes it just doesn’t work. 
P11: The stuff I’ve ordered from it can take weeks to come through.  Yes it can be a pain that. 
P23: if you are working with commercial documentation which tends to be pretty significant in terms of 
size, there just won’t be a transfer mechanism for them other than ‘I’m going to stick in on a USB 
stick’…if it’s about me standing next to an employee that I know and trust and then putting it on a USB 
stick that I’ve just provided, handing it to me and me walking to my pc, that’s fine.  If we’re going to post 
it or not personally accompany it then I would encrypt it. 
P76: Some people do have personal USB sticks. If they’ve taken a picture of something that’s outside 
then there’s no need for that level of security. 
SharePoint slow to setup, Access control setup slow, Slow IT support, Password reset slow  
P8: if you’re not the owner of SharePoint but are working on a project and you want to store stuff onto 
SharePoint so it’s available more widely to a certain group of people, then not being in control of that 
SharePoint folder and having to go to the administrator to say, “Can I have this document? Can you give 
me access rights?”…sometimes that’s a bit frustrating because it’s a delay in doing that. 
P23: But when I want to get into a file it’s password-protected, “What’s the password? Let me in.” Or 
access to a Share Point. If your name’s not down in the database, then you need to ask the 
administrator…it’s a ten second job for the administrator, but the problem is 1) getting hold of that 
administrator and 2) ensuring that the administrator who doesn’t know who you are, making sure that 
administrator realises that there’s an urgency for you  
P37: It’s a new contract worker coming in.   We’ve got an organisation who now manage all our 
contractors. They’ve been waiting for their log-in details.  It takes a while to come through, can take a 
week; you have to plan ahead, and they hadn’t got them, so they’ve been using their managers’, 
apparently. 
Perceived inability of the technical side to get some things right, Some generic accounts appear to exist, 
Sharing files through multiple formal/informal channels 
P54: In advance of recruiting or knowing the names of the people I’m recruiting, I need to set up all of 
those accesses. So I set up a generic access for those people, so in the early stages, a number of people 
will be sharing a generic access while we go through the process of creating LAN ID and all of the 
various system accesses. It was in a controlled way that it was done but it was because of the urgency of 
getting those people onboard and the first part of the access set up via a generic access 
P5: I think there’s only one or two systems where we have a generic password, like a team password. 
Obviously the policy is that everyone has individual passwords. It’s just some systems don’t allow that, 
so I can only think of a couple that we’ve got, but in general, they’re all individual passwords.  
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I: How do you arrive at a password, if it’s a team one? 
P: Normally someone will just e-mail it out, basically saying, “This is what it is, if you need to 
access that.” If it gets changed, because some of them time-out, then they e-mail it around again saying, 
“It’s changed to this.” Yeah, but there’s very few. 
P48: Normally e-mail, there are SharePoint sites that are scarcely get used, most people just e-mail to 
each other still that’s the way most people do it. 
P40: Well, as a team we use Drop Box quite a bit. It’s not formally mandated but Drop Box works very 
well with us. It’s private enough for the team. That’s how we have most of our work stack documents or 
any big documents. Outside of our team, some people have tried to share SharePoint documents and it 
doesn’t work…What other ways? Sadly back to email again. 
Disruption 
Network drive small, Connectivity problematic, Encrypted drives - feel safe - Reliant on local storage, 
Ad-hoc backups (to external drives – sometimes personal), “Unintentional backups” onto local laptop 
systems, of e.g. emails. 
P16: I used to use a network drive but it’s filled up.  They give you some sort of awful limit on the 
network, I have about four gigs worth of data of artefacts and important stuff that I need access to and I 
think on the network drive they allocate something like 50 meg, it’s just useless.  So it all goes on the 
laptop unfortunately. 
P4: I’ve got a hard drive I plug into my USB to do back-ups and that drive doesn’t tend to go out of my 
home. 
P7: all the basic raw systems data will be on the corporate main frame, but the material that we extract for 
our use and you know I have probably 20 or 30 gigabytes of data sitting on my laptop, together with that 
backed up on hard drives and so on…and obviously I encourage my team to do similar sort of back up 
activity.  I’m sure if we scream the place down we could probably find ourselves some hard drives 
somewhere. 
P37: I have actually backed up my data recently on to a portable device, which I keep at home, and it is 
secure, only because I would prefer to do it for me, but they say that’s our responsibility now, because 
that function has, again, been outsourced, and they don’t have that capability…it’s my responsibility to 
back it up to the hard drive if there’s enough room available. 
P69: I’ve got it in my bag in fact.  I do this once a week.  We’ve got an external western digital, so that 
drive is also encrypted and password protected as well and basically we run a back up of our laptop 
probably once a week to back the files up but again we can’t get into that without the correct details. 
Forget encrypted USB password – lose access - Carry laptop with data 
P42: Well, sometimes it just hasn’t worked and it’s really let me down which is really annoying because 
it’s not like I’ve forgotten the password or anything like that, it’s just sometimes it just doesn’t work. If I 
go to a supplier’s premises or anything like that with my laptop 
P28: USB sticks are the most protective sticks in the world. I had two and I couldn’t remember the 
passwords for the life of me, so I can’t use them. 
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Sharing drives hard to manage - Share information through emails, Also third party services used 
P6: It depends, our team one seems quite clear but I’ve worked on various projects before and had 
problems being able to access certain directories. It can be quite frustrating and then you have to get the 
administrator to give you access and it can take time. 
P23: I love the way people believe e-mail is the only way of communicating. It’s not. If you need 
something doing quickly, you need to ring someone. 
P40: Well, as a team we use Drop Box quite a bit. 
Inconsistent email filtering, Website blocking problematic - Access the information at home 
P10: We looked at it and thought “Why has this been blocked?”  “Why?”  We never found it.  They 
thoroughly checked the document and couldn’t see what it was picking up.  It’d happen fairly frequently 
actually. 
P66: Yeah.  Company B tends to be the other way around, to be honest, so you get things classified as 
spam that aren’t which is frustrating, particularly when some of them originate internally on our network.   
P54: It’s difficult to say. In my view, there’s one particular site I was trying to get access to that had come 
back saying, “This site has been blocked,” that in my view wasn’t really … But then I could kind of see 
they were erring on the side of caution, so I just said, “Okay, fine, fair enough. I won’t bother, I’ll do it at 
home.” 
Password manager not work for all systems - Write passwords in documents or on paper 
P44: I have the application that’s installed so that updates the system as and when it needs to and if I need 
to manually go in there and change it I can do that by that method but I also have a back-up which is my 
outlook in notes. 
No lockable space - Clear desk problematic, Need to carry documents with them 
P23: I have a couple of key documents for me in my laptop bag. They are strategy presentations printed 
off. Like I’ve just done now, anything that’s on the desk I put … everything; wallet, charger off the 
phone, I’ll unplug it all and put it in my bag and leave my bag on the desk here. I’m not going to walk it 
around. I like to think I’m secure here. 
Increased cognitive load 
Various passwords for different systems, Password change rules across different systems - Keep 
passwords same, Passwords similar after changes, Write passwords down 
P4: I would make them as simple as the system would let me get away with and I would record them in a 
word document.  So it’s not all that secure but if there’s so many of them and ‘remember me’ won’t work.  
I can’t remember them all. 
P10: You don’t necessarily, you don’t write them in a notebook, put it that way. I:  So it’s like a secure 
Word document on your computer or laptop or something like that. P: Precisely.  Yes. 
P56: Yes, so what I used to do is whenever the first one came up that needed to change, I’d then change 
them all to keep them in sync.  It’s not long really, 10 minutes, quarter of an hour you’ve kind of done it.  
It’s just I think there’s a tendency with that sort of thing to complain about it more than to actually just get 
on with it and do it. 
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Too much in the policy, No role-specific communication - Own interpretation. Role-specific awareness, 
Not checking website, Not everything relevant, Colleague/line manager support 
P82: I obviously know the general jist of most of the security policies but I wouldn’t say I know the in-
depth detail of everything.  
P39: They are very easy, I’ll just have a quick look through one now.  Yes they are fairly clear.  It’s 
basically common sense, common sense, common sense. 
P7: Well for instance would be that if I am copying a draft report to some of my team to review, I might 
even though it’s screamingly obvious to them, I might still reinforce the message in the covering email, 
by reminding them that this contains customer information, that sort of thing. So it’s a sort of apologetic 
reminder that they need to do what I know damn well they will do.  It’s the way you reinforce those sort 
of messages…It’s my personal way of approaching it, whether or not it’s company policy I don’t know.  
But again I think with a lot of these things, there is an element of common sense in them, making sure 
that the you know papers have all the right confidentiality markings on, which definitely is company 
policy and then reminding everybody if you’re sending them a draft or something like that, or what the 
intended circulation is, who they shouldn’t send it to if necessary.   
I: Are you aware of the general security policies? P46: I know where they are.  I: Do you ever refer to 
them? P: No. I: Have you ever read them?  P: I’ve been here a long time. I probably have. 
P30: Probably a broad principle, rather than detail, I’d have to say. 
P58: Yeah, if I’m discussing something which is confidential I will make sure I tell them I tell them it’s 
confidential, “please don’t talk to anyone else about it.” We recently had an incident where someone had 
joined by team and they had had an incident in the office. I needed to brief my team, “this is confidential, 
please don’t talk about it” 
Marking guidelines confusing - Not using those 
P61: No, I don’t think that’s widely understood, the different security classifications and the different 
treatment that that should be. 
I: Is there an official classification? P70: There is, yeah. I: Do you know the levels? P: No.  I know one is 
more severe than the other but I couldn’t tell you specifically what we’re supposed to do and not do. 
Organisational adaptability 
Can request removal of websites from blocked list - Reported problems followed up 
P57: But it was only when the password changed that we realised you could literally log into anyone’s 
machines, so it wasn’t just customer services’; you could go round the director’s and all sorts of stuff. I 
think we flagged that and it got changed quietly. 
P22: You can e-mail a particular group who will unbar it for you, and they’ll let your line manager know 
that you’re doing it. No it’s pretty quick, I’ve not needed to do it recently, but it’s pretty fast like that if 
people have a good reason to do something. 
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Not many employees report concerns or problems - No reporting culture 
P46: I think the reality with most things is to stay ignorant. I wouldn’t go up to the head of F and S if I 
was outside and say “I’ll do this and I’ll do that” and he’d go “you’re not supposed to do that” , you’ll get 
told off 
P17: Probably, it depends- if I saw someone on someone else’s computer and they were doing something, 
if it didn’t know them, I don’t know, probably ask my line manager what to do. 
Team level security communication and mediation 
Managers not know complete policies, Problematic central communication and training (irrelevant, 
generic, inconsistent and overloaded), Reliance on managers not formalised - Communication at team 
meetings, Security support by line managers and colleagues, Devise own adaptations to unsatisfactory 
security measures or, Introduce own novel solutions 
P71: It would be filtered down from myself, or if there’s anything I need to talk to them about it will be 
passed out to them all via a group e-mail. When they first join the company, for example, we do an 
induction where we cover things like security policies and we ensure that they do their CBTS and things 
like that. 
P56: I think there is a general practice that your line manager is a bit more switched on to these things.  
So if you have these questions, it’s really the line manager and then the line manager can either direct 
you, help you or just tell you to go and read it yourself. 
Employees not fully aware of policies – also partially dismiss their usefulness, Managers not know 
complete policies, Access control decision making by managers (authorising access to resources), 
Management approval for information access - Ad hoc – based on manager/colleague understanding and 
perception 
P52: I don’t think if you go through the security one or any of them a light bulb doesn’t flash and think, 
“oh I must remember that for the future, I didn’t realise that or think about that.” I think it’s really 
common sense looking at them. 
P57: I: And do you ever discuss security with them? P: No. I’d expect him to tell me if there was some 
significant change in policy or if someone in the team had done something naughty, but broadly, no. 
P7: It’s my personal way of approaching it, whether or not it’s company policy I don’t know.  But again I 
think with a lot of these things, there is an element of common sense in them, making sure that the you 
know papers have all the right confidentiality markings on, which definitely is company policy and then 
reminding everybody if you’re sending them a draft or something like that, or what the intended 
circulation is, who they shouldn’t send it to if necessary. 
Security perception 
Protects the organisation adequately, Closed-build, encrypted password protected laptops, Considered in 
requirements - Importance of security well understood, Employees see value in security 
P68: security is very high on our agenda, and like I say, from other departments, from the experiences of 
other departments, like customer services, they have to do the DPA checks, and if they fail a number of 
DPA checks, then they’re reprimanded basically, for want of a better word, and the calls are recorded and 
listened into by their managers. 
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P35: that’s the fundamental reason we try to engage security soon enough, because if you get too far 
down the road and the reason is, “No, you’ve got to stop what you’re doing because you’re doing it 
wrong,” at that point you’ve gone so far down the road that you’ve got to backtrack and you may then end 
up having to launch a product without key features in it because you’ve not secured them. 
P79: However if we were putting something brand new in, it wouldn’t be acceptable for it to not get to the 
current standard. 
Impacts productivity (e.g. email filtering/access problems, password reset problems) - Negative attitude, 
Insecure behaviours justified 
P35:  It’s mainly usability. It’s things like the whole password and log in thing was causing me a bit of an 
upset this morning. It doesn’t seem to be able to make its mind up whether it wants my generic LAN 
password or it wants my Share Point password which sends me into a bit of confusion. Once you get 
there, there’s limits on the size of files, it takes a long time to upload and it’s not very clear whether it’s 
uploading properly or not so all you get is the browser, the blue bar at the top, which goes a little bit of 
the way and stops and then, in my case, times out, so you’ve got no idea whether it’s working, whether 
it’s good or not. Whereas you’re going through all those steps, in Drop Box you just pick it up and lob it 
in and it’s done. 
I: Have you used SharePoint before? P28: I’ve used them but I don’t really like using them very much. 
I’m going on maternity leave next week and the guy taking over from me said, “I’ve assumed you’ve put 
everything on SharePoint?” It’s just not my thing really. I don’t really do that.  I just don’t really like the 
system. I have used them in the past when I need to share things with people when there are lots of 
people. It’s just a personal thing. I never really got going with it. 
P69: Yeah I store quite a lot of stuff locally on it…convenience, speed, getting stuff quickly. We don’t 
have that much space really that we can share on our file as well. It’s a bit limited and I’ve actually more 
space on my laptop than I’ve got on my shared drive. 
Security and compliance measured using CBT completion rates, Too many CBTs, Information appears 
irrelevant, Communicated information perceived as common sense - Communication perceived as 
unimportant, Self (or team)-devised security behaviours 
P54: I must admit, a CBT is just one of those that you end up having to do. You’re obliged.  
P25: So I think the security one is every three years.  Yes, part of my role is to make sure that people do 
those courses and chasing up line managers to make sure they do them.  It’s very difficult, some people 
just do them and don’t complain and you know that’s fine, but others, I think they see them as being a 
waste of time and slows them down on getting on with their real job, as they might put it. 
P45: Yeah, yeah, there are.  There are, and what you should do with your laptop, you know, where you 
should and shouldn’t leave it, and stuff and nonsense. 
P56: So yes there have been odd occasions when I have done some work on my own computer.  I know 
that security frown quite a lot on that, they don’t like that and their principle is if you need the tools for 
the job, the company should be providing those tools, which is a fair statement, but sometimes I know 
that I can do things with my personal computer … different operating system, I can do something with 
my own computer and do it very quickly, that I just can’t do at all on my work one. 
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Access revoking problematic, Should be doing more, Information oversharing prevalent, No enforcement 
- Central security appears ineffective 
P29: We’ve always had probably I feel the right level of security there anyway the only thing is probably 
pick on as I said is if you had certain people who had access to folders who probably should no longer 
have access to these folders. I probably say even throughout the company it seems to be, you know I had 
a request come through recently regarding the system which I haven’t used for donkey’s years.  Saying, 
“Do you still require the system?”  The answer is, “Well no; I haven’t needed access to that system for 
about ten years or so to be honest…” 
P23: Yes. ‘View’ is my default. I think I am the owner of the department’s only group share, but people 
generally don’t use that. People like to e-mail information, which is flawed in my mind, because if you 
host information online with the right levels of access, we don’t need to actually … First of all there’s this 
data concern. So if you imagine you send me an e-mail with an attachment that’s quite big to 10 people. 
That person then replies, “Thanks,” with the attachment; we’ve just doubled up our capacity when we 
don’t really need it. That kind of bugs me. The other thing is, I don’t know how many times in a day I get 
phone calls saying, “Have you got this file? Have you got that presentation?” I’ve just received an e-mail: 
“Can you all send in your slides. ‘Reply all’ so one can see what we’re all putting together.” It’s 
completely flawed. Why are we doing this all over e-mail? What we should be doing is hosting this in a 
Share Point where we all load up our information, you can view each other’s and that’s the most up-to-
date version. If I haven’t got it, it’s there, so if I get hit by a bus, they don’t need my laptop; it’s already 
on the Share Point. 
P34: But I’m being totally honest and open with you, I think it’s a case of rather than people not 
understanding the policy, it’s the policy not being policed. 
P9: There’s not a rigidly enforced clear desk policy that I’m aware of.  I do have an assigned desk in the 
office, so I don’t hot desk or anything like that and I wouldn’t call mine a clear desk 
P55: So there was a notice came round driven by security, saying these things were available, so if you 
must use sticks, we recommend you use these one.  So that was kind of the information and I actually 
proactively went and ordered it.  It was up to the individual to take action. 
P7: … there are always you know dozens and dozens of files on the thing, often with obscure names and 
things.  I suppose if you were a baddie you could probably spend your life going through some of these 
files to see what you could find. 
P48: Well the trouble with it, you kind of go 78% of the way on your own and then at some point you 
decide that you need the OK from the guys and they need to look through it. The issue for them is there 
are just not enough of them to really look at everything. 
Culture perception 
Employees want to comply/contribute to security, Challenging colleague behaviour - Mechanisms 
demanding reasonable time/effort are followed IF employees understand why 
P28: Yeah, I think they do, I mean, people just leave stuff lying all around, I once went into a retail store 
and there was somebody’s bank details lying around and I went absolutely mental.  
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P53: I’ve done a couple myself. Generally if somebody’s said, “So and so, can you go and look at so and 
so’s customer details. The account is this, the password is that,” and we say, “You do not send 
passwords.” 
P67: Mandatory training is in place and I think people’s brains are in the mindset that you’ve got to carry 
your pass, don’t leave your laptop on show.  It’s sort of embedded into people, people that I know 
anyway. 
Productivity driven culture, Security considered tickboxing, Lack of awareness on many security issues, 
Varies across locations, Need to be more proactive - OK to bypass security when it creates primary task 
problems 
P66: if you are working with commercial documentation which tends to be pretty significant in terms of 
size, there just won’t be a transfer mechanism for them other than ‘I’m going to stick in on a USB stick’. 
I: So, whether to encrypt or not to encrypt, do you decide it based on the sensitivity of the information or 
...?  P: Yeah, it depends on the sensitivity of the information and, if you like, the nature of the transaction.  
So if it’s about me standing next to an employee that I know and trust and then putting it on a USB stick 
that I’ve just provided, handing it to me and me walking to my pc, that’s fine.  If we’re going to post it or 
not personally accompany it then I would encrypt it. 
P22: Just an opinion, I would say we’re far more focused on what we do and our results and the 
customers, than we are about things like that. 
P50: Yeah sometimes you see people printing things out.  It’s the rare case that you’ll go to the printer 
and find that somebody’s printed something and it’s ended up on their own printer or whatever else, that 
sort of thing.  I think we’ve done good work in one location in minimising the risk of that because, I don’t 
know if you aware of it but you have to go and collect your printing with your pass card.  In other 
locations we don’t do that. 
P25: ‘Oh my log in is locked out and I didn’t want to delay this conference call, so I used my mates’. 
P50: Because some of the security constraints are messy, for example, some of the SharePoint sites 
require different log-ins that some people now and, some people aren’t that good at maintaining so 
therefore to avoid complexity some are just emailed. 
P63: I have one from the company that’s encrypted that keeps locking up, and you have to bin it because 
it locks up, but I have my own that’s easier. 
P77: Well, I mean, sorry, I do have a number of occasions to try and upload files and I’ve just resorted to 
doing the ‘download to laptop, disconnect, upload’ sort of thing because it’s easier, I guess, if slower. 
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Trust 
Category name A Pct B Pct Total Pct 
Accept the need for security mechanisms and policies to protect 
the organization 
104 88% 80 98% 184 92% 
Close relationship with their colleagues 49 42% 30 37% 79 40% 
Communication of related risks and the need to protect the 
organisation 
66 56% 57 70% 123 62% 
Conflict between trust relationships, Policy demands no inter-
employee trust 
113 96% 75 91% 188 94% 
Contractors have same access 30 25% 1 1% 31 16% 
Desired behaviours outlined in policy 65 55% 31 38% 96 48% 
Employees recognise organisational reliance on them 83 70% 60 73% 143 72% 
help each other - collaborative protection 11 9% 3 4% 14 7% 
Inter-employee trust relationships prevail 108 92% 63 77% 171 86% 
Intrinsic compliance: Ability: Employee knowledge and risk 
awareness to protect the organization 
97 82% 78 95% 175 88% 
Intrinsic compliance: Motivation: understanding responsibility - 
propensity to do good 
44 37% 37 45% 81 41% 
Mechanisms implemented to prevent insecure behaviours 105 89% 71 87% 176 88% 
Policy clauses defining desired employee behaviour without 
enforcing it 
48 41% 25 30% 73 37% 
Potential sanctions defined in policy for bypassing security 25 21% 10 12% 35 18% 
Problematic assurance mechanisms slow down or disrupt 
primary task - Need to bypass mechanisms or ignore policy 
105 89% 74 90% 179 90% 
Recognize breaking organization-employee trust 84 71% 48 59% 132 66% 
Self-devised security mechanisms 96 81% 68 83% 164 82% 
social capital development 10 8% 4 5% 14 7% 
Temporal incentives: Sanction avoidance 40 34% 23 28% 63 32% 
Trust enabler to productivity when security is problematic 43 36% 17 21% 60 30% 
Understand potential problems to the organisation by a security 
leakage - understand contribution to organisation protection 
104 88% 72 88% 176 88% 
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Assurance 
Understand need for restrictions 
Understand potential problems to the organisation by a security leakage 
PA60: Certainly from financial information we have a lot of knowledge and information that could affect 
stock market value of the company.  You know we hear about recent things that maybe in advance to the 
public. 
PB11: I guess in the area that we cover there is a risk there that if the policy wasn’t enforced people could 
access customer’s information and sell it on. 
Accept the need for security mechanisms and policies to protect the organization  
PA18: I feel that’s much more safer because okay, I am responsible.  I know what I’m doing, but still, 
sometimes I can just make a mistake and here I go.  I downloaded something which is in fact affecting 
everybody else, so and the company will just sort it out, if we get into any trouble and especially with the 
kind of information with your work, with regulators and all that stuff, I mean I’m sure, the servers will 
(be) much more secure.   
PA78: There are certain things and certain criteria that you need to be abiding by and which has to stay 
within the confines of the company, and you’re employed, by the company to be able to keep really hush 
about that 
PA102: …I think there’s a balance to be struck between giving people trust and appreciating their 
common sense and their intelligence and also protecting one’s system from the occasional stranger who 
walks through the area. 
PB70: So there’s always that reminder and then everyone I work with is very security conscious in any 
case, it’s kind of securing things but also not talking about things because a lot of the projects I work on 
are quite commercially sensitive in terms of if the competition were to get wind of them it would weaken 
our market position. 
Understand their contribution in protecting the organisation 
PA77: I think it’s almost like a badge of honour for the chaps I work with and they feel quite proud to be 
working in that environment, so they’re quite happy that it’s secure and it’s considered a secure location, 
so they’re quite happy to go along with any policies that are implemented. 
PA99: …I think there’s a balance to be struck between giving people trust and appreciating their common 
sense and their intelligence and also protecting one’s system from the occasional stranger who walks 
through the area. 
PB58: If laptops have been left on the desk overnight, I might be the last person to leave the office and I 
may have put them in a draw or taken them home with me and brought them back in the morning.  
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PB71: I make sure that the documents that we send out are marked relevantly or only shared with the 
necessary parties, things like that really. We just ensure that we’re not doing anything untoward really. 
Mechanisms and policy compliance 
Desired behaviours outlined in policy 
PA114: ensuring that you know, my team are actually aware of information security policies, processes, 
call it what you will, of which there is a plethora on our Infonet.   
PB11: there’s also pages on the intranet so the security team have their own section on the intranet where 
you can go and look for specific information if you’re unsure of what the policy might be around a 
particular type of access. 
Mechanisms implemented to prevent insecure behaviours 
PA72: Not to use your own memory sticks but to use the memory sticks that we’ve now got where you 
have a password for them, they’re approved memory sticks that the company’s got 
PB47: If I want a contractor to go in there I have to fill out an access form telling them exactly what 
they’re doing, where they’re going to go there, and how long they want it for; and once it goes past that, 
that access is revoked, and they can’t get in there. 
Potential sanctions defined in policy for bypassing security 
PA71: I think the penalties for not following the security policies are increasingly getting harsher.  I think 
as a result people are more mindful and I think also with various other things that have gone off in the 
external environment it does, sort of, heighten awareness. 
PB14: It could be dismissal and potential prosecution I would imagine, dependant on the sensitivity of the 
data, I mean we’re not allowed to talk about products to other peers in other companies, so we wouldn’t 
do that. Obviously that’s breaching data protection Act, it’s breaching copyright, it can be breaching all 
sorts of security risks.  So it’s certainly not something I’d do. 
Temporal incentives: Sanction avoidance 
PA8: So there are people out there that are watching, enforcing, I guess. 
PB72: one of their activities during the course of the evening is to patrol and if there are things left on 
desks to collect them, they make a record of where they were collected from and then contact the person 
who’s there the next day to say that “they’ve left this and were they aware?” 
PB73: The trust has always been there, but the consequences are also there if it’s broken. 
PB21: Because, they could do something on the system, and other people would think it was me. 
Because, if somebody used my password, they could do something detrimental, and then it would be me 
that would get (in trouble). 
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Organisation-employee trust 
Employees are trusted by the organisation 
Policy clauses defining desired employee behaviour without enforcing it (e.g. don’t share passwords, use 
encrypted drives) 
PA87: You don’t have to read it, no. It’s like the locked policies we have, you kind of know they’re there, 
but nobody actually really – sucks you down to say that you’ve got to read it, and understand it. 
PA93: I’m pretty free for whatever premise that I wanted access. It’s not being audited. I could 
effectively, if I wanted to, get away with not having to focus too much time on security issues and more 
on delivery issues.  
PA82: obviously I mean, if everybody is working on confidential information, it has been pointed out that 
at various meetings et cetera, that that should be done, as a matter of security. 
PA71: I think the onus in our company these days is a lot to put the responsibility on the individual. But 
the consequence of that, is that quite often the consequence of not complying aren’t just a risk to them 
PB34: Now, we have an internal policy that says documents should be marked as ‘confidence’ or ‘in 
confidence’ and not everyone follows that particular policy.  So, for example, the use of encrypted USB 
sticks is to ensure the right policy is used and maintained. Whereas at the moment, the policy stands and 
people know the policy stands but people don’t always follow that policy. 
PB56: I think it’s encouraged, whenever you talk to the right people it’s encouraged, but it’s not 
enforced…So there was a notice came round driven by security, saying these things were available, so if 
you must use sticks, we recommend you use these one.  So that was kind of the information and I actually 
proactively went and ordered it.  It was up to the individual to take action. 
PA57: somebody said “Oh, I’ll set you up on this, I’ll set you up on this” […] that’s just because they 
were sitting next to me, that wasn’t just their job, or anything, it’s no one’s particular job to set people up 
on different systems. 
PB67: I guess it’s judgement and what you’re working on and whether the data is sensitive (inaudible) so 
head count, people’s name and grades and stuff are obviously sensitive so I would put a password 
protection on that.  But if it’s just an overall (inaudible) that everybody can see then probably not.  If it’s 
budgets that need to be seen by everybody then probably not. 
PA7: It’s my personal way of approaching it, whether or not it’s company policy I don’t know […] 
reminding everybody if you’re sending them a draft or something like that, or what the intended 
circulation is, who they shouldn’t send it to if necessary. 
PB74: Whenever I do transmit confidential information, it’s on a needs-only basis so it’s on a need-to-
know principal. […] I will remind them as well, verbally, when I’m speaking to them that this matter’s 
confidential and remind them that they’re not to discuss it further. [...] You might grant access to all the 
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members in your team, you might grant access to a specific folder for a group of people. So it tends to be 
managed locally I believe with local admin rights. 
Communication of related risks and the need to protect the organisation 
PA7: We do get the communications.  Once in a while we get, you know, emails, like corporate 
communications and, you know, things like that or, a specific system, they have their own emails that go 
out and says, you know, “This is happening,” or, you know, “Do this, do that.” 
PB27: So, we have an intranet where basically what I would call…I suppose…for want of a better word 
company notices or points of information are portrayed.  If there was a requirement to drive home some 
particular messages I would expect them to come through the intranet. 
Employees recognise organisational reliance on them 
PA7: We do get the communications.  Once in a while we get, you know, emails, like corporate 
communications and, you know, things like that or, a specific system, they have their own emails that go 
out and says, you know, “This is happening,” or, you know, “Do this, do that.” 
PB80: (talking about security implementers) so long as we tell them that we’re going to do something, 
they’ll trust us to do it, they won’t necessarily come along and sort of sit behind you and make sure 
you’re actually implementing that piece of design. 
PB23: We tend culturally to be allowed more freedom and responsibility than some people might do…It’s 
almost impossible in security terms to stop a human actually attaching a document when they shouldn’t 
it’s very difficult to get round that. 
Intrinsic compliance - Ability: Employee knowledge and risk awareness to protect the organization 
PA7: There’s deeds, easements, things like that, that people, sort of secure information that anybody can 
just grab.  So things like that they want to be more careful on, you know? 
PB69: (talking about USB drives) No, they’re more trouble than they’re worth because you could 
potentially get into trouble with those things, leaving stuff on them that you shouldn’t do, and leaving 
them lying around, they’re just too easy to lose, so I don’t use them. 
PB17: we are using a lot data and we know the impact that has on the company and the customers if that 
gets into the wider domain  
Intrinsic compliance - Motivation: understanding responsibility - propensity to do good 
PA83: I think all the data I work with is very sensitive. And, from what I’ve seen, you know, the 
company is quite serious about securing its financial information and all the applications I deal with are 
password-protected 
PB58: So maybe I’m not the right person to take those risks and make those choices, but I think we all 
have to share that that’s part of the ethos of the company. 
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Breaking trust 
Problematic assurance mechanisms slow down or disrupt primary task - Need to bypass mechanisms or 
ignore policy  
PA2: …they’ll take their company computer off the proxy, and while you’re off the proxy, go home, log 
in, grab the files, save them, come back in, you’re back on the proxy, you’re okay. 
PA52: Because they keep expiring.  So we maintain a set of seven generic accounts for each position 
which are known only to the control room and are kept in a secure procedure which is administered 
closely and is only known to the control room. 
PA13: I think the email, they block everything, sometimes maybe I just want to print out something, 
you cannot send email, so I just used a USB drive.  
PB37:  I mean, at the moment the IT policy, which I have to enforce as the delivery manager, is it has to 
be secure and (inaudible), and the mechanism we have to go through … and this takes time … is if the 
business doesn’t want to pay for that, then it has to be escalated to senior level relative to the risk, and the 
business has to then decide, are they going to take that risk, yes or no?  So you have to go through all 
those escalations to move the project forward, and the business will decide whether it’s an acceptable risk 
or not, you know; so it’s the right thing to do, but it takes time, and time is money, and it delays projects; 
and then the business owners are unhappy both ways, you know.   
Recognize breaking organization-employee trust 
PA31: There’s a policy that they shortly after we moved to this building they made a big deal out of 
“Don’t allow following access through doorways…and I don’t think most people take that terribly 
seriously, and it's kind of hard to, it seems kind of impolite to say, “Sorry, no, I can't let you through, I’m 
going to have to slam the door in your face.  Human nature tends to be I’ll hold the door for you, so, so I 
think that’s, those are kind of at odds. 
PA53: The reason I diverted away from policy has been driven by a business requirement.  And it’s, it’s 
one of those things that’s always been discussed with seniors and it’s been seen as a work around because 
the policy doesn’t fit the business requirement. 
PB56: So yes there have been odd occasions when I have done some work on my own computer.  I know 
that security frown quite a lot on that, they don’t like that and their principle is if you need the tools for 
the job, the company should be providing those tools, which is a fair statement, but sometimes I know 
that I can do things with my personal computer and do it very quickly, that I just can’t do at all on my 
work one. 
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Inter-employee trust 
Trust between colleagues 
Close relationship with their colleagues 
PA2: And because of that, a lot of times the field guys, they won’t tend to trust you initially you’ve got to 
be there for a while…like now that I’ve been here three years, “Oh, I’ve worked with him a lot.  Not a 
problem, I like working with him.” 
PA57: I mean SharePoint is good, but you have to be trusting for users to use it properly. 
PB3: You work with them so much.  God, the engineers that I work with for our company I spent hours 
with them on a daily basis, so you do get to know them very well. 
Prevailing over organisation-employee trust 
Conflict between trust relationships - Inter-employee trust relationships prevail 
PA12: “…as far as “Oh, this contractor wants to get something done quick, here use my ID for doing 
that. You know, and then I’ll switch the password after.  Okay, he’s sort of protected it, but really is, 
you’ve just shared your ID, you just shared a password, and with a non-company person, you know, 
violation, but you need to get your work done.” 
PA70: “…before when we had like our group meetings, even though we were contractors, we were also 
allowed in those meetings, but as an employee, I felt myself to be more a part of that group now, because 
now we belong to the company” 
PA9: “…when that contractor was still there I wasn’t told to treat contractors differently.” 
PA41: “I saw this co-worker who was being hired as a contractor and I called the woman […] and she 
calls me back in a couple of days from now and she says “I checked it out and found out that that wasn’t 
really another person, that was me…” 
PA90: “…a lot of times the field guys, they won’t tend to trust you initially you’ve got to be there for a 
while.  Like now that I’ve been here three years, “Oh, I’ve worked with him a lot.  Not a problem, I like 
working with him.” 
Trust enabler to productivity when security is problematic 
PA2 (on password sharing): I have some level of trust with them, it’s more if they have enough level of 
trust with me to be “Okay, here’s the thing so you can log in and do it quick.  I’ll change it as soon as I 
come back so that we’re secure and all that but I need you to keep working to get the job done.” 
PA116 (on not locking their screens): “…because when you comment on it and say “Well you should 
actually be locking your screen when you walk away”, the comment you get back is the fact that “Well 
you know we should be able to trust people around.” 
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PA78: I mean the employees, you can share to the employees, because they don’t talk amongst 
themselves because obviously they know the policies of the company as well.  So when you’re an 
employee of Company A and I speak to another employee of Company A, it’s not a problem, because 
everybody knows what the security policies are with the company. 
PA118: ... it is very rare for a new starter to have that kind of trust given to them within the first, let us 
say month or so.  So it is probably between very trusting colleagues that passwords are handed across to 
each other. 
PB3: I mean I assume that this is our building and it’s all trusted people working in here and therefore I 
act appropriately on that basis. If my laptop gets nicked then I’ll notch my estimations of the building 
down slightly. 
PB18: well if someone’s into the company and they need a certain document they know where to find it 
then pass it on. 
I: So if someone asked you to share your password with them, you’d have no problem with that? PB6: 
No, as long as it’s a trusted colleague. 
PA30: “…But it was quicker sometimes to just throw it on a flash drive and chuck it over the cube wall.  
We just didn't really see the point in needing to buy an $80 flash drive to do that.  The people that I work 
with, I’m speaking from my experience, they’re all a lot smarter than me.  They all have grad degrees and 
PHDs and stuff, and they write really good programmes, I would trust them to take some information off 
their computers. 
Self-devised security mechanisms 
PA95: So I always make a point, if I’ve ever had to give my ID to somebody, I reset my password as soon 
as I can afterwards…it minimises the risk … I trust people I work with, but the point is that you still take 
the contingency measure. 
PB3: Well, it depends who’s working on the platforms as well, what’s been done; for example, if 
we’ve had to give temporary passwords to an engineer, or someone like that, we will change the 
password, give them their own password, and once they’re done we will change them back, so 
nobody ever actually has the official passwords except the engineers themselves. 
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Appendix J: Survey results 
Company A 
Scenario A – File Sharing (Behaviour)  
Jessica, a Business Analyst at a utility company, needs to share a large volume of files with colleagues in 
her department as part of a high priority task she is undertaking. These files contain “Confidential” 
company information for “internal use only”. Jessica has made the files available through Microsoft 
SharePoint, restricting access to certain team members. Some team members tell her they cannot access 
the files due to incorrect permissions, so Jessica has submitted a request for changes to be made to her 
colleagues’ permissions and escalated this due to the urgency. However, she knows from past experience 
that it may take up to 1 week for the changes to be approved and applied. If these files are not made 
available within the next 2 working days, this will severely impact delivery and quality. As not all of her 
colleagues require access to all the files, to manually distribute them would involve her identifying the 
subset of files for each person - this will be a very time-consuming task, so Jessica creates an archive of 
all the relevant documents and considers how best to deliver it to the group.  
Option A: Request that those with access share their (main log-in) account details and passwords with 
those without to allow them access to the information.  
Option B: Burn a copy of the files onto a CD/DVD and distribute to the work group.  
Option C: Email the document archive directly to the general work group mailing list using your 
company email address.  
Option D: Move the files to an unrestricted folder on the internal network to allow the work group to have 
continued access to it.  
N 877 Number 
1st 8.44% 74 
2nd 29.76% 261 
3rd 46.98% 412 
4th 14.82% 130 
 
Scenario B – Managing Permissions (Behaviour) 
John is a System Administrator at a utility company responsible for deciding who has access to 
confidential information.  
John normally reviews each request and then applies the most appropriate permissions, or the request is 
denied according to established procedures and guidelines. He undertakes this task every 24 hours to 
ensure there is no risk of maintenance schedules slipping due to a lack of access to records.  
John is called away from the office on short notice by a family emergency and he is concerned about how 
this task will be managed during his absence. The system used to set the permissions does not easily 
allow him to deputise the task to another account, so he must find another way to ensure this activity is 
completed while he is away. He is also concerned that as the guidelines are not always clear and require 
some degree of discretion when granting access, deputising the task may mean there is a higher risk of 
incorrect permissions being granted. This makes the choice of who to trust this task to in his absence an 
important one.  
Option A: Leave your password with your secretary, who although temporary, is a trusted employee, with 
instructions to use your account to resolve "emergency situations".  
Option B: Leave your password with a trusted member of the department and ask them to handle "all 
decision making" while you are away.  
Option C: Grant blanket access rights to the whole department (clone of the permissions of an individual 
with the most access rights) for the duration of your absence to forestall many of the access requests you 
are usually is asked to deal with.  
Option D: Give out login details of a range of access permissions (used by temporary workers) with 
instructions that they be used where existing permissions do not allow access.  
N 865 Number 
1st 17.80% 154 
2nd 52.49% 454 
3rd 7.40% 64 
4th 22.31% 193 
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Scenario C – USB Stick Usage (Behaviour) 
Jason works for a utility company as a Commercial Analyst and is currently involved in an important 
project that requires him to present progress updates to clients, often in offsite locations.  
Jason would normally use his laptop to take presentations to clients but his laptop is currently in for 
maintenance. Instead he decides to use an encrypted USB memory stick to transfer the required files to 
the client site. Unfortunately, shortly before he is due to leave for the meeting, Jason realises he lent out 
his encrypted USB stick and cannot recall who to. He knows he will not get a replacement at such short 
notice. In the meantime he still needs some way to transfer information. The presentation includes 
embedded media and is therefore too large to email and he knows that offsite locations cannot access the 
internal network.  
Option A: Take the required data on an unencrypted USB stick - you have one to hand.  
Option B: Borrow an encrypted stick from a colleague. You would have to also make a note of their 
password so you can access the data at the client's site. The colleague had asked that you do not share / 
erase the confidential data already on the stick.  
Option C: An employee of the client has been visiting the utility company and is due to travel back with 
you. Use the available unencrypted stick to put a copy of the data onto their laptop and ask them to take it 
to the client's site.  
Option D: Upload the files to a public online data storage service and recover them at the client's site.  
N 133 Number 
1st 36.84% 49 
2nd 45.86% 61 
3rd 9.77% 13 
4th 7.52% 10 
 
Scenario D – Tailgating (Attitude) 
Agnes works for a utility company as a Customer Account Manager and often has meetings on site with 
external visitors.  
Agnes is aware that visitors need to be supervised at all times and security / reception are made aware of 
all visitors. She therefore personally receives visitors and allows them entry/exit through the barrier door 
which requires an ID pass and further supervises them whilst they are on site.  
Whilst collecting visitors she often sees unsupervised people without a visible visitor's badge waiting near 
the barrier door and occasionally ‘tailgate’ (follow closely behind another person) to get into the main 
building. Although Agnes appreciates that this is a security risk, she is also aware that this is a common 
occurrence which is normally overlooked.  
Option A: Notify security that you have observed visitors tailgating past the barrier.  
Option B: Confront the people you see tailgating directly and ask them to show you some ID (if they are 
not known to you) and supervise them back to reception.  
Option C: Assume the people have access and have been checked by the reception staff and continue with 
your work so as not to disrupt their work or yours.  
Option D: Confront the people and then report their names to either your manager or security.  
N 359 Number 
1st 34.26% 123 
2nd 57.38% 206 
3rd 4.46% 16 
4th 3.90% 14 
 
Scenario E – Document Control (Attitude) 
Anne works for a utility company as a Compliance Officer and is responsible for managing and handling 
documents containing sensitive Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) information. Only certain people 
can access and use this information, provided they have gone through the appropriate vetting.  
Anne recently received an angry phone call from Bob (Senior Manager) who is not happy that his staff no 
longer have access to important information they need. Anne explains the vetting procedure to him, but 
he is still not happy and asks to speak to her boss Cyril, who supports Anne and tells Bob that his staff 
require clearance to access the documents.  
A couple of weeks later Anne reviews the access logs to the documents, and notices that Dave (who 
works for Bob) has been accessing a large number of CNI documents. Anne looks into this further and 
339 
 
 
 
finds that Dave is widely sharing this information to others in his team, none of whom have been through 
the vetting and managing of privileged information training.  
Option A: Report your observations to Cyril, and urge him to tell Bob formally that this is not acceptable.  
Option B: Send Dave an informal email, reminding him that sharing CNI documents with non-cleared 
employees is not allowed.  
Option C: Initiate an audit of Bob's Department to attempt to track the use and distribution of the CNI 
documents.  
Option D: Do nothing - If something goes wrong, Bob has to deal with it as he is the Senior Manager in 
charge of the department that is sharing the information.  
N 796 Number 
1st 72.99% 581 
2nd 13.44% 107 
3rd 13.44% 107 
4th 0.13% 1 
 
Scenario F – Information Disposal (Attitude) 
James works for a utility company as a Senior Contracts Manager and regularly reviews confidential 
contracts, which contain sensitive commercial information and customer data. He prefers to review 
documentation in paper form, so he often prints out confidential documents to read and make notes on 
whilst travelling on the train to/from home. When he is finished with these documents, as an 
environmentally conscious person, he places them in the recycling bin. At home there is no secure 
disposal available so he uses the standard recycling service. The risk of ’dumpster diving’ (people 
stealing documents from rubbish bins) has been communicated in a recent Internal Awareness Campaign. 
It specifically recommends disposing of confidential information in the confidential bin but James feels 
that this is overly cautious and does not always use the Confidential but the normal recycle bin as he 
thinks the paper will be destroyed when it is recycled anyway, so there is no need to be concerned.  
Option A: James’ working practises are acceptable; recycling the paper is good for the environment and 
destroys any sensitive information at the same time.  
Option B: James should ensure any paper copies he makes are disposed of specifically in a confidential 
recycle bin to ensure they are securely shredded once he has finished with them – hard copies are a major 
source of information leaks.  
Option C: James is right to work in the way that suits him best – without access to the company systems 
even if someone did get hold of a few bits of information they couldn’t damage the utility company 
anyway.  
Option D: James is being totally reckless with customer’s information – the major threat caused by hard 
copies is to the customers via identity theft and he should stop printing out work unless it is absolutely 
necessary.  
N 133 Number 
1st 0.00% 0 
2nd 71.43% 95 
3rd 0.00% 0 
4th 28.57% 38 
 
Scenario G – Backing Up Information (Behaviour) 
Emilia works for a utility company as a Finance Analyst and is a very conscientious individual who 
occasionally works from home in the evening to catch up on things she could not complete during the 
day.  
Emilia normally uses the train to get home. She chooses to leave her laptop as she has recently had her 
laptop stolen when travelling home from work.  
Emilia keeps a backup of all her work files on her personal computer so she can access files without 
having to connect to the utility company system as her home network connection is not always reliable. 
She knows this is against company policy, but she lives in a safe neighbourhood and does not consider 
this to be a great security risk. In order to transfer files to her home computer she uses a variety of 
methods.  
Option A: Use one of your USB sticks to carry your current work with you on the train.  
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Option B: Email the files to your personal email account from your work account and download them at 
home.  
Option C: Use an online storage service such as Drop box as an interim transfer location, deleting the files 
once you have made a local copy.  
Option D: Log in to the company VPN and make local copies via that connection.  
N 278 Number 
1st 21.58% 60 
2nd 5.40% 15 
3rd 3.96% 11 
4th 69.06% 192 
 
Scenario H – External Threats (Attitude) 
Andrew works at a utility company site, and he walks there each morning from the local station. One 
morning he notices a blue van parked outside the entrance gates. He thinks he has seen the van parked in 
the same spot several times before over the last couple of weeks. Andrew becomes suspicious so he notes 
down the van details so he can check again if it is the same van. A few days later, Andrew notices the 
same van parked in the same location. As he passes the van he observes two individuals, one of whom 
appears to be taking pictures of the building/people around the building. As soon as the individuals see 
Andrew, the van pulls away in a hurry.  
Option A: Put it out of your mind; you have seen the van several times and nothing has happened at the 
site so it probably isn’t a threat.  
Option B: Report the incident to your line manager; it is better to report such incidents even if nothing has 
happened.  
Option C: Report your suspicions directly to security so they can take the appropriate action.  
Option D: Do nothing now but keep an eye out for the van in the future to confirm his suspicions. If it 
shows up again then report the incident.  
N 347 Number 
1st 0.29% 1 
2nd 15.27% 53 
3rd 84.15% 292 
4th 0.29% 1 
 
Scenario I – Information Requests (Behaviour) 
Mohammed is a Contract Support Assistant at a utility company who manages 3rd-party contracts. One 
afternoon, he receives a phone call from Alison who used to work with him at the utility company but 
now works for one of the utility company’s trusted 3rd-party companies. She asks Mohammed for some 
commercially sensitive information that is not publicly available through the company’s web site.  
While the company she works for is allowed access to the information, Mohammed is aware that there is 
a procedure 3rd-parties need to go through to obtain that information. Mohammed politely refuses the 
request and reminds Alison of the procedure she should follow. Alison now becomes very persistent and 
reminds Mohammed that they used to be colleagues as well as mentioning the names of several senior 
people in both companies, saying they will be extremely unhappy if she does not get this information that 
day. She further says she is still in contact with his line manager and will explain everything to him later, 
so Mohammed should be ok with providing this information today.  
Option A: Accede to the request for information to ensure that the senior personnel are satisfied and 
Alison's productivity isn't hampered.  
Option B: Send Alison the information she requested but immediately inform your line manager of the 
call and that information has been provided.  
Option C: Ask Alison specifically which pieces of information she needs and send through a redacted or 
edited version of the documents.  
Option D: Send the information through but password protect the file and wait until you have spoken to 
your line manager before releasing the password to Alison.  
N 359 Number 
1st 7.80% 28 
2nd 5.01% 18 
3rd 8.08% 29 
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4th 79.11% 284 
 
Scenario J – Working Practises (Attitude) 
Sanjeeta has worked with Kevin at a utility company for a number of years. Kevin has always been an 
effective member of the team, but is known for ’having his own way of getting things done’. A few 
months ago Kevin left the utility company to work for one of the utility company's Service Partners. They 
still maintain a close working relationship and are located at the same site. Recently Sanjeeta noticed that 
several confidential documents/records were missing and there was no audit trail of who had used them 
last.  
Sanjeeta then recalls that Kevin had accessed the documents to resolve a query associated with a project 
he had recently been working on, so she decides to ask Kevin about the missing documents next time she 
saw him.  
When asked about the missing documents, Kevin becomes very defensive and objects to being 
challenged, telling Sanjeeta that she should “stick to her own work and stay out of mine”. Sanjeeta was 
very taken aback by this response.  
Option A: Do nothing, Kevin’s working practises have always been eccentric and this seems to be no 
more than a product of his usual attitude.  
Option B: Discuss Kevin’s behaviour with the department manager – it isn’t acceptable for an individual 
in the department to have their own methods that conflict with the company best practice and policy.  
Option C: Accommodate Kevin's work practises by adjusting your own, it will be easier and more 
productive for you both.  
Option D: Call the Business Conduct helpline and make a report about Kevin’s behaviour – it is 
suspicious that there appears to be no proper audit of his work. 
N 877 Number 
1st 0.91% 8 
2nd 66.25% 581 
3rd 0.91% 8 
4th 31.93% 280 
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Company B 
Scenario A (Attitude) – ID Badges  
Jemima is a member of the Operations team working at the company headquarters. While sat working at 
her desk she notices someone she doesn’t recognise walk past without a visible ID badge. This prompts 
her to do one of the following:  
A) Nothing, the security badges are only used for accessing the building and once you are in serve no 
other real purpose.  
B) Make sure that her own ID badge is visible, seeing someone without theirs reminds her that she should 
have hers on display.  
C) Go and talk to the person and ask if they have a badge. If they have remind them to have it on display, 
if not then politely escort them to security.  
D) Nothing, although security badges are meant to be visible at all times it is a formality and it is the job 
of the security guards to check not hers.  
N 152 Number 
1st 6.58% 10 
2nd 18.42% 28 
3rd 55.26% 84 
4th 19.74% 30 
 
Scenario B (Attitude) – Clear Desk Policy  
When leaving his desk to go for lunch with some colleagues Darren, a member of the HR team, notices 
that one of them has left his screen unlocked. The rest of the people he is with don’t seem to have noticed, 
or seem to be OK with leaving it as it is. Darren got into the habit of locking his screen some years ago 
while working in a different company. As his colleagues start to walk away he decides to:  
A) Do nothing, the screen will automatically lock after a few minutes and this will keep things secure.  
B) Do nothing, there is no risk here as no-one could get into the office without passing through security . 
The screen locks are there just as a formality.  
C) Lock the screen himself.  
D) Quickly find out who’s desk it is from the group and ask them to lock it before they leave for lunch.  
N 456 Number 
1st 10.75% 49 
2nd 1.32% 6 
3rd 33.99% 155 
4th 53.95% 246 
 
Scenario C (Behaviour) – PasswordManager  
Hina, a member of the Operations division, has recently been required as part of her job to use a new 
piece of software about once a week. This requires her to log in to the service using a new username and 
password combination. Unfortunately PasswordManager does not work correctly with this new software 
and fails to store or enter her password. Because of the lack of PasswordManager support Hina is worried 
about being able to use the service as she struggles to remember infrequently used passwords.  
Assuming that Hina decides to continue using the service without the support of PasswordManager, if 
you were Hina, what would you do in these circumstances?  
A) Store the password using a method of your own devising – you can be trusted to keep it safe.  
B) Share your password with a trusted member of your working group so that if you forget it they can 
remind you.  
C) Stop trying to remember the password and just use the password reset feature to generate a new 
password each time you need to use the service.  
D) Re-use a password from another service that you have committed to memory.  
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N 152 Number 
1st 43.42% 66 
2nd 1.32% 2 
3rd 19.74% 30 
4th 35.53% 54 
 
Scenario D (Behaviour) – VPN  
Robert, an analyst in the Operations team, has a set of logs from secure company hardware that he needs 
to upload to the manufacturer’s website for analysis. He is working from home and unfortunately while 
connected to the VPN he is unable to utilise the upload function on the manufacturer’s site. It is necessary 
that the logs are analysed each day so he cannot wait until he is next in the office if he is to successfully 
complete this task.  
Assuming that Robert decides to upload the logs via a different method, if you were Robert, what would 
you do under these circumstances?  
A) Make a local copy of the logs, disconnect from the VPN and upload the logs over your home 
connection.  
B) Email the logs to a colleague not working from home and see if they can upload the logs via a direct 
LAN connection.  
C) Give the password to the server to a trusted colleague not working from home and ask them to 
download the logs from the server before uploading to them to the manufacturer.  
D) Email the logs directly to the manufacturer's customer support email, and ask them to conduct the 
analysis and send the file back.  
N 152 Number 
1st 13.16% 20 
2nd 61.84% 94 
3rd 16.45% 25 
4th 8.55% 13 
 
Scenario E (Attitude) – Tailgating  
Jessica is heading toward an access controlled entry door and notices a man she does not recognise gain 
entry by following close behind someone else who had tagged in at the door. The two men are walking 
close together although they do not appear to obviously be in conversation. The second man is holding a 
cup of coffee in one hand and his laptop in the other. His ID badge is not immediately visible. Jessica 
decides to:  
A) Follow the man and ask to see his ID badge.  
B) Find a security guard at one of the manned turnstiles and tell them what happened.  
C) Return to her desk, she sees this sort of thing quite regularly and it is probably because his hands were 
full that he did not swipe through himself.  
D) Do nothing, if he is up to some mischief the security guards will catch him later on.  
N 164 Number 
1st 21.95% 36 
2nd 64.63% 106 
3rd 11.59% 19 
4th 1.83% 3 
 
  
 
Scenario F (Behaviour) – File Storage  
Concerned about the safety of his current work Shamal decides to back up his data, some of which is 
confidential. As he uses his own laptop under the ‘bring your own device’ scheme he usually stores all his 
work on his drive on the central server but he wants to have a second copy just in case something happens 
or he loses connectivity to the company network. He thought about using one of the common drives but 
none of the ones he regularly uses have sufficient space.  
A) Create a local copy on the hard drive of your BYOD laptop, it is the only machine you work on so you 
know it will be safe and this ensures you will always have access to it if needed.  
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B) Use a common drive that you used for an old project and still have access to, as your credentials were 
never revoked. It has enough space although you do not know who manages it now.  
C) Use an online service, such as Dropbox, to store the data as it is more under your control.  
D) Back your work up onto a USB stick – you have ordered an encrypted one but while you wait for it to 
arrive you use a personal stick you have to hand.  
N 164 Number 
1st 39.02% 64 
2nd 21.34% 35 
3rd 21.95% 36 
4th 17.68% 29 
 
Scenario G (Attitude) – Secure Disposal  
John works as a Sales Advisor in a store in London. During a busy period of the day he notices that a 
customer, served by one of his colleagues, has left their paperwork behind. John’s colleague grabs the 
paperwork and throws it into a wastepaper bin under the desk. Seeing this John decides to: 27  
A) Carry on serving customers in the store, all the rubbish will be thrown out at the end of the day 
anyway so it is no big deal, and using the shredder in the back area, locked by a keypad, is inconvenient 
when the bin is right there.  
B) Make a note to check with his manager what the appropriate action would be, as it has been some time 
since he took the Data Protection CBT module and he cannot clearly remember the details.  
C) Go and grab the paperwork out of the bin when he has a spare moment and take it to the shredder in 
the back of the store.  
D) Go over immediately and ask his colleague to take the paperwork out of the bin and put it in the 
shredder, having documents lying around exposes both the store and the customer to the risk of identity 
theft.  
N 292 Number 
1st 0.34% 1 
2nd 2.40% 7 
3rd 6.16% 18 
4th 91.10% 266 
 
Scenario H (Behaviour) – Credit Check  
Karina works as a Sales Assistant in a store. Her manager has asked her to increase her sales in order to 
meet the store’s monthly target. In her experience customers can be put off by the need for credit and ID 
checks, and sometimes fail them altogether. She knows of a few unofficial ways of making the checks 
seem less of a problem, or to increase the chance of customers passing them.  
A) Give the benefit of the doubt when encountering IDs with indicators of possible fraud, such as dates of 
birth that do not seem to align with the apparent age of the customer, or addresses in different cities.  
B) Use your employee discount to offer the customer a more attractive deal.  
C) Attempt multiple credit checks in quick succession in order to try to figure out which details are 
causing the problem and amend them.  
D) Give information about the credit check to a few of your personal contacts so that they can prime 
potential customers on what they need to do to beat the system before referring them to the store. 
N 292 Number 
1st 20.21% 59 
2nd 63.36% 185 
3rd 9.59% 28 
4th 6.85% 20 
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Appendix K: Company B communication plan improvements 
Old communications plan 
This existed when the researcher joined the organisation 
Introduction 
Security awareness is an essential part of our security management activities to protect the company from security incidents.  We need to demonstrate an effective awareness 
programme is in place during audits to achieve and retain our security certifications including: 
5. TISAC - 10 Steps to Cyber Security 
6. PSN – Public Services Network  
7. ISO27001 – Information Security Management 
8. ND1643 – Ofcom Minimum Security Standards 
9. ISO22301 – Business Continuity Management 
10. PCI DSS – Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
This Communications Plan details the programme of security awareness activities for 2014.  It’s aim is to enhance and promote security throughout the company as a ‘business as 
usual’ issue by raising awareness of current threats, promoting good practice and demonstrating security awareness of Company people. 
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Communication topic Why (supports) 
Current threats or major issues that 
have been in the press / emergency 
issues 
Raise awareness of current threats. 
Data theft Illustrate the key stats regarding awareness of mobile device security and theft 
Geek Tweet To raise awareness and promote the fact that this is an up-to-date place to find security information 
Security CBT Re-launch revised security CBT 
Privacy Markings Guide people towards the security policies and making them aware of them. 
Keeping data safe Guide people towards the security policies and making them aware of them. 
Glasgow 2014 Raise awareness and Glasgow games will impact the high street shops 
Social Engineering Make people aware of the types of social engineering and the need to validate any requests for access 
to buildings, customer data or company information. 
SMIP SMIP testing begins in June.  Provide some awareness about the programme, and security changes that 
are being implemented and the on-going support from the business. 
Data Protection and ICO on EU data Data raise the profile of information security and impact of legislation protection (EU data) 
Reporting IT Security Incidents Launch new reporting process, (Dependant on SIEM area) reporting IT Security Incidents 
PCI-DSS Worked hard to get PCI, must maintain it.  
Password Security Some of these can be done together and are really guiding people towards the policies and making 
them aware of security policies 
Virus and Malware Some of these can be done together and are really guiding people towards the policies and making 
them aware of security policies 
Acceptable use on Computers Some of these can be done together and are really guiding people towards the policies and making 
them aware of security policies 
BYOD The policy needs to be revisited and HR Engaged before any launch. 
Re-launch of Potential Security Issue 
form 
Launch new reporting process, (Dependant on SIEM area) 
How our certifications deliver benefit 
to the business 
In support of ISO27001 and other certifications. 
Wear it, Mark it, Clear it In support of PSN.  (repeat existing campaign) 
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New communications plan 
Improvements required 
1. All points relate to the importance of information in the company – could launch those separately as part of an overarching “Protect our information” campaign 
2. Raise the profile of information security and impact of legislation protection (UK and EU) 
3. Guide people towards the security policies and making them aware of them. 
4. Make people aware of the types of social engineering and the need to validate any requests for access to buildings, customer data or company information 
Actions taken 
1. Added SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley) compliance requirements 
2. Defined an overall theme (“Protecting our information”) and related communication to that 
3. Need to identify the rationale behind each section – avoid risk of overloading 
a. What the current state is? What are the behaviours to be changed? 
b. How do we know? (metrics – data?) 
c. What are the current implementation constraints? 
d. Short term goals? 
e. What do we want to tell people about it? 
f. Long term goals - future improvements? 
g. …everything needs to align with security implementation change planning 
4. Define audit-related deliverables 
a. Communication records 
b. Metrics showing improvements 
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Communications 
topic 
Why (supports), current state  Ideal state 
Implementation 
Constraints 
What to measure Short term goal 
Long Term 
goal 
Privacy Markings 
Helps protecting information  
handling / sharing 
Avoids putting organisation / 
individuals at risk 
Employees aware what they are – 
not know how to use them 
Leads to overclassification 
All information held or processed has its 
value assessed by its author or nominated 
business owner and corresponding privacy 
marking assigned.  
Individuals know how to mark and how to 
deal with sensitive documents when they 
see them 
Not all people use all 
levels – target 
awareness based on 
this 
Markings on 
documents left around 
found on site security 
clear desk checks 
Improve 
understanding 
on how to 
classify 
documents, mark 
them and  handle 
them 
Same 
Social 
Engineering 
Prevent unauthorised information 
disclosure 
Information is a key asset and it 
is important that everyone 
considers all the impacts of 
disseminating information.  
Employees can recognise a social 
engineering attack 
Employees refuse to share information 
before full verification of other party 
Current 
implementation leads 
to password and 
information sharing 
through other 
channels 
Abnormal access 
patterns 
Reduce exposure 
to engineering 
attacks 
Same 
Data Protection  
Employees sometimes downplay 
importance of information they 
handle 
Awareness is role specific 
Data sharing ad-hoc – using 
external services, emails  
Clear desk not always followed 
Employees understand the importance of 
information they handle 
Centralised corporate file sharing and 
storage with adequate capacity, no cloud 
services used  
Audits – if all other areas covered there 
should be no problems with this 
Shared drives highly 
visible to a lot of 
people 
No formal 
mechanism for file 
sharing exists 
DLP system needs to 
be deployed 
Documents left 
around,  
number of support 
requests for file 
sharing mechanisms, 
DLP metrics on email 
sharing, volume of 
traffic to cloud 
providers, Utilisation 
of internal systems 
Improved 
awareness on 
information 
sensitivity, 
utilisation of 
corporate 
systems for file 
sharing and 
storage 
Less documents 
left around 
Fully integrated 
in employee 
day-to-day 
information 
sharing 
Acceptable use on 
Computers 
Secure backup / data transfer 
important for information 
confidentiality and availability 
No centralised backup / data 
transfer  strategy 
USB drives need to be secure 
Regular backups performed.  
Interval between backups should be linked 
to sensitivity, impact of loss, corruption or 
non-availability of the data.  
Any PC used by the company will enforce 
mandatory encryption of USB devices  
Backed up network 
storage of limited 
capacity 
Encrypted USB 
system needs to be 
deployed 
Behaviours before and 
after piloting 
deployment 
Data from reporting 
systems 
Screen lock 
Secure backup / 
sharing of 
information 
Everyone has 
encrypted USBs 
Ensure all 
organisational 
provisions 
support desired 
behaviours 
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Communications 
topic 
Why (supports), current state  Ideal state 
Implementation 
Constraints 
What to measure Short term goal 
Long Term 
goal 
Password Security 
Sharing of passwords occurs in 
some rare situations   
Writing down passwords is 
prevalent  
Passwords must only ever to be written 
down for emergency record purposes and 
then stored under protected conditions (i.e. 
in approved locked metal furniture);  
Employees should download and use 
password manager 
Password manager 
problems and 
compatibility issues, 
expiry makes 
passwords difficult 
to remember 
Password manager 
adoption 
Prolonged account 
inactivity 
Password reset 
requests 
Abnormal access 
patterns 
No password 
sharing 
No writing down 
Password 
manager works 
flawlessly  
Same 
Access Control 
Guide people towards the 
security policies and making 
them aware of them. 
Access revoking slow – line 
managers not taking action, 
accounts marked as inactive, 
taken down by access control 
teams 
Access revoking for leavers done 
automatically through HR. 
Line Managers ensure security 
implications of leavers are addressed  
None 
Prolonged account 
inactivity 
Also list of line 
manager requests to 
remove someone from 
the system 
Time from dismissal to 
access removal 
Procedures to 
restrict building, 
system and 
application 
access 
immediately for 
people who are 
dismissed or 
who abandon 
service.  
Same 
Virus and 
Malware 
Danger to the organisation 
Lack of formally communicated 
USB policy creates risks  
All systems and devices on the corporate 
network should be protected against 
viruses using approved antivirus software 
None 
Infected machines 
detected on the 
network 
Identification of 
infections and 
appropriate 
actions taken 
Same 
Reporting IT 
security incidents 
Current behaviours widely 
varying: from reporting 
everything to nothing 
Reporting concerns/problems 
allows: 
Early identification of potential 
compromises 
Potential areas for 
implementation improvements 
All problems are reported 
Followed up by security management 
Impact of reporting communicated back to 
employees 
None 
Helpdesk reporting 
rates 
Time to respond 
Number of resolved 
problems 
Employees are 
willing to report 
security 
concerns and 
seek support 
when in doubt 
Implementation 
of mechanisms 
that allow 
report-driven 
improvements 
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Appendix L: General suggestions for improvements presented to Company B 
Topic 1: Employee Awareness and Security Communication 
Area Current state Changes required  
Who needs  
to act 
Delivery Constraints Metrics Required 
Simplify 
communication 
Employees are aware on importance of information they 
handle, potential breaches, impact to the organisations and 
the need for security,  policy existence, BUT 
sometimes downplay importance of information they handle 
 
Communication on security incident driven,  
irrelevant, generic, inconsistent and overloaded  
 
Communication done at team meetings and security support 
by line managers  
 
Do not expect their team to know full policy 
Simplify communication, 
role-based through 
managers 
 
Managers should be 
informed about security 
risks, assess those and 
decide what applies to their 
teams  
 
Reduce employee need to 
filter though policy content 
Security 
management 
 
Line managers 
Requires additional 
communication to be 
included in line 
manager brief and 
team meetings  
 
Requires additional 
effort to plan and 
deliver 
Use function of 
metrics presented in 
the remainder of this 
table as an awareness 
and security 
behaviour indicator 
 
Clear desk logs on 
document marking 
Make CBTs 
role-specific, 
spread 
throughout the 
year 
Too many CBTs that need to be taken at the same time 
 
CBT content perceived as common sense  
 
Spread CBTs throughout 
the year 
 
Change nature of 
communicated information  
 
Introduce quiz both to 
engage with employees and 
measure employee security 
knowledge 
Security 
communications 
delivery 
CBT completion time 
depends on employees 
 
Development of 
quizzes and training 
material can take time 
 
Requires alignment 
with corporate 
communication 
strategy 
Questionnaires 
included in line 
manager 
communication 
 
Employee 
questionnaires  
 
All metrics outlined in 
this table should 
improve with this 
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Topic 2: Information Handling 
Area Current state Changes required  
Who needs  
to act 
Delivery Constraints Metrics Required 
Deploy 
centralised 
corporate file 
sharing with 
automatic 
backups 
Data sharing ad-hoc though multiple formal/informal 
channels (emails, shared drives, SharePoint, USB sticks, 
third party cloud storage for collaboration)   
 
No centralised backup strategy, Ad-hoc backups, 
“unintentional backups” on local laptop systems (emails) 
 
Network drive space small,  some unaware of its existence, 
store past and currently-working documents on laptop  
 
Confidential information taken home on paper or on devices 
where visitors/family members have access 
Deploy centralised 
corporate file sharing with 
automatic backups (inform 
employees about this) 
 
Deployment of DLP system 
(control and monitor 
sharing practices) 
 
Communicate need to be 
careful with devices that 
hold company information 
IT Security 
 
Security 
management 
 
Line managers 
Cost of storage 
problem for network 
drive increase  
Check volume of 
cloud storage use. 
 
Utilisation of internal 
file-sharing systems 
 
DLP metrics to 
identify changes in 
information sharing 
practices  
Mandatory USB 
encryption 
Capacity of encrypted USBs not sufficient, also often 
problematic when plugged in to other machines 
 
Employees need to find alternative ways to communicate 
information – use unencrypted drives 
Mandatory encryption of 
USB storage OR  
Provide sufficient capacity 
encrypted USBs to 
everyone 
IT Security 
 
Security 
management 
Encrypted US 
software deployment,  
Cost of giving out 
USBs 
USB metrics to assess 
use of unencrypted 
drives 
Provide secure 
physical 
document 
storage 
Everyone appears to understand the need for it BUT 
confidential information is left around  
 
People who have lockers appear more prone to comply 
Secure lockers exist for 
employees, Nothing is left 
overnight on the desks 
Property 
 
Security 
management 
Provision for lockers 
can create cost and 
space issues 
Numbers of 
documents left around 
(through clear desk 
checks) 
Improve leaver 
process 
Access revoking slow, line managers not taking action, 
accounts marked as inactive and taken down by access 
control teams 
Line Managers ensure 
leavers form are 
immediately handed in 
 
Leaver access revoking 
done through HR   
Security 
management  
HR 
Line managers 
Need capability  to 
re-activate old 
accounts for 
contractors that may 
go and return 
Unused accounts 
should decrease after 
intervention, time for 
leaver account 
deactivation 
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Topic 3: Employee feedback and passwords 
Area Current state Changes required  
Who needs  
to act 
Delivery Constraints Metrics Required 
Encourage 
reporting 
 
Employees differ in willingness to report vulnerabilities, 
problems etc, often mentioning others would take care of it.  
 
Two reporting sources: Direct contact with security, through 
their line managers 
Employees should report 
security concerns and seek 
support when in doubt – 
include this in 
communication 
 
Followed up by security 
managers and appropriate 
actions taken 
Security 
management  
Resources required to 
address reported 
issues and 
communicate impact 
back to employees 
Calls for support 
 
Number of reported 
problems followed up 
 
Time taken to respond 
Provide 
password 
management 
support 
Sharing of passwords occurs in some rare situations  
Writing down passwords is prevalent  
Fix password manager to 
work with all 
organisational systems 
IT Service 
provider  
 
Security 
management 
Additional effort 
required to introduce a 
working password 
manager 
Password manager 
adoption 
 
Abnormal and 
inconsistent login 
attempts 
 
 
